Shoot & capture: media representions of US military operations in Somalia 1992-93 and Fallujah 2004 by Patrick, Caitlin
Durham E-Theses
Shoot & capture: media representions of US military
operations in Somalia 1992-93 and Fallujah 2004
Patrick, Caitlin
How to cite:
Patrick, Caitlin (2007) Shoot & capture: media representions of US military operations in Somalia 1992-93
and Fallujah 2004, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2458/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP




Shoot & Capture: Media Representions of US 
Military Operations in Somalia 1992-93 and 
Fallujah 2004 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the 
author or the university to which it was 
submitted. No quotation from it, or 
information derived from it may be 
published without the prior written 
consent of the author or university, and 
any information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
Submitted by: Caitlin Patrick 
PhD Thesis 
Department of Geography 
October 2007 
Contents 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. i 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... ii 
List of Images, Figures & Tables ........................................................................................... iii 
Part One- Critical Foundations 
Introduction- Watching 'Others', Watching 'Ourselves' ................................................. l 
Chapter One - Theorising the Media, Discourse & the Visual ....................................... 12 
i) Key Theoretical Bases for Studying Media ............................................................... 13 
ii) Mediation, Power/Knowledge & Society .................................................................. 18 
iii) Representing 'Others' .................................................................................................. 26 
Representing the' developing' world: a look at' Africa' ............................ 31 
Deconstructing self/other binaries ................................................................ 37 
iv) . Interpreting the Image/Photograph ........................................................................... 40 
v) Representing War & Death ......................................................................................... 49 
The political economy of media production and 
representation .................................................................................................. 53 
Covering Somalia: political and economic factors ..................................... 59 
Structural studies: embedding in Iraq 2003 and the current media 
landscape .......................................................................................................... 63 
vi) Conclusion: A Return to the Larger Picture ............................................................. 69 
Chapter Two -Approaching the Case Studies: A BackgrQund to Method & Media 
Sources ........................................................................................................................................ 72 
i) The Case Studies: Why They Are Important & How They Were Selected .......... 73 
The case study approach .................................................. : ............................. 77 
ii) . Media Sources ............................................................................................................... 81 
iii) Methodological Approach & Coverage Trends ....................................................... 85 
The Somalia case study ................................................................................... 87 
The Fallujah case study .................................................................................. 95 
An Ethics of Approach: The Importance of Foucault & Derrida ........................... 97 
Chapter Three - Somalia: Past Policy & the Political Landscape ................................ 101 
i) 'Traditional' Somali Society & Customs ................................................................ 103 
ii) The Colonial Era ........................................................................................................ 111 
iii) The Somali State, the Cold War & Collapse .......................................................... l15 
iv) The 'Failed' State: Somalia Before & During UNOSOM !... ................................ 124 
v) 'Saving' Somalia: 'The New World Order' & Decisions to Intervene ............... 134 
vi) Americans Arrive: Somalia During UNITAF ....................................................... 138 
vii) UNOSOM II: The Road to 'Black Hawk Down' ................................................... 147 
viii) Leaving Somalia: Narrating the Aftermath ........................................................... 155 
Part Two- The Case Studies 
Chapter Four- From Beachhead to 'Black Hawk Down': Somalia & 'Africa', 'Dark' 
Places, 'Failed' States ............................................................................................................ 164 
i) A 'Failed' State: Placing Somalia ............................................................................. 167 
ii) Responsibility & the 'Failed' State .......................................................................... 170 
iii) 'Discovering' Famine: Death Statistics & Moral Comparisons .......................... 175 
iv) Fatalism versus Western 'Saviours' ........................................................................ 180 
v) Framing Intervention: 'Saviours' Arrive or Doomed to Failure? ....................... 184 
vi) Somalia in Context: Exceptions in Coverage ........................................................ 194 
vii) Fatalism Resurgent: The Land of No Hope ........................................................... 198 
viii) Somalia Doomed: Violence in Mogadishu & Echoes of Vietnam ...................... 201 
ix) 'Black Hawk Down': The Unexpected Expected .................................................. 206 
x) Sum-up of Major Themes ......................................................................................... 216 
Chapter Five- From Beachhead to 'Black Hawk Down': Stereotypes in Somalia; 
Passive Victims, Aggressive Killers & Their 'Saviours' ................................................ 224 
i) Aid Workers: Primary Storytellers & Trusted Voices .......................................... 227 
ii) Passivity & Helplessness: Representation of Women & Children .......•............. 231 
iii) The Somali 'Ghetto': Somali Men as Drug-Users & Violent Delinquents ........ 235 
iv) Khat: Fuel to the Fire of Conflict? ............................................................................ 244 
v) From Somalia to South-central: the Persistence of Black 'Ghetto' Framing ..... 247 
vi) Warfare in Mogadishu: Somalis as Threat & Under Threat... ............................ 257 
vii) 'Black Hawk Down': Images of 'Savagery' & Ungratefulness ........................... 265 
viii) Aidid: 'The Man Who Makes Somalia Worse' ...................................................... 270 
ix) Sum-up of Major Themes ......................................................................................... 283 
Chapter Six~ Fallujah 2004: Lessons Learned & Bodies That Didn't Matter ............ 294 
i) Analysing Fallujah: Background & Coverage Overview .................................... 299 
ii) Fallujah: 'A Dangerous Insurgent Hotbed' ........................................................... 303 
The Islamic city: linking Fallujah to Sunni 'fundamentalism' and 
Sad dam Hussein ........................................................................................... 306 
A city backdrop for battle ........................................................................... 313 
City of darkness: Fallujah as an insurgent bastion .................................. 319 
New Orleans meets Fallujah: shared discourses of 'war zone' cities ... 324 
iii) Fallujan Citizens: Seldom Seen, Rarely Heard ...................................................... 326 
A limited portrait of Ba' athists and Islamic extremism .......................... 329 
'Disappeared': casualty counts and civilian opinions ............................ 339 
US soldiers: highly visible individuals ..................................................... 350 
iv) The Implications of Absence ................................................................................... 355 
Conclusion- The Shadow of 'Black Hawk Down' ........................................................ 367 
i) Imaging 'Others' in Mogadishu & Fallujah ........................................................... 371 
ii) Circulating Power: Changing Communication Networks Between 1993 & 
2004 & Enduring Media Content Themes ............................................................. 375 
iii) Contributions to Knowledge & Further Research Recommendations .............. 381 
Appendix One -List of Media Items Surveyed .............................................................. 386 
Appendix Two- References for Somalia & Fallujah Images Found Online ............ 389 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 391 
Acknowledgements 
This work could not have been undertaken without research funding and support from 
Durham University, an Overseas Research Scholarship and a doctoral fellowship from 
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 
Many thanks to David and Steve, for their editing, suggestions and encouragement. 
Love and thanks to my family, for their constant confidence in my academic abilities, 
and particularly my mother, Anne, for all her editing help. 
Finally, I'm incredibly grateful to Newcastle's Ultimate Frisbee teams, Too Many Pies 
and The Brown, for keeping me sane and entertained throughout the entire PhD 
process. Talya, Sarah, Tim and John have also been a wonderful help, all taking their 
turns listening, sympathizing and helping me to reach this point. 
ii 
Abstract 
Mass media images and narratives have an important role to play in the 
workings of international and domestic politics. Technological developments, 
particularly in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have enabled a rapidly-
growing 'economy' of images, information and means of communicating. These new 
commodities are circulated in an international sphere defined by shifting and unequal 
power relations. With this context in mind, this work undertakes an analysis of media 
representations of place and people in selected coverage of the Somalia intervention of 
1992-1993 and the American sieges of Fallujah, Iraq in 2004, looking at both media 
narrative and imagery. 
Despite technological changes and differences in political context, coverage 
content for each case study illustrates many similarities in representations of places and 
people. Both case studies highlight the continuing resonance and use of long-standing 
racial and colonial stereotypes to describe, or to 'disappear', 'other' people and places. 
The aim of this project has been to recognise and problematize these powerful 
dichotomizations between a primarily Western 'us' and 'others', illustrating the 
political nature of such attempts, their failings, and the consequences of these efforts at 
division. Exploration and exposure of the political nature of categorizations can assist 
in provoking a re-thinking not only of how' others' are seen but of how 'we' construct 
our own identities. 
Keywords: media, representation, conflict, intervention, discourse analysis, Somalia 
intervention, Fallujah 
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Introduction- Watching 'Others', Watching Ourselves 
"The event is not what happens. The event is that which can be narrated. "1 
This story begins with two moments of violence; still and moving images of 
each were captured by witnesses, allowing them to be widely watched by audiences in 
'the West'2• One took place in Mogadishu, Somalia over ten years ago, in 1993. The 
bodies of several American soldiers, in Somalia on a mission to capture factional leader, 
General Mohammed Farah Aidid, were mutilated and dragged through Mogadishu 
streets following two deadly American helicopter crashes and fierce ground fighting in 
the city. The second event occurred in Fallujah, Iraq in 2004. The bodies of four 
American security contractors were dragged and hung from a bridge after their SUVs 
were shot at and set on fire. These images and accompanying narratives of the 
desecrations resemble one another at several levels of analysis, which will be addressed 
by this project. A broader line of enquiry will explore the social world in which these 
images and narratives emerged and how certain interpretations of them affected 
relations between socially-constructed understandings of' America' and 'others'3• The 
processes of creating and interpreting images and narratives are understood 
throughout this work as flexible and complex, with many possible outcomes, 
influenced by a wide variety of factors. In my exploration of these processes, the term 
'discourse' will be used frequently; I follow David Howarth in his reading of Michel 
1 Allen Feldman, Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 14. 
z 'The West' is a problematic term in many respects. The region covered in this term, often also called 'the 
global north', is diverse. This term, however, does continue to be used, often as a self-descriptor, by 
members of a group of wealthy, liberal democracies with various forms of capitalist economies, clustered 
geographically in western Europe and North America. It is often used with other groupings of world 
states to indicate one particular 'civilisation' in contrast to others, linked by geography or religion ('Africa', 
'the Islamic world'). This term will be used throughout this work; when it is placed in quotations, a 
particular effort is generally being made to problematize or emphasize this term. 
3 This term will be used constantly throughout this work and refers to any person/thing/place defined as 
outside what the subject self considers home/me/us etc. It will most often be used in discussion of the ways 
in which 'the Western self' defines itself against a multitude of diverse peoples/places/things and is usually 
in quotation marks to highlight the constructed and changeable nature of this category. 
2 
Foucault to define this term, arguing that 'discourse' "refer(s) to historically specific 
systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects ... discourses are 
concrete systems of social relations and practices that are intrinsically political, as their 
formation is an act of radical institution which involves the construction of antagonisms 
and the drawing of political frontiers between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'."4 
Mark Bowden5 comments that the types of images which emerged from 
Mogadishu and Fallujah can be viewed as part of a grim history of 'lynching' 
photographs. Using lynching and hunting photographs as examples, political 
geographer David Campbell has written on the importance of social context in the 
construction of image meaning. 6 These two authors provide some important starting 
points for thinking through the significance of the Mogadishu and Fallujah images. In 
both cases, the self-conscious posing of the 'hunters' with their 'prey' positions not only 
the two categories of bodies in the image, to which a variety of interpretations can be 
applied, but also puts into question the relationship of the image-maker to the 
'meaning' of the image. As Campbell remarks, "The photographers who produced the 
lynching photos were not simply spectators to the killing but part of the lynching, 
integral to the public status and meaning of the murder."7 This statement reinforces the 
importance of the broader setting and conditions in which images are produced and 
viewed, a crucial area to which this project will continually return. Beyond being 
linked to the moment of the captured 'event', the modern image-maker also plays a 
pivotal role in the process of representation by bringing an event into a realm of 
broader consumption. 
4 David Howarth, Discourse (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 9. 
5 Mark Bowden is the author of Black Hawk Dow11, a detailed study of the events of October 3-4, 1993 in 
Mogadishu. Bowden's book was the basis for a Ridley Scott-directed Hollywood film depicting the battle 
in Mogadishu. 
6 Bowden speaks specifically of events in Mogadishu and Fallujah as comparable to lynching photos. 
Campbell discusses lynching photography and links it to images of death and disaster in current media 
productions. See Mark Bowden, "The Lesson of Mogadishu", Opinion Journal from The Wall Street 
Journal Editorial Page, AprilS, 2004, htt:p:Uwww.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110004911 
(accessed July 1, 2007) and David Campbell, "Horrific Blindness: Images of Death in Contemporary 
Media", Joumal for Cultural Research 8, No. 1 Oanuary 2004): 55-74. 
7 Campbell, "Horrific Blindness", 57. 
Approaching 'horrific' images from an alternate angle, Bowden comments on 
the intentions of the subjects of the images. He believes, during both the Somalia and 
Fallujah events, that the crowds involved in the desecration acted with the desire to be 
seen and to have their activities 'captured' for wider viewing: 
Lynching is deliberate. It is opportunistic rather than purely 
spontaneous, and it has a clear intent: to insult, to challenge and to 
frighten the enemy, and to excite and enlist allies. The mutilation and 
public display of bodies follows a distinct pattern. The victims are 
members of a despised Other, who are held in such contempt that they 
are considered less than human. Respectful treatment of the dead is the 
norm in all societies, and a tenet of all religions. Publicly flouting such 
basic dignities is a communal expression of hatred designed to insult 
and frighten. Display of the mutilated remains must be as public as 
possible.8 
3 
This statement raises many issues, touching upon some of the fundamental 
topics which this project will address. The hatred, violence and lack of empathy 
conveyed by these images were shocking for many Western and non-Western viewers, 
but, again, these actions need to be understood in terms of their conscious, and perhaps 
unconscious, situating within larger discourses. As Campbell writes, in parts of late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century America the lynching of African Americans and 
others deemed to be 'threats' to the predominately white 'norm' were not uncommon 
and were moments to be celebrated and remembered. Many lynching photos that 
remain are in postcard format, designed as 'keepsakes' of these events. This 
'understanding' of lynching, however, even during its time, was hardly a stable or 
uncontested one. Campbell notes that the dawning of the civil rights movement and 
the dramatic shifts in social attitudes in late 1950s and 1960s America meant that these 
brutal images could be read and used politically in very different ways, to provoke 
horror and to increase demands for equal rights and fair treatment for African 
Americans.9 Such research offers both a note of caution and a glimmer of hope when 
8 Bowden, "The Lesson of Mogadishu". 
9 Campbell, "Horrific Blindness", 57. 
contemplating the depressing images of Somalia and Fallujah. These images need not 
only function as a means of spreading hate; they may also provoke political actions 
designed to increase understanding and to end violence. Following Howarth's 
explanation of how discourses function, "discourses are contingent and historical 
constructions, which are always vulnerable to those political forces excluded in their 
production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond their control."10 
4 
The note of caution, however, brings us to a major theme running throughout 
this work: the creation of difference through narrative and imagery, a political and an 
ethical act in itself, and the political and cultural affects of this production. Both sets of 
desecration images from Mogadishu and Fallujah were deemed 'shocking'. Why? 
How do these images both challenge and draw upon existing discourses of people and 
places? Discussion of these questions will involve looking at the races and genders of 
those involved in the events, the histories and countries where they occurred, and, 
particularly, the portrayal of certain groups as 'naturally' prone to violence. How do 
these images solidify or throw into question for audiences who 'we' are and why 'they' 
hate 'us'? How has 'our' relationship with 'them' arrived at these points? 
These questions will require a reconsideration of how 'the West' defines itself 
against 'others' and the various omissions these definitional boundaries allow and 
encourage. This exploration should take into account not only the images and words 
seen and heard in both immediate cases, but also during other points in Western media 
stories of Somalia and Fallujah. Following the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, I understand the processes of contesting and fortifying various concepts as 
ongoing, but with continuous historical ruptures. The aim of particular discourses, 
labelled by Laclau and Mouffe as hegemonic projects, to construct and stabilize specific 
systems of meaning can never be complete or total. Conversely, however, one should 
not assume "the total diffusion of power within the social, as this would blind the 
analysis to the presence of nodal points and to the partial concentrations of power 
10 Howarth, Discourse, 9. 
5 
existing in every concrete social formation." 11 This study, therefore, looks at the content 
of images and narratives in order to explore their linkages with hegemonic discourses 
of race, colonialism and gender. This will involve the identification and consideration 
of those who create, distribute, perpetuate and contest such hegemonic discourses. 
When dealing with this aspect of representational processes, this project will focus 
overwhelmingly on the area of Western mass media production and the media's 
relationship with Western governments, but other organisations and audiences 
themselves also have important impacts on how imagery and narrative is created, 
interpreted and spread. 
These two sets of images provide a launching point for discussion of media 
representation of the Somalia intervention of 1992-93 and events in Fallujah in 2004. 
Providing a wider and deeper breadth of coverage material for analysis and will help to 
locate, explore and challenge hegemonic ways of understanding the moments when 
both desecrations took place. The continuing power and resonance of hegemonic 
discourses of race, gender and colonial place will be evident from this study's empirical 
work on Somalia and Fallujah. This being said, disruptions to these hegemonies are 
increasingly occurring for a variety of reasons, forcing transformations and exposing 
internal contradictions in such hegemonies. To study these discursive forces in the case 
of Somalia, the years 1992 and 1993 will be examined, looking at newspaper articles 
written about Somalia during these two years in both The New York Times and The Times 
of London. Television coverage from the BBC and the American television network, 
ABC, will also be studied in order to span media genres. 
The Fallujah case study is a more recent period of media representation of 
conflict, which will provide useful comparative points with research on Somalia. It will 
allow comment on the current situation for media reporting of conflict; significant 
changes in technology and military doctrine have taken place since Somalia. With 
reference to the theoretical situation of this work, outlined above, the Fallujah case 
11 Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (London: Verso, 1985), 142. 
6 
study shows the persistence of hegemonic discourses over time and illustrates that 
these discourses are not geographically limited. Importantly, the usage of these 
discourses by Western interveners in diverse locations illustrates how they function 
both as efforts to identify and position an 'us' as well as to create and define outside, 
often conflictual and dangerous 'others'. This said, Fallujah is a valuable event for 
study on its own terms and can stand independently to make important assertions 
about media coverage. Newspaper analysis for this case involved several top British 
national publications and The New York Times; television coverage was limited to 
American CNN coverage. In both case studies, the very broad categories of 'place' and 
'people' were used as initial analytical bases for examples from coverage, which were 
further sub-divided thematically for closer study. As will be seen in further theoretical 
background to this work, these categories overlap and link to each other in many ways 
and are fundamental aspects of the hegemonic discourses investigated in this work. 
For the purposes of this project, they also offer a means of recognising the importance 
of 1 setting' and 'characters' in media stories of Somalia and Fallujah, which was evident 
when viewing and reading the coverage. 
Beginning broadly, the first chapter of this work will outline and situate the 
theoretical tenets on which it rests. Its approach is poststructural; while a significant 
debt is owed to neo-Marxist thinkers who explore the political and economic structures 
in which 1 cultural' organisations such as the mass media function, my understanding of 
the interactions between media, governments, various organisations, and audiences is 
more fluid than that of many neo-Marxists. As an alternate starting point, Michel 
Foucault's concept of power/knowledge is useful for discussing visual and textual 
discourses, which outline and 'normalise' what it is possible to know and how it is 
possible to act. Foucault's work has also been extremely influential in the area of 
colonial and postcolonial studies, where many theorists have used his concepts to 
unravel the complex relationships between predominantly Western colonisers and 
colonised 'others'. These discussions will be particularly relevant for the work of this 
project because both case studies involve previously-colonised, predominately-Muslim 
areas. Postcolonial theorists have also been heavily influenced by the work of Jacques 
Derrida, whose 'deconstruction' of binary linguistic categories in order to expose the 
contingency and artificiality of many such attempts at separation is also outlined in 
depth. Derrida' s approach has greatly influenced the way in which the Somalia and 
Fallujah case studies were analysed in this work. 
7 
A further section of the theoretical background chapter discusses various 
approaches for interpreting images, particularly photographs, of suffering, death and 
disaster. Broader discussions involving the representation of 'others' and the social, 
political and economic conditions of representation in 'the West' are narrowed to look 
specifically at the products of visual media. A final section targets media 
representations of war and death, moving the focus of the chapter to a more specialised 
area of literature with direct relevance to both case studies. In these studies, two broad 
categories of research are highlighted: those focused on analysing the complex, 
structural relationships between media, governments, organisations and audiences and 
those primarily interested in analysing the content of media production. The empirical 
work of this project is more heavily based in the study of media content, but it 
nonetheless recognises the importance of linking trends in content to unequal structural 
relationships which often help to perpetuate certain discourses over others. 
The second chapter picks up at this point to look specifically at the case studies 
used by this particular work and its approach for analysing them. While the theoretical 
themes outlined in the first chapter are key components of the 'lens' through which the 
coverage case studies are viewed, Chapter Two explains why the Somalia intervention 
and events in Fallujah in 2004 were chosen as case studies. It also describes in depth 
the media sources that were analysed in each case study and how choices were made 
regarding which media coverage to view and read. 
Chapter Three, the final 'introductory' chapter before substantive analysis of the 
case studies begins, provides a historical background to the situation in Somalia. As it 
is the primary case study for this work, I considered it important to provide readers 
with an overview of Somalia's political, economic and social situation, briefly 
8 
throughout its history but more specifically at the time of the UN/US intervention in 
1992-1993. Information of this sort is not often provided in any depth in media 
coverage, but is useful for readers and researchers attempting to analyse what issues 
coverage may have under/overstated or omitted altogether. This chapter will draw on 
the work of well-known anthropologists and historians of Somalia as well as the work 
of those who have challenged some accepted accounts of Somali culture. The aims of 
this chapter are to highlight the colonised nature of much background knowledge 
about Somalia and to expose a history of ties between Somalia and 'the West' which 
challenge the frequent attempts, in media coverage and beyond, to polarise the two. As 
Susan Carruthers suggests, quoting the work of colonial theorist, Frantz Fanon, "Africa 
surely looms large in the production of the West, whose material and mental 
dependencies on Africa are often denied and/or projected as unidirectional needs and 
claims made by "them" of "us."12 
The following three chapters, Four, Five and Six, are where the discursive 
analysis of media coverage first of the Somalia intervention and then of events in 
Fallujah takes place. Coverage of the Somalia intervention is explored through three 
overarching themes, which were developed following a reading and viewing of the 
coverage. Chapter Four, "Somalia & 'Africa': 'Dark' Places, 'Failed' States", analyses 
depictions of Somalia as a place, looking closely at discourses of colonialism, 'failed' 
states and the 'developing world' as a site of danger for 'the West'. Chapter Five 
contains two large sections, which explore representations of people, both generally 
and specifically. "Stereotypes in Somalia: Passive Victims, Aggressive Killers and Their 
'Saviours"' looks at media discussion of Somali people generally and "Aidid: "the man 
who makes Somalia worse"" specifically, and briefly, investigates mentions of Somali 
factional leader, Mohammed Farah Aidid. The often-interwoven discourses of race and 
gender will be particularly important in this chapter. The Fallujah case study (Chapter 
Six) will be introduced with a short amount of background information to contextualize 
12 Susan Carruthers, "Tribalism and Tribulation: Media Constructions of' African Savagery' and 'Western 
Humanitarianism' in the 1990s" in Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime, eds. Stuart Allan & Barbie Zelizer, 
157 (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2004). 
9 
it, as was done in greater depth for the Somalia study. Although circumstances were 
substantially different in Somalia and Fallujah in terms of the involved parties, 
conditions for the media and overarching geopolitical narratives, the categories of place 
and people remained a relevant way of dividing coverage examples. This in itself 
opens broad areas for comment and comparison regarding 'the West's' relationship 
with 'others'. "Fallujah: 'A Dangerous Insurgent Hotbed"' looks at the ways in which 
the city of Fallujah was often demonised as a place. "Fallujan Citizens: Seldom Seen, 
Rarely Heard" outlines the non-appearance of Fallujah's residents in several media 
organisations' narratives and images, particularly around the periods of American 
siege. All three chapters sum-up general themes and findings for each case study, 
which are then explored in the final, concluding chapter. 
"The Shadow of 'Black Hawk Down"' will begin with media comparisons of the 
contractor deaths in Fallujah with the 'Black Hawk down' events. The brevity of this 
moment can perhaps be read as indicative of the unwillingness, particularly of those in 
the US administration, to recognise the similar effects of' othering' occurring in both 
cases. This concluding chapter will discuss the often-tragic results of representing 
'other' people and places as fundamentally unlike and unconnected to 'us'. It will also 
insist upon the contradictory nature of many such binary distinctions, some of which 
will have been deconstructed in earlier chapters. Additionally, the disappearance of 
'others' in many media and government representations of events will be discussed, as 
an ultimate form of rejecting contact, connection and harm to 'others'. Comparison of 
the two case studies will cover not only the contents of media items but will also 
comment on important changes in structures affecting media production of news in the 
twelve years between the two cases. Final suggestions for future research will also be 
included. 
Returning briefly to the two moments of violence, Bowden's earlier quoted 
comments about the symbolic power of the desecrated bodies are important. For many 
American and other viewers, the images of the bodies said much about the horrors of 
'them', the desecrators, and implied that these 'barbaric', 'inhuman' horrors could have 
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no possible 'civilised' response. Some acts are 'beyond the pale'; the perpetrators of 
this violence are therefore not like 'us'. In the case of Somalia, abandonment followed; 
in Iraq, the American military attacked Fallujah, the killing of the contractors having 
further legitimized it as a target. 
Alternately, for those who participated in these acts, the bodies could be viewed 
as an attempt at an exchange of sorts, a violent effort by 'them' to be heard by the 'US'. 
The underlying text might read: "We do not want your presence here; we can also 
inflict damage on 'you' and to those who represent you here if needs be". Indeed, the 
words 'exchange' and 'response' beg the question 'to what could these actions be a 
response?', a query which is often delegitimized by Western, and particularly 
American, discourses of self-righteousness and eternal innocence. This question, in 
turn, reveals more bodies, of 'others', often unseen, in fact, frequently absent from the 
Western media. The politics of which bodies are created and shown, and when, and 
with what outcomes, is the issue which this project will now address. These questions 
are of vital importance, not only for governments, organisations and the media, which 
are most frequently associated with the creation, presentation and distribution of 
information, but also for audiences. If all bodies are to matter, a 'we' must challenge 
and question the boundaries that are drawn around 'our' collective name. 
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Image 1: US soldier's body- Mogadishu, October 1993 
Image 2: US contractors' bodies- Fallujah, March 2004 
Chapter One - Theorising the Media, Discourse & the 
Visual 
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This chapter will outline and critique theoretical work which has been 
influential for this project. While specific authors will often not be explicitly mentioned 
in more empirically-focused chapters to follow, it is important for readers to bring an 
understanding of literature relevant to this work's analytical approach to these later 
sections. This task begins by situating the project as a whole within a broad history of 
Marxist-influenced cultural theory, with a particular debt to poststructural scholars 
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. The focus of the theoretical lens will then be 
'zoomed in' to look specifically at the work of Foucault and Derrida and their 
influences on the study of postcolonial regions and research of these areas. Particular 
emphasis will be placed on the ways in which these parts of the world have been 
represented. A section will then be devoted to theoretical work on how photographs 
are created and interpreted, looking at the potential affects of images on societal 
groups. Given the fundamental role of various forms of visual imagery across several 
media types, particularly in television production but also in newspapers and online, it 
is important to deconstruct and politicize the processes of image creation and 
production. Pictures can then be regarded as symbols which function within 
'economies' of vision and discourse, rather than merely objects in and of themselves. 
A final, narrower focus will then be taken to discuss theoretical, and some 
empirical, work which, like this study, has been significantly influenced by some of the 
broader neo-Marxist and poststructuralliterature. This section will look specifically at 
research on the mass media's interactions with governments, audiences and non-
governmental organisations. In particular, the media's role in representing violence, 
suffering and conflicts will be developed in order to prepare readers for an analysis of 
the specific coverage case studies. Notably, this section will include significantly more 
work which investigates in depth the political and economic networks in which media 
operate. AsP. Eric Louw suggests in his work, The Media & Cultural Production, both 
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political-economic and cultural studies approaches to analysing media have important 
insights to offer. This project recognises both approaches, although a more culturally-
situated one will dominate the case study analyses.1 
Key Theoretical Bases for Studying Media 
Theoretical positions on the place of the mass media in society and their 
relationship with viewers, listeners and readers often have similarities with debates 
about other forms of technology and their effects on the conditions of human life and 
knowledge production. During the 1960s, Marshall McLuhan became a leading 
optimist regarding new and expanding forms of media technology, such as television 
and radio.2 McLuhan envisioned a universal human consciousness developed through 
the act of watching and listening to mass media that would thereby create a 'global 
village' effect. This ideal, however, has been, and continues to be, challenged by those 
who doubt that the effects of expanding media reach to 'the masses' will be wholly 
beneficial or will have primarily community-expanding outcomes. These more 
pessimistic scholars often draw on Marxist theory but have challenged traditional 
Marxism's 'base/superstructure' divide. Frequently inspired by the work of Antonio 
Grarnsci, they have expanded study of 'superstructural' phenomena and attempted to 
explain the place of' culture' in greater depth. Grarnsci believed that the elite's control 
and use of social and cultural structures, like the media, to maintain the support of the 
oppressed masses for the capitalist system was as crucial to this system as bourgeois 
control of commodity production.3 Crucially, winning over working classes was not 
seen by Gramsci as a purely coercive effort; it involved positively drawing various 
groups together in agreements over particular ideas. Gramsci called this strategy 
winning 'hegemony'.4 
1 P. Eric Louw, The Media & Cultural Production (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 2. 
2 SeeM. McLuhan, Understanding Media: the Extensions of Man (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994) and Q. Fiore 
and. M. McLuhan, The Medium is the Message: an Inventory of Effects (New York: Bantam Books, 1967). 
3 See David Howarth, Discourse (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 88 and Richard Kearney, 
Modern Movements in European Philosophy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986). 
4 Howarth, Discourse, 90. 
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Although a great number of cultural studies approaches have been influenced 
by Marx and Gramsci, two broad groupings emerged which are relevant for this 
project: structuralists and poststructuralists/postmodemists. In the case of 
poststructuralists and postmodemists, very few thinkers categorised in these groups 
have ever accepted such labelling. Differences between 'poststructuralism' and 
'postmodemism' are difficult to draw, although Ben Agger suggests a potentially 
useful distinction in his work by classifying poststructuralism as a particular group of 
theories focused on knowledge and language "whereas postmodernism ... is a theory of 
society, culture, and history."5 This project utilises theories which extend from both 
sides of this proposed distinction. 
Structuralists and poststructuralists/postmodernists follow, to a large extent, the 
'linguistic tum' in Western philosophy, which encouraged an analytical focus on the 
uses of language and its societal rules of operation.6 Structurally-influenced theorists 
have generally argued that the linguistic ordering principles of a social group are the 
major determinant of discourses and human consciousness within that society. As 
Steven Best and Douglas Kellner suggest: "The structuralist revolution deployed 
holistic analyses that analyzed phenomena in terms of parts and wholes, defining a 
structure as the interrelation of parts within a common system ... Structural analysis 
aimed at objectivity, coherence, rigour, and truth, and claimed scientific status for its 
theories."7 
Structuralist approaches were developed for use in anthropology by Claude 
Levi-Strauss, in psychoanalysis by Jacques Lacan and in a re-development of Marxism 
by Louis Althusser. In the setting of a rapidly urbanizing and industrializing post-
World War II France, new forms of media, consumerism and communications became 
major areas of interest, taken up by academics such as Roland Barthes, Guy Debord and 
5 Ben Agger, "Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, Postmodernism: Their Sociological Relevance", Annual 
Review of Sociology 17 (1991): 112. 
6 The 'linguistic tum' is often said to have its roots in the semiotic theory of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-
1913). 
7 Steven Best & Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1991), 18-19. 
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Jean Baudrillard. Barthes and Baudrillard later moved away from structural 
approaches but were strongly influenced by this body of work. According to Best and 
Kellner, an important unifying principle of the structuralist approach was its challenge 
to humanist social science theory, which had dominated Western philosophical 
traditions from Descartes to Sartre. "The subject was dismissed, or radically decentred, 
as merely an effect of language, culture, or the unconscious, and denied causal or 
creative efficacy ... On this model, meaning was not the creation of the transparent 
intentions of an autonomous subject; the subject itself was constituted by its relations 
within language, so that subjectivity was seen as a social and linguistic construct."8 
For the purposes of this project, structuralism is primarily important because its 
ideas were often influential to a loosely-labelled collection of poststructural thinkers, 
whose insights inspired much of this work's style and approach. The theories of more 
structurally-oriented theorists such as Louis Althusser and Guy Debord, for example, 
became points of reference and challenge for thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Jean 
Baudrillard. Alternately, theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas and 
Roland Barthes, who worked outside many major debates on societal structure versus 
human agency, can be linked to Foucault and Baudrillard in various ways. 
Contrasting with the above thinkers, American linguistic scholar and cultural 
critic Noam Chomsky's work on the political economy of media and communications 
industries is also of importance to this project, in its own right but also because of his 
influence on other media scholars. Chomsky's work can be loosely linked to 
structuralism in the sense that he maintains a firm faith in the value of a systematic, 
scientific approach to his studies. Following in a more neo-Marxist vein than many of 
the abovementioned theorists, Chomsky also remains more focused on exposing the 
specific locations and figures he sees as continuing cultural and economic domination 
in modern society: governmental and business leaders. This is a clear differentiating 
factor between Chomsky and poststructuralists, who tend to view 'power' as being a 
far more diffuse and unstable factor. The value of Chomsky's work persists for this 
8 Best & Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, 19. 
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project, however, as it illustrates how much of media control is concentrated in a few 
areas, and investigates the effects of this situation on coverage content. Despite various 
and multiple resistances to dominant ways of conceptualizing events, sites with 
recurring and consistent power and influence need to be recognised. 
Very broadly, those labelled poststructuralist/postmodernist tend to view social 
structures and discourses as more fluid and subject to change than structuralists and 
analysts such as Chomsky. They have critiqued the presumed objectivity of 
structuralism in favour of a strongly historicist approach to social studies. Derrida, for 
example, has challenged what he refers to as Western philosophy's commitment to a 
'metaphysics of presence', which encompasses the assumption of many theories that 
subjects can have an unmediated access to reality.9 Poststructuralists are for the most 
part sceptical of politics and theories of knowledge which posit an often-hidden 
meaning or origin of society or 'Mankind', to be reached by moving beyond existing 
conditions. Those researchers using a poststructural approach in the field of media and 
communications have often investigated how audiences may reinterpret or challenge 
various dominant media discourses, feats that would involve a creative reshaping of 
existing social codes. This approach is in line with the support of many poststructural 
thinkers for forms of 'micropolitics', which would see a variety of decentralized, 
identity-based groups challenging overarching claims to power and knowledge, rather · 
than global movements based primarily around economic classes. 
Baudrillard, for example, altered his initial pessimistic position on bourgeois 
media control to challenge the idea of a passive and alienated public. He suggested 
that frequent mass failures to respond to certain media 'events' in ways expected by 
media creators could be seen as eruptions which challenge particular world views.10 
Recent commentators such as Angela McRobbie have also made an effort to illustrate 
9 For more in depth explanation, see Best & Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations and Agger, 
"Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, Postmodernism: Their Sociological Relevance", 105-131. 
10 See Mike Gane, Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews (London: Routledge, 1993). For a valuable collection 
of excerpts from some key works of Baudrillard, see Mark Poster ed. Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 
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the ways in which specific marginalised and oppressed groups including Black Britons 
and women have successfully resisted their representation in much mass media.U 
The work of poststructural and/or postrnodern theorists informs this work 
primarily because it rejects the necessity for an idea of objective 'truth' as an ultimate 
goal, or possibility, for news coverage or otherwise. I concur with ideas which suggest 
that an unrnediated access to 'reality' is not possible and that only a historicized 
position on social relations can be sustained. This project takes the view that media 
effort should be focused on presenting a diversity of voices and opinions, rather than 
on locating a singular 'truth'. In line with a more poststructural understanding of 
ethics, media should facilitate an ongoing questioning of divides between 'us' and 
'others' in contemporary global society. The content of empirical material studied for 
this work is viewed through a deconstructive filter, which aims to expose and debate 
the ways in which differences between particular selves, an 'us', and 'others' are 
created, consolidated and thrown into question. 
This project is thus theoretically indebted to poststructuralism, particularly the 
deconstructive and genealogical studies of Derrida and Foucault respectively. The 
work of these authors will be explored in more depth below. The particular media 
selected for close analysis, however, justify reflection on Chomsky's work, given that 
they are overwhelmingly items produced by large media companies, which operate in a 
world of increasing consolidation of media ownership in the hands of a decreasing 
number of elites. I would argue that all the theorists mentioned above generally accept 
the notion that cultural codes of understanding, which contain visual and textual 
elements, have been socially constructed throughout history, frequently in conditions of 
inequality. Drawing on the work of the abovementioned theorists, one could 
specifically suggest that the narrative and image content of modern media are 
constructed within particular politico-economic conditions, those of late modern 
capitalism, which influence the parameters of media coverage. While new forms of 
11 See Angela McRobbie, "Postmodernism and Popular Culture", in Media Studies: a Reader, eds. Paul Marris 
& Sue Thornham, 391 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999). 
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media, particularly on the Internet, are emerging to challenge the coverage of large 
corporate and public media organisations, this work suggests that, in the case of two 
studies of primarily corporate media coverage roughly a decade apart, there is only a 
minimal effort at greater plurality in coverage from several of these particular media 
sources. Having laid out the broad theoretical spheres in which this project sits, further 
sections of this chapter will now critique the contributions of important theorists for 
this work in depth. 
Mediation, Power/Knowledge & Society 
Like Gramsci, almost all of the major theoretical influences of this work have 
themselves been somewhat challenged or inspired by the writings of Louis Althusser. 
Althusser built upon Gramsci's conception of cultural'hegemony' through his notion of 
'ideological state apparatuses'. For Althusser, 'ideology' is the representation of "the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real [productive] conditions of 
existence."12 The individual's relationship to their conditions of existence is always 
imaginary in the capitalist system for Althusser because there are real, objective 
relationships between individuals and their means of production that are hidden or 
distorted by capitalism. The imaginary situation, however, becomes materially based 
in human activities through capitalist social institutions and apparatuses, which 
support certain practices. 
The primary effect of ideology is to develop and enforce individuals' beliefs in 
their ability to constitute themselves as various kinds of subjects; the concept of 
'ideology' has thus often been closely associated with that of 'discourse'.B According to 
Althusser, certain media, such as television advertisements, are thus structured to help 
individuals recognize themselves as particular subjectivities with 'unique' preferences 
12 This is Mark Poster quoting Althusser in Mark Poster, The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social 
Context (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 54. Parentheses are author's own. 
13 Purvis and Hunt suggest that, although 'ideology' and 'discourse' are often used almost interchangeably, 
ideology has primarily emerged from a base in Marxist theory whereas discourse is more linked to the 
linguistic turn in social science and semiotic methods. Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt, "Discourse, Ideology, 
Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology ... ", The British Journal of Sociology 44, no. 3 (Sep. 1993), 474. 
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and viewpoints in direct contradiction to their real relationship with the controlling and 
exploiting means of production. Individuals, therefore, believe themselves to be free 
subjects, able to autonomously make decisions by consumption in capitalist society, 
while, in fact, their position and opinions are dictated by conditions of the capitalist 
economy.14 Media audiences, for example, might believe that they are able to develop 
their own 'objective' understanding of world events based on the accounts of television 
broadcasters or newspaper columnists. Althusser would likely argue, however, that 
such media in fact offer a highly ideologically-driven viewpoint, based on the degree of 
their control by corporate elite through advertising geared to attract certain target 
groups. Althusser retains the idea that his 'scientific', neo-Marxist approach to 
analysing ideological state apparatuses can discover the objective truth to the workings 
of these bodies. This idea of a 'true' account of societal workings being discoverable is 
contested by most of the following major theorists who influence this work. The 
exception is Chomsky who, despite some foundational differences from Althusser, 
including a more humanist approach to the subject, comes to generally similar 
conclusions. For the purposes of this work, Althusser's privileging of capitalism as the 
basis for his societal analysis is not necessary. Althusser's notion of the modern self as 
being constructed and created through its interaction with state and capitalist 
apparatuses, including most media, however, is important for conceptualising how 
various societal discourses are created, developed and perpetuated. 
Michel Foucault was a contemporary of Althusser and the two were strongly 
influenced by each other's work. Foucault also explores how the complex self-
understandings of everyday subjects both shape and are shaped by ideological, often 
media-driven, apparatuses of the state system and capitalism. In his early studies of 
madness, medical practice and the history of social sciences, Foucault illustrated ways 
in which the definitions, practices and core assumptions of these fields have changed in 
14 See Louis Althusser, "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses", Lenin and Philosophy and other essays 
(London: NLB, 1971). 
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response to a variety of factors throughout different historical epochs.15 For Foucault, 
history-writing was not to be a cumulative process, producing histories of Mankind or 
Capitalism, but a more disjointed affair, conducting' genealogies' of how specific 
societal groups and technologies have been constituted in various historical periods.16 
The role of the intellectual was to reject philosophy's traditional, singular gaze and to 
be critical insofar as she/he renounces the authority of the 'centre' and moves about 
witnessing life from a multiplicity of marginal positionsP Foucault suggests that 
attempts at dominating or controlling understandings of human life are enacted both 
discursively and physically through many different social structures in complex, often 
hierarchical ways. Foucault's development of the term 'discourse' is very expansive, 
referring not only to words and constructions of concepts but to entire programs of 
knowledge creation and state-generated programs. These forms of knowledge, belief 
and practice are seen as shaping our material world rather than merely describing a 
pre-existing one. 
By the mid-1970s, Foucault was involved in exploring how 'knowledge/power' 
hierarchies come into existence and maintain dominance in specific times and places; 
importantly, these structures were seen to be composed of both discursive and non-
discursive elements, such as administrative bodies, state organisations etc. He stated in 
a 1975 interview that "power would be a fragile thing if its only function were to 
repress ... If, on the contrary, power is strong this is because as we are beginning to 
realise, it produces effects at the level of desire- and also at the level of knowledge. Far 
from preventing knowledge, power produces it".18 For Foucault, power is not 
something that can be escaped in any sort of utopic 'end of history'. While aspects of 
the modem state system sometimes appear to function solely in a mode of surveillance 
and silencing of dissent, discourses of knowledge often create 'productive' power that 
15 See Michel Foucault's The Order of Things, The Birth of the Clinic and Madness and Civilisation. 
16 Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London: Routledge, 1990), 71 & 79. 
17 David Michael Levin ed., Sites of Vision: The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 6. 
18 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1980), 59. 
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enables and encourages Western societies to think and act in certain ways, believing 
this knowledge to be 'true', 'right' etc. 
As mentioned above, this sort of power can function at a micro-level, outside 
what might traditionally be seen to be places where the state impinges on individuals' 
lives. Individuals are created and influenced by power yet also hold power through 
their non-acceptance/acceptance, spreading and adapting of discourses themselves. 
The importance of vision and imagery, as well as text and language, for Foucault is 
obvious in many ways, including physically in his analysis of the Panopticon, a form of 
nineteenth century prison architecture which he associated with the invasive, 
oppressive gaze of authority upon individuals. In Foucault's theory, the possibility of . 
this external gaze was meant to facilitate the individual's internalization of such forms 
of surveillance by self-censoring, monitoring and modifying their own thoughts and 
behaviour in conformity with the norms and beliefs of state disciplinarians.19 
Foucault is often critiqued for not providing any normative criteria for 
evaluating the workings of power; it is seen as a "complex strategic relation in a given 
society" .20 This is perhaps where he breaks most obviously from his structuralist and 
Marxist predecessors, by refusing in his later work to see power as a primarily top-
down, imposed or necessarily state-driven force nor as a factor used to mask 'truths' of 
various economic systems.21 Commentators such as Robert Young, however, have 
come to Foucault's defense in this matter, arguing that he does not remove the 
possibility of resisting various forms of power as such but merely moves away from a 
theory of resistance centred on the individual subject as a sovereign agent. For 
Foucault, there is no special or privileged position that can be reached outside the 
operations of power from which subjects might resist. Subversive resistance develops 
due to the fact that oppressed 'others' are always already inside the workings of 
19 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 71-72. 
20 Ibid, 236. 
21 For in-depth discussion of these ideas, see Foucault, Power/Knowledge. 
'power', 'reason' and 'the same', which are therefore partly constituted by that which 
they repress.22 
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While he did not study media and communications phenomena explicitly, 
Foucault's work is clearly important for understanding the development and use of 
these technologies at several levels of analysis. The media function as a means for 
determining what constitutes 'knowledge' and 'truth' and for distributing it; they can 
thus be seen as places where institutionalized power may be concentrated in modern 
societies. The creation, packaging·and distribution of knowledge through media 
sources can largely be seen as a 'productive' form of power. While it is possible for 
media to act in oppressive or restricting ways, media discourses are generally 
understood in the West as means of spreading ideas and 'educating' audiences in 
particular ways. Media can function in a multiplicity of forms and can be used by 
many groups; they can become a space where competing and 'subversive' discourses 
are articulated as well as being a means of top-down communication with masses for 
elites. The variety of discourses represented in mainstream media, however, is often 
debatable. At a different analytical level, Foucault's 'genealogical' approach of 
historicizing and challenging prevailing ways of conceptualising partieular people and 
places is a key theoretical strategy of this project. Although this work aims to illustrate 
how the media function to create and distribute information, analysing and critiquing 
the content of media items will be its primary goal. 
Two other theorists whose works are relatable to that of Foucault and the 
project being undertaken here are Jean Baudrillard and Guy Debord. Martin Jay 
suggests in his seminal work, Dawncast Eyes that Debord's work responds to the same 
general questions as Foucault's while using the opposite viewpoint. While Foucault is 
concerned about "the disciplining and normalizing effects of being the object of the 
gaze", Debord "stresses the dangers of being its subject."23 For Debord, the greatest 
concern for modern subjects is seduction by the 'spectacle' of images that modern life 
22 Robert J. C. Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London: Routledge, 1990), 86. 
23 See Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in 201h Century French Thought (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994), 416. 
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has become rather than a normalising gaze from outside. The 'spectacle' for Debord is 
not a collection of images but a social situation in which connections between people 
become increasingly mediated by images. Everything that has previously been directly 
experienced moves into the representational sphere of specialised images, which 
presents itself as something enormously positive and indisputable.24 
Debord's work is greatly indebted to neo-Marxism and Althusser. Like 
Althusser, he sees the media as generally a form of unidirectional communication with 
the masses and as a form of class domination utilised by the bourgeoisie. The 
'spectacle' is described as a form of capital at such a late stage of capitalism that it has 
become based on imagery and discourse, rather than cornmodities.25 Comparable to 
Althusser' s view of ideology, Debord suggests that the 'spectacle' can be used to 
reproduce and create differences, separation and atomism between 'viewing' subjects 
who might otherwise share class similarities. This separation occurs despite the fact 
that modem societies' technological developments are to a significant extent actually 
decreasing geographical and societal distances across national borders. 
Debord is in many ways an anti-humanist and a less-empirical alternative to 
Chomsky; many of their conclusions about the functions of media are similar. 
Although this work is in many ways sympathetic to Debord's locating of media as a 
form of 'spectacle', which can be limiting and divisive in the discourses it presents, I 
would resist a view of current mass media as a primarily unidirectional means of 
communication. Public response to media imagery and discourse is increasingly 
surveyed, and media often act and produce coverage based on their interpretations of 
how their audiences will respond. While this work will look at the ways in which 
'spectacular' news coverage works to both make visible and obscure particular 
perspectives, it will do so from a position which is more clearly developed in this work 
through use of Foucault. 
24 See Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (New York: Zone Books, 1994). 
25 See paragraphs 24 & 34 in Debord, The Society of the Spectacle. 
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Baudrillard' s early thought is relatively close to that of Debord and Althusser. 
It is his later writings that are most important for this work, however, as his interest in 
Western media coverage of conflict is made explicit in these publications. At first 
Baudrillard studied different societies where consumption, rather than production, had 
become the dominant mechanism of capitalism. Consumerism and consumption were, 
for Baudrillard, fast becoming viewed as common social factors while destroying old 
concepts of Marxist class consciousness through their atomizing and alienating force on 
individuals.26 Baudrillard soon moved away from this neo-Marxist stance, however, 
towards a more ironic and less comprehensive position than poststructuralists such as 
Foucault and Derrida. He critiqued Marxist-inspired and structural theories, which 
argue that surface appearances mask a hidden structure or essence, to favour a model 
based on what he called 'seduction', an analytic approach which would focus on the 
new world of floating and unfixed images, objects and netWorks of discourse, rather 
than attempting to go beyond 'surface' features of cultural life. This term ushered in 
Baudrillard's assertion that the Western world now operates without clear distinctions 
between object/representation or thing/idea. It is instead increasingly constructed of 
models or 'simulacra', which have no referent or ground in a reality outside their own 
systems of relation. 27 
According to Baudrillard, these simulacra are 'hyper-real' constructs such as 
electronic capital and digitized information that now occupy a privileged position in 
society, usurping old universalized categories of 'space', 'time', 'truth' etc. Thus, 
Baudrillard "has moved from the TV ad which, however, never completely erases the 
commodity it solicits, to the TV newscast which creates the news if oruy to be able to 
narrate it".28 At this stage, Baudrillard reached a pessimistic and negative position with 
regard to the citizenry of Western states. With the collapse of metanarratives such as 
26 This period of Baudrillard' s work corresponds with his publication of: The System of Objects (1968), 
Consumer Society (1970), and For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (1972) according to Mark Poster 
ed., Jean Baudril/ard: Selected Writings (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 
27 See Mike Gane, "Ch. 53- Baudrillard", in A Companion to Continental Philosophy, eds. Simon Critchley & 
William R. Schroeder (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1999). 
28 Poster, Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, 6. 
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liberalism and Marxism, the old, rational ways of understanding the subject had 
become outdated. Subjects were now viewed primarily as consumers by Baudrillard, 
and they are thus vulnerable to manipulation by simulacra. His next analytic stage of 
'fatal strategy' theory-making focused upon the point of view of hyper-real objects 
rather than human subjects.29 
By 1985, Baudrillard wrote ironically regarding potential responses of the public 
to a situation in which the media present an excess of information which, because it is 
often in simulated rather than representational format, cannot be adequately responded 
to or engaged with. His highly-criticized answer to this dilemma was silence and 
passivity. The viewer masses recognize that they are being talked at by the media with 
no possibility of response; they thus react with hyperconforrnity, giving up their will to 
choose and their will to be studied and to be known by the media and its pollsters. 
Baudrillard concluded his short work on the masses by asking questions about the 
contradictory roles the media can play: "Are the mass media on the side of power in 
the manipulation of the masses, or are they on the side of the masses in the liquidation 
of meaning, in the violence done to meaning? Is it the media that fascinate the masses, 
or is it the masses who divert the media into showmanship?"30 
Baudrillard' s work, particularly later texts, are often criticized due to their 
hyperbole, lack of sustained analysis and totalizing claims. I accept all these factors as 
issues which have in many ways prevented greater academic engagement with 
Baudrillard's work. As explained by Baudrillard scholar Mark Poster, "He writes about 
particular experiences, television images, as if nothing else in society mattered, 
extrapolating a bleak view of the world from that limited base."31 Despite the analytical 
limitations of Baudrillard's concepts as a result of his style and approach, his work is 
nonetheless valuable to this project at many stages. Baudrillard's study of discourse 
networks and simulations in media is a basis from which this work begins. It accepts 
29 This period corresponds to Baudrillard's later works, On Seduction (1979), Simulacra and Simulations (1981) 
and Fatal Strategies (1983). 
30 Baudrillard, "The Masses: the Implosion of the Social in the Media", in Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, 
218. 
31 Poster, Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, 7. 
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the idea that such representations, often without material referents, have important 
consequences, both discursively and materially, for societies. While this project will not 
look specifically at strategies of media reception by audiences, Baudrillard's later 
questioning of the relationship between media producers and audiences will likely be 
important for further work into the dynamics of this relationship.32 His analysis of the 
Gulf War of 1991 will be discussed in depth in a further section, where his work's 
relevance for this project will also become clear. 
Neither Debord's nor Baudrillard's societal analyses have been as influential to 
this project as those of Foucault, whose impact on theories of social discourses and 
institutions will also be seen in the next section. Some of Debord's and Baudrillard' s 
concepts and vocabulary, however, are more specifically relevant for media studies 
than those of Foucault and are thus helpful for enhancing descriptions of how I 
interpret the media as operating in Western societies. 
Representing 'Others' 
Foucault's ideas regarding the concept of power/knowledge and his 
geneaologies of different discourses have been very influential to the work of 
postcolonial theorists. These authors have criticised the Western tradition of colonising 
'others' through the absorption and the oppression of the cultures of the colonised as 
well as, equally importantly, their environments and material resources. These forms 
of colonialism are seen to consist of dominating forms of power, in a variety of types of 
overt exploitation and control, and also in more 'productive' forms with efforts to 
create 'colonial subjects' and to help them achieve Western norms and 'standards' of 
efficiency, technology and development. All these terms, and indeed the entire 
discourse of 'development', are loaded with very particular meanings of what it is to be 
'civilised' or 'primitive' human beings in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first 
32 William Merrin has helped to illustrate Baudrillard's continuing relevance for media studies through 
discussion of his case studies of Gulf War I, 9/11, and the Afghan and Iraq wars, see William Merrin, 
Baudrillard and the Media: A Critical Introduction (London: Polity Press, 2005). 
centuries, just as Foucault showed that concepts such as 'madness' have been imbued 
with different meanings throughout various epochs. 
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These shifting meanings become tied not only to oppressed groups but also to 
the self-understandings of colonisers or, in the case of madness, the 'sane'. As 
postcolonial theorist Robert Young suggests: "It is this sovereign self of Europe which is 
today being deconstructed, showing the extent to which Europe's other has been a 
narcissistic self-image through which it has constituted itself while never allowing it to 
achieve a perfect fit."33 Practices of colonialism, and forms of resistance to colonialism, 
are thus seen to be fluid, shifting and continuing well past the independence 
movements of many colonised regions. Human geographer Derek Gregory has traced 
these "imaginative geographies" from earlier colonial times through to the postcolonial 
world. Gregory identifies many areas of conceptualization, and action, which illustrate 
the resilience of older, colonial discourses in current times. Despite giving ample proof 
of the prevalence of these discourses, he nonetheless recognises, in line with the 
thought of Judith Butler, Robert Young and Homi Bhabha, that "every repertory 
performance of the colonial present carries within it the twin possibilities of either 
reaffirming and even radicalizing the hold of the colonial past on the present or 
undoing its enclosures and approaching closer to the horizon of the postcolonial."34 
Foucauldian theory in this sense is often brought into analysis of the encounters 
between primarily Western media producers and their developing world 'subjects'. 
Edward Said's work includes perhaps two of the most influential efforts both in 
describing the history and mindset of colonialism as well as media perpetuation of 
colonial ideas.35 Influenced by Foucault, Said argues that a complex set of 
representations was historically created, developing a structure for how 'the West' 
would understand and interact with 'the Orient'. This imaginary has largely 
determined Western involvement with the vast and diverse regions subsumed under 
33 Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West, 17. 
34 Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 19. 
35 See Edward Said, Orienta/ism, (London: Penguin, 2003) and Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media 
Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981). 
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the term 'Orient', 'Third World' or 'developing world' from colonial days to the 
present. Said's hope is that realisation of this situation will lead to efforts to develop 
different ways of understanding 'others', ways which do not postulate the existence of 
a single set of characteristics representing the 'other' or 'the Orient', where, in fact, he 
sees diverse and ungeneralisable groups.36 
Difficulties for this position arise, according to Robert Young, when Said 
attempts to posit a critical place for intellectuals distanced from contemporary 
ideologies. In Young's opinion, this retention of the Western humanist conception of 
the critical individual prevents Said from exploring how 'the West's' creation of the 
'Third World' or 'the Orient' reflects its own self doubts and internal contradictions 
rather than misrepresenting 'real' aspects of these places. Young, taking a more 
Derridean perspective, suggests that this position traps Said in having to say that there 
is a 'right' or a 'wrong' way to interpret these discursive categories, which Young 
believes should not be treated as fixed or stable.37 Roxanne Doty seems to concur with 
Young in her work, Imperial Encounters: the Politics of Representation in North-South 
Relations. Doty argues that colonial discourses are structured, relational entities that are 
inherently open and contestable, although they often claim to be total. Using Foucault, 
Doty also suggests that shifting meanings can become stabilised or naturalised at 
various points due to the coalescence of certain power relations but are never 
absolutely fixed.38 These perspectives would be in line with those of Gregory, 
mentioned above, and Judith Butler. 
Other theorists engaging with issues of postcolonialism after the publication of 
Said's Orientalism have picked up on many of his ideas while trying to steer clear of his 
dilemmas. They argue that colonial stereotypes are not crude or 'incorrect' but rather 
complex, ambivalent and contradictory. Homi Bhabha has developed the idea of the 
'colonial mimic': hybrid, fetishised identities practiced by colonised peoples that both 
36 Young, White Mythologies, 126-127. 
37 Ibid, 129-140. 
38 Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: the Politics of Representation in North-South Relations (London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 6. 
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adopt some features of the coloniser but which, also, precisely because of these 
adoptions, can become threatening to the coloniser. Young explains, when interpreting 
Bhabha's work, that "(c)olonial discourse does not merely represent the other, 
therefore, so much as simultaneously project and disavow its difference, a 
contradictory structure articulated according to fetishism's irreconcilable logic. Its 
mastery is always asserted, but is also always slipping, ceaselessly displaced, never 
complete."39 
Bhabha believes that this form of mimicry and hybridization can encourage 
internal 'native' resistance to colonial discourse and practices without the need for 
agency to come from subjects somehow existing outside colonial structures and 
mindsets. His approach, which emphasizes the value of psychoanalytic approaches to 
colonial study, is also taken up to an extent by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who has 
developed the idea, strongly influenced by the work of Derrida, that colonised peoples 
need to (re)tell their own stories of life and history to offer alternative perspectives to 
those of colonial elites. Spivak stresses, however, that these stories must be recognised 
as always incomplete and never unifiable in one colonial subject-position. According to 
Young, one of the most difficult things about Spivak's work is her idea that often 'the 
subaltern cannot speak'. Spivak believes that, in many cases, those individuals or 
groups whose experiences have been constantly rewritten and spoken only by 
colonising voices and in the terms of imperialism and patriarchy have simply not been 
able to be heard. Fortunately, this is primarily the case for historical situations, where 
the subjects are no longer alive to have the chance to tell their stories. Nevertheless, the 
options Spivak gives may disappoint many students of postcolonialism: "Rather than 
speak for a lost consciousness that cannot be recovered, a paternalistic activity at best, 
the critic can point to the place of women's [or a colonial subject's] disappearance as an 
aporia, a blind spot where understanding and knowledge is blocked."40 
39 Young, White Mythologies, 143. 
40 Ibid, 164. 
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The relevance of these ideas for the work at hand is evident in their recognition 
that colonial bodies can be made silent and passive; however, these subjects can also 
contest and fight their circumstances in myriad ways, both discursively and physically. 
In the two case studies analysed for this work, the media and policyrnakers often spoke 
for, or kept silent, the voices of those whose countries were being 'intervened' in; these 
actions should be seen as part of continuing colonial practices, which this work aims to 
highlight and challenge. Despite Western media tendencies to represent Somali and 
Iraqi citizens in particular ways, often in line with long-time colonial stereotypes, Iraqis 
and Somalis will be seen to have actively contradicted such stereotypes or to have 
embraced and used certain Western perceptions to their own advantage. While this 
project has neither had the time nor the expertise to thoroughly investigate moments of 
Somali and Iraqi resistance, the imperative nonetheless exists to remember that 'the 
West' is not the only entity capable of sight, thought, analysis and assessment. The 
constructed 'us' is responded to by those it names 'others' in a plurality of ways, which 
deserve and require acknowledgement. 
James R. Ryan's work on visual elements of colonial geographic practice 
provides ways of understanding how sets of Western cultural attitudes towards the rest 
of the world were historically developed and solidified.41 Like Susan Sontag and many 
others, Ryan also subscribes to the idea that photographic imagery is ambiguous; a 
multiplicity of meanings may be generated by plural forms of knowledge brought to 
photos by their viewers. He investigates how cameras were immediately enlisted in 
projects of empire-buildin~ whether they were being cumbersomely brought to record 
battle scenes, to preserve images of landscapes and topography or to allow the flora, 
fauna and peoples of the colonies to be classified and displayed in centres of colonial 
power. Photography was seen, like other Western sciences and technologies, both as 
proof of Western intellectual and cultural superiority to 'other' areas but also as means 
by which these places could be absorbed into Western knowledge and control. Used in 
41 See James Ryan, Picturing Empire: Photography and the Visualization of the British Empire (London: Reaktion 
Books Ltd., 1997) and James Ryan & Joan Schwartz eds., Picturing Place: Photography and the Geographical 
Imagination (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003). 
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conjunction with telescopes and microscopes, photography also expanded human 
powers of observation and observable space. Inevitably, these new spaces were 
invested with meaning that was not simply based on obvious, visual'facts' of the 
photographs, as many might have liked to believe, but were also tied to the fantasies 
and imaginings about other worlds beyond the immediate experiences of their creators 
and viewers. 
In an important step for this work, Ryan points out that it was not just the 'dark' 
and 'unknown' regions of the expanding colonies that were exposed to the 'light' of 
cameras. The 'deviant', 'different' and 'marginal' populations of the Western world 
itself were also explored and compared. Thus, during the Victorian and Edwardian 
eras, the East End of London became imaged and described as a place of darkness, 
danger, illness and the unknown using some of the same vocabularies and 
photographic techniques as were being used to document African jungles. The linking 
of diverse areas and peoples through recurrent use of specific verbal and visual 
strategies will be an important element of this project's empirical investigations, 
specifically in the case of Somalia. In this case, many similarities will be noted between 
frequent media representation of Somali men and boys as dangerous, drug-taking 
agents of violence in Somali society and the almost contemporaneous representation of 
African American motorist Rodney King and of those African Americans who reacted 
to the acquittal of the police officers charged with his severe beating. Again, as 
discussed above, 'others' rejections and (often ironic) acceptance of classifications 
imposed upon them are strategies during many engagements between constructed 
groups. 
Representing the 'developing' world: a look at 'Africa' 
These broad theoretical debates provide much material for thought in the study 
of 'Western' media representation of the 'non-Western' world. How are audiences to 
evaluate what they see and read of these diverse areas? While it may be theoretically 
straightforward to accept that there can be no single, 'true' understanding of diverse, 
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'non-Western' 'others', let alone one that is not contaminated by the self-
understandings of media producers and observing selves, pervasive media images and 
text representing non-Western locations have proved to have remarkably persistent and 
consistent qualities. The media brings areas of the developing world to the Western 
viewer in both entertainment and information formats. The content of these stories is 
often highly reliant on 'colonised' sources of information; for example, the use of 
primarily Western correspondents or policymakers who are non-resident (and often not 
even present) in a certain area as the voices of authority and knowledge about a 
particular history or issue. The use of developing world elites who may be viewed as 
illegitimate or far removed from a group of people or a situation in their state or region 
can also lead to a very specific version of events being told at the expense of others. 
The supposedly objective or 'expert' text or voice, often accompanied by 'transparent', 
'self-explanatory' images are, however, routinely constructed and presented as if they 
represent the only 'rational', 'logical' way to view a certain situation. The colonial basis 
for Western knowledge about much of the developing world, as well as other factors 
within the modern system of mass media production, consistently interact to hone a 
repetitive stereotype and to limit public exposure to other interpretations. 
African countries certainly fall within Said's and other postcolonial theorists' 
expansive understanding of the constructed 'Oriental' category and are frequently 
portrayed within a narrow set of parameters, largely influenced by the colonial past. 
As contributors to Beverly G. Hawk's edited work, Africa's Media Image point out, most 
Western-educated media correspondents covering Africa have been taught, either 
directly or indirectly, that Western states, not Africans themselves, were the moving 
force in African history.42 African states are frequently viewed as still in the 'infancy' 
stages of a linear progression towards Western standards of governance, technological 
development and culture. As Doty points out, metaphors are often used whereby 
'developing' countries become growing children for whom the 'First World' knows 
42 See Beverly Hawk, ed., Africa's Media Image (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 4. 
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best.43 Often, these countries appear in Western media as mired in deficiencies and 
conflicts, which are seen as motivated by 'tribalism' and brutishness which are not 
comparable to Western forms of violence. The common inability of Westerners to 
speak many African languages heightens their difficulty in gaining knowledge of the 
particular history and context of a situation from local people. Instead, journalists tend 
to rely heavily on official government sources of information, either those of the African 
state itself or those of familiar Western, 'home' governments. 
A huge diversity of countries and societies are routinely lumped together, 
spoken of generally as 1 Africa', and linked with the abovementioned stereotypes. The 
word I Africa' now frequently calls up images for Westerners of unchanging, primitive 
locations that hit the headlines only briefly as disaster areas, places that are spectacular 
or disturbing particularly because of the immense chasm assumed between existence 
there and life in the West. African states and politics, along with other areas of the 
1 developing' world, are routinely under-covered by Western news sources because of 
the presumption that few interesting, relatable or profitable stories emerge from them. 
The nature of involvement, or often the lack of involvement, by Western governments 
in this region confirms for the media that this part of the globe is not politically or 
economically influential or important. 
Western reporters who have covered areas of Africa express a variety of 
opinions, with many deeply committed to getting the 'local' perspective for their stories 
and some explicitly eager about using their work to draw Western attention and aid to 
troubled areas of the continent. This 1 crusading' approach has its own issues in terms 
of the discursive structures and imagery on which it tends to rely. Many journalists 
mentioned in the Hawk-edited work, however, speak of the danger and difficulty of 
fairly reporting African events due to intense censorship from local government bodies, 
cultural and linguistic divisions, and a lack of resources from their own media 
employers. One correspondent, contributing to Hawk's work, explains that he gave up 
covering the continent because he was bored with its lack of progress, the ignorance of 
43 Doty, Imperial Encounters, 134. 
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African leaders and the difficulty of travelling to report within the continent.44 Even 
Dan Eldon, a young photojournalist who was deeply committed to covering the Somali 
conflict, described himself as 'shell-shocked' and needing leave from Somalia after 
spending just under a month there. Many other journalists stayed in the country for 
less than that amount of time.45 When examples of media coverage in both Somalia and 
Iraq are given, the issues and assumptions outlined above from the Hawk edition will 
be provided with more empirical support. 
Jonathan Benthall's work investigates the relationship between relief agencies 
and the media in an attempt to think about how interaction between these two groups 
may affect coverage of particular issues and regions. This work is of relevance 
particularly to the case of Somalia, where aid agencies in some cases had greater local 
knowledge and experience of the country and its dynamics than intervening 
governments and the United Nations. Western media coverage often portrayed these 
organisations and their workers as Somalia's 'heroes', while the rest of the world was 
deemed to be slow and ineffective in its involvement. Efforts by Somalis themselves to 
survive and facilitate peacemaking were often overlooked when this particular 
representation of aid workers was used by media. In the case ofFallujah, the work of 
aid agencies is not widely reported in many news sources. The presence of such 
agencies in Fallujah was likely reduced due to the physical dangers of working in the 
city while it was under siege. Agency work that was able to continue, however, often 
may have been underrepresented because aid agencies, due to the nature of their work, 
frequently highlighted the civilian costs of the battle, an aspect of Fallujah's story which 
many media sources seemed unable or unwilling to tell. 
Benthall's research stresses the importance of the media for 'creating' disasters 
by recognising them and giving them acknowledgement outside of the areas where 
they occur. While this publicity can often benefit aid agencies in the publicised region, 
a harmonious relationship between a non-governmental organisation (NGO) and the 
44 See Stanley Meisler, "Committed in Africa: Reflections of a Correspondent", in Africa's Media Image, 36 
45 For more on Dan Eldon's story, see Jennifer New, Dan Eldon: the Art of Life (San Francisco: Chronicle 
Books, 2001). 
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media can become conflictual if the NGO feels the story of its work is being told 
incorrectly or in an otherwise damaging fashion for their efforts. Alternately, media 
organisations can occasionally feel pressured by certain groups of agencies to cover 
specific events for which they are trying to fundraise.46 Benthall believes that most aid 
agencies alternate between playing on guilt and compassion, despite their efforts in the 
1970s and 1980s to move away from fundraising appeals based on making people in 
developing countries into stereotypes of need, shock-value and helplessness. He 
suggests that the media are culpable in this continuation, as they are often socialised 
into understanding the developing world in a very narrow and particular way. 
Stanley Cohen agrees with Benthall in this particular assessment of why certain 
stereotypical images prevail despite at least rhetorical efforts at change. Cohen 
suggests that famine stories are popular with the media because they are superficially 
not as ambiguous as issues involving human rights or political movements. Famine is 
not an easy issue for governments to refuse to act upon; it can also appear to have an 
easy solution- food aid. Because of its widely-televised and described history in certain 
areas, particularly in Africa, media, viewers and governments already have rehearsed 
narratives and stock imagery to fall back on when famines occur. This is especially 
obvious with regards to African famines after the well-known Ethiopian event of 1984-
85. Women and children are almost exclusively shown as victims, while men are often 
less visible or are depicted as involved in violent acts which created or support the 
famine. Cohen believes this pattern is followed because, to create the greatest amount 
of audience sympathy, the victims of famine must be seen as totally blameless for the 
circumstanc~s surrounding their plight. Thus, the young are commonly shown as 
suffering for the actions of their elders and in patriarchal societies women are 
sometimes depicted, usually incorrectly, as being unable to improve the well-being of 
their families. Aid workers are also a necessary link in the story for Cohen, as he 
suggests that they bring an important, relatable Western face into the narrative for 
audiences who want to see their own connection, however vague, to a particular 
46 Jonathan Benthall, Disasters, Relief & the Media (London: LB. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1995), 49. 
event.47 Again, with reference to the case of Somalia, these themes will be visible and 
important to the ways in which that country's situation was understood. 
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Tim Allen and Jean Seaton are specifically interested in another aspect of 
conflict reporting besides famine, the 'ethnic' element perceived in many of these 
events. In the second chapter of their edited work, Seaton argues that the media is 
crucial in presenting audiences with their first, influential definition of the social 
groups taking part in conflicts. She believes that the concept of primordial ethnicities 
often ends up depoliticising conflicts and may be explained by the media's lack of 
interest and effort in explaining conflicts' political calculations.48 In short, it is easier to 
tell a story about a simple good/bad binary and Seaton argues that the media often 
deliberately do not publish stories that might disturb these morally simple frames. 
David Keen, a contributor to the Allen and Seaton work, concurs with Seaton and adds 
that a commonly-held idea has developed in the West that 'pointless' 'ethnic' wars 
happen elsewhere and require Western involvement to end them. Keen argues, 
instead, that supposed 'ethnic' conflict is often equally a case of fights over class 
privileges and an unequal division of resources. He also concurs with Cohen, and 
other researchers whose work will be explored later in this chapter, that media are often 
focused on stories that provide an exciting or compelling visual element, with those 
which cannot provide this option being overlooked. The risk of media personnel 
becoming overly dependent on Western 'experts' in the military, aid agencies and 
academia is also acknowledged. Due to various racialized, colonial stereotypes, 
'experts' often appear as the culturally more acceptable and reliable sources of 
information.49 Evidence from media coverage of both Somalia and Fallujah will 
illustrate the extent to which media have followed these predicted paths, both with 
regards to coverage of famine and conflict situations. 
47 See Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities & Suffering (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 
174-176. 
48 Tim Allen & Jean Seaton eds., The Media of Conflict: War Reporting & Representations of Ethnic Conflict 
(London: Zed Books, 1999), 43-50. 
49 David Keen, "Chapter 4", in Allen & Seaton eds., The Media of Conflict, 81-83 & 96-97. 
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Deconstructing self/other binaries 
Such colonised interpretations, built on unstable, binary distinctions between 
developed/undeveloped, civilised/uncivilised and valuable/unimportant are an 
excellent point at which to move into a consideration of the theoretical relevance of 
Jacques Derrida's work, both for postcolonial and media studies. Derrida is hesitant to 
allow his 'deconstructive' approach to studying texts to be spoken of as a method. He 
balks at the suggestion that generalities might be pulled from a vast variety of case 
studies, arguing that only a very relative generality can strive to adjust itself to each 
singular case.50 Derrida's belief that texts are unable to close or complete themselves, 
however, leaves space for a re-evaluation of supposedly clear boundaries and divisions 
which are interpreted within texts, images, and broader societal discourses. The 
importance of his work for debates surrounding the development of postcolonial 
theory have been hinted at above and his insights also pertain to ideas which are 
formed and spread by modern mass media and its coverage of the developing world. 
A deconstructive approach will be extremely useful for this work's attempt to identify 
and question the predominant ways in which Western interventions in both Somalia 
and Iraq were conceptualised in British and American mainstream media. As Derrida 
suggests, what is left out of these particular understandings may be just as important as 
what is described. Deconstruction for Derrida involves exposing the inevitable failure 
of supposed dialectical oppositions to be held apart. He sees each distinction as 
unavoidably contaminated by and dependent upon its presumed opposite.51 Western 
approaches to understanding 'other' places and people, like Somalia and Iraq, are thus 
always seen to be dependent upon the ways in which those in 'the West', an often-
unstable term in itself, interpret and define themselves. 
What remains undeconstructible for Derrida is also what gives deconstruction 
its justification as an approach for this work; that is 'justice', defined as the affirmative 
50 See Elizabeth Rottenberg ed., Negotiations: Interventions & Interviews 1971-2001 Jacques Derrida (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002}, 192. 
51 Edith Wyschogrod, "Derrida, Levinas & Violence" in Derrida & Deconstruction, ed. HughJ. Silverman, 
(New York: Routledge, 1989). 
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experience of the coming of the 'other' as 'other'. 52 Derrida' s conception of ethics 
borrows heavily from that of Emmanuel Levinas, who radically criticised and 
transformed traditional Western ethical philosophy. Levinas argued that ethical 
consciousness is not a set of values to be adhered to but rather the experience of an 
exterior being, or Other, who exceeds any idea of the 'other' or 'difference' in the self, 
forcing the self to justify and to question its own existence. His ethical philosophy 
moves away from traditional concepts based on reducing what is 'other' to the 'same' 
or to 'one'.53 Derrida picks up on this infinite sense of tension in his own work on 
blindness and vision, as he explores the ethical character of human capacity for sight. 
"He seems to recognize, at least implicitly, that there is a potential in this capacity not 
only for aggression, but also for sympathy and compassion: the eyes can be touched 
. 
and moved, moved even to tears, by what they see, what they are given to see."54 
Derrida follows this example to a large extent when discussing the difficulty of 
the truly ethical decision. He conceives of justice as the undecidable limit of the 
possible while recognising that the law and all decision-making processes must cut and 
divide in certain ways. There is always a moment of 'madness' in any ethical decision 
because the open-ended nature of democratic justice allows the possibility that cruel or 
perverse decisions may be made as well as 'good' ones. Preserving a sense of justice 
becomes tied to the action (or inaction) involved in leaving open space for a multiplicity 
of outcomes and potentials. 55 This project will hopefully contribute in a small way to 
this preservation by helping to expose the limits of media representation of the Somalia 
intervention and, in less depth, coverage of the Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004. I aim to 
illustrate the limits of coverage discourses in order to open a space in which new or 
52 Rottenberg, Negotiations: Interventions & Interviews 1971-2002, 104. 
53 For more on Levinas' and Derrida's understandings of ethics see Sean Handed., The Levinas Reader 
(Cambridge, US: B. Blackwell, 1989) and Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999). 
54 Levin, Sites of Vision: The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy, 430. 
55 For more on Derrida's engagement with Levinas and ethical decision-making, see Jacques Derrida, "The 
Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundations of Authority'", in Deconstruction and the Possibility oflustice, eds. 
Cornell, Rosenfeld and Carlson (London: Routledge, 1994) and Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
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previously-unheard narratives and imagery of Somalia and Iraq can be presented and 
debated. 
Derrida has not commented extensively on the current situation of modem mass 
media except in his recent, co-authored work with Bernard Stiegler, Echographies of 
Television. 56 For Derrida, unsurprisingly, the experience of modem forms of 
communication can be paradoxical in the impulses it creates within the individual: 
Take the example of television. It constantly introduces the elsewhere 
and the global into the home. Thus I am more isolated, more privatized 
than ever, with the constant intrusion, desired by me, into my home, of 
the other, the stranger, the distant, the other tongue. I desire this 
intrusion and, at the same time, I shut myself in with this stranger; I 
want to isolate myself with him without him; I want to be at home. The 
more powerful and violent the technological expropriation, the 
delocalization, the more powerful, naturally, the recourse to the at-
home, the return toward home.s7 
It is Derrida' s hope that the spread of media technologies, which bring diverse 
areas of the world into various peoples' knowledge and vision, may negotiate and 
mediate with allegedly opposing impulses towards national singularity or localness. 
This will not be an easy negotiation since, as described above in paradoxical form, 
Derrida sees the very possibility of hospitality and openness as a condition based on a 
localness that always risks the possibility "of closedness, of selfish and impoverishing 
and even lethal isolation".58 Derrida' s position here is most important in terms of its 
broader, ethical influence for this project, along with his techniques for approaching 
language and deconstructing texts by highlighting tensions between 'self/other' 
binaries. He does not consider in Echographies of Television how the content, style and 
presentation of news imagery may affect its reception by various audiences. Derrida' s 
work at this point is complemented by the theoretical work of Foucault and 
postcolonial writers, who are concerned with articulating the specific material 
56 JacquesDerrida & Bernard Stiegler, Echographies of Television (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 
57 Ibid, 80. 
58 Ibid, 81. 
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mechanisms and discursive strategies which allow for processes of closure and opening 
towards 'others' to occur. 
At a broader level, Derrida' s paradox provides an excellent angle for exploring 
UN, but most particularly US, involvement in the Somalia intervention. It was, 
rhetorically at least, an ethic of openness and concern for wider humanity which 
brought these entities into Somalia with aid and support for the Somali people. 
Conversely, the reaction of the US after the 'Black Hawk down' mission was one of 
closing down, abandonment of the region, and discussion of a foreign policy driven 
more by national interest than humanitarianism. Derrida' s suggestion of the risk of 
isolationist closure seems to have occurred here, leading to the question of upon what 
the initial moment of openness was based. This work will use a Derridean-inspired 
analytical strategy to deconstruct media discourses and imagery throughout the 
Somalia intervention in order to investigate this change in approach towards Somali 
'others'. The case of Fallujah provides a more recent example for exploration and 
comparison with Somalia. 
Interpreting the Image/Photograph 
A range of theoretical literature which explores relationships between 
knowledge, power and communication media has been surveyed, as well as the 
linkages between this body of work and research on representations of colonised 
people and places. Susan Sontag's work provides a closer look at the experiences of 
photographic image creation and viewing, as well as addressing the content of these 
images. Her approach, along with those of several other theorists discussed in this 
section, provides a valuable complement to the theories of social discourses outlined by 
the academics mentioned above. The image-based economy has grown rapidly in the 
last twenty-five years, especially with the recent introduction of affordable digital 
technology. Many questions have arisen as to how these new technologies will be used 
by consumers and further developed by producers. Imagery has been and is currently 
enlisted for a huge range of purposes including: producing desire, consumption, 
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entertainment and education. The theorists reviewed in this section also deal 
specifically with issues surrounding public viewing of news imagery of conflict, 
violence and suffering. Such imagery is predominant in both case studies undertaken 
by this work; its theoretical analysis is therefore crucial. 
Sontag's earlier writing has remained relevant, particularly her often-cited 1977 
book On Photography. It has provided a starting point for much of the more recent 
study conducted into the place and affects of visual news imagery in modern Western 
societies. A line from her opening essay in this work provides an excellent entry point 
into Sontag's broad areas of interest: "In teaching us a new visual code, photographs 
alter and enlarge our notions of what is worth looking at and what we have a right to 
observe. They are a grammar and, even more importantly, an ethics of seeing."59 This 
linking of visual study with an ethics of approach is common across the range of 
theorists in this section who deal with imagery of conflict and disaster. Even though 
the term 'discourse' is not used explicitly across this entire range,of authors, their 
understanding of how images function in societies, and particularly in Western media, 
largely fit within broader conceptions of discourse. Images are understood and 
debated socially, through language, and thus are often crucial parts of social discourses, 
which can be comprised of images, text, speech and intersubjective relations. Meanings 
associated with images, which can be apparently stable or in flux, are seen to have 
' 
social and material impacts. 
In States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities & Suffering, Stanley Cohen discusses 
the paradox of television bringing important events to the knowledge of Western 
audiences but simultaneously presenting them in ways that transform viewers into 
cultural tourists or voyeurs of atrocity.60 Ron Burnett broadly agrees with Sontag's 
concept of images as helping to 'frame' individuals' understanding of a subject. He 
makes frequent use of this particular term, calling photographs a means by which 
vision is framed and mediated; photographs are described as 'windows' for the activity 
59 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 3. 
60 Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities & Suffering, 169. 
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of seeing. Although such windows may appear to provide 'transparent' views, Burnett 
suggests that images can also make viewers aware of the boundaries between perceiver 
and perceived, allowing a retreat or withdrawal of the viewer from the viewed. For 
Burnett, however, it is possible for these metaphorical windows to be smashed, 
permitting mediated experiences to touch viewers in significant, ethically-motivated 
ways.61 
Burnett's approach is similar to that of Roland Barthes. Barthes differentiates 
between the studium, elements in a photograph which the viewer connects with via 
shared socio-cultural and political references, and the punctum, an aspect or detail of a 
photograph which "pricks" an individual viewer in a particular way. According to 
Barthes, the punctum is usually not a deliberate element of the photograph but rather 
something supplemental and unplanned, different for each viewer.62 Burnett's window 
analogy is useful for this work, as it functions in a similar way to the concept of 
'discourse'. Within this project, the development of particular discourses for 
understanding images and events are critical for developing a context for social 
comprehension. Discourses inevitably also function, however, as ways in which 
particular interpretations are solidified, often at the expense of others, which do not fit 
within the view from a particular 'window'. Nevertheless, the possibility for 
questioning and challenging prevailing discourses remains, as suggested by Barthes. 
The development of new social references is continual, and punctum experiences 
express an enduring aspect of individuality involved in experiencing images. 
While in a sense photography's dilemmas and relations with society can be 
understood in similar ways to those of traditional arts such as painting, there is little 
doubt that, with its creation and development in the age of mass production, 
photography also offers something quite different. As Sontag asserts in her later work 
on this topic, Regarding the Pain of Others, photographic images are both a transcription 
61 Ron Burnett, Cultures of Vision: Images, Media & the Imaginary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1995), 4-6. 
62 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida (London: Vintage, 2000), 25-55. 
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of reality and yet are also an interpretation of that reality.63 Different popular modes of 
interpreting photos have developed throughout photography's history. Take, for 
example, instances in which a less polished or perfected picture is thought to be 
somehow more 'authentic' and less manipulated than one which has clearly been posed 
or arranged. These sorts of assumptions are made by viewers without knowing the 
photographer's, and likely also the photo editor's, thought processes and the choices 
both these image producers routinely make about how to crop a photo, where to 
publish it, etc. Sontag points out the interesting way in which Westerners are often 
disappointed by finding out that a photograph has been 'staged'· or 'artificially 
arranged'. Why does this disturb us? Sontag suggests that it is because we want 
photographers to be voyeurs for us into the horrors and joys of others' lives. We want 
confirmation that certain widely-recognised emotions, individuals and situations are 
'real' parts of our collective history.64 For Burnett, the debate over what is 'real' in a 
photo recognises that there is always continual social work involved in the recovery 
and maintenance of meaning. 
For Luc Boltanski, one of news photography's ethical dilemmas is that Western 
cultural norms tend to view the spectator or photographer's lack of involvement and/or 
detachment from the scene and/or subjects that they 'capture' as a guarantee of 
objectivity. A spectator to suffering or conflict may feel the need to describe scenes 
'objectively' yet be unable to do this when discussing the suffering of others. 
According to Boltanski, witnesses often deal with this situation by describing suffering 
and their own reaction to it. A difference between the observing and the acting self is 
thus created. This distancing can be ironic or self-critical but often results in viewers 
learning more about the spectator's own feelings and reactions than the feelings of 
those suffering, usually the main subjects of the images created.65 
63 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2003), 26. 
64 Ibid, 55. 
65 Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media & Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 43-45. 
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Study of the choices involved in the taking, developing and interpreting of a 
photograph brings us back to Sontag's ethical exploration of how a camera, be it a still 
camera or a video camera, becomes a mediator for encounters with strange and 
different situations and people.66 Here there again appears to be a paradoxical situation 
in that the act of taking a photograph can be seen both as an act of intervention or 
violation and as an act of non-intervention. For example, a photojournalist looking for 
dramatic footage in Somalia might intervene in the lives of Somali women in a refugee 
camp while attempting to take photos of their emaciated children; the process of taking 
such a photo, however, means that they choose, at least temporarily, not to assist these 
subjects. 
The necessary actions of stopping, considering, framing and taking a photo 
mean that the photographer allows an act to continue so that the photo may be taken. 
The picture-taker therefore becomes somewhat complicit in the act taking place. An 
example of this particular situation occurred when South African photojournalist Kevin 
Carter took a picture of an emaciated Sudanese toddler, collapsed on the ground with a 
vulture standing nearby. The photograph won Carter a Pulitzer Prize and was widely 
acclaimed throughout the photographic community; it was also, however, a source of 
much interest and some outrage to the viewing public. In response to a flood of reader 
criticism and concern, The New York Times, which published the image on March 26, 
1993, subsequently had to print an editorial piece noting that the young female subject 
had made it to a feeding station. 
The photograph was first used to illustrate an article describing the brutal civil 
war in Sudan, which was creating large numbers of internally-displaced, starving 
people. Its initial caption did not provide specific information about the fate of the 
child shown. While the image was hailed by some journalists and editors as an 'iconic' 
photograph of suffering and starvation, a substantial segment of the viewing public 
were more interested in the specifics of the photo rather than its larger representational 
possibilities. They wanted to know what, if anything, Carter had done to assist the 
66 Sontag, On Photography, 10-11. 
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child. For Carter, who was by all accounts traumatized by much of his conflict 
experience and who later took his own life, these questions illustrated the failure of 
viewers to grasp the broader significance of the situation represented by his image: "A 
friend of his [Carter's] reported that when he asked Carter 'what did you do with the 
baby?' Carter 'looked at me in bewilderment and said, 'Nothing, there were thousands 
of them."'67 In this case, aspects of Carter's image prompted some audience members 
to challenge his role as 'objective', 'uninvolved' photographer/witness and asserted his 
imperative to act as an ethical, fellow human. 
In any of the abovementioned examples, the involvement of a camera can and 
will change the engagement between the potential image-maker and his/her potential 
subjects. It will also create varying perceptions of 'distance' in the three point 
interaction between photographer, photographic subject and the image's audience. 
Importantly, as Boltanski points out, there is a risk of photographers and viewers 
falling into an 'aesthetic mode', where what the spectator/photographer and the viewer 
have to say about the unfortunate subject of suffering is intended not for dialogue with 
that sufferer but instead for iconographic, artistic, fundraising or pity-inducing 
purposes.68 One must also point out, following the Carter example, that the opposite 
possibility also exists. An audience may identify with one particular victim, potentially 
at the expense of failing to recognise a less-visible toll, such as that which the long-
running civil war had had on thousands of other, unphotographed Sudanese citizens. 
Giving consideration to the multiple ways of engaging with 'famine' photography is 
important for this project, since the presentation of famine images from Somalia only 
months before the Carter picture was taken prompted moral justifications by US 
policymakers and the media for intervening in the 'failed' state. Images of civilian 
victims of conflict have also played an important role in the moral evaluation of initial 
and continuing US involvement in Somalia and Iraq. 
67 David D. Perlmutter, Photojournalism and Foreign Policy: Icons of Outrage in International Crises (Westport 
CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998}, 26. This book contains a more detailed discussion of the Carter Sudan 
image. 
68 Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media & Politics, 132. 
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The Carter example exposes both the power and also the limits of a photograph 
in ways that relate again to Sontag's foundational questions. Along with photographic 
theorists such as John Tagg and Victor Burgin, Sontag speaks of the importance of the 
caption and the identification of irnages.69 All three of these theorists point out the ease 
with which a caption can drastically change the meaning of an image, potentially 
aiding its tendency to ambiguity or bringing the image very much 'horne' to the viewer. 
Tagg and Burgin both cite Walter Benjamin on the importance of captions for helping to 
preserve the 'use value' of a photograph, that is the places and context in which it is 
seen, and for helping to avoid the aestheticization of an image, especially those 
involving violence or the suffering of others.70 Sontag agrees with Tagg and Burgin on 
this point. She suggests that photos of misery cannot have meaning or affect unless 
there is an appropriate context, moral space or ideology which accompanies or predates 
the images: "The ultimate wisdom of the photographic image is to say: 'There is the 
surface. Now think- or rather feel, intuit- what is beyond it, what the reality must be 
like if it looks this way.' Photographs, which cannot themselves explain anything, are 
inexhaustible invitations to deduction, speculation and fantasy."71 
What each of these commentators suggests is that there is always an element of 
risk to the photograph, not unlike the way Derrida suggests that there is always a risk 
in democracy and justice. Photos can be captured and used for a multiplicity of 
different purposes; the decision on how to use them must thus take place in the realm 
of ethics, rather than simply being determined by criteria of 'truthfulness'. Tore-
emphasize, this understanding of images is complementary for viewing them as a 
crucial part of many societal discourses. Sontag, Boltanski, Cohen and Burnett also 
view ethical sentiments triggered by images and narratives of suffering as unstable; 
they must be acted upon or else will eventually wither. Sontag argues that one of the 
most important reactions to images of suffering is not to feel sympathy, which implies 
69 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 10. 
70 See Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", Illuminations (London: 
Pimlico, 1999). 
n Sontag, On Photography, 23. 
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disconnectedness and impotence in the face of events, but to instead be provoked into 
questioning how the pain of' others' may be linked to our own perceptions of our 
security, or insecurity, in 'the West'.72 Ian Walker writes in his contribution to The 
Photographic Image in Digital Culture that he believes an important reaction to viewing 
images is that we are often left with an uncomfortable silence between what we sense 
was experienced 'there' and 'our' experience 'here', as an observer.73 John Berger also 
emphasizes non-rational responses to photos. He believes there can be no firm division 
made between sight and imagination; images are both cognitive and metaphoric.74 
Such insights can be linked to the methodological approach of this work, 
meshing well with a deconstructive discourse analysis. Exposing and interrogating the 
discourses within which the Somalia and Fallujah interventions were placed, often 
supported by particular types of imagery, can help to expose the integration of these 
discourses with power relations that render certain voices, and not others, silent. They 
encourage particular associations, while rendering others illegitimate, wrong, deviant 
etc. As Sontag suggests, audiences' recognition of how their own actions' at home' are 
implicated in the survival of seemingly-distant 'others' could help to challenge often-
persistent dichotomies between the situation of the viewer/reader/listener and that of 
the often-distant observed. 
All of the abovementioned commentators engage to a certain extent with 
previously discussed theorists of modem media, whose work overlaps in places with 
their own. Sontag is critical of theorists such as Baudrillard and Debord. For her, their 
assertion that reality has been replaced by simulations and images results in the 
universalisation of the experiences of a small, privileged group of Westerners who have 
the luxury of becoming spectators to other peoples' pain while ignoring those who 
refuse to view television images in such a cynical way. Cohen's reading is similar; 
while he has some praise for Baudrillard's work, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, he 
72See Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 101-103. 
73 Ian Walker, "Desert Stories or Faith in Facts?", in The Photographic Image in Digital Culture, ed. Martin 
Lister, 244 (London: Routledge, 1995). 
74 Lister, The Photographic Image in Digital Culture, 40. 
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believes that it is a relativistic work, along with that of other authors he labels 
'postmodernist', which curtails any ability these authors might have to judge events 
ethically. For Cohen there is still a 'real' vantage point from which to prove the 'truth' 
of represented events.7s 
Boltanski's critique of Baudrillard is more subtle; he is primarily worried that 
too much focus on the media form of imagery itself will allow people to bracket off or 
forget the content of images. Recognising the view of some that charity is becoming a 
mediatised, entertainment industry, he stresses the importance of public speech and 
discussion for raising awareness and aid for suffering, rather than simple recourse to 
pity-motivated imagery.76 Burnett has the most detailed comment on Baudrillard. Like 
Sontag, he feels that Baudrillard is overly pessimistic about the world of images, seeing 
it as overwhelmingly violent, consumption-oriented and narcissistic for viewing 
subjects. According to Burnett, Baudrillard reifies the image into a negative ideological 
construct and ends up precluding the possibilities of images being multifaceted, 
ambiguous and a potentially positive force for change and creativity. This being said, 
Burnett suggests that Baudrillard has often been misread as a prophet hailing the 
arrival of a postmodern world with no reality but only images. He sees Baudrillard as 
profoundly sceptical of current trends and conscious of the political and social impacts 
of the disappearance of certain bodies and representations in a Western world which is 
otherwise bombarded with images.77 
It is not the contention of this work that one should take either a solely negative 
or positive stance regarding 'the West's' current situation of learning about and 
viewing disaster and conflict in 'other' places primarily through mediated options such 
as newspapers, television and the Internet. In his defence from some of these critics, it 
seems doubtful that Baudrillard intends to privilege 'the West' in this way. If anything, 
Baudrillard appears overly-eager to glorify "primitive", non-Western cultures, which 
he believes still understand and accept the importance of "authentic" dialogue and 
75 Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities & Suffering, 280. 
76 Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media & Politics, 177-182. 
77 Burnett, Cultures of Vision: Images, Media & the Imaginary, 210-213 & 319-332. 
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"symbolic exchange". There can be little excuse for belittling all the accounts of 
journalists, aid workers and other individuals who have risked their own safety for 
firsthand reporting of war zones and conflict. The motivations and actions of these 
groups within conflict areas and in the 'developing world' as a whole, however, should 
remain open to questioning and scrutiny. These individuals are not necessarily vulgar 
voyeurs of others' pain, but their actions and presence are also never completely 
benign, 'objective' or 'uninvolved'. In the same sense, the subjects of their study, 
photographs and work resist simple binary categories of good or evil. Baudrillard' s 
work can be used productively without necessarily succumbing to the obvious traces of 
irony and cynicism, particularly in his later work. The work of Sontag and others 
discussed in this section can similarly be brought into this project's engagement with 
various images of 'other' people and places, reminding readers and the author of the 
ambiguous nature of photographs, which allows them to be used as crucial elements in 
a multiplicity of discourses, and the necessity of an ethically-aware approach to their 
interpretation and use. 
Representing War & Death 
In recent years an increasing number of works have been published on the 
media's roles in covering conflicts and humanitarian disasters. As in other areas of 
media and communications studies, focus has varied between those who have 
primarily investigated the dialogue and images associated with conflict reporting and 
those who have explored its political-economy. While few works have been as 
provocative in their language and claims as Baudrillard's The Gulf War Did Not Take 
Place, many similar themes have emerged and have been explored using varying 
degrees of theoretical and empirical study. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait 
prompted an American-dominated but UN-sanctioned response in the first months of 
1991. This has been a popular case study, as many commentators suggest that media 
coverage of this war represented a new stage in terms of war technology, media 
technology and journalistic approaches to conflict coverage. Baudrillard's The Gulf War 
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Did Not Take Place is composed of three essays written before, during and after the 
hostilities, all of which appeared in the French newspaper, Liberation. One of the key 
points illustrated is the extent to which control of the production and circulation of 
conflict images is now seen by many governments as of equal importance to the ability 
to control and direct ever more sophisticated military technology to fight wars. These 
new developments have also been extensively investigated by James DerDerian, who 
labels them as characteristics of 'virtuous war' or 'infowar': 
Broadly conceived, 'infowar' is as old as Sun Tzu's 'strategic factors' 
and as new as the armed forces' Joint Vision 2010 'full-spectrum 
dominance'. However, the new infowar is significantly different from 
past forms in the proliferation of networked computing and the use of 
high-resolution video ... The speed of interconnectivity that the 
computer enables has, more than any other innovation in warfare from 
the stirrup to gunpowder to radar to nukes, shifted the battlefield away 
from the geopolitical to the electromagnetic. Less obviously, the power 
of cyberwar comes from its ability to reproduce as well as to 
deconstruct reality with a real-time verisimilitude that will make future 
war more a contest of signs than of soldiers.78 
While the media have been historically-important propaganda tools in many 
earlier wars, Baudrillard and Der Derian are in agreement that there is little doubt 
about the increasing interconnection of the media and the military in the early 1990s: 
"The media promote the war, the war promotes the media, and advertising competes 
with the war."79 This new level of connectedness, prompted largely by the media's 
increased technological abilities to broadcast 'live' and twenty-four hours a day from 
the 'front' in the Persian Gulf, is viewed in a negative and also an ironic light by 
Baudrillard. His work illustrates ways in which the huge output of media coverage 
during the Gulf War failed, like the war itself, to have any 'real' meaning for viewing 
publics; both coverage and warfare were experienced primarily through hyper-real, 
simulated images: 
78 James DerDerian, Virtuous War: Mapping tlte Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network (Boulder 
CO: Westview Press,2001), 118. 
79 Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 31. 
The war, along with the fake and presumptive warriors, generals, 
experts and television presenters we see speculating about it all through 
the day, watches itself in a mirror: am I pretty enough, am I operational 
enough, am I spectacular enough, am I sophisticated enough to make 
an entry onto the historical stage? Of course, this anxious interrogation 
increases the uncertainty with respect to its possible irruption. And this 
uncertainty invades our screens like a real oil slick, in the image of that 
blind sea bird stranded on a beach in the Gulf, which will remain the 
symbol-image of what we all are in front of our screens, in front of that 
sticky and unintelligible event. so 
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Baudrillard exposes the emptiness, barring entertainment value, of the hours of 
information provided by 'experts' about actions in the Gulf. This 'information' in fact 
provides little or no context for understanding the 'events', which Baudrillard believes 
are more about shows of force than substantive issues in any case. Importantly, this 
war was represented as 'bloodless' by many American news sources, particularly 
television. For the Americans, there was indeed a minimal loss of life; yet the massive 
casualty numbers and destruction of infrastructure needed for life on the Iraqi side of 
this conflict went largely unimaged and unmentioned. Der Derian pursues this theme 
in more depth; he points out that a key aspect of virtuous war is its ability to threaten 
from a distance, with little risk of one or both warring parties sustaining either damage 
or casualties. "On the surface, virtuous war cleans up the political discourse as well as 
the battlefield. Fought in the same manner as they are represented, by real-time 
surveillance and TV 'live-feeds', virtuous wars promote a vision of bloodless, 
humanitarian, hygienic wars."81 
Similarly, the Gulf War is represented in Baudrillard's work as a "dead" or 
"non-war", in which asymmetric power prevents any exchange of violence or 
diplomacy, or much human contact at all, between the warring parties. According to 
Baudrillard, the media collaborate with the military in developing this new form of 
conflict, where the West acts in defense of 'values' without any willingness to engage 
80 Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, 31-32. 
81 DerDerian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network, xv. 
with the beliefs of the 'enemy' or even to treat them as subjects worthy of 
representation: 
For the Americans, the enemy does not exist as such. Nothing personal. 
Your war is of no interest to me, your resistance is of no interest to me. 
I will destroy you when I am ready. Refusal to bargain ... The 
Americans understand nothing in this whole psychodrama of 
bargaining, they are had every time until, with the wounded pride of 
the Westerner, they stiffen and impose their conditions ... For them, the 
time of exchange does not exist.:.For the Americans, bargaining is 
cheap whereas for others it is a matter of honour, (mutual) personal 
recognition, linguistic strategy (language exists, it must be honoured) 
and respect for time (altercation demands a rhythm, it is the price of 
there being an Other). The Americans have no account of these 
primitive subtleties. They have much to learn about symbolic 
exchange.82 
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Baudrillard's work is often deliberately hyperbolic and provocative, but several 
important points for this work emerge from it. For the majority of Western audiences, 
surface-level images and words on the flat planes of screens or newspaper pages are 
their only forms of engagement with international conflicts and interventions. New 
technology allows some means of access to these sites, in the form of simulacra, but 
cannot provide other forms of connection, which are often forgotten about or denied. 
DerDerian is explicit about this loss, that of the 'human' element previously 
inescapable in conflict. He fears that the increasing speed of technologies in the media-
military network may lead to "quick military fixes" replacing the "deliberative process 
of diplomacy".83 In the cases of both Somalia and Iraq, the use of asymmetric warfare 
to ensure a minimal loss of American lives helped to encourage a type of warfare, and 
the production of media coverage, from which civilian casualties on the 'other' side 
were largely absent, much as Baudrillard and DerDerian outline in the case of the 1991 
Gulf War. When situationS with the population of the state being intervened upon 
became difficult, in both cases a military fix was undertaken, as the above authors 
82 Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, 54-55. 
83 DerDerian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network, 147. 
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suggest, at the expense of more measured and diplomatic options. When the 'other' 
sides in conflict were able to become powerful image generators, as in the cases of 
'Black Hawk down' and the contractor killings, control of images was momentarily lost 
by Western policymakers. At these points, the affects of images of 'our' dead were 
pronounced in a Western media environment where these sorts of visuals were rare. It 
will be important for future work in this area to consider the ways in which new 
technologies of polling and surveying media audiences may also fuel policy shifts 
towards responses driven by the necessity for speed over measured consideration, 
following perceived public angst about particular images. 
The political economy of media production and representation 
Theorists such as Sontag, Boltanski, Cohen and Burnett from the previous 
section all assume the existence of' compassion fatigue' as a potential for media 
audiences bombarded by images of suffering. The mostly 'old-fashioned' types of 
violence and disaster discussed by these authors are represented in many areas as 
'primordial', incomprehensible and unstoppable. Commentators like Baudrillard and 
Der Derian are more focused on the other end of the violence spectrum; the state of 
affairs in their examples is viewed more as a' seduction' of audiences through the use of 
simulacra and the pursuit of high-tech, bloodless wars. Susan Moeller's work provides 
valuable insights at this juncture; she explores the much-dis_cussed but under-theorized 
concept of 'compassion fatigue', mentioning the significance of the site of audiences as 
well as the content and presentation style of media coverage. Despite Moeller's 
statements about the importance of audience analysis, however, her empirical work 
maintains a focus on the content and political-economic situation of media production. 
Compassion fatigue is a concept that remains largely undeveloped through direct study 
and engagement with audiences. Research in this area would benefit from increased 
engagement with audience reception of media images and narratives. 
According to Moeller, compassion fatigue acts as an a priori restraint on media, 
with some stories never being told due to an assumed lack of public appeal. She also 
54 
suggested that compassion fatigue can abet American, and more generally Western, 
self-interest by reinforcing simplistic and formulaic coverage. This leads to the further 
demand that coverage be sensational and arresting to get aired or printed. Compassion 
fatigue can also encourage media to abandon stories quickly due to the presumption 
that Western publics will quickly grow bored of similar or repeated stories. The earlier-
discussed perception of Africa and much of the 'developing' world as being low-
priority and low-interest news for Western audiences is reinforced by Moeller. She 
points out that post-Cold War cutbacks in the numbers of foreign correspondents 
stationed abroad have increasingly forced journalists to 'parachute' into situations for 
short periods of time. In terms of structuring media reports, a general trend towards 
abbreviating news items and decreasing foreign news budgets has, according to 
Moeller, led to the increased use of 'voiceover' on top of images so that journalists do 
not even have to be present at the site of events but can simply package information 
and images from wire services or freelancers.84 Moeller's comments are relevant both to 
the Somalia intervention and to media coverage of Fallujah, Iraq, where voiceover was 
a frequently-used technique for coverage, and are valuable for returning to 
consideration of the political and economic environments in which media coverage is 
produced. 
In contrast to those who stress the novelty of various aspects of the media-
military-government relationship during the 1991 Gulf War are theorists who point out 
the extent to which news production has always been closely linked to the political and 
economic structures with which it co-exists. In this sense, the Gulf War would exhibit 
some new representational and structural aspects but it would also share many areas of 
continuity with past conflicts. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries much of 
global media have become multinational and conglomerated businesses, dominated by 
English-language giants primarily in Great Britain and the USA.85 The majority of 
84 Susan Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death (New York: 
Routledge, 1999). 
85 This issue is discussed by almost all commentators on media and conflict including: Susan Carruthers, 
Day a Kishan Thussu, Bartholomew Sparrow, and the Glasgow Media Group. 
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Western media organisations are private, profit-making businesses who need to 
provide their shareholders with good returns through the selling of advertising space. 
There are concerns, notably those articulated by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, 
that these conditions of existence create sets of structures and operating procedures 
which make it difficult for individual journalists to produce original stories or to frame 
reports in ways that might challenge the prevailing economic and social status quo. 
Chomsky and Herman suggest that it is much harder to see processes of propaganda 
creation in capitalist societies where the media are free, privately-owned and portray 
themselves as spokespeople for free speech and community interests. Yet, as they 
illustrate, high start-up costs for media make it extremely difficult for a small player to 
survive in the media and communications sphere. Consequently, most agenda and 
news-setting are determined by a few, very wealthy companies. 
Because advertising income is of major importance for the budgets of most 
media enterprises, advertisers have significant influence over media producers. 
Chomsky and Herman attribute the dearth of 'left-wing' news providers to the fact that 
media with this type of reputation have found it increasingly difficult to find funding in 
a largely-corporate environment. Following from the above points in their exposure of 
differentials in power relations, Chomsky and Herman outline the disciplining 
mechanisms for media who attempt to disagree with the stance of government or large 
business. The work of large, corporate public relations (PR) teams has largely replaced 
the research and investigation that would be otherwise required by journalists; these 
PR teams can flood the media with 'facts' to obscure or highlight certain issues. If these 
organisations can gather 'experts' to testify on their behalf, the media may then have to 
incur a significant amount of difficulty and expense in order to prove their 'unpopular' 
point. s6 
While the 1991 Gulf War triggered much discussion, several commentators 
highlight continuities in structures and cultures of war coverage dating back to the 
86 EdwardS. Herman & Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media 
(London: Vintage, 1994), 20-26. 
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World Wars and particularly to the Vietnam War. The 'Uncensored War': the Media and 
Vietnam, Daniel Hallin's work on media coverage of the Vietnam War, has been of 
particular influence for theorists of media and conflict. Hallin used his case study to 
support the idea of a co-dependency relationship between the media and government, 
arguing that t~e twentieth century emphasis on 'objective journalism' actually led to 
closer ties between journalists and stat~ organisations. Government officials routinely 
became the 'expert', 'credible' sources from whom journalists gathered their 
information and frame of reference for an event. Just as journalists often depend upon 
policymakers to present them with 'relevant' news to cover, policymakers need 
journalists to publicise and promote issues and actions that are important to them so 
that the general public become aware of their undertakings. Hallin, like Herman and 
Chomsky, points to the creation of self-referential circles of information and storylines 
through this co-dependency. During and after the Vietnam War, Hallin notes that the 
press consistently adopted the frameworks presented by government officials over 
alternatives from academics or war veterans, for example.87 Hallin believes that 
journalists only rarely challenge dominant government perspectives or 'status quo' 
viewpoints. Chomsky and Herman's empirical work corresponds with that of Hallin; 
they cite the media's reliance on information provided by government and business 
leaders as one of their five 'filters' on media coverage.88 
Hallin concludes that the problem with media coverage of Vietnam was its 
quality, not quantity. He feels that the American government frequently sent mixed 
messages about its aims and approaches in the region when using the media to 
communicate; this occurred both deliberately and due to internal disagreement. 
Despite their ability to access many areas of conflict in Vietnam and tell stories from the 
'front', Hallin believes that American media occupied a relatively conservative vantage 
point during the conflict. Their primary 'expert' sources for framing events remained 
key Administration officials; critical perspectives on the war only began to emerge 
87 S~e Daniel Hallin, The 'Uncensored War': the Media and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986). 
88 Herman & Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 2. 
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consistently once a serious split in agreement over Vietnam policy occurred within the 
US government. These factors, in Hallin's eyes, resulted in the American public never 
gaining a good understanding of why the US went to war in Vietnam or why their 
actions there ultimately resulted in failure. 
Bartholomew Sparrow undertakes a more general study of many of the same 
issues as Hallin, Herman and Chomsky in his work, Uncertain Guardians: The News 
Media as a Political Institution. Sparrow speaks specifically of media-government 
relations in the US, but many of his comments are relevant for other Western media and 
governments. Sparrow argues that there is a strong public perception of the media as 
guardians of public interest against government corruption; this perception was 
particularly re-enforced in the 1960s and 1970s during the Vietnam War and the 
Watergate scandal. Journalistic codes echo these high ideals, holding journalists to the 
moral watchdog role they often believe they are fulfilling. In contrast to these 
prevailing beliefs, Sparrow suggests that the wider political and economic environment 
largely prevents the media from acting in this ideal' guardian' role; in fact, the media 
are subject to many external forces.89 Like Hallin, Sparrow believes that the media's key 
role is not primarily to provide a broad range of information to publics but rather to be 
agenda-setters in their packaging of issues and images. The media also function as 
attention-getters for certain issues; they confer legitimacy upon them and act as 
channels for persuasion and motivation. The give and take, co-dependent relationship 
between journalists and policymakers is again discussed. In order for journalists to 'get 
the scoop' and governments to 'get good press', productive relations must be 
maintained between these two groups. Relationships between individual journalists 
and particular government sources are often developed, feeding an already competitive 
environment between media organisations, which compete for sources as well as 
market share and advertisers. 
89 Bartholomew Sparrow, Uncertain Guardians: The News Media as a Political Institution (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999), 4. 
In her work, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the 20th Century 
Susan Carruthers also explores the media's mixed role of both supporting and 
challenging states' wartime actions. She suggests that the media's relationship with 
policymakers is often ambiguous in terms of whether the media is leading 
interpretation of events themselves or adopting the discourses used by 'experts' and 
politicians.90 Like Hallin, she believes, however, that, for the most part, policy is only 
swayed by media organisations when it is already controversial or debated among 
policymakers. Carruthers feels that, increasingly, 'real-time' television may have 
somewhat of a 'push in-pull out' effect on governors by compressing their decision 
times to fit a twenty-four hour news cycle. 
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All of the abovementioned ideas challenge straightforward understandings of 
the 'CNN effect', a concept which argues that widespread media coverage of certain 
conflicts or issues can have a large impact on policymakers' decisions to involve 
themselves in a situation or to disengage from it. Prime examples given of this 
phenomenon include the Vietnam War, the Ethiopian famine of 1984-85 and the 
Somalia intervention, two of which predate the creation of CNN. Hallin, Sparrow and 
Carruthers argue the reverse, that it is more likely that a government or international 
organisation's interest or involvement in a particular conflict will be the driving force 
for media coverage. Carruthers also argues that in many cases the context and 
background of a story are less important than its potential to be brief and dramatic; 
conflicts or differences of opinion supported by compelling imagery tend to make the 
best 'news events'. As will be seen in the following sub-section, particularly in the case 
of the Somalia intervention there is strong evidence for the idea that the media's 
coverage patterns largely followed American governmental and UN actions in the state. 
90 Susan Carruthers, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the 201h Century (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2000), 6-8 & 206. 
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Covering Somalia: political and economic factors 
Only a small group of scholars have looked at the effects of media coverage on 
the Somalia intervention in particular. Their primary concerns have been trying to 
establish whether a causal link exists between amounts of media coverage of the 
Somalia crisis and policy actions of the Bush government of the time. The Somalia 
intervention has been a popular case study for those concerned with testing the 
existence of 'the CNN effect' in relations between the media, governments, 
organisations and audiences. Somalia is seen as important due to the fact that media 
images, first of famine and Marines landing on a beach and then of US soldiers' bodies 
being desecrated, were shown shortly before significant American governmental 
actions were taken, suggesting a connection between the two. 
The studies have used a variety of methods to test this assertion, such as article 
counting, content analysis, elite interviewing and bureaucratic modelling. A general 
consensus which appears to have emerged is very similar to the view supported by 
Hallin, Sparrow and Carruthers: the media and government are co-dependent most of 
the time. In the specific case of Somalia, most of the authors cited below argue that 
there is little evidence to support a claim that media coverage drove the Bush 
administration to intervene in Somalia. If anything, these analytical works suggest that 
the media followed the US administration into Somalia. 
One key exception to this general conclusion is the work of Peter Viggo 
Jakobsen, who argues that because no US national interests were at stake the 
intervention was justified solely on the basis of needing to end the human suffering 
shown in the media. Thus, Jakobsen's rationale is that, because there was no other 
'good' reason for the US to intervene in Somalia besides 'humanitarianism', 
policymakers must have been at least somewhat swayed by media coverage. 91 Several 
other analysts do not make this assumption and instead conduct a more detailed study 
of varying amounts of Somalia media coverage. They argue that the volume of 
91 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace 
Enforcement After the Cold War?" Journal of Peace Research 33, No.2 (1996): 209. 
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coverage matters in determining how much effect the media will have on publics and 
policymakers. Therefore, low amounts of media coverage are taken to mean that the 
media were not actually the ones pushing the story and thus likely would not have had 
a large influence on policymakers. 
Analysts who do not believe that media coverage was a primary factor in 
drawing US forces into Somalia do not, however, deny the media's influence altogether. 
Several key figures involved in the Somalia operation, including Ambassador Robert 
Oakley and Walter Clarke, Deputy Chief of Mission, do believe that President Bush felt 
a personal moral commitment to act in Somalia, based on seeing and hearing reports of 
the suffering.92 While this affect may not have been sufficient to fully determine the 
Bush administration's choice to intervene, once troops were in the field they inevitably 
became characters in Somalia's mediatized story of conflict, suffering and potential 
reconciliation. From this point of political action, American public opinion of the 
mission in Somalia, and to a significantly lesser extent that of Somalis, became sources 
of information to be commented on and solicited by media and government. 
Perception of the mission, a key focus of this project, is not the primary interest of most 
of authors whose work is discussed below. Their focus is mainly on how the decision 
to intervene was made and they present complementary ways of understanding this 
decision despite the fact that their methodological concepts for approaching the 
intervention differ. 
Conflict or divergent 'expert' opinions are seen as key for all the scholars in 
generating media interest in a situation. As Jonathan Mermin notes in his article, 
"Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven 
Foreign Policy'': "Although Congress had expressed concern over Somalia in the 
spring [of 1992], it had not challenged the Bush administration's policy of working 
through the UN to achieve a diplomatic solution ... Conflict and movement only 
appeared in July, when Kassebaum and Simon declared the response of the Bush 
92 See Oakley and Clarke interviews on website for PBS Frontline, "Ambush in Mogadishu", 
http://www. pbs.org!wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ ambush/interviews 
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administration inadequate and urged a change in policy."93 The Kassebaum and Simon 
declaration in this quote refers to the comments of a Republican senator, Nancy 
Kassebaum, who visited Somalia to witness the humanitarian crisis there firsthand in 
the summer of 1992, and Democratic senator Paul Simon, who supported her call for 
US intervention, contrary to the stated approach of the Bush administration. This 
splitting of' official' American opinion on Somalia is recognised by all the authors as a 
key point at which the media increased its coverage of the region, which until this point 
had been almost non-existent. 
This emphasis on the potential of key 'actors' corresponds with Frank Stech's 
analysis of popular news frames. He stresses the importance of the "personalised 
actor" subframe, where individual leaders, spokespeople and organisations become the 
"normalised, official sources" who tie otherwise potentially fragmented actions 
together.94 Other academics have presented slightly different factors as being of key 
importance for understanding why Somalia came onto the American agenda in a much 
more significant way in late 1992. However, the assumption of the importance of 
following 'key actors' through a storyline remains. As Stech suggests: "Media images 
convey a dramatized story subframe: beginnings, action style, plot lines and sub-plots, 
settings and scenery, rising and falling action ... and endings that close with a chorus 
Goumalists, politicians, experts, the public or all four) interpreting the moral lessons of 
the drama."95 Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus also point to the importance of 
looking at specific individuals who are able to influence the decisions of key 
policymakers.96 These authors follow the actions and motivations of Andrew Natsios, 
an official at the American Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), illustrating 
his individual success and importance for bringing the Somalia story to the media and 
93 Jonathan Mermin, "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven 
Foreign Policy", Political Science Quarterly 112, No.3 (Autumn 1997): 393. 
94 Frank J. Stech, "Winning CNN Wars", Parameters (Autumn 1994), 39-40, http:Ucarlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/a-index.htm (accessed July 18, 2007). 
95 Stech, "Winning CNN Wars", 40. Italics are author's own. 
96 Steven Livingston & Todd Eachus, "Humanitarian Crises and US Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN 
Effect Reconsidered", Political Communication 12, Is. 4 (1995). 
key policymakers through persistent media briefings and meetings with senior 
administration figures. 
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Other important work on the Somalia intervention includes Piers Robinson's 
article counting and content analysis of the tone of print articles and television stories 
during a period of the lead-up to the American intervention in Somalia.97 This is 
probably the closest of all the studies undertaken on Somalia to the methodology of this 
work. Robinson comes to similar conclusions to the authors mentioned above. His 
counting indicates that the American media had almost no sustained interest in Somalia 
before the decision was made to send in US troops. The media therefore appears not to 
have induced the 'CNN effect' at all but rather to have largely followed American 
governmental actions. Robinson found that during this initial build-up to the 
intervention coverage was overwhelmingly supportive of the mis~ion and empathetic 
towards Somalis.98 This discovery will be an interesting point from which to explore 
changes in the content and style of media discourse, which likely helped to encourage 
growing uncertainty and eventual wide-scale American public rejection of the mission. 
The authors discussed in this sub-section are relevant for this research because 
their work helps to break down and analyse the complex, multifaceted interactions 
which comprise the beginning of 'the Somalia intervention', particularly those between 
the media and governments. Their work provides strong evidence for scepticism 
regarding the 'CNN effect', along with that of Hallin, Sparrow and Carruthers. This 
project will also support the premise that, for the most part, media discourses are 
heavily influenced by the policy initiatives, opinions and statements of government 
officials, as well as international and domestic organisations deemed to be 
'authoritative' or 'expert'. Numerous examples, in the cases of the Somalia intervention 
and US involvement in Fallujah, Iraq, will illustrate that the content and timing of 
media stories is closely linked to the activities of influential, governing bodies. The 
97 See Piers Robinson, "Operation Restore Hope and the Illusion of a News Media Driven Intervention", 
Political Studies 49 (2001 ). 
98 Analysis of the tone of articles during the first thirteen days after the announcement of the intervention 
was done on the basis of counting the number of times three key words from each of four frames labelled 
'support', 'critical', 'empathy' and 'distancing/neutrality' were used. 
media are thus understood by this work as an integrated, co-dependent part of their 
political and economic environments, rather than acting primarily as highly-
independent, investigative organisations. 
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This project will go beyond these authors in terms of the scope of media 
coverage it analyses, however, and will expand greatly upon analysis of themes in the 
content of this coverage. Additionally, no assumption will be made that media 
coverage approaches are exclusively' set' or 'caused' by government discourses. The 
importance of studying the content of media items in this project rests instead on the 
idea that there is a high level of interaction and shared development of interpretive 
discourses between governments and policymakers, various organisations, media and 
audiences. Indeed, the extent to which individuals can be classified into only one of 
such groups is questionable. It is to be expected, as suggested the work described 
above, that the levels of influence one 'group' has over another are usually unequal; 
however, these relational influences can be subject to change. 
Structural studies: embedding in Iraq 2003 and the current media landscape 
The co-dependency relationship between media and governments has been fed 
in a circular fashion during recent and current conflict periods, which are often 
characterised by a vast production of 'information' for journalists to report and 
continual 'breaking news' items to which government officials must respond. In these 
situations, journalists become very dependent on the policymakers and bureaucrats 
who 'feed them' new information for publication or broadcast. Almost all major US 
government departments now have their own public affairs and media relations 
divisions which control flows of information to the media and respond to media stories 
and enquiries.99 At times, these agencies can easily create an excess of information, 
which can overwhelm journalists working to tight deadlines in a twenty-four hour 
news cycle. 
99 Sparrow, Uncertain Guardians, 11 & 71-72. 
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Several analysts of media and conflict, including Carruthers, Daya Kishan 
Thussu, and Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer, discuss the ways in which an 
abundance of information may actually have minimal positive effect on the analytical 
depth of journalists' work when they have little or no time to research, read or evaluate 
this information before their stories go to press or air.100 Similarly, there is also no 
guarantee that increased amounts of broadcast time or print space ensure greater depth 
of coverage, as has often been evident during crisis reporting in the Gulf, Afghanistan 
or in New York in the wake of 9/11. As Baudrillard and others have pointed out, much 
of twenty-four hour news coverage can become more speculative than substantial in 
these situations. 
In their work on embedded media coverage of the Iraq war starting in 2003, 
Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer suggest that the immediacy and proximity of 
reporters to their military units meant that the larger significance of American military 
actions in Iraq could be lost in the large numbers of stories filed by individual embeds 
who only were able to ascertain activities within their very small sphere of access.101 
Unfortunately, journalists who covered the war from the American-created media 
centre in Qatar often seemed to fare little better in their efforts at gaining a broader 
picture of the war. Many complained of time-consuming security procedures, delays in 
the Bush administration's confirmation of reported actions, a clear 'pecking order' 
favouring TV reporters during question periods, and the predominance of 'spin' over 
factual news provided by media briefers.1o2 
In his co-edited work with Des Freedman, War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 
24/7, Daya Kishan Thussu' s assessment of modern media-military relations is similar to 
that of Carruthers, Hallin and Sparrow. Thussu believes that, rather than challenging 
government norms, early twenty-first century media has encouraged a blurring of 
media-military boundaries with the use of embedded reporters and military personnel 
100 See Day a Kishan Thussu & Des Freedman eds., War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7 (London: Sage 
Publications, 2003), 120; Carruthers, The Media at War: Communication & Conflict in the 20'h Century, 199 and 
Howard Tumber & Jerry Palmer, The Media at War: the Iraq Crisis (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 25. 
101 Tumber & Palmer, The Media at War: the Iraq Crisis, 25. 
102 Ibid, 66-68. 
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working as consultants for media programs. He points to the importance of Der 
Derian's concept of 'virtuous war' to explain this new position of media as an integral 
part of modern warfare, along with increasing ties between military training and 
technology programs and Hollywood film and video game production.103 Embedding 
is an especially important part of fostering this bond; when they are embedded, 
journalists are often reliant on their military units for technology, communication links, 
transportation, and, most basically, their safety and protection in a war zone.104 Many 
journalists have expressed concern about the embedding procedure; they point to the 
risks to their impartiality and the ways in which embedding might affect their 
treatment should they be captured by 'enemy' fighters. 
Tumber and Palmer's work extensively covers journalists' thoughts on 
embedding in the Iraq crisis of 2003, where more than 500 of over 3000 journalists who 
flocked to the region were embedded.105 In this case, the embedding plan allotted 
certain numbers of places to news organisations, rather than to individual reporters. 
This system meant that it was very difficult for freelancers to gain accreditation. The 
US Defense Department could effectively sanction news organisations for 
correspondent 'misbehaviour' by allotting them fewer or less 'choice' positions.106 
While the Pentagon insisted that embeds would not be 'held hostage' by a military unit 
and could leave whenever they wanted, once embedded, reporters' freedom of 
movement was greatly curtailed. If journalists decided to leave their units to conduct 
independent reporting, they were effectively barred from returning to their embed 
units later. Additionally, part of the embed arrangement required journalists and their 
news organisations to sign documents promising that they would comply with rules 
about what they could and could not report, primarily for reasons surrounding the 
safety of the unit and protecting future military strategies. Many journalists, however, 
found it difficult to present coherent reports while omitting all potentially 
103 SeeDer Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network. 
104 Thussu & Freedman, War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 2417, 120. 
1os Tumber & Palmer, The Media at War: the Iraq Crisis, 1. 
106 Ibid, 14-15. 
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compromising information for the military; this provoked some media-military tension 
during the crisis. 
Some media professionals responded positively to embedding. They argued 
that it gave many journalists a chance to develop a strong understanding of how the 
military works from the inside. Others, however, confirmed the fears of several of the 
abovementioned authors that the embedding process proved problematic when trying 
to develop context and a broad picture of the conflict. Embedding also increased safety 
risks for journalists in what was already one of the most lethal wars yet for the media:107 
Philip Knightley described the Iraq War as the one 'when journalists 
seemed to become a target' ... and John Simpson, the BBC world affairs 
editor, who was injured in a 'friendly fire' incident, blamed the deaths 
of many of the journalists on the 'ultimate act of censorship'. He 
believes that the system of embedding meant that journalists operating 
independently of the US and British troops became potential targets: 'In 
this war, the Americans were more than twice as dangerous to the 
proper exercise of journalism, the freedom of reporters to see for 
themselves what was happening, as the Iraqis were.' 108 
Discussions about the style of media presentation of conflict and the media's 
ability to cover conflict areas also link clearly to issues surrounding the media's 
structural set-up. In his works, Daya Kishan Thussu speaks extensively about the 
political economy of the media. He claims that TV has quickly gained status as the 
most privileged and authoritative source of information over print and radio news. 
English-language productions have dominated worldwide, and continue to, in all types 
of media; within the hierarchy of TV news, British and American networks remain 
ahead. CNN is estimated to reach 150 million homes in 212 countries while BBC World 
reaches 241 million people in 200 countries. Among other forms of media, the TV 
107 Figures from the IFJ [International Federation of Journalists] show that numbers of journalists killed in 
the 2003 Iraq War were unprecedented. Over the 21 years of war in Vietnam between 1954 and 1975, some 
63 journalists were killed. In the Iraq conflict, 17 journalists or media staff died in just six weeks. The 
casualty rate among media staff was higher than in any other conflict and, in proportion to the numbers 
present, even higher than among soldiers of the coalition. From Tumber & Palmer, The Media at War: the 
Iraq Crisis, 36. 
1os Tumber & Palmer, The Media at War: The Iraq Crisis, 37-38. 
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market generally is especially lucrative and expected to keep growing. Global numbers 
of TV sets have tripled since 1980; much of this growth has been in Asia and a result of 
improving satellite penetration of once isolated areas. 109 
At the same time, the economics and format of TV news is changing 
dramatically. Audiences for peak-time evening news are declining from over ninety 
percent of total viewers in the 1960s to around thirty percent in 2000. This decline in 
news watching has happened alongside the American deregulation of cross-media 
ownership laws in the rnid-1980s.11° This step prompted large mergers of news 
networks with entertainment companies, such as the AOL-Tirne Warner-EM! merger 
(the biggest in history), and a move towards a more mixed 'infotainment' style of news 
presentation. When interest in traditional news broadcasting appears to be declining 
significantly, the format in which expanding world audiences receive their TV 'news' is 
an important area for further investigation. New styles and contents of news 
production will likely have important influences on how local, national and 
international events are conceptualised by audiences. 
Carruthers' vision of the political economy and social structures in which the 
media function is also similar to those of Thussu, Hallin, Sparrow and, to a large extent, 
Moeller. Reporters and news editors are seen as constrained by a globalised media 
business situation. Carruthers suggests that financial considerations become especially 
important with foreign news coverage because it remains the most expensive news 
media venture.111 It is also routinely assumed that audiences are most interested in the 
news of those 'closest' to them. This often results in different values being put on 
human lives based on their proximity to 'horne' audiences. Some surveyed audiences, 
however, have remarked thattheir primary difficulty with foreign news is not lack of 
109 Thussu & Freedman_ War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 2417, 118-120. 
110 Ibid, 118-120. 
111 Carruthers, The Media at War, 15. 
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interest but rather an inability to understand stories due to lack of historical knowledge 
and context of the issue area.112 
According to the range of commentators discussed above, the result of these 
structural and stylistic media changes for Western publics is that most 
readers/viewers/listeners of news are not appealed to in their capacity as voters/citizens 
but as potential consumers of advertised goods, whose corporate producers determine 
the economic viability of news organisations. This dependence on advertisers means 
that these businesses must be kept happy; newsrooms therefore often become places of 
hierarchy and convention. Indeed, Sparrow cites that an average of seventy percent of 
news story content is reproduced across the major Western media outlets. Thussu 
produces a similar figure, claiming that three global wire services, Associated Press 
(AP), Reuters and Agence France Press are the source of about eighty percent of 
worldwide public information. 113 These figures hint at the similarities in decision-
making processes across media-corporation divides, as well as the increasing tendency 
of these corporations to cost-cut by purchasing pre-packaged yet customisable news 
from a small number of other businesses, the wire services. Meanwhile, the general 
public finds it hard to judge the quality of news output, since few people have time to 
cross-check their media sources and tend to take their news on faith from a few, 
'trusted' sources. 
There has been recent academic interest in the possibility of public resistance to 
the greatly-consolidated political-economy of Western, and indeed global, media. The 
Internet has been especially useful in providing groups and individuals with little 
political power and few economic resources with an alternative means of producing 
and circulating information and has become an important source of information for 
many global citizens. While this new potential must be readily acknowledged, 
particularly during 2004 at the time of the Fallujah intervention, the Internet was only 
m See Making Sense of the World, A joint BBC News- DFID study of public perceptions of television 
coverage of developing countries, October 2002, www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/makingsense.pdf 
m Sparrow, Uncertain Guardians, 131 and Daya Kishan Thussu, Intemational Communication: Continuity & 
Change (London: Arnold Publishers, 2000}, 152. 
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in development stages during the early 1990s when the Somalia intervention took place. 
Sources of news for audiences were thus largely restricted to radio, print media and, to 
a great extent, television during this earlier case study and analysed coverage 
investigates representation of the intervention across some of this range. To maintain a 
comparative focus based on analysis of similar forms of media, the Fallujah case study 
coverage was sourced from similar, mainstream newspaper and television sources. 
More detailed discussion of the selection process for case studies and coverage sources 
will appear in the following methodology chapter. 
Conclusion: A Return to the Larger Picture 
As is obvious from the diversity of work in this chapter, a wide range of 
academic literature can be applied to study of the media's role in Western societies in 
general and specific terms. I have charted a course from broad studies of societal 
institutions, the discursive nature of language and visual artefacts, and the politics and 
history of various forms of representation and identity-creation towards more 
specialised research areas that are specifically focused on aspects of the functioning 
and/or the content of Western mass media. Even narrower fields of study, such as 
media coverage of conflicts and disasters, still contain a sizable amount of variation. 
Research methods range from the more abstract musings of Baudrillard to Tumber and 
Palmer's interview-based investigations of journalists' experiences covering conflict. 
While linkages are often claimed and subject matter routinely overlaps, the 
methodological approaches of media and communications research appear to roughly 
split into two research fields, which as P. Eric Louw suggested can be loosely labelled 
the political-economic and the cultural.t14 With the exception of Hallin's work and that 
of The Glasgow Media Group115, however, little detailed case study research has been 
done by either side. Claims are made on both sides and supporting examples are 
114 Louw, The Media & Cultural Production, 2. 
115 See John Eldridge ed., Getting the Message. News, Truth & Power (London: Routledge, 1993) and John 
Eldridge ed., Glasgow Media Group Reader Volume 1 (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
offered, but these only rarely come from sustained engagement with coverage of a 
specific event. 
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As Susan Carruthers argues in a recent book chapter which attempts to bridge 
the gap between these two scholarly approaches: "In this division of labour (somewhat 
schematically overdrawn here), media studies, NGO activists, and international 
relations scholars tend to concentrate on Western policy processes and outcomes, while 
Africanists, anthropologists, and political geographers deconstruct the poverty of 
media imagery and analysis of complex crises."116 Following Carruthers, this project 
will also attempt to work across these boundaries, precisely by engaging with existing 
ideas in both roughly-defined 'fields' and adding substantive case study findings. The 
project undertakes analysis of a greater amount of Somalia media coverage over a more 
sustained period than academics such as Mermin, Livingston and Eachus, and 
Robinson, who have looked specifically at the influence of media coverage in the lead-
up to the intervention in 1992. It thus helps to add to the pool of research on media 
coverage of this event. Coverage is also engaged with in a substantially different way, 
one which is more focused on thinking through the cultural implications of coverage 
content. The dynamics and flows of influence between various governmental, media, 
NGO, international organisation and audience groups are considered, but are not 
theorised or investigated in the causal way undertaken by these other academics. I 
would argue that the boundaries between these 'groups' are often fluid and unclear 
and thus causal links are difficult, if not impossible to pinpoint. 
In speaking to the more 'cultural' side of media studies, I have used a research 
approach which owes much to those who have pioneered the development of the 
concept of 'discourse' in social sciences. Two key figures at the forefront of this type of 
theory are Foucault and Derrida. The detail of my case study research, however, will 
also help to support the existing findings of several academics who are also applying 
the work of Foucault and Derrida to areas of cultural geography, media studies and 
11 6 Susan L. Carruthers, "Tribalism and Tribulation: Media Constructions of' African savagery' and 
'Western Humanitarianism' in the 1990s", in Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime, eds. Stuart Allan & 
Barbie Zelizer, 156 (London: Routledge, 2004). 
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international politics, including Gregory, Der Derian, Stephen Graham and David 
Campbell.117 In very recent case studies, such as that of Fallujah, highlighting dominant 
themes and providing supporting examples from media coverage can substantiate the 
initial observations of many commentators and academics. 
If the enduring, complex and often damaging relationships between 'the West' 
and' Africa' (one might also broadly read previously-colonised 'others' here) are to be 
exposed and challenged, the Western media's role in perpetuating the maintenance of 
such dichotomizations must be investigated both in terms of the content of its products 
and in terms of its position within the global political economy. The literature surveyed 
and highlighted above represents, in fitting terminology, the theoretical'frame' through 
which the case study material has been approached. The following chapter will deal 
more extensively with the methodological strategies used to undertake this work. 
Further justification and explanation for my case study approach will be found here. 
117 These authors have investigated or engaged with media coverage of a wide variety of areas including: 
Iraq during the 2003 war (Gregory), Iraq during Gulf War I (DerDerian), Fallujah, Iraq (S. Graham) and 
Bosnia and Sudan (D. Campbell). 
Chapter Two - Approaching the Case Studies: A 
Background to Method & Media Sources 
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The preceding literature review chapter outlined the many theoretical 
approaches that have been used to consider concepts of interpretation, knowledge 
creation and discourse, the societal position of photographs, the structure and political 
economy of the media, and the media's coverage of conflicts and disasters. These 
approaches have been influential to this project's overall style, organisation and 
conclusions. This chapter will specifically examine this project's two case studies: the 
Somalia intervention and American attacks on Fallujah, Iraq in 2004. Historically, 
Somalia is of great significance, as it represents the advent of post-Cold War Western 
hopes for leadership of global humanitarian interventions and also illustrates some of 
the immediate problems faced during such undertakings. By the post-9/11 period of 
the comparative case study, Fallujah, American governmental discourses with regards 
to intervening globally were, at least rhetorically, substantially different from the time 
of Somalia. Despite the different geopolitical setting of each case study, there is 
evidence to suggest that particular ways of understanding 'other' places and people 
have remained entrenched and pervasive in daily Western discourses; media play an 
important role in the creation, distribution and perpetuation of these discourses. 
Building on this brief overview this chapter outlines why these two case studies 
were chosen and why a case study-based approach is important for this piece of 
research. A brief discussion of the media sources chosen for specific analysis in both 
cases will then provide some background and justification for use of these particular 
sources. The approach taken to interpret media texts and images, a discourse analysis, 
is also further described. Following this practical description of methodology, 
summaries of the trends in numbers of selected newspaper and television items 
throughout the analysed periods of the Somalia intervention and Fallujah sieges will be 
provided. These summaries will leave readers with a sense of the events' chronologies, 
specifically with regards to media coverage, so that following chapters can focus 
73 
overwhelmingly on coverage content. The counts also help to justify my choice to limit 
analysis of Somalia intervention television coverage throughout the two year 1992-1993 
period and to focus particularly on media coverage during 'high points' in coverage 
production with regards to Fallujah, during the months of April, October and 
November 2004. A final chapter section will re-emphasize the importance of Foucault 
and Derrida' s theoretical contributions to the study of discourses, as the work of these 
two scholars is the primary basis upon which my project builds. 
The Case Studies: Why They Are Important & How They Were Selected 
As was suggested by Susan Carruthers in the previous chapter, analysis and 
critique of media coverage tends to fall roughly into two categories: those who are 
primarily interested in the effects of interactions between media, policymakers, 
organisations and audiences and the results of media representations on policymaking 
processes, and those concerned with the content of media coverage and its affects. Both 
groups have used case studies and historical examples to support their assessments and 
their theoretical points. For those interested in the interaction between media, 
policymakers, organisations and audiences, case studies often appear to be chosen to 
test widespread perceptions about which societal groups had influence over others in 
defining certain events.! Researchers who are predominately interested in the content 
of media coverage often choose cases for study based on the perceived wider 
significance of the case beyond its time and place. Alternately, the goal of the research 
may be to look at the views and experiences of those specifically involved or concerned 
with the case. This project is more closely aligned with the goals of those studying 
content in depth. 
1Daniel Hallin's work on Vietnam War coverage has been widely cited not only because of the large body 
of coverage he drew upon for analysis but also due to widespread public and governmental perceptions 
about the power of media images for decreasing American public support for the War. Investigating the 
legitimacy of these perceptions was one of Hallin's explicit reasons for choosing the Vietnam case study. 
Testing similar assumptions was a research aim for Piers Robinson, Steven Livingston & Todd Eachus and 
Jonathan Mermin in their studies of Somalia, although they go into significantly less depth than Hallin 
when dealing with coverage content. 
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As stated above, the Somalia intervention was chosen to be this work's primary 
case study largely because of its historical timing. Occurring soon after the end of the 
Cold War, events in SOmalia came at a time when America was beginning to 
contemplate its potential new international roles. This was a period of particularly 
obvious flux in policies, budgets and governmental agency roles; old and new 
international paradigms and discourses overlapped and often produced contradictory 
impulses. After the 'success' of the 1991 Gulf War, the US military establishment was 
confident in its ability to wage high tech, predominately air wars. It was less optimistic, 
however, about its role as a potential peace enforcement body in multinational efforts 
to end civil strife overseas; it was these types of actions that it was increasingly being 
encouraged to undertake. It is therefore important to contemplate the perceived 
influences of the Somalia intervention on American foreign policy discourses and 
Americans' and, more broadly 'Western' citizens', perceptions of intervention in 'other' 
places. Post-Somalia, the 1990s remained unsettled, without an obvious dominant 
discourse emerging to structure America's role in the world. 2 
When considering Somalia's influence on the American government, the media, 
and the practice of intervention following the US pullout in early 1994, the spectre of 
the Rwandan genocide haunts international policy history. Western media coverage of 
this event was not extensive during the height of the killings, possibly due both to the 
dangers for journalists of operating in Rwanda but also likely because many Western 
governments, particularly the US, seemed to actively attempt to ignore and downplay 
events that they would not even label' genocide' for fear of being bound by the 
Genocide Conventions to become involved. American failure to lead a world effort to 
stop the violence in Rwanda when it was occurring has frequently been analysed using 
bureaucratic politics methodologies. 3 These studies suggest that communication 
2 For a compilation of work on this subject, see Gearoid O'Tuathail, Simon Dalby & Paul Routledge eds., 
The Geopolitics Reader (London: Routledge, 1998) and Gearoid O'Tuathail, "The Postmodem Geopolitical 
Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millenium", Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 90, No. 1 (March 2000): 166-178 
3 See the work of Samantha Power, such as "Bystanders to Genocide", The Atlantic Monthly (September 
2001), htt.p:Uwww.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/power.htm (accessed June 23, 2007). For specific information 
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between crucial US governmental bodies often broke down, meaning that the scale and 
scope of the events was frequently not passed between political bureaucracies or to the 
general public through news media. Events went underreported or unreported. 
Overarching reasons for these multiple failures were encompassed in terms 
which denote specific ways of understanding past events, such as 'Vietmalia 
syndrome'.4 American diplomat, Richard Holbrooke coined this phrase to suggest that 
experiences from Vietnam and Somalia were continuing to haunt US policymakers 
when decisions on whether to station American troops overseas had to be made.5 Fear, 
excessive fear many suggested, of US casualties was preventing the American 
government from becoming involved in important international activities. Holbrooke 
is only one among many who have attempted to articulate a link between the American 
experience in Somalia and its more recent foreign undertakings. The ways in which the 
Somalia experience may have changed America's use of force overseas, its willingness 
to act as part of multinational peacekeeping teams, and its handling of media reporting 
on its international military actions have been of particular interest to academics, 
international organisations and domestic policymakers and institutions.6 
The US military learned its 'Black Hawk down' lessons almost immediately, and 
began training and technological work to deal with new, often non-state threats seen to 
emerge from urban, civilian-populated areas of 'failed' states. It can be argued that 
America's foreign policy stance did not find a single, powerfully-articulated new 
direction until after the September 11th events. Foreign policy has since been structured 
primarily around 'the war on terror' and dealing pre-emptively with states and 
on media coverage, see Allan Thompson ed., The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (London: Pluto Press, 
2006). 
4 For more on the creation and use of this term, see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random 
House Inc., 1998). Holbrooke felt that the shadow of 'Black Hawk down' events hung heavily over the US 
military during negotiations about how to end conflict in the former Yugoslavia. 
5 See Andrew Lam," An American Tragedy", The Nation online, 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070312/lam (accessed June 23, 2007). 
6 For information on changing US military and administration relationships with media, see Frank J. Stech, 
"Winning ·cNN Wars", Parameters (Autumn 1994): 37-56. Somalia's effects on new military strategies are 
documented in Sgt. 1•1 Class Debbi Newton, "Blackhawk down 10 years later: Remembering the Battle of 
Mogadishu and how it changed the way the military trains", Connecticut Guardian 4, No. 10 (October 2003): 
1-2 & 4-5. 
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organisations deemed to threaten US security. To the extent that Somalia has re-
emerged in current political discourses, it has become linked to this new narrative. 
Much of Muslim Africa is being represented by parts of the US military, as well as some 
politicians and commentators, as a hiding and training ground for al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic terrorist groups now seen to threaten the 'free' world.7 
Lessons from Somalia, particularly those in the military sphere, and the 
development of the 'war on terror' discourse, help to explain a great deal of the 
relevance of this work's second, comparative case study, Fallujah, Iraq in 2004. Iraqi 
leader Saddam Hussein's alleged links to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, and claims 
that he had the capacity to deploy weapons of mass destruction against 'the West', 
were key justifications for the American war against the Iraqi regime and its occupation 
of the country beginning in March 2003. The emergence of 'terrorist' and 'insurgent' 
groups in Iraq meant that much of the US military's new doctrine on fighting urban 
battles with non-traditional enemies were put into effect; many of these principles had 
been developed following the disastrous urban combat experience of 'Black Hawk 
down' in Mogadishu and were 'tested' on Fallujah in particular. 
Likely due to both dissimilar circumstances and lessons learned from past 
conflict involvement, many aspects of the American intervention in Iraq are run 
differently to the Somalia situation. In the case of Iraq, the US acted aggressively and 
pre-emptively, rather than in a humanitarian response to a civil conflict. Analysis and 
comparison of media coverage content, however, will illustrate ways in which the 
discursive representations employed by policymakers and media in Iraq were often 
similar to those used in Somalia over ten years earlier despite the different 
circumstances, different actors involved and changed approaches to managing conflict. 
These discourses can be roughly divided into two broad sections, representation of 
places and people, with many related sub-themes. For example, despite differences in 
7 For examples of this view, see Stewart M. Powell, "Swamp of Terror in the Sahara", Air Force Magazine 
(November 2004): 50-54; Ken Menkhaus, "Chapter 3: Somalia, Global Security and the War on Terrorism", 
The Adelphi Papers 364, No. 1 (March 2004): 49-75 and James Phillips, "Somalia and al-Qaeda: Implications 
for the War on Terrorism", http://www.herita~e.or~/Research/HomelandDefense/BG1526.cfm (accessed 
June 28, 2007). 
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the style of and motivation for the two interventions, discourses of humanitarian care 
and desires to 'democratise' Iraqi and Somali people were common in American 
government statements and media reports from each situation. In both cases, however, 
civilians' opinions and stories regarding their experiences of the interventions were 
often minimal in media coverage, denying these groups a voice on their own 
circumstances. Analysis of Western media representations of Somalia and Fallujah, as 
well as Somali people and Fallujans, supported by coverage examples, will form the 
bulk of this work's research and will contribute to academic study of English-language 
media representation of conflict and disaster. 
While these factors will not be focused on in as much depth, conditions for 
media in both case studies, while significantly different, often appear to have resulted 
in similar trends in media items' content. Media arriving in Iraq entered a situation 
where their access to the country and its people was largely controlled by the American 
military, who established a presence in the country. By contrast, in Somalia many 
Western media outlets were already in situ, had covered aspects of the situation before 
UN and US troops arrived, and had no military restrictions imposed on their activities 
after these groups' arrival. In both situations, however, media faced limitations on their 
ability to report. Physical danger, from both American and 'enemy' groups, was an 
issue in each case. Overt and subtle military and governmental attempts at controlling 
and censoring particular media stories also occurred at various times in both Somalia 
and Fallujah. Rich possibilities for comparison thus exist between these two very 
different American military interventions in terms of linkages through shifting foreign 
policy discourses, in which representations of' other' places and people are key, and in 
terms of conditions for media reporting the conflicts. 
The case study approach 
With the relevance and possibilities for comparison between the two chosen 
case studies laid out above, it is also important to answer the question of why a case 
study approach was taken. The 'deep' case study approach used for this work can be 
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contrasted with one which would have taken a small number of examples of media 
coverage from many different instances of American international intervention. These 
examples could either be from a single media form, such as television, or from a variety 
of mediums. As a primary goal of this project was to explore the possible affects of 
media discourses, I wanted to undertake as detailed and sustained an analysis of each 
case study as possible in order to obtain a sizable volume of coverage material. 
Particularly in the case of Somalia, I wanted to differentiate my work from that of 
others who have primarily analysed media item counts or have looked only at short 
time periods during the intervention in depth.8 These types of studies very rarely deal 
with the content of their surveyed media items in any detail and this project aims to 
add to this area of knowledge. 
In order to locate trends within coverage content, it was deemed important to 
survey a sizable volume of coverage within a 'relevant' period of time. Examples of 
particular visual and narrative styles in coverage that are given in this project thus tend 
to be representative of many other examples that could have been presented or else are 
included as important moments of anomaly and difference found in coverage 
discourses. The length of time over which coverage was surveyed was based, again, on 
historical factors deemed to delimit the scope of the 'event' which media were 
representing. In the primary case of Somalia, coverage analysis was started months 
before the famine became heavily covered by Western media, prompting UN and 
American intervention. A portion of this 'prelude' period was important to analyse, 
despite the fact that coverage was low at this stage, in order to investigate how Somalia 
was being discursively and visually represented before it became 'major' news in the 
early 1990s. For this reason it was also deemed important to review historical academic 
work on Somalia and its people, which is undertaken in Chapter Three. 
The beach landings of Marines in Mogadishu in December 1992 and the 'Black 
Hawk down' events in October 1993 are routinely thought to be important moments of 
s This includes the work of those cited in the 'Covering Somalia' sub-section of "Reporting War and Death" 
in Chapter 1 such as: Jonathan Mermin, Steven Livingston & Todd Eachus, Piers Robinson and Peter Viggo 
Jakobsen. 
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beginning and closure for American involvement in Somalia. They are moments book-
ending this 'event' which are strongly remembered, largely due to their media 
coverage. The analytical period for Somalia therefore encompassed both these 
moments and focuses heavily on coverage during them. Despite a focus on these 
beginning and end periods, a key aim of this project with regards to Somalia was also 
to fill in gaps between these two events. While Somalia is often remembered as two 
particular, and in many ways opposing, moments, I believe it is important to 
deconstruct perceptions of dichotomy or disjuncture between these events. In order to 
develop a deeper understanding of how Somalia and Somalis were represented 
throughout the intervention period, it is crucial to follow their media coverage through 
time, in order to spot changes, continuities and contradictions. 
As a complement to my analysis of Somalia media coverage, I interviewed Paul 
Lowe, a photojournalist, in November 2005. My goal in this interview was to explore a 
journalist's thoughts on how events in Somalia were represented, both by himself and 
by other journalists. Lowe travelled to Somalia twice: in August 1992, when the extent 
of famine there was only beginning to be covered by media, and in December 1992, in 
order to cover the American intervention.9 His comments on taking photographs in 
Somalia, his experiences in Somalia generally, and his overall thoughts on 
photographing conflict and famine situations provided useful evidence and points of 
consideration for my coverage analysis and in my discussions of academic and 
policymaker understandings of the Somalia intervention. While I was unsuccessful in 
gaining further interviews with journalists and media personnel, I believe that such 
interviews would be valuable to pursue in future research. 
The Fallujah case study has been included in an effort to explore how this 
particular Iraqi city and its people were represented by Western media during an 
important time in their recent history, as the city was attacked by American forces twice 
9 In August 1992, Lowe went to Somalia with a minimal guarantee from a European newspaper but says 
essentially he was personally interested in shooting the story of Somalia, particularly in black and white 
film. In December 1992, Lowe had a guarantee from the American Life magazine to cover the troop arrival. 
He did this in colour film but also shot some black and white images. 
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in one year. Historical-discourse and foreign policy-related reasons for comparing 
Fallujah with Somalia have been given above, and have also been discussed in the 
introduction. Due to limited time and resources, study of Fallujah's representation is 
more limited in time scale and with regards to the specificity of media sources analysed 
than Somalia. Study of this case only begins at the moment when Fallujah became 
notorious, particularly in American media coverage. This was the moment of the US 
contractor killings in March 2004, which prompted the first siege in April 2004. 
Coverage of this attack, and a following one in November, are particularly focused 
upon, due to the fact that they represent dramatic high points in media interest in 
Fallujah, as will be numerically illustrated in a following section of this chapter. Again 
due to restrictions on time and resources, the months between the two sieges in April 
and November 2004 are not analysed consistently, unlike the period between the 
beginning and ending moments in Somalia. Despite the fact that it is based on fewer 
media items, the Fallujah case study still aims to highlight and explore continuities, 
contradictions and changes in the ways in which this city and its inhabitants were 
represented and to compare these representations with those of Somalia and Somalis. 
Because a primary research goal of this work is to explore how conflict and 
violence are represented in 'Western' media, British and American sources were 
chosen. I made these selections not only because of the lack of language barrier for my 
analysis but also because of the dominance of these two countries in global media 
production, as well as within 'the West', as outlined in Chapter One. Choosing two 
different national sources of coverage also provided the possibility to compare the 
extent to which textual, verbal and visual representations of places and people are 
shared or differ across state and ownership divides. The decision to use newspaper 
and television as the two analysed media forms was based, in the primary case of 
Somalia, on the fact that in the early 1990s these were ways in which substantial 
sections of the British and American publics received their international news. 
Although this situation has likely changed in the case of Fallujah, with the rise of the 
Internet, newspaper and television remain key sources of news and consistency in 
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treatment of the two case studies was privileged over the introduction of new, Internet 
news sources. 
The sourcing of news items was also a major limiting factor in choosing forms of 
media to analyse. In the case of newspapers, historical coverage, in text with 
descriptions of accompanying images, is relatively easy to access through the Lexis 
Nexis database. Television coverage is more difficult and expensive to obtain, but that 
which was acquired was either ordered in videotape form or, in the case of newer 
material for Fallujah, watched through streaming online. The Vanderbilt Television 
News Archive, based at Vanderbilt University in Tennessee, US, was the source of all 
American television coverage. BBC television coverage for the Somalia case was 
obtained through the British Film Institute in London, UK. The various media sources 
which were used for each case study will now be explored in depth and the choice to 
use each source justified. 
Media Sources 
As mentioned above, the discursive analysis of texts and images which has been 
undertaken for both case studies differs from the methodological styles of other 
academic studies of the Somalia intervention and thus adds to this area of research. 
This project also aims to provide additional support to existing and ongoing work on 
media and military representations of Fallujah.10 In this effort, two television networks' 
and two newspapers' coverage of the Somalia intervention were closely investigated, 
one of each from Britain and the US, from within a two year period from January 1, 
1992 until December 31, 1993. This period covers the months leading up to the US/UN 
aid airlift and troop intervention in mid to late 1992 through to just after the fateful 
'Black Hawk down' mission in October 1993. The New York Times was chosen as the 
10 This includes the work of geographers such as Stephen Graham and Derek Gregory. See Stephen 
Graham, "Cities and 'the War on Terror"', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30, No.2 
(2006): 255-276; Stephen Graham, "Remember Fallujah: Demonizing Space, Constructing Atrocity", 
Environment and Planning D: Society & Space 23, No.1 (2005): 1-10 and Derek Gregory, "The Death of the 
Civilian?", Environment and Planning D: Society & Space 24, Is. 5 (2006): 633-638. 
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Somalia case study's American newspaper source because of its reputation as a world 
leader in the accuracy, depth and insight of its news coverage. It trails only USA Today 
and The Wall Street Journal in national circulation, has won far more Pulitzer Prizes than 
any other American newspaper and has been known for its early 'scoops' on stories of 
importance since its creation in 1851.11 The New York Times was also a founding 
member of The Associated Press wire service in 1856 with other major news 
organisations. 
In 1896, the paper was acquired by publisher Adolph Ochs, who coined the 
term' All the News That's Fit to Print', interpreted at the time as an attempt to 
differentiate the paper from the perceived 'yellow' journalism of other New York 
publications.l2 Ochs was largely responsible for The New York Times' emerging 
international scope and reputation. Although The New York Times has been downsizing 
recently, like many other print media, by the end of 2005 it still employed over 350 full-
time reporters and about forty photographers. In the new millennium, it has been 
trying to strengthen its status as a national newspaper; it currently has sixteen news 
bureaus in the New York region, eleven national bureaus and twenty-six foreign news 
bureaus. 
The Times (often known as The Times of London to differentiate it from many 
other newspapers with 'Times' in their titles) was chosen as the primary case study's 
UK source because it is likely to attract a roughly similar reader demographic in the UK 
and also has been historically described as an outlet committed to 'balanced' and 'in 
depth international news coverage. Like The New York Times, The Times has a venerable 
history, dating back to 1785.13 For much of its early existence, The Times had little 
competition and built its reputation around contributions from important figures in 
11 See The New York Times company website for a wide variety of facts about the publication, 
www.nytco.com/investors-nyt-circulation.html (accessed March 20, 2007). In 2006, the NYT had a 
circulation of roughly 1,086,798 copies on weekdays and 1,623,697 on Sundays. 
u The term 'yellow journalism' was coined in the 1890s in the US and refers to journalism which is 
exploitative and sensational, aimed at grabbing readers' attention. See W. J. Greenwood, Yellow Journalism: 
Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies (Westport: Praeger, 2001). 
13 The Times online, www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/debate/feedback/articlell85820.ece (accessed 
March 27, 2007). 
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politics, science, and the arts. It was also among the first newspapers to send special 
correspondents abroad, for example, to cover the Crimean War. After an industrial 
dispute shut The Times down for almost a year in 1978-79, it was bought out by 
Australian media tycoon, Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch's new management style led to 
claims by some staff that The Times was going downmarket, losing its long-held 
reputation as Britain's newspaper of record. Whether or not these claims have validity, 
recent figures show that The Times retains the highest number of upper income readers 
of any UK paper and is the UK's leading daily newspaper for businesspeople. 
Although its daily circulation of 657,301 means it is well below popular tabloids, The 
Times has more full rate sales than any other 'broadsheet'.14 
The two broadcasters, the BBC in Britain and ABC in America, were chosen 
based on their positions as very wide-reaching and perceived 'neutral' broadcasters in 
their respective countries. Although the BBC has recently gained a questionable 
reputation as being 'anti-war' regarding British and American involvement in Iraq, it 
has been routinely recognised for its independence and perceived objectivity 
throughout its history. ABC, unlike Fox News and some of its recent competitors in the 
US, has also maintained a reputation for more 'factual', rather than editorial, styles of 
news presentation, most obvious recently during the US invasion of Iraq. BBC news 
has worldwide reach and is world-renowned for its international news coverage. On 
the national circuit, its services are used by ninety percent of the UK population every 
week.15 Since its early days as a wireless broadcaster in 1925, the BBC has positioned 
itself as an independent provider of educational, informational and entertainment 
programming, allegedly free from political interference and commercial pressure. In 
1932 and 1943 respectively, the BBC radio set up its Empire (later World) Service and 
War Reporting Unit. The importance of international coverage continued after World 
War IT, when BBC television services were developed. BBC has also been a pioneer in 
14 Circulation listed is for September 2006-February 2007 period. The Times Media site, 
www.timesmediaadvertising.com/ourbrands/times/thetimes.aspx (accessed March 27, 2007). T7te Daily 
Telegraph has a higher circulation rate than The Times, but only due to discounted subscription rates. 
15 See www.bbc.co.uk/info/purpose (accessed March 20, 2007). 
broadcasting in foreign languages; it already produced stories in forty different 
languages by WWII.t6 
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ABC was also created in an attempt to make media programming more 
'objective' and independent although, unlike the BBC, it has always been a private 
media enterprise dependent on advertising for its existence. "ABC grew out of a 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 'monopoly' probe. The 1938-41 radio-
network investigation ... cited several problems with CBS and NBC, the two then-
existing radio networks."17 A new station, the American Broadcasting Company, was 
born out of the separation of two NBC stations in 1943. In the 1950s world of rapid 
television development, however, ABC survived by making careful strategic 
partnerships with other large businesses such as United Paramount Theatres and the 
Disney companies. This business manoeuvring eventually resulted in a takeover by 
Capital Cities Communication in 1986 and the biggest media merger to that date when 
Capital Cities/ABC was acquired by Walt Disney Co. for $19 billion in 1995. This 
merger sparked a flurry of other buy-ups in entertainment stock and was part of a 
trend towards more globalised, conglomerated media organisations. 
Recently, ABC, along with other older media networks such as NBC and CBS, 
has been challenged by the emergence of specialty cable networks. Although newer 
specialty information channels and networks such as CNN, MSNBC and Fox have 
moved throughout the 1990s to usurp much of the traditional power and audiences of 
the old networks, many of these new options were not in existence at the time of the 
Somalia intervention. Acquiring footage from newer, influential stations that were in 
existence, such as CNN, is very difficult until the late 1990s and the start of the twenty-
first century. The time period of the Somalia case study has therefore limited choice in 
terms of broadcasters as well as the availability of archived resources. In the case of the 
Fallujah study, as will be described in further depth later, time and financial constraints 
meant that a variety of British and American newspaper and American television 
16 See www.bbc.co.uk!heritage/story/index.shtml (accessed March 20, 2007). 
17 See www.museum.tv/archives/etv/A/htmlA/americanbroa/americanbroa.htm (accessed March 20, 2007). 
This website is the source of all further information in this paragraph on ABC. 
coverage was analysed in smaller amounts and for a shorter time period than in the 
Somalia case. 
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Despite some inevitable constraints, media sources have been chosen with the 
goal of analysing the output of organisations that are explicit in their commitments to 
reporting events at a global scale and to publishing a plurality of opinions and ways of 
understanding world events. The importance placed in Western media on gathering 
news from a 'plurality' of sources is often linked to the achievement of greater depths 
of knowledge and 'truth', which are strongly influential concepts in Western societies 
where, in Foucault's terms, knowledge is power. Importantly, 'plurality' has also been 
linked to more explicitly universal moral ideals of 'fairness', where all voices and 
opinions will be heard. I deemed it important to evaluate the existence of 'plurality' in 
media organisations which have the reputation of holding this concept as a goal, rather 
than investigating the output of tabloid newspapers and television networks which, 
although they may claim 'accuracy' and 'objectivity', may be seen as less committed to 
the value of 'plurality'.1s 
Methodological Approach and Coverage Trends 
I considered discourse analysis to be a valuable method of approach for this 
project, which investigates the political and cultural strategies of hegemonic discourses 
that attempt to constitute, explain and dominate 'non-Western' people and places 
through a study of media coverage of recent interventions involving 'the West' and 
'others'. Cultural geographer Gillian Rose identifies two generalized types of'discourse 
analysis, both linked to various periods in the research career of Foucault. These types 
of analysis are differentiated by their focus: the first type is primarily concerned with 
the analysis of texts and images while the second is more focused on questioning the 
18 My placing of many of the above terms in quotations indicts my awareness of the strategic and multiple 
ways in which they are claimed and used in speech by various actors. However, I feel that these terms can 
and should be explored within specific situations of their use to understand how they are functioning to 
influence what can be claimed and known. 
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social institutions responsible for creating such artefacts and bodies of knowledge.19 
This project's work is a blend of Rose's two approaches and closely tied to the later 
work of Foucault. While individual texts and images are analysed in depth, there is 
also an effort made to consider the larger institutional conditions in which these texts 
and images were created and in which they function and circulate. The workings of the 
Western media as a societal institution is therefore studied as a particular area where 
power/knowledge is constituted through discourses and the construction of identities, 
although other societal institutions, such as governments, are also recognised as being 
key areas where discourses are constructed and contested. 
In practical terms, as outlined in depth by Rose, discourse analysis stresses the 
importance of careful study of particular texts, images and institutions, grouped under 
specific themes and chosen for their conceptual value and interest. Broad themes in 
coverage were thus selected through analysis of the media items in each case study, 
with reference to the background of theoretical literature provided in Chapter One. 
The primary discourse outlined in this chapter is that of colonial and postcolonial 
'development', which is crucially linked to the processes of identity formation whereby 
a 'West' defines itself against 'others'. This overarching discourse was broken down 
into themes, which were further developed using textual and visual examples from 
selected media ite~s. For example, in the case of Somalia, I was particularly interested 
in understanding how this state was deemed to have 'failed' and what the implications 
of 'failure' might be for Somalia and its people, discursively and materially. This 
analysis involved looking at specific collections of words or images associated with the 
term 'failed states', exploring what subjects and objects were created by this concept, ie. 
how were people who lived in this 'failed state' represented, and studying how this 
concept was connected to others. 
19 Gillian Rose, Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials, 2nd ed., (London: 
Sage Publications, 2007), 146. David Howarth argues, in his work Discourse, that these periods might be 
viewed as Foucault's 'archaeological' period (Rose's 'discourse analysis 1) and 'genealogical' period (Rose's 
discourse analysis 2). See Howarth, Discourse (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 72. 
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Discourse analysis, as outlined by Rose, may also draw attention to the 
complexity and contradictions internal to discourses and to absences in particular 
discourses.20 Throughout my analysis of media items, I have made efforts to highlight 
and be aware of these moments, as points where the political aspects of discourses are 
often particularly clear. The non-appearance of Fallujan citizens in many verbal and 
visual narratives during the city's siege provides a key example here. Although I 
discuss large-scale similarities in the themes and strategies used in discourses 
associated with Fallujah in comparison with Somalia, the uniqueness of context and 
terms is important to note and no attempt was made to force textual and visual samples 
of Fallujah coverage into the thematic categories used for analysis of the Somalia case. 
In order to provide an overall sense of how selected Western media followed 
events in Somalia and Fallujah, monthly counts of newspaper and television coverage 
for the roughly two year period in Somalia and the key monthly periods for the 
Fallujah military actions were established, an activity similar to that undertaken on a 
shorter time scale for the Somalia case study by Robinson, Mermin, and Livingston and 
Eachus.21 It was assumed that focusing on media items from periods of high coverage 
would roughly coincide with perceived important events in terms of the policies and 
actions of US, and in the Somalia case also UN, forces. 
The Somalia case study 
Since Somalia is a very low source of stories and interest regularly in Western 
media, discovering relative high points of story coverage was a straightforward 
endeavour, especially within a two year time period.22 Unfortunately, the BBC offers 
20 Rose, Visual Methodologies, 164-165. 
21 See Piers Robinson, "Operation Restore Hope and the Illusion of a News Media Driven Intervention", 
Political Studies 49, 2001: 941-956; Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, "Humanitarian Crises and US 
Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect Reconsidered", Political Communication 12, no. 4, 1995:413-429 
and Jonathan Mermin, "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-
Driven Foreign Policy", Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 3, 1997: 385-403. 
22 Creating a media coverage timeline for this case study was possible using Lexis Nexis's search facilities to 
isolate The New York Times and The Times of London coverage of Somalia for the years 1992 and 1993. 
Sourcing of ABC television coverage was undertaken through the Vanderbilt Television News Archive 
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no such catalogued access to its news programming. BBC coverage, sourced from the 
British Film Institute, was therefore chosen using the key periods of media interest in 
Somalia as identified by ABC and newspaper sources to guide the selection of dates to 
view coverage. The Lexis Nexis archive was searched using the term 'Somalia' for the 
years 1992 and 1993. Of the articles which appeared, those which used the word in 
ways which did not relate to the Somalia intervention were discarded. For example, 
articles were not included if reference to the Somalia intervention only appeared as a 
single mention in an article that was predominately about another issue, such as the 
war in Bosnia which occurred within roughly the same time period. Comparisons of 
these two conflicts were relatively common, however, and often important for setting 
the context in which the conflict in Somalia was viewed by Western publics. These 
articles were included when there was any greater attempt, besides a mere mention, to 
discuss the Somalia intervention in relation to the situation in Bosnia and wider world 
events.23 
Unsurprisingly, a basic timeline of Somalia media coverage for the years 1992 
and 1993 shows that the high points of Western interest in Somalia by far were when 
US troops entered the country, bringing humanitarian support in December 1992, and 
following the 'Black Hawk down' events of October 1993. The later stages of the 
famine, which prompted the intervention of US troops, were heavily covered for less 
than a month in the press and only a week or so on television. Abruptly, after troops 
were documented delivering food to the needy, coverage dropped off significantly, 
leaving audiences largely 'in the dark' about conditions in Somalia until the killing of 
Pakistani peacekeepers, the subsequent hunt for Aidid and the events of 'Black Hawk 
down'. Following this final increase in coverage, Somalia dropped out of Western view 
again, after having been represented in Western media records almost solely as a land 
online. This archive has created a comprehensive catalogue of stories on the nightly news coverage of 
major US broadcasters, which makes it possible to run keyword searches and identify periods when high 
levels of Somalia stories were aired. 
23 As will be explained in more depth below with regards to the Fallujah case study, Lexis Nexis creates its 
own bundles of newspapers which can be keyword searched. I used the 'UK newspapers only' category to 
search for Times coverage and 'US news' category to search for New York Times coverage. 
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of continuous famine and violence. In The New York Times coverage, these points were 
especially obvious. There was increasing coverage of Somalia throughout 1992 from 
lows of three to eight articles per month from January to June, rising to a range of 
twelve to twenty-nine articles per month between July and November as news of the 
famine and warfare in Somalia was spread. December 1992, when American troops 
were actually sent to Somalia to lead a humanitarian mission there, had the most 
coverage with 142 articles in the month. In 1993, monthly numbers of articles range 
from five to thirty-eight, with an average of twenty-eight articles per month. In March, 
April, May and December, coverage was well below average, ranging from five to 
seventeen articles, and in October coverage was very high with 109 articles published. 

















Figure 1: Patterns of Coverage in The New York Times and The Times 
The Times of London in general carried lower numbers of stories about Somalia 
throughout the two year period and the pattern of coverage is slightly different. Again, 
the early months of 1992 were marked by general low coverage; the range was from 
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two to ten articles per month from January to July. In August 1992, however, there was 
an upsurge in coverage, with forty-seven articles published. Coverage remained 
relatively high in September with twenty-two articles published, dropped off for 
October and November but then predictably increased when American troops 
intervened in December with seventy-three articles published. In 1993, coverage 
remained relatively high in January and February- with twenty-five and twenty articles 
respectively- and then dropped off again until June, when attacks against Pakistani UN 
peacekeepers took place. After this point, coverage remained roughly consistent 
through to the 'Black Hawk down' event in October. There were thirty-one articles 
published in June, twenty-one in July, a drop in August to thirteen and then an increase 
again to thirty-one in September and thirty-six in October. In a similar fashion to The 
New York Times coverage, article numbers dropped off significantly after 'Black Hawk 
down' and the announcement of troop withdrawals. November and December 1993 
feature six and eight articles respectively, taking coverage back down to levels before 
the famine was widely discovered by the media in early to mid-1992. 
The trends in newspaper coverage are largely mirrored in the television 
coverage. This is unsurprising given the fact that television networks often select 
stories to cover based on what major national newspapers are highlighting. Coverage 
levels for television news do roughly follow the patterns of the newspapers; however, 
the total number of items tends to be much smaller. While there may be intense 
coverage for a few days, television coverage appeared to drop much more sharply after 
an event was perceived as 'over'. This factor can likely be explained by the greater 
expenses of producing television news compared to newspaper reports. ABC ran eight 
mentions of the famine and conflict in Somalia during August 1992. One piece was 
almost five minutes long and was a summary of the 'horrors' in Somalia, followed by a 
three and a half minute comparison of Bosnia and Somalia. Most television items, 
however, were between one and three minutes long and focussed on the attempts of the 
international community, particularly the Americans, to airlift food into Somalia. After 
some initial interest in the famine, coverage dropped off fairly significantly. ABC ran 
91 
five items on Somalia in September 1992 but three of these were barely ten seconds each 
in length and one just over two minutes. The one lengthy item was a half-hour ABC 
Nightline program, which featured an interview with UN Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali on the famine and civil war in Somalia along with a few taped interviews 
with doctors and nurses working with NGOs in the country. By October 1992 only two 
items were shown, one twenty seconds long, the other just over three minutes, on the 
inability of UN troops based in Somalia at that time to prevent the looting of food aid. 
In November 1992, as the possibility of more intense involvement in Somalia 
began to be discussed after the election victory of Bill Clinton over George Bush Senior, 
ABC began to provide more substantive coverage. This shift happened quickly in the 
last week of November. All six items aired by ABC in November were shown during 
this week and varied between two and six minutes in length, along with a half hour 
Nightline special on possible US military intervention shown on November 30. As news 
of the intervention was confirmed, planning began and the intervention occurred in 
December. At this point, coverage rose to its highest levels, with each of the three 
major networks sending a key anchor to discuss the intervention live in Somalia. ABC 
aired forty-nine items on Somalia in December 1992; in several cases these were in-
depth Nightline programs on issues in Somalia and top stories on regular nightly 
newscasts. On five days in December, half or close to half of the nightly thirty minute 
ABC news broadcast was devoted solely to stories on the intervention in Somalia. By 
January 1993, coverage had backed off to sixteen items in the month. The focus of these 
items is overwhelmingly on the actions and experiences of US troops in Somalia, with 
mentions made of UN/US-backed attempts at diplomacy with various Somali clan 
groups. 
After January, there is a dramatic decline in reports on Somalia. There were 
eight items in February 1993, the majority only a minute or two long. In March 1993, 
three items were shown. A Nightline special involved catching up on the current status 
of the Somalia mission with a group of experts but the other two pieces were a five 
minute item on a US Army Colonel's personal successes on duty in Somalia and a 
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twenty second clip on the approval of a UN peacekeeping force to replace the American 
UNIT AF mission. In both April and May, each month featured only two short items. 
In early June 1993, Pakistani peacekeepers working for the new UNOSOM II 
mission were attacked while searching a feeding centre and a weapons storage facility 
controlled by Mohammed Farah Aidid, one of the major clan leaders claiming a right to 
rule Somalia. The resulting uproar after these killings became a new story out of 
Somalia and nineteen items were broadcast during this month. The vast majority 
describe actions taken by the UN and US against Aidid and his militias in response to 
the killings. This was followed by another slow period in July, when only five items 
ran, all but one of them under one minute in length. In August, eleven reports on 
Somalia were broadcast. The defining event for the coverage here appears to be the 
killing of four US troops in an ambush blamed on gunmen working for Aidid. This 
event precipitated more discussion about the UN[US position in Somalia and stories on 
possible retaliation for the killings. The US government also made the decision to send 
400 elite US Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos to Somalia to assist in Aidid' s 
capture and this new output of American forces generated some media interest. By 
September 1993, however, these elite forces had failed to solve the 'problem' of Aidid as 
quickly as hoped and the six items aired by ABC during this month outline an 
increasingly tense situation in Mogadishu. At home, televised discussions with US 
policymakers indicate an increasing displeasure with the situation and policies of the 
Somalia mission. 
The 'Black Hawk down' events of October 4, 1993 dominate the broadcast 
coverage of this month; with twenty-nine items shown, this is the second and final high 
coverage point of the Somalia mission. Of these items, nine were at least thirty minute 
long Nightline or Headline shows, which involved televised discussions with 
policymakers and experts on the direction affairs in Somalia had taken. President 
Clinton made two televised speeches to outline how he would deal with the aftermath 
of the events and these speeches generated further media discussion. In the first, 
detailed airings of the 'Black Hawk down' story, images were shown of dead American 
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Figure 2 Patterns of ABC News Coverage 
soldiers in various states of undress being dragged through Mogadishu streets by 
cheering Somali crowds. The airing of these images caused a groundswell of revulsion 
and anger in the American public, however, and the major networks all appeared to 
make the decision that these images would not be shown again, at least not on 
primetime news. Following this choice, there were few 'visuals' to accompany this 
story, save for the burnt-out military vehicles and scenes of urban combat and 
destruction that had been the prevailing images of Somalia since at least June 1993. 
These obstacles in creating a 'visual' story may well have led to decreased television 
coverage of Somalia, although the 'Black Hawk down' events remained a major source 
of debate in US political and military circles long after the story left viewers' screens. 
After President Clinton's announcement that US troops would be removed 
from Somalia within a few months, ABC media coverage of the 'failed state' decreased 
dramatically. Only one item of less than one minute was aired in November 1993. Of 
the seven items aired in December 1993, most are short and centred around US Defence 
Secretary Les Aspin' s resignation, which related to events in Somalia, and the return to 
his home in the US of Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, the US helicopter pilot 
captured during the 1Black Hawk down' events by Aidid forces. For the most part, 
current events in Somalia had been withdrawn completely from the American 
television imagination. 
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While viewed BBC nine o'clock news coverage generally appeared to air the 
same /newsworthy' events in Somalia as ABC, the only coverage summary that can be 
given is one based on coverage which was actually chosen to be watched and analysed. 
On December 4, 1992 news of the US troop deployment to Somalia was the lead story/ 
taking approximately the first six minutes of a thirty minute broadcast. From 
December 6 to 11, roughly two minute pieces coming in the final half of the thirty or 
forty minute program appear to be the standard Somalia coverage allocation, with the 
items tending to update conditions in Somalia and activities of the newly-arrived 
troops. On June 61 19931 the killing of Pakistani UN peacekeepers was the lead story on 
the nine o'clock news. The UN1 s reprisal attacks on Aidid also feature as a lead story 
on June 12, as does the shooting of Somali demonstrators by Pakistani troops on June 
13. This issue was dealt with quite differently by ABC, which showed images of 
injured and dead Somali demonstrators but only commented briefly on the fact that 
these casualties /allegedly' were caused by the UN. BBC coverage appears to reflect 
more on the overall UN mission and speculates on the direction in which the anti-Aidid 
attacks are taking it. 
The 1Black Hawk down' events in October were covered in a fairly similar way 
to ABC but did not remain a large part of nightly news broadcasts for as long. On 
October 5, 1993, when the controversial images of dead American soldiers were shown, 
the story was already only two minutes long and was covered in the second half of a 
thirty minute broadcast. By October 7, the nine o'clock news did not contain any 
stories on the /Black Hawk down' events/ although questions surrounding UN and US 
policy responses to the disaster began to make the first half of the thirty minute 
program in the form of roughly two minute items on October 10 and 14, 1993. 
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After organising the television coverage so as to be able to recognise and 
highlight key periods of media activity and interest in the Somalia intervention, more 
detailed analysis was undertaken of items around the key time periods of December 
1992, June 1993 and October 1993. With the newspaper coverage, these periods remain 
only a guideline and important or revealing articles from outside these periods are 
studied as well. 
The Fallujah case study 
As with coverage of the Somalia intervention, Lexis Nexis was used to obtain 
fairly comprehensive newspaper coverage in the time period of the two sieges of 
Fallujah in 2004. While the counts below cannot be treated as exact, given that Lexis 
warns that the availability of newspapers it collects varies, the volume of coverage over 
specified periods in 2004 indicates that Western media interest in Fallujah followed 
patterns of American military involvement there. 
Table 1: Lexis Nexis article numbers & CNN items mentioning 'Fallujah' or 'Falluja' 
UK newspapers only US news (major CNN coverage 
(all major British newspapers plus (sourced from 
newspapers) some wire services) Vanderbilt 
Television 
Archive) 
March 2004 59 453 3 
April2004 1324 2264+ * 39 
May2004 494 2042+ 6 
September 2004 294 1536 # not available 
October 2004 883 1696 21 
November 2004 1682 2256+ 45 
* Lexis Nexis cannot retrieve exact numbers of articles when over 1000 results will be produced from a 
search. In each of these three cases, even fifteen day, rather than monthly searches, produced in excess of 
1000 results for at least one half of the month period. Exact figures were not pursued in this case, where 
the goal is simply to indicate trends in coverage. 
96 
As can be seen from the above table, high points in coverage occurred across all media 
surveyed in April2004, immediately following the deaths of the contractors on March 
31. November 2004, the month of the second siege of Fallujah, is another obvious high 
point of coverage. 
For each monthly search conducted on Lexis Nexis, the search terms 'Falluja' and 
'Fallujah' were entered in order to account for different spellings of the city's name 
across the print media spectrum. The category 'UK newspapers only' is defined by 
Lexis as containing available articles from all major British newspapers, which 
encompasses a substantial list of publications. The 'US news' category includes 
newspapers published in the US, plus wire services where more than sixty percent of 
stories originate in the US. Data for CNN coverage of the Fallujah events was obtained 
from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive. CNN was particularly chosen because it-
is the only news source obtained by Vanderbilt which can be streamed electronically, 
rather than requiring the orderin~ production and shipping of videotapes. This 
procedure, while undertaken for analysis of coverage of the Somalia intervention, was 
prohibitively expensive in the case of the Fallujah material. Searches of the Vanderbilt 
database of coverage indicate that of the major American broadcasters whose coverage 
is obtained by Vanderbilt, including ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN and Fox News, CNN 
appears to have produced the most news items covering events in Fallujah. 
Since comparative purposes were privileged over a focus on specific sources for 
this chapter, a mixture of British and American newspapers were obtained, rather than 
a limit of one British and one American newspaper source as was the case for Somalia. 
While the number of articles uncovered by Lexis Nexis searches indicates that an 
extremely large amount of newspaper coverage on the events in Fallujah is available, a 
small range of sources for analysis were selected largely based on their length and the 
amount of focus devoted to Fallujah. This was judged by the number of times the name 
'Fallujah' or 'Falluja' was referred to in the article and through skimming the article 
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abstracts on Lexis Nexis.24 Where searches provided a variety of media sources, there 
was also an attempt made to select articles from different newspapers. British 
newspaper sources covered by the survey for Fallujah primarily include: The Guardian, 
The Independent, The Times and The Daily Telegraph. American newspaper sources 
include The Associated Press and The Washington Post but analysis was 
overwhelmingly based on New York Times articles. 
An Ethics of Approach: The Importance of Foucault & Derrida 
The importance of Foucault's work for this project has been described in 
Chapter One, but warrants re-emphasi.s before an analysis of media coverage is begun. 
Although in his later work Foucault moved away from the term 'discourse' and more 
often discussed 'power/knowledge configurations', his theoretical shift does not put the 
work of this project at odds with his approach. 'Power/knowledge's inclusion of non-
discursive factors, such as societal institutions, in explanations of historical change adds 
to the depth of analysis possible for this work, stressing the importance of studying not 
only the content of media outputs but also the interactions and position of the media, 
along with governments and non-state organisations, as institutions in a broader field 
of social bodies. 
Foucault's final writings on bio-power explore the different ways in which 
human beings become subjects and, again, were Crtlcial to the theoretical bases on 
which this work began. According to David Howarth, the "three modes of 
objectification" by which humans become subjects for Foucault are linked to "the 
discursive conditions that make knowledge possible", which decentre subjects and 
recognise our constitution as subjects as crucially tied to "ways of speaking" within 
various discourses. From this point, Foucault is particularly interested, Howarth 
explains, in the "dividing practices" by which subjects are internally divided or divided 
24 When Lexis Nexis searches are viewed, it is possible to see the number of times the search word is 
mentioned in each retrieved article and article word count is given. This makes it relatively easy to select 
'dense' articles for analysis, ones which tend to be longer in length and reference the area of interest most 
frequently. 
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from others. Thinking through the social and political processes, particularly 
discursive ones, by which these dividing processes take place has been the fundamental 
goal of this project, and has also been of great scholastic importance for those studying 
colonial and postcolonial relations, whose writings are also key for this work. Finally, 
Foucault explored the ways in which humans create themselves as subjects "through 
processes of recognition, self-mastery and transgression". At this point, Foucault 
recognises the possible active roles of individuals both to maintain and resist particular 
strategies of power/knowledge.25 This idea is in line with statements in this project 
which affirm the idea that systems of dominance can be made unstable from the inside 
and, despite appearances, are not permanently fixed entities; there is, therefore, hope 
for change. 
Another necessary element of this project was a constant vigilance to an ethics 
of approach, which will serve to illustrate the importance of Derrida's thought for this 
project, which is largely compatible with its use of Foucault as well. The normative 
understanding of responsibility taken in this work is heavily indebted to the ethical 
studies of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, both of whom draw theoretical 
attention to the possibilities of 'other' or alternative narratives, which may be silenced 
by a dominant or a specific interpretation of an event.26 This understanding is in line 
with Derrida's concept of differance, which represents the idea that all identity 
formation is historical and contingent, as every affirmation of identity is premised on 
the active deferring of other possibilities.27 Acknowledgement of and interest in the 
'other', what is deferred, suggests the presence of a kind of ethics as constitutive of 
deconstructive approaches. Deconstruction works to question and oppose singular or 
totalitarian readings of particular texts, events etc. and to illustrate their necessary 
interdependence. 
25 Howarth, Discourse, 79-81. These pages are the source for these ideas and the direct quotes. 
26 See Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) and Emmanuel 
Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy", in The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Cambridge USA: B. Blackwell, 
1989). 
21 Howarth, Discourse, 41. 
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Motivated by this deconstructive ethics, this project will question the discourses 
of Somalis, Iraqis and their respective countries that were represented in Western 
media and explore the existence of power differentials and hegemonic discourses, 
which contributed to certain stories being told rather than others. This approach aims 
to open a space in discussion for Somali, Iraqi, non-Western and other alternative 
accounts of the conflict. There is an absence of Somali and Iraqi voices and views in 
this work, largely for linguistic and logistical reasons. A large part of the aim of this 
project, however, is to encourage Western audiences to question narratives of the 
intervention mediated primarily through Western 'experts' and to become more open 
to those offered by alternative sources. I began this work with the suspicion that 
Somali and Iraqi narratives of interventions in their states and the views of dissident 
'others' outside of elite policy and media-making circles were not widely heard in 
mainstream media coverage of both these events. This suspicion was itself questioned 
by looking at how coverage was presented in American and British media sources with 
a reputation for plural, 'fair' and balanced approaches to representing issues. The aim 
was not to create one new account of the Somalia intervention or of incidents in 
Fallujah in 2004. A central theoretical tenet of this work is that there can be no single 
'objective truth' of each situation, which Western media somehow failed to capture. 
This project's methodology which, as illustrated in this chapter and Chapter 
One, is based primarily on deconstructive approaches to texts and discourse analysis, 
could be used to (re)explore a variety of past and current intervention case studies. It 
should not, however, be considered a universalist approach, as deconstructive readings 
have consistently challenged traditional Western natural and social science 
methodologies that privilege a particular style of research claiming to be 'objective', 
'parsimonious' and 'reproducible'. Although a deconstructive/discursive method may 
be used in a variety of situations, particular cases, such as the Somalia intervention and 
events in Fallujah in 2004, are unique and any broader lessons or themes emerging from 
both case studies must be carefully drawn rather than assumed. 
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The goal of this chapter has been to continue the trajectory through Chapter 
One. I have now moved from discussing broad theoretical influences for this work, 
through more targeted and specialised studies, to describe the research processes used 
for this single, particular project. By explaining and justifying the research choices and 
strategies used for the project in this chapter, following, content-rich chapters will be 
able to focus almost exclusively on exploring dominant narrative and visual 
representations of the Somalia intervention and Fallujah in 2004. The next chapter, 
which marks an end to the first half of the project, will turn to the meeting of Western, 
and non-Western, politics and social structures in the physical and cultural geographic 
space of 'Somalia'. This final background chapter, "Somalia: Past Policy and the 
Political Landscape", will provide readers with some sense of existing Western 
knowledge of Somalia in the early 1990s, at the time when Somalia's civil war and 
humanitarian difficulties were recognised by parts of the West. As will become evident 
throughout this chapter, Western knowledge of the Somali Horn region was limited 
and concentrated in a few academic and policy-specific sectors. Those with specialised 
and local knowledge, and the voices of Somali citizens themselves, are rarely heard in 
analysed Western media coverage, where sources for quotable material are often 
political officials and relief workers. Providing a history of Somalia, albeit a brief and 
incomplete one, particularly around the time of the intervention, is also an attempt to 
give readers some basis of evaluating what selected media coverage provided and what 
it left out. 
Chapter Three - Somalia: Past Policy & the Political 
Landscape 
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When Somalia first started to appear on the screens and pages of Western news 
sources, many citizens of the US and UK had probably never heard of the country 
before. Somalia had fluctuated from a Cold War enemy to an ally of the West before 
the civil war and intervention of the early 1990s, but much Western involvement with 
the state occurred without significant media interest. Even when Somalia is known of 
in Western societies, its history is primarily understood through narratives of Somali 
peoples' interaction with the West as interpreted by Westerners, whether it be during 
the pre-colonial and colonial eras, throughout the Cold War, or in the 'New World 
Order' of the present. This chapter will focus on this particular body of literature, that 
which is predominately available for those in the West who wish to understand 
Somalia more fully. While there are some notable examples of Somali intellectuals, 
musicians, poets and novelists representing their region and society, general levels of 
scholarship on Somalia are low in comparison to many other African countries; studies 
are still often undertaken by Westerners. These factors suggest that there would be 
benefit in Somalis producing their own accounts of their country's history and culture 
for the outside world. 
This chapter will examine academic and policy-oriented research on Somalia 
with a particular focus on the period of the UN/US intervention although it will follow 
a chronological timeline in order to situate the intervention activities within a larger 
period of Somali history. Studies of Somali societal and cultural structures will be of 
particular interest in order to uncover the ways in which general Western 
understandings have been formed about the Somali 'character' and Somali capabilities 
for self-governance. As will be seen later, these interpretations often found their way 
into media discourses about Somalia and Somali people. While there have been 
attempts throughout Somalia's history to represent the complexity of its society, many 
narratives of Somalis, which emerged in academic, policymaking and popular areas 
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during and after the civil war and interventions, functioned to simplify and close down 
multi-faceted explanations for why the state had 'failed'. For example, the following 
comment appeared on the first two pages of an analytical work on the intervention: 
Somalis are possessed of a racist psychology- with inferiority 
complexes ... It is fair to say that their Arab-African schizophrenia 
makes Somalis tend to disdain everyone but themselves. Although 
their evolved homogeneity has imbued the Somalis abstractly with a 
sense of common heritage and destiny, it now manifests itself merely as 
exclusion and not as unity. With one another, Somalis are distinctly 
callous.1 
While it is a more extreme example, this quote hints at the pessimistic and 
stereotyped views held by many of Somalia's supposed 'saviours' regarding those they 
had gone to aid. Such representations permeated important parts of the debate on 
approaches to engaging with Somalia; they had an impact on the ways in which 
problems in the country were conceptualized and approached. A strong underlying 
assumption that Somalis themselves did not possess the capabilities to find peaceful 
resolutions to their conflict meant that several international attempts to aid Somalis 
took a top-down, directive approach, in which Somalis themselves often had little say. 
Media coverage of the conflict and intervention tended to follow and, in some cases, 
exacerbate these trends by focusing extensively on the discourses presented to them by 
American and UN officials and international aid personnel. 
Due to a lack of resources and linguistic skills, this chapter will not present the 
intervention story from the perspectives of Somalis who lived through it, although 
these voices need to be heard. It will instead provide readers with a background on 
how Somalis have been historically understood by primarily Western specialists and 
discuss problems and debates during the intervention period in Somalia which are not 
represented in depth in much media coverage of this period. The limited number of 
authors, primarily anthropologists, who are cited in this chapter again highlights the 
1 Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 
1995}, 1-2. 
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scarcity of academic work being done on Somalia and its people, or at least the minimal 
amount available to Western researchers. Nonetheless, bringing even a limited 
knowledge of this country and its people to media coverage of Somalia in Chapters 
Four and Five will enable readers to reflect more deeply on analysed media coverage. 
'Traditional' Somali Society & Customs 
Most academic commentators on Somali history have presented life in the Horn 
of Africa region as characterized by fluidity, rather than stability, and this factor has 
C!lrried into issues regarding national borders and political organisation. According to 
John Drysdale, one of few Western Somali-language speakers and a long-term 
researcher of the region, the loose boundaries of a 'greater Somalia' included parts of 
northern Kenya, eastern Ethiopia and what is now Djibouti. These boundaries were 
determined by conquests undertaken by various Somali-identifying groups and by the 
limits of fertile pasture areas over 200 years before Somalia's official creation as a 
nation-state.2 When Drysdale wrote in the early 1960s, he estimated that eighty percent 
of the Somali population were nomadic pastoralists.3 Their movements between inland 
grazing areas and the wells of mainly coastal towns and cities were dictated by the arid 
climate interspersed with brief wet seasons, the climactic norm for much of the Somali 
Horn region. 
More recent work by David Laitin and Said Samatar appears to confirm the 
enduring character of this lifestyle. Laitin and Samatar's 1987 work indicates that at 
this time, shortly before the outbreak of the 1990s civil war, two-thirds of Somalia's 
population continued to migrate seasonally and live by animal husbandry.4 These 
figures are challenged, however, by Maria Brons, who quotes figures from 1983 to 
argue that only 52.5% of Somalia's population were nomads at this time, with 19.9% 
2 John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1964), 7. Drysdale is a renowned 
anthropologist who spent considerable time in Somalia and speaks the Somali language. He was brought 
back to the country during the 1992-93 UN/US intervention in an attempt to help with negotiations. 
3 lbid, 8. 
4 David Laitin & Said Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 22. 
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being settled farmers and 27.6% being non-agricultural. Brons also mentions figures 
from 1975 to support her argument that the non-agrarian population of Somalia was 
increasing during the 1970s and 1980s as nomadic and farming populations steadily 
decreased.5 Debates over these figures have important implications, given the strong 
emphasis on pastoral life in many studies of Somalia and its perceived significance for 
Somali 'clan' identity creation. 
Scarcity of good pasture and watering holes has meant that relations have often 
been strained and prone to shifts between various Somali herding groups, as well as 
with neighboring cultures such as Abyssinian Christian groups in what is now 
Ethiopia.6 Within Somali society, extended family and clan affiliations became 
important for negotiating these competitive conditions in both peaceful and violent 
ways as well as for divisions of labour. Clan membership is thus described as 
facilitating natural resource allocation as well as providing support for individuals 
during frequent scarce seasons; droughts during winter months were common. While 
conflicts did occur, cooperation was also crucial for surviving in such an environment. 
Somali shared beliefs are said to prioritize the characteristics of fortitude and generosity 
towards others. These values, along with detailed genealogies of a group's lineage and 
history, were transmitted orally, primarily through forms of memorized alliterative 
poetry. Up to the present, oral traditions remain dominant in Somalia. A written 
version of the Somali language was only created in 1972 and radio stations remain a 
fundamental means by which information is shared since only thirty percent of the 
Somali population is estimated to be literate.7 This number is expected to have fallen 
5 Maria H. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State: Somalia From Statelessness to Statelessness? 
(Utrecht: International Books, 2001), 76. 
6 Laitin & Samatar mention frequent battles between Muslim Somali groups, who began adopting the 
Islamic faith around 1000 AD after encounters with travelling Arab religious figures, and Abyssinian 
groups between 1100 and 1500 AD. See Laitin & Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, 12. 
7 See Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, 10-17 and Laitin & Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, 31-36 & 
65. 
since the 1980s due to the destruction of state-organised educational systems during 
years of conflict.8 
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Despite the undeniable importance of clan affiliations for Somali life throughout 
the nation's history, most Somalia researchers suggest that these relationships can, and 
often are, overstated or misunderstood. Drysdale suggests that the Somali social 
system is very fluid and can allow for both family and individual independence from 
clans as well as tight clan and national allegiances. 9 The population of the entire 
Somali nation, which often unites itself through claims of having a common ethnic 
origin, language and religion, has always be difficult to calculate but was estimated to 
be about six to six and a half million in 1996, with an additional two and a half to three 
million in other countries.10 Larger Somali clan groups, such as the Darod, may have 
millions of members while sub-clan groupings and patrilineal ties can decrease to the 
level of only tens. Perceptions of distinctiveness between these groupings are 
developed through shared narratives of history and regular interactions. They can and 
have been both politically exaggerated and obscured.11 
Because of the migratory style of many Somalis' lives, centralized systems of 
governance have remained incredibly difficult and impractical to create and develop. 
Historically, Somalis employed forms of very direct, small-group democracy. Group 
decisions tended to be made communally and any man deemed to have reached 
maturity could participate, although elders' opinions tended to carry the greatest 
weight. When decisions and negotiations needed to be reached among larger groups, 
for example at an inter-clan level, meetings of the involved clans were held. These 
8 Alice Bettis Hashim, The Fallen State: Dissonance, Dictatorship and Death in Somalia (Lanham: University 
Press of America Inc., 1997), 125. 
9 A Somali proverb is often used to illustrate the possible shifting nature of Somali alliances, albeit in a 
predominantly negative light: "Me and my clan against the world; Me and my family against my clan; Me 
and my brother against my family; Me against my brother." Scott Peterson, Me Against My Brother: At war 
in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1. 
to Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 74. Like many Somali statistics, this figure varies 
considerably depending upon how Somalis in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya are counted. Since the 
breakdown of the state, collecting accurate population counts and other statistics has been very difficult. 
11 Hashim, The Fallen State, 29-30. With specific reference to the 1990s and the time of the intervention see 
the work of Catherine Besteman. 
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types of meetings were held in an ad hoc, as-needed manner rather than conforming to 
a centralized or regularized schedule.12 Across Somali society basic tenets of justice 
held, comprising a mixture of Islamic and more localized rules of law, and were based 
on material rather than moral compensation. The responsibility for compensation 
payment (diya) was shared by a communal or family diya-paying group, which could be 
joined by both families and individuals and was not necessarily made up of the same 
members as an individual's herding group.B Importantly, clan divides have been 
challenged by intermarriage among different clans, although this practice was more 
common before the 1990s civil war than after it. Traditionally, women, along with 
elders and religious figures, have played a role in narrowing clan differences.14 
These descriptions of Somali life and customs are contrasted by Jonathan 
Stevenson's account from shortly after the end of the intervention. As a professor of 
Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, Stevenson likely has influence at least 
within the American military community and perhaps further in policymaking and 
media circles. Stevenson portrays Somali behaviour and social structures as largely 
unchanged from distant history to present and reads particular cultural trends in a 
distinctly negative light: 
There is practically no such thing as a Somali patriot or a Somali 
nationalist. By tradition Somali nomads are self-sufficient ... To the 
extent that they are politically motivated at all, these willing expatriates 
move abroad and angle for profit in the interest not of their country but 
of their clan ... Clans are extended patrilineal networks that go back 
several hundred years- not terribly different from the Hatfields and 
McCoys of Appalachian legend. The clan system- which stresses 
segmentation over community- developed not out of any affirmative 
desire for interdependence or religious solidarity but rather out of a 
reluctant need to bolster the individual. .. Property was defined not by 
12 1. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali (Oxford: James Currey Ltd., 2002), 9-10. 
13 Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, 19-21. Also see Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 100 & 125 
and Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, 10-11. 
14 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 108. 
legal ownership but simply by occupation, and no particular moral 
stigma attached to theft or even murder.15 
While he later criticizes American interveners for their failure to learn more 
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about Somali history and culture before becoming involved in the country, Stevenson 
proposes a limited and pessimistic view of Somalis. Here, the roots of Somalia's 
discord appear to trace back to primeval Somali traits of selfish individualism, 
profiteering and a lack of morality. Clan and legal structures for settled disputes and 
resolving issues such as theft go unmentioned, and clans are linked to retrogressive 
social groups in the US, rather than having any of their communal or supportive roles 
acknowledged. The clan system becomes representative of fundamentally-applied 
Somali character stereotypes. Elements of Stevenson's representations will later be 
recognizable in some media coverage of Somalia, although it is obviously different 
from other academic understandings outlined here. 
Recent Somalia researchers in particular have highlighted an important 
minority, and perhaps at present even a majority, of Somalis who have not followed a 
nomadic pastoralist lifestyle and have interpreted some facets of clan relations 
differently to nomadic Somalis. Although they are often omitted from generalized 
descriptions of Somalia's population, these groups have existed throughout the 
country's history. Traditionally, the people of Somalia are said to come from two main 
lineage groups, the Samale and the Sab. The differences between these two broad 
groupings were said to be reflected in their productive lifestyles. Primarily living in 
north and central Somalia, the Samales were the dominant, nomadic pastoral group, 
whereas the Sab tended to be settled agriculturalists clustered around one of the few 
fertile areas of southern Somalia, the inter-riverine valley between the Shabelle and 
Juba rivers.16 
15 Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia, 3. 
16 Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, 6-7. Lewis interprets Sab differently than Brons. While the 
Rahanweyn, Digil and Mirijle clans are viewed as Sab clans, Sab also means those who fulfill tasks degrading 
to nomads such as hunting, leather and metal working and haircutting- jobs common in ex-slave groups. 
Those Sab who undertake these jobs are said by Lewis to comprise only a "minute fraction" of the total 
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Complicating factors to this broad distinction are found in the diverse relations 
that Sab clans have had with large numbers of enslaved peoples from various parts of 
East Africa who arrived in southern Somalia at several historical points. Former slave 
groups were sometimes re-enslaved by the local Somali populations or could also be 
adopted into their clans or live as neighbors to them. Islamic law stated that slaves who 
converted to Islam should be manumitted and permitted to live free in these 
communities. Catherine Besteman, I. M. Lewis and other researchers explain, however, 
that the ancestors of these slave groups are still said to manifest physical features that 
reveal their Bantu ancestry, despite the fact that almost all of them learned to speak 
Somali, practice Islam and have affiliated with a Somali clan. Throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with colonial support, there was a solidifying of 
racialized constructions of the Bantus as distinct and inferior to 'pure' Somalis which 
further encouraged discrimination against them in myriad ways including placement at 
the bottom of any clan allegiance system they joined. On a broader scale, 
agriculturally-focused clans were also looked down upon, as farming was seen as an 
inferior pursuit to herding.17 
Brons also cites Lewis on linguistic differences between the Maxaa Somali of the 
Samale and the Maay-maay Somali of the Sab, which are apparently as significant as the 
differences between Spanish and Portuguese rather than being merely dialectical. 18 
Besteman adds that the famous Siad Barre literacy program of the early 1970s taught 
only the new written version of 'standard' Somali, which was the Maxaa version and 
became the official state language, thereby alienating those who spoke Sab Maay-maay 
Somali.19 While ethnic homogeneity has often been idealized by both Somali and non-
Somali commentators as a key positive force for Somali unity, Brons and Besteman 
argue extensively that there have always been a variety of cleavages that co-exist with 
Somali population and at present the enfranchisement of these groups (the Midgans, Tumals and Yibirs) is 
said to be far advanced (Lewis, 10). 
17 Catherine Besteman, "Representing Violence and 'Othering' Somalia", Cultural Anthropology 11, No.1 
(February 1996): 124. 
18 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 99-102. 
19 Besteman, "Representing Violence and 'Othering' Somalia",125. 
clan distinctions in Somali society, such as those of perceived racial background and 
economic occupation. Once Somalia was given independence and a central Somali 
government, dominated by pastoralists, was created, this situation became more 
politically significant. 
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Beyond the perceived racial and livelihood differences outlined above, other 
factors distinguish the existences of settled and nomadic Somali groups which continue 
to have relevance to present day. While nomadic Somalis are said to have relied on 
series of clan and elders' meetings outlined above, settled Somalis apparently put less 
emphasis on clan politics and relied more upon their neighbors during times of need.20 
Because of their sedentary nature, agricultural groups tended to establish more 
permanent and class-based structures of governance than did nomads. 21 This is 
generally the explanation given for why the two major Sab or Rahanweyn clans, the Digil 
and the Mirifle,22 suffered a disproportionate number of deaths during the 1990s famine. 
After their farmlands and villages had been destroyed and their populations dispersed 
by a combination of conflict and drought, these groups had little in the way of larger 
clan structures upon which to depend in this difficult period.23 During the 1990s war, 
many clan groups were dislocated from their traditional regions and occupations. 
Some made attempts to grab valuable land, especially around the ports of major cities 
like Mogadishu and Kismayo and in the inter-riverine area. This economic situation 
provides another explanation for why fighting in Somalia's farming region was intense 
and often deadly for locals. 
In many ways, the new insecurities caused by the breakdown of the central 
Somali state have re-created a greater need for the clan system in present-day Somali 
20 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 120-125. 
21 Besteman's work suggests that clan membership itself was far more fluid in southern, agricultural 
regions. "People switch clan affiliation for protection, for marriage, for grazing or land rights, for labor, for 
political reasons- or for other personal reasons. The process of affiliating with a clan other than the one 
into which a person was born is quick and easy in the south, and is not necessarily permanent." Besteman, 
"Representing Violence and 'Othering' Somalia",124. 
22 The term Rilhanweyn is sometimes used as an overarching category for two sub-groups- the Digil and 
Mirifle but is also sometimes considered to be one of two major Sab clans, labelled the Rilhanweyn and Digil. 
23 John Prendergast, Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia (London: Pluto Press, 
1997), 115-116 & 124-125. 
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life than may have existed during the Barre years or before. The agricultural clans and 
groups of the south have historically claimed to face discrimination and disadvantage. 
Their lower levels of involvement in the military effort to overthrow Barre meant that, 
at least in the early civil war years, they were not well-prepared to assert with force 
their rights to their land and safety in the anarchic situation that followed the toppling 
of the Barre regime. This overthrow was primarily undertaken by sub-groups within 
the historically nomadic clans. The gradual and then rapid collapse of the Barre 
dictatorship during the 1980s meant that many Somalis who had urbanized during the 
1960s and 1970s, moving from traditional economic pursuits to supposedly more secure 
work in administration for the government in Mogadishu, were left jobless. These 
citizens, out of necessity, often turned for support to extended family and friends from 
within their clan.24 
The research presented in this section thus suggests that a prevalent 
representation of Somalis as nomadic herders has both traditionally and currently 
overlooked the existence of other societal groups. A number of Somalia researchers 
view racial, class and external factors as being important in contributing to conflict in 
the country as well as clans. Importantly, the relevance of all these factors has shifted 
historically due to political, economic and social conditions, rather than being 
primordially determined, as much media coverage implied. In order to understand the 
ways in which Somalia's socio-economic and political collapse was facilitated, it is 
important to look at the ways in which colonialism and the independent Somali state 
which followed have affected various Somalis in diverse ways. The broad research 
support illustrated in this section for viewing Somali clans and social structures as more 
fluid and complex than they are generally described during the 1990s intervention is 
significant for analysing later media and policymaker representations. 
24 This situation is discussed by several authors including Brons, Besteman and Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, 
The Collapse of the Somali State: the Impact of the Colonial Legacy (London: HAAN Publishing, 1996), 138-139. 
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The Colonial Era 
The colonial era marked the start of a new set of relationships between diverse 
Somali ·groups and a variety of colonising powers. Britain, France and Italy all staked 
claim to various parts of the Somali region and carved the territory amongst 
themselves, imposing their own versions of political and economic rule with little or no 
thought given to existing Somali social and migratory patterns. Britain annexed 
northern Somalia, now known as Somaliland, and signed treaties with the regional 
majority Isaaq clan. France claimed the northwestern corner of Somalia, now Djibouti, 
while the Italians took areas in the south of the country and were particularly interested 
in creating large farming plantations in the fertile areas.25 The Christian empire of 
Ethiopia used this period to push for its own territorial gains in the Ogaden and Haud 
regions, two important grazing areas on what was to become a highly contested border 
between the two countries. Somali land was thus divided among outside forces with 
little regard for the ways in which these new borders split clan groups and resource 
access in ways that created antagonism between neighboring groups.26 
While these new divisions did cause increased levels of violence and 
competition amongst Somalis, Laitin and Samatar suggest that they also created an 
impetus for emerging Somali nationalism based on united opposition to arbitrary and 
unrepresentative colonial control.27 The so-called 'Mad Mullah' Sayyid Mohammad 
began his nationalistic attempts to unify a number of Somali dans in 1895, principally 
to fight Ethiopian pillaging of lands perceived to be Somali, but he also coordinated 
Somali attacks against European colonisers for over twenty years.28 In the Italian-run 
south, Somalis violently revolted against their employment as little more than slave 
25 Hashim, The Fallen State, 48 and Paolo Tripodi, The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu from 
Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope (Basingstoke UK: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), 26-29. 
26 Hashim, The Fallen State, 47. 
27 Laitin & Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, 54. 
28 This anticolonial rebellion survived four major British military expeditions and the first use of air strikes 
in colonial Africa. It collapsed when the 'Mad Mullah' died of influenza in 1920 in a remote Ogaden village. 
James Mayall ed., The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former 
Yugoslavia and Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 102. 
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labor on various colonially-run farms. 29 Sayyid Mohammad was later taken up by Siad 
Barre as an example of a national hero who had united the Somali people against 
outside invaders. While some authors seem to support his idea that these rebellions 
were important for fostering initial feelings of pan-Somalism, Brons suggests that the 
experiences of Somali groups in the nomadic north and the primarily agricultural south 
were very different and would not necessarily have been relatable in ways that would 
create strong nationalist feelings.3o 
The British had little interest in Somalia beyond its strategic location at the 
meeting point of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, which was important both 
militarily and for trade. The northern Somali economy was therefore geared 
overwhelmingly towards supplying the nearby British port city of Aden with fresh 
food, with very little funding being placed into alternative occupations, infrastructure, 
education or governance training for local elites.31 A trade deficit also began which has 
continued and worsened to present day. Colonial investment in Somalia remained 
comparatively very low, which meant that indigenous Somalis bore the full force of 
these negative outcomes with little or no assistance.32 
As they tired of expending military resources in this comparatively 
unproductive colony, the British began a period of detente in their border skirmishes 
with the Ethiopians and set upon a process of boundary negotiation, conducted largely 
without Somali input. Alice Bettis Hashim describes the disastrous effects of these 
negotiations for Somalis; they resulted in an 1897 treaty which ceded both the Ogaden 
and the rich grazing area of the Haud to Ethiopia, destabilizing the grazing practices of 
at least five major Somali clan groups. Britain sought to maintain a balance of power in 
Africa and, according to Hashim, favoured maintaining the greater strength of 
Somalia's neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia, over the well-being of Somalia's people.33 
29 Hashim, The Fallen State, 48. 
30 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 139-141. 
31 Hashim, The Fallen State, 50. 
32 Ibid, 52. 
33 Hashim, The Fallen State, 51 and Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State, 51-52. 
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Conditions in southern Somalia, under Italian rule, were little better. Italy 
established a monopoly over exports, customs and tariff regulations which had a highly 
negative impact on urban Somali business and trading communities around 
Mogadishu. Although the Italian government was initially in favour of the abolition of 
slavery on southern Somali plantations in the late 1800s, conditions of near-slavery 
continued without much change and were actively encouraged during the Fascist 
period. The colonial practices of both the British and the Italians also aided in the 
official establishment of discrimination based on racial features, with those claiming 
Arab origins labelled 'non-slave' and 'non-farmers' while Sab groups faced increased 
hardship and even less freedom. The kolonya system, which was established during the 
1920s, involved the expropriation of high quality land from villages with no 
compensation and the forced relocation of villagers onto plantation sites. It was only 
after southern Somalia was established as a UN protectorate in 1950 that coercion of 
labour and land expropriation were banned and small-scale subsistence farming based 
around villages was re-established.34 
Southern Somalia was administered by Italy as a UN protectorate from 1950-
1960 in an attempt to prepare it for independence. Britain attempted to match the 
transfer to self-governance of the northern Somaliland Protectorate to that of the south, 
with the goal of seeing the two sectors unified as soon as possible in 1960. There was 
much work to be done in creating a single state system into which two very different 
styles of colonial administration, British in the north and Italian in the south, could be 
integrated. Prototype Somali political parties began to be formed among the young and 
educated minority as early as the 1920s and the creation of these parties increased in 
pace as the date of independence neared. Most of these parties were tied to specific 
clan groups so parties representing clans such as the Darod, who were widely-spaced 
across Somali territory, had some advantage in representation. Already the primary 
goal of many of these parties was to unify all Somali peoples in French Somaliland 
34 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 147-149. Issa-Salwe also provides a description of life for 
Somalis under Italian colonialism in The Collapse of the Somali State, 52-53. 
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(now Djibouti), Ethiopia, Kenya, British and Italian Somalilands.35 Interestingly, 
however, political groups representing settled, agricultural communities such as the 
Rahanweyn Digil and Mirifle pushed for the protectorate state to be kept in place for 
thirty rather than ten years, hinting at their fears that the future Somali state would be 
dominated by nomadic groups who might consider the inhabitants of their 
communities to be 'lesser' Somalis.36 
Such studies of Somalia's colonial political economy help to complicate 
assertions made by commentators such as Stevenson, who suggest that Somalia's 
economic difficulties are merely one more manifestation of its general primitive and 
"Darwinian" situation: "Even in peacetime, the Somali economy has no margin. 
Three-quarters of the population remained vagrant nomads and lived at the subsistence 
level on camels, sheep, goats and cattle. Cyclical drought produced mass starvation on 
a regular basis. Somalia has long depended on the permanent presence of foreign relief 
organizations to feed those its economy could not."37 While using derogatory 
terminology to describe Somali survival strategies attuned with the region's climate, 
this assessment fails to take into account the effects of colonial procedures on the 
Somali economy. Although hardship due to droughts is acknowledged to have been a 
historic issue for Somalis, "mass starvation" is not mentioned as a "regular" event by 
any other Somali commentator surveyed. While offers of foreign relief were often 
exploited by the Barre regime, the fact that many Somalis survived without state 
assistance during this regime, and continue to survive almost two decades after the 
country's move to statelessness and its abandonment by much of the outside world, 
would seem to challenge such assertions of chronic dependency. 
Newly-created central state bodies in independent Somalia posed a challenge to 
the traditional authority of clan elders and religious leaders to roughly the same extent 
as the colonial systems upon which they were based. While, in practice and at local 
levels, elders and religious leaders tended to remain influential, the new Somali judicial 
35 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 152-153 and Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State, 67. 
36 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 153. 
37 Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: US Policy in Somalia, 7. 
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system referred to the colonial laws of the British and Italians and only partly provided 
space for customary and sharia laws.38 The creation of a central Somali army also placed 
a new, powerful coercive force into the hands of Somalia's state leaders, diminishing 
the potential for the use of traditional leaders as conflict negotiators. Finally, the 
colonial period and its ending had done nothing to reduce high levels of social 
fragmentation in Somali society. If anything, colonialism may have worsened these 
divisions by supporting racialized hierarchies, by creating greater amounts of 
environmental and economic insecurity, and through the physical separation of Somali 
social groups across four distinct states. These colonial legacies would come back to 
haunt the Somali state throughout its short period of existence.39 
The Somali State, the Cold War & Collapse 
The Somali state's interaction with the outside world appears to be another area 
of diverse perspectives in the body of literature on Somali history and politics. James 
Mayall takes a fairly negative view of Somalia's political history, suggesting that 
Somalia was responsible for destabilizing the Hom region by engaging in violence to 
take land from its neighbours.40 Hashim, Brons and several others are much more 
supportive of the Somali position; they argue that Somalis were drawn into violence 
because of the unfair colonial divisions of land on the Hom and that neighboring states, 
especially Ethiopia, were involved in provoking at least some of the fighting. 
Brons suggests that from its creation in 1960 there was frustration among 
northern Somali clans about the concentration of power and governance in Mogadishu 
and this point is picked up by several other authors.41 Despite these broad disparities, 
Somali politicians were careful from the outset of the Somali state project to create 
coalitions from a variety of clans. This suggests that, despite the creation of a Western-
modelled political system, the concept of the clan remained important for recruiting 
38 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 156. 
39 Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State, 67. 
40 Mayall, The New Interventionism 1991-1994, 97. 
41 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 162. 
support and undertaking social projects. These inter-dan and sub-clan alliances 
required repayments in the form of jobs, council positions or occasionally direct 
monetary pay-offs and opportunities spread across clans to keep the peace. 
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Although this form of power-sharing and coalition-building across clan divides 
was important and in some ways reminiscent of older forms of Somali governance, as 
time went on there was also a large amount of personal jockeying for influence and 
benefits among politicians looking more for their own personal gain than for the 
interests of their constituents.42 During the 1969 elections many petitions claimed 
voting irregularities and there were widespread claims of abuse of power, corruption 
and nepotism. By 1968, twenty-one percent of the Somali national budget was being 
put into military spending, allegedly to counter fears of an Ethiopian attack; money was 
being diverted away from civilian projects to provide this funding.43 Hashim blames 
the failure of Somali democracy largely on the proportional representation system 
which was inherited from Italy, claiming that, in Somalia, the system encouraged self-
interested men to present themselves as candidates based on their personal clan 
lineage.44 Brons concurs and adds that the marginalization of rural Somalis, southern 
agriculturalists and northern urban-dwellers from state services such as education, 
infrastructure, medical and development services, which were concentrated in and 
around Mogadishu, also increased public disenchantment with the new central state.45 
The political and social climate was therefore set for change in 1969 when President 
Shirmarke was assassinated. The armed forces swiftly seized power and appointed 
General Mohamed Siad Barre as Somalia's new President. 
The policies that Barre offered initially appeared very enticing to a large portion 
of the Somali public, already disillusioned with past corruption and lack of services. 
Barre also commanded one of the most popular elements of the new central Somali 
state. Through its involvement in public projects such as communal well-digging, 
42 Hashim, The Fallen State, 67 and Tripodi, The Colonial Legacy in Somalia, 103. 
43 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 169. 
44 Hashim, The Fallen State, 77 and Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State, 74-75. 
45 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 165 and Tripodi, The Colonial Legacy in Somalia, 108. 
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experimental farming and road building and by being a very large public employer, the 
national army had achieved an important place in Somalia's collective identity 
immediately after its creation.46 Barre's speeches emphasized his desire to make 
Somalia into a 'modern' state, complete with adequate social services to allow all 
Somalis, nomadic and urban, educated and illiterate, to achieve equal levels of 
education and opportunity. This guideline involved the development and widespread 
teaching of the Somali language script and the promotion of self-reliance and pride in 
the Somali nation. Following a devastating drought in 1974-75, Barre encouraged the 
resettlement of rural Somalis who began abandoning their pastoral livelihoods for 
allegedly more secure opportunities. His goal, which was only minimally achieved, 
was to steer more Somali citizens into farming and fishing co-operatives or into an 
urban labour-force.47 
Barre believed that clan cleavages were the most divisive factor in Somali 
society and vowed to see the clan system dissolved.48 To assist this process, he created 
local orientation centres, which were designed to compete with the mosques and 
lineage associations to foster bonds between Somalis that were not based on clan 
affiliation.49 The use of clan names and terminology was also forbidden. While 
marginally successful, these policies nonetheless failed to dislodge the old and popular 
customary law and security provisions that existed within clan groups. These 
traditions existed in tandem with new central programs and merely went underground 
and not out of existence when there were conflicts between old and new systems. 5° 
Brons argues that at least until the late 1970s Barre's policies, whether 
considered dictatorial and un-Islamic by some segments of society or as positive and 
unifying by others, were an issue predominately for urban populations. She suggests 
that it was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Barre's leadership became 
46 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 170 and Tripodi, The Colonial Legacy in Somalia, 114. 
47 Ahmed I. Sarna tared., The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
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shaky and his counter-insurgency actions were launched, that rural Somali populations 
began to feel much impact from government policies beyond a few agrarian 
development schemes. 51 This point is challenged by other commentators, such as Laitin 
and Samatar, who have a generally more positive view of Barre's early governance; 
they believe that state institutions had more of an effect on many Somalis' lives than 
does Brons. Both the extent of Barre's influence on the Somali population, as well as its 
positive or negative effects for Somalis, are significant points of disagreement amongst 
commentators. 
Shortly after his rise to power, Barre tied his policies to the larger ideological 
framework of' scientific socialism'. While some analysts of Somali history have argued 
that Barre was honestly mounting a revolution against bourgeois liberalism, which was 
often negatively associated with colonial-era policies and the excesses of the democratic 
years, others have pointed to the political expediency in this move. The Soviet Union 
had been pouring money into military spending for Somalia, in the form of both 
equipment and training, since 1963. Within a few years, Somalia had acquired the fifth 
largest army in Africa. Barre was not hesitant to make the most of the Cold War 
conflict in order to improve Somalia's military capacities in relation to other 
neighboring states and to acquire assistance in infrastructure development within 
Somalia.52 
After it declared Cold War neutrality, Somalia seemed to have few other 
external interests in the 1970s besides the reclamation of the prized Ogaden grazing 
land and the reunification of the Ogadeni Somalis with the rest of their national 
kinspeople. These feats would require a large amount of external military support. 
Despite the devastating effects this conflict would have on their country, Hashim 
argues that most of the Somali public supported this objective: "At the outbreak of 
hostilities with Ethiopia in late 1977, Barre's popularity soared almost to the level of his 
51 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 177. 
52 Ibid, 169. Jeffrey Lefebvre comments that "Mogadishu's defense expenditures ... rang(ed) between 13.3 
and 27.5 percent of the national budget during the period 1967-1984." Jeffrey Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: 
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coming to power in 1969."53 Brons and others tend to counter this view somewhat; they 
suggest that it was primarily clans with close ties to the Ogadeni Somalis who favoured 
violent action to recapture this land. They argue that many of the northern clans and 
settled farming communities were frustrated early on by the amount of funding that 
went towards this struggle at the expense of other development goals.54 
The beneficial pattern of Soviet aid to the Barre regime continued until1976, 
when the Soviets agreed to deliver military aid to Ethiopia as well, following the 1974 
end of Emperor Haile Selassie' s rule and the takeover of Soviet-oriented Mengistu 
Haile Mariam. By 1977, Ethiopia had expelled all American military advisors; their 
turn to the East raised Soviet hopes of a socialist federation of Somalia, Southern Yemen 
and Ethiopia. Barre, however, had no interest in seeing Soviet military aid shared 
between Somalia and Ethiopia; he was tempted to attack the eastern border of Ethiopia 
in an attempt to take the Ogaden region for Somalia while Ethiopian political structures 
remained weak and confused. He was already funding the guerrillas of the Western 
Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) to make small attacks across the border. By July, 1977, 
regular troops from the Somali National Army had joined the war. 55 
Barre was confident that, even if the Soviets stopped supporting him, he could 
look to the Americans for new sources of backing. In August 1977, he was greatly 
disappointed to learn that they would not give military support because of Somalia's 
irredentist goals. By October of the same year, the Soviet Union had decided to throw 
all its forces behind Ethiopia. Deserted by both superpowers, Somalia was forced to 
withdraw from the Ogaden in March 1978. In the end, neither America nor the Soviet 
Union wished to see international norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity 
overturned and this ended Somalia's hopes of reclaiming the Ogaden by force.56 As 
Barre scaled down his irredentist rhetoric and agreed to recognize borders with Kenya 
53 Hashim, The Fallen State, 102. 
54 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 185 & 189. 
55 Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn, 35. 
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and then Ethiopia in 1984 and 1988 respectively, America increased payments to his 
faltering regime. As long as Barre stayed within his own borders, they were 
comfortable to provide support despite increasing internal dissent and human rights 
abuses. 57 
All commentators agree that the failure of the Ogaden war represented the 
beginning of a rapid decline in Barre's popularity. As a direct result of the conflict, 
more than one million refugees, fearing Ethiopian persecution, streamed into Somalia 
from the Ogaden. Sensing growing public frustration with his failure to win the 
Ogaden, Barre became increasingly determined to stifle criticism and dissidence. 
Despite his previous and continuing speeches against 'clannishness', Barre adopted a 
policy of appeasing the various Darod sub-clans. These groups were close to his own 
family roots and included the Ogadenis, since he had already alienated the northern 
Isaaq and Hawiye clans, as well as the Majerteen.58 Members of favoured clans began to 
receive special advantages in business, employment, and education and were assigned 
a disproportionate number of higher level government posts. In addition to resentment 
at the new repressive and discriminatory measures undertaken by Barre, many Somali 
groups were distressed by continued precedence given to central areas of Somalia over 
northern ones and by the secular tone of the Barre government. Several anti-Barre 
political groups stressed that their goals included strengthening Somalia's Islamic 
political ties and turning foreign policy towards other Muslim countries in contrast to 
what was seen as Barre's excessive focus on the Western and Eastern superpowers.59 
Throughout the early 1980s, Barre's repressive tactics became more deadly 
against the northern Isaaqs and Hawiyes. Clan-related state terrorism was carried out to 
traumatize the local population in an effort to keep them from supporting rebel groups. 
Northern cities came under 'special emergency regulations' and were basically taken 
57 Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State, 184. 
58 Ibid, 103. 
59 Ibid, 186. 
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over by state military police.60 In the economic sector, many government-owned 
farming, energy and industrial projects were failing under poor management. 
Consequently, most government-controlled employment opportunities arose in refugee 
management or the administrative sector. The large, profitable and still privately-
controlled livestock and commodity export sectors were primarily the domains of the 
Isaaq and Hawiye clans out of Berbera and Mogadishu. In 1983, this export of livestock 
and related products accounted for about 93.9% of all Somali export earnings.61 Barre 
attempted to take control of this trade away from these clans by creating a 
discriminatory export licensing system. According to several Africa Watch reports 
cited by Brons, pro-Barre military dealt with the issue at the source, attacking 
pastoralists and routinely looting their stock.62 
The situation of southern Somali farming clans is only looked at in depth by 
Brons, who suggests that these citizens had suffered from the beginning of the Barre 
regime, when all land was put under state ownership and registration of title became 
the only legal way to hold land. This procedure meant that control of land use was 
taken away from traditional local leaders and elders and placed in the hands of 
centralized and often-absent state controllers. Many long-established farmers from the 
Rahanweyn Digil and Mirifle clans did not register their farms because of the prohibitive 
cost and travel required and because high illiteracy levels made them uncomfortable 
dealing with bureaucracies. The new system denied farmers the flexibility of using a 
variety of different land types, insuring them some yield even if one particular water 
source failed. It also created some situations of insecurity where village 'strongmen', 
with the necessary connections and resources to register their land, gained power and 
control over unregistered land users, who were often put to work as wage-labourers.63 
Throughout the 1980s, macroeconomic conditions in Somalia continued to spiral 
out of control as Barre clung to power. Inflation reached one hundred percent by 1984 
60 I. M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society, Lawrenceville US: The Red Sea Press, 
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and the IMF stepped in to reschedule a foreign debt which had grown to $172 million 
US. Trade deficits were running at $350 million and the Somali shilling faced seventy 
percent devaluation. By 1987, over seventy-five percent of government operating 
budgets in social and economic ministries were funded by foreign assistance and the 
defense department was estimated to be consuming more than fifty percent of the state 
budget. Far from being 'self-reliant', Somalia was now accepting large amounts of food 
aid, making it among the most dependent countries in the 'Third World' at the time. 
Despite these depressing indicators of severe governmental mismanagement and 
continued reports of internal human rights abuses, 'security assistance' was provided to 
Somalia by the US, along with economic aid packages, until the cusp of the civil war. 
"The 1989 US figure for such aid was given as $133.5 million in addition to military 
training and lethal military aid such as rifles and other small weapons."64 
The Isaaq finally revolted against their treatment by the Barre regime in 1988, 
seizing control of the northern cities of Hargeisa and Burao. Barre responded by 
sending forces to level the cities and commit wide-scale and severe human rights 
abuses.65 Somali military pilots eventUally refused to continue bombing civilians and 
foreign mercenaries had to be brought in. At this point, a Barre-appointed Ogadeni 
military leader, Colonel Omar Jess, refused to enter into the attacks on Hargeisa and 
turned his forces southwards against Barre himself. He was joined by General 
Mohammed Farah Aidid, who was later to play a major role in 1990s Somali politics. 
Various coalitions of clan groups began to demand Barre's resignation and there-
establishment of democratic governance but Barre refused to give up power. A 
combination of Isaaq forces, the Hawiye militias of Aidid' s Habr Gedir clan, Abgal 
followers of Ali Mahdi Mohamed, a prominent Mogadishu businessman, and the 
Ogadeni forces of Omar Jess surrounded Mogadishu in December 1990, forced Barre 
south into his home Marehan clan territory in January 1991, and then eventually out of 
64 Hashim, The Fallen State, 111. The macroeconomic figures for this paragraph can also be found in 
Hashim, 110-111. 
65 Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State, 99-100 
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the Somali state. 66 Jess then settled in the southern city of Kismayo to continue attacks 
on Barre's loyal son-in-law General Hersi Morgan. Aidid began a power struggle with 
his former Abgal partner, Ali Mahdi while continuing his efforts to drive Barre out of 
southwestern Somalia. Heavy fighting laid waste to much of central- southern Somalia 
and Mogadishu, resulting in most of the early, unpublicized famine. The lsaaq returned 
to their northern lands and declared secession to form the as yet unrecognized 
independent Republic of Somaliland. 
There are a variety of opinions on why the Somali state collapsed only thirty 
years after its creation. An overarching factor, however, would likely be that attempts 
at centralized governance increased, rather than eased, the insecurity of Somali citizens, 
which had, in turn, increased during colonial times. In important ways, the democratic 
and then dictatorial governments in Somalia mimicked structures of colonial rule 
whereby only small groups profited with regards to trading opportunities, land tenure 
and access to education, public services and employment despite the Somali state's 
avowed objective to change this situation. The minimal attempts by government to 
improve the lives of Somali citizens often conflicted with traditional and trusted forms 
of self-rule, which several commentators argue were not well enough incorporated into 
the Somali state. While they were perhaps temporarily roused by the nationalist cause 
of enlarging Somalia's boundaries to include separated Somali groups, many Somali 
clans were not interested in risking their country's safety by engaging in warfare and 
were resentful that such a large proportion of state funds and time were spent in this 
pursuit. 
Despite his declared aims of preventing clan-based politics and policies, Barre 
himself favoured his own family clans over others. In the last ten years of his regime, 
he engaged in divide and rule tactics of playing one clan off another in order to 
maintain his power base, which led to increased inter-clan tensions within the Somali 
state. Citizen coping strategies to offset the negative effects of many of Barre's 
66 John L. Hirsch & Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 11. 
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economic and social policies had typically manifested themselves in renewed reliance 
on the clan system in areas where this was historically a major part of peoples' lives. 
As governmental functions became increasingly erratic and even directly violent 
towards some Somali groups during the 1980s and life in most parts of Somalia became 
increasing dangerous, this tendency to tum towards clans was only re-enforced. 
Somali identification with clans thus varied during the country's history, and was 
influenced by both internal and international political and economic factors. Rather 
than being a constant unit for analysing Somali society, clans appear in the above 
accounts as dynamic, but persistent, elements within the culture, interacting with other 
factors. 
The 'Failed State': Somalia Before & During UNOSOM I 
By early 1991, the civil war had begun to centre on Mogadishu. President Siad 
Barre declared a state of emergency, prompting UN offices in the capital to evacuate. 
US Marines staged an amphibious rescue of their 272 staff from Mogadishu in late 
January 1991 when Barre fled Mogadishu and the $30 million US embassy was left to 
looters; many other states and relief agencies also left due to dangerous conditions.67 
After Siad Barre was ousted, John Drysdale describes some small-scale efforts to re-start 
a political process with power-wielding Somalis such as Ali Mahdi and Aidid in 
Djibouti in the summer of 1991. These efforts, sponsored by Italy, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, received no larger international support and failed.68 Stevenson suggests that 
the US made covert efforts to re-start negotiations in October 1991 but these also fell 
through. The worst fighting between Aidid and Ali Mahdi in Mogadishu occurred in 
67 Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia, 34 and Jennifer Kay Woofter, "OPSEC v. RTK: 
Media Restrictions in United Nations Peacekeeping" (Virginia: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
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68 John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? (London: HAAN Associates, 1994), 32-33. Hirsch and 
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November 1991; indiscriminate shelling killed thousands of civilians and rendered food 
supplies to the city insecure.69 
Mohamoud Afrah, a Somali journalist who remained in Mogadishu throughout 
the early fighting, notes in his diaries that Somali citizens were already expressing 
frustration with the emerging 'warlords' at this point, claiming they were as indifferent 
to ordinary civilians' suffering as Siad Barre had been.70 The Habr Gedir and Abgal had 
turned against one another months previously, but Drysdale claims that Ali Mahdi's 
self-proclamation as Interim President of Somalia without Aidid's approval in January 
1992 reinforced problems between the two groups. Ali Mahdi is alleged to have made 
such a claim in order to position himself as a useful contact for a brief meeting with UN 
personnel at this time, despite the fact that his leadership was not widely accepted by 
many Somalis.n 
According to journalist Scott Peterson, who spent time in Somalia after the 
outbreak of civil war, Barre's fleeing army abandoned over forty thousand weapons of 
various sizes and hundreds of millions of rounds in the capital. These abandoned arms 
were looted, which resulted in a heavily-armed population and the creation of large 
gun markets selling weapons at cut-rate prices. While Peterson argues that most 
Somali citizens deplored this tum to clan-based violence, they had little choice but to 
arm themselves and seek protection from their clans as all other forms of civil security 
had broken down.72 Mogadishu was split along north-south lines between Abgal and 
Habr Gedir 'territories' and the Green Line which divided these sectors became a place 
of frequent skirmishing. With normal trade and economics forced to a halt due to 
insecurity, looting and stealing became common pursuits. Peterson estimates that over 
forty distinct bandit groups, not necessarily affiliated with either of the major clans, 
69 Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia, 35-36. Stevenson also notes that after the US 
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came into existence and helped to strip Mogadishu bare, even digging up miles of 
buried copper and phone wires to sell. Factories and industrial supplies were 
deconstructed and sold wholesale to businesspeople across the Middle East by wealthy 
Somalis seeking to flee the country with as much money as possible.73 
The inter-riverine area, fertile and crucial for Somali internal food production, 
was also a scene of intense fighting in 1990 and 1991, which devastated farmlands and 
led to approximately 500 thousand refugees and 500 thousand internally-displaced 
citizens.74 In this region, the Darod clan of Barre made a stand against the Hawiye forces 
of Aidid; each side wanted to take control of this highly-productive area, which neither 
group had previously occupied. The Rahanweyn farming clans who historically 
occupied the inter-riverine land are numerically although not territorially among the 
largest Somali clans. Brons suggests that the disproportionately brutal attacks that 
were directed at them were likely a strategic move by both the Darod and the Hawiye to 
weaken their chances of rising to prominence in any new Somali government.75 
As attacks and starvation worsened in southern Somalia, many citizens fled to 
refugee camps on the Kenyan border or into Mogadishu, in hopes of food and 
protection. Mogadishu itself was periodically starved of food and those with guns and 
numbers soon created a profitable situation from this humanitarian disaster. The Habr 
Gedir controlled the airport and the harbour and used these holdings as well as their 
weapons to demand payments and portions of aid, often up to thirty percent, from the 
very few international relief agencies that continued operating in Somalia. These 
included the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), Save the Children UK, 
the International Medical Corps and Medecins Sans Frontieres. Ali Mahdi' s militias 
also profited by controlling flows of aid through their sectors of military control. Aid 
agencies and Somali civilians additionally had to deal with the moryaans, unaffiliated 
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groups of young men who remained dangerously unpunishable and unreachable, 
outside the influence of clan elders or the clan-based militias.76 Other profitable 
industries that emerged during the civil war years were the production of 'technicals', 
SUVs and pickup trucks re-fitted with large weapons, and the transport and sale of 
khat, leaves that were chewed for a stimulant effect. Both these industries made large 
profits from sales to militia and young bandit groups; according to Scott Peterson, both 
were largely controlled by Osman Ato, Aidid's primary financier.77 
In January 1992, a full year after much of the international community's 
abandonment of Somalia, the UN Undersecretary for Political Affairs, James Jonah 
undertook a day's stopover in Mogadishu, after the UN was urged to become involved 
in Somalia by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Jonah failed to get either Ali 
Mahdi or Aidid to agree to a ceasefire. Drysdale argues that Aidid at this point saw 
Jonah as supporting Ali Mahdi through his proposal to put foreign troops in 
Mogadishu and thus was not prepared to talk.78 In response to this unsuccessful effort, 
the UN Security Council adopted resolution 733 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
This resolution imposed an arms embargo on Somalia, an action deemed acceptable by 
the US, which at this point vigorously opposed the involvement of peacekeepers. 
By March 3, 1992, a ceasefire had been agreed between Aidid and Ali Mahdi 
with UN witnesses; this resulted in a further UN resolution (746) being signed to 
encourage continued UN humanitarian work in Somalia and to support the dispatch of 
a twenty person technical team to monitor the ceasefire. UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali took a personal interest in the case of Somalia, seeing it as a post-Cold 
War chance for more robust UN solutions to African problems, and further 
recommended "the establishment of a United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM), comprising fifty military observers to monitor the cease-fire, and a 500-
strong infantry unit to provide United Nations convoys of relief supplies with a 
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sufficiently strong military escort to deter attack" .79 A coordinator was needed on the 
ground in Somalia to manage UN arrival groups, increased aid activities and 
negotiation with Somali leaders. On April28, 1992, Boutros-Ghali appointed Algerian 
diplomat, Mohammed Sahnoun as Special Representative for Somalia; resolution 751 
had been passed four days earlier, establishing UNOSOM I as a mission. 
Sahnoun, who by all accounts undertook his role with energy and commitment, 
decries the wasted opportunities in Somalia as he saw them. He had been critical of the 
UN' s efforts in Somalia from their commencement, arguing that a stronger focus should 
have been put on diplomacy by those who were willing to spend an extended period of 
time in Somalia rather than shuttle in for a few hours. These diplomatic efforts should 
have been undertaken in conjunction with greater international pressure for peace, 
including cuts to bilateral trade and development assistance. In Sahnoun's opinion, 
much more extensive use of regional organisations should have been made before 
involving the UN.80 Sahnoun's primary difficulty following his appointment was that, 
despite several more Security Council resolutions, the international will actually to 
commit and use resources in Somalia was not forthcoming and negotiation with Somali 
groups remained slow.81 Early UN-sponsored peace talks in January and February 1992 
had involved Ali Mahdi and Aidid or their representatives almost exclusively, thus 
alienating smaller, neutral Somali clans and sending the implicit message that those 
who did not hold military sway in Somalia were not of primary importance in the 
peace process.82 
Despite Sahnoun' s negotiating successes with factional leaders and members of 
surviving Somali civilian organisations, there was no coercive component to his 
mission. By early September 1992, UN resolutions had approved the placement of over 
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four thousand personnel in Somalia, but only fifty unarmed Pakistani officers were 
actually on the ground.83 Sahnoun commented that at this stage NGOs who had 
remained in Somalia throughout the conflict were trusted and respected by Somali 
citizens to a much greater extent than the UN. The UN was seen as ill-prepared and 
unable to operate in the face of the armed groups or to enforce any of its resolutions or 
decrees. This opinion was at least partly confirmed when the 500 Pakistani UN 
peacekeepers whom Sahnoun was eventually offered and whom he convinced the 
Somalis to accept arrived two and a half months late and then refused to be deployed 
outside their barracks without permission from the Pakistani government.84 
During Sahnoun' s time as UN chief in Somalia, the famine situation in certain 
areas of the country was 'discovered'. This story and companion imagery caused a 
short surge of media and governmental interest in Somalia; the coverage highlighted 
death counts, potential numbers at risk of death, and the looting of food aid by armed 
groups of men. Such footage came late in terms of actual conditions on the ground in 
Somalia. August and September 1992 were the height of the famine, which had been 
growing in scale well before these dates and began to subside throughout the autumn, 
before the US-dominated UNIT AF mission had even been widely contemplated. Much 
of this early, and often undisclosed, success at easing the famine can be credited to 
Sahnoun, innovative aid agencies, and to the determined efforts of Somali citizens 
themselves. Sahnoun was active in drawing media attention to the region and assisted 
in negotiations to bring some stability to southern Somalia, which helped death rates to 
begin dropping by the autumn of 1992.85 The media only arrived in any great quantity 
in Somalia at the peak of the inter-riverine famine and then promptly disappeared 
again for much of the autumn during US election season; Somalia could not compete as 
'priority' news with the election, or many other events. According to Jeffrey Clark, the 
State Department was also heavily involved in the Balkans and Iraq, with additional 
83 Peterson, Me Against My Brother, 46. 
84 
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issues in the former Soviet Union, and thus did not give Somalia much attention until 
July 1992.86 
Drysdale is particularly clear in his narrative of the early stages of UN 
involvement that, despite media reports based on dramatic aid agency figures, all of 
Somalia was not dying. For political reasons and due to patterns of fighting, famine 
was predominately concentrated in the inter-riverine area, where fighting and crop 
destruction had been intense, but the desperate situation in this part of the country was 
often represented to the external world as that of all of Somalia. Drysdale also believes 
that the amounts of food being looted were often exaggerated. He claims that by the 
end of October 1992, ICRC was reporting only a twenty percent theft of aid as opposed 
to the eighty percent commonly cited by Sahnoun' s replacement. 87 
The lack of consistent attention meant that famine in Somalia was not well-
understood by all Western interveners and was not explained in many media sources. 
Paul Lowe, a photojournalist who spent time in Somalia during the height of the famine 
in August 1992 and during the American troop arrival in December 1992, explains the 
famine situation as he experienced it: 
I think when we were in Baidoa we all basically stayed at a hotel, what 
passed for a hotel; it was a pretty basic setup but it had a restaurant and 
I remember getting spaghetti bolognese in the restaurant there. So 
there was food again there but it was a very functioning, I mean 
Somalia was ... functioning as a country despite the conflict ... you could 
move from place to place, there were markets, restaurants ... So 
certainly from what I saw, from what I experienced, the problem wasn't 
with the availability of food per se, it was about how you controlled 
that, who could afford to buy it or not.88 
Lowe's comments highlight the political nature of the famine in Somalia; it was both 
geographically localized and tied to economic issues of access, depending on the 
connections and financial situation of individual Somalis. The web of economic and 
86 Clark, "Debacle in Somalia", 118. 
87 Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?, 56 and 4-5 (relating to theft of aid supplies). 
88 Author's interview with photojournalist, Paul Lowe, November 2005. 
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social relations which dictated Somali access to food and supplies was therefore a 
crucial aspect of the conflict which was rarely highlighted by policymakers or media. 
As the US and various Western governments began to express a greater 
willingness to donate food, supplies and aircraft to make humanitarian deliveries after 
news of the famine broke, Sahnoun managed the difficult task of negotiating possible 
arrivals of peacekeeping forces to protect and distribute these goods with factional 
leaders such as Aidid. He was frustrated to the point of resignation from his 
assignment in October 1992 when the UN announced the additional approval of three 
thousand peacekeeping troops on top of the expected 500 Pakistani troops without first 
allowing Sahnoun to consult with Somali leaders.89 Both Aidid and Ali Mahdi reacted 
angrily to the possibility of unapproved additional peacekeepers; Aidid' s forces shelled 
UNOSOM forces at Mogadishu's airport and Ali Mahdi's supporters shot at ships 
carrying food as they attempted to enter Mogadishu's seaport. These increased 
tensions between Somali military factions and the UN were felt by relief workers, who 
experienced a surge in looting and hijacking of their vehicles and warehouses.90 
Sahnoun' s loss is bemoaned by many commentators as marking the end of 
constructive diplomacy and peace-building in Somalia. Sahnoun felt unable to work 
within the UN bureaucracy and argued that productive starts he had made on 
negotiating disarmament programs and the regionalization of politics through 
consultation with Somali elders had been jeopardized by the UN's actions.91 Drysdale, 
while he generally praises Sahnoun' s efforts, is more uncertain about the possible roles 
for Somali elders in facilitating peace during the civil war. "Elders can do little about 
armed clansmen who perceive their obligations in political terms, requiring a political 
solution to the state of sub-clan disequilibrium, not in terms of compensation for 
wrong-doing which is the traditional role of elders in council."92 Alternately, however, 
Drysdale argues that the power of elders, once established, is certain, while politicians 
69 Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities, 39-40. This was UN resolution 775, according to Stevenson, 
Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia, 42. 
90 
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91 Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities, 37-40. 
92 Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?, 71. 
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in Somalia remain in a much more precarious position, constantly needing to negotiate 
for support or fight to quell dissent. 
For Drysdale, it was crucial that insecurity in Somalia be understood as 
stemming from both political tensions and opportunistic banditry, two issues which he 
viewed as requiring different approaches by the international community. In both 
cases, he believed that significant amounts of Somali civilian participation were crucial 
and he later praises the efforts of the northern, breakaway nation of Somaliland, which 
used a council of its elders to decide on uses for resources and to ground the basis of its 
new political system with no international assistance.93 
Sahnoun was replaced as UNOSOM I coordinator by an Iraqi diplomat, Ismat 
Kittani; Kittani is generally accepted by commentators as having been less willing to 
actively involve Somali leaders in UN planning, which led to increased distrust of the 
mission in Somalia.94 At this point, 500 Pakistani peacekeepers had finally arrived but 
were trapped at the airport in Mogadishu; they were ill-equipped, had angered Aidid 
by taking possession of the airport, and did not feel safe leaving their base to patrol.95 
Plans for a more significant intervention, however, were afoot; the UN and US had 
chosen, with the defection of Sahnoun, to interpret the situation in Somalia as one 
which required a large influx of foreign assistance, in terms of leadership, equipment 
and bodies on the ground. In contrast to this top-down approach, some independent 
aid agencies appeared to be faring far better with a decentralized approach. Philip 
Johnston, president of CARE, had recently begun facilitating a new style of relief 
program, which emphasized collaboration with Somalis, rather than refusing to trust 
locals. 
Both Sahnoun and Africa Watch director Alex De Waal have since argued that 
the 'spectacular' solution of large scale intervention had a centralizing effect on the 
Somalia conflict, which overemphasized the power of factional war leaders in 
93 Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?, 73. 
94 This fact is mentioned in Drysdale, Stevenson and John L. Hirsch & Robert B. Oakley. 
95 Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia, 44. 
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Mogadishu at the expense of a more grassroots approach.96 As large-scale intervention 
in Somalia became more likely towards the end of 1992, some localized efforts were put 
on hold in many areas in favour of planning the massive logistical arrival of US troops. 
The problem with this strategic move, according to James Mayall, was that the show of 
military might was designed to be limited from its inception and so would have at best 
a temporary impact on the daily practices and economies of the Somali conflict. It thus 
was not prepared to secure long-term change in Somalia. Its only immediate 
consequence in the eyes of many relief workers was to draw resources away from aid 
agencies trying to continue their work with Somalis.97 
The next section will introduce some of the broader, and often conflicting, 
political factors and discourses which were circulating during the American decision to 
intervene in Somalia. The UNIT AF mission was organised as a 'stronger' option, 
involving extensive US military and logistical aid, after the perceived failure of 
UNOSOM I to accomplish many peace-building goals in Somalia. As this section has 
shown, however, UNOSOM I did not act as robustly on its mandate as it might have, 
and did not give significant support to early, regional diplomatic efforts. Individual 
countries involved in UNOSOM I were reluctant to get involved on the ground in 
Somalia. Sahnoun's attempts at engagement with local leaders, both traditional and 
factional, were undermined by the inefficiency of some UN bodies and by the decision 
to dramatically increase the military aspect of intervention in Somalia with the creation 
of UNITAF. Throughout this period, when Somalia was discussed, it tended to be 
represented as an anarchic mess, full of starving people. The more complex political 
and economic factors underlying much of the violence and famine do not appear to 
have been on at least the publicly-discussed agendas of many involved parties in 
Somalia. Complications with intervention strategies, following from viewing the 
96 Mohamed Sahnoun, "Flashlights Over Mogadishu", The New Internationalist, No. 262 (Dec. 1994): 9 and 
Alex De Waal & Rakiya Omaar, "Can Military Intervention Be 'Humanitarian"?, Middle East Report (March-
June 1994): 6. 
97 Mayall, The New Interventionism 1991-1994, 17. 
country relatively simplistically as a group of starving people being prevented from 
receiving food aid, will be seen in following chapter sections. 
'Saving' Somalia: 'The New World Order' & Decisions to Intervene 
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In the early 1990s, there was growing optimism in the international arena and in 
academic circles that the end of the Cold War was providing an option to end the free-
market, socialist and non-aligned divides which had often paralysed UN decision-
making and action on various issues of international importance. Predictions were 
made that it would now be possible for the UN to enter a more active phase of existence 
and deal multilaterally with problems such as the internal'ethnic' conflicts in Somalia 
and Bosnia. The US appeared buoyed by its success in 'liberating' Kuwait during the 
1991 Gulf War, an action which was approved by a newly cooperative Security Council. 
The international response to Somalia, when it first began in early 1992, was also 
presented as groundbreaking in that the Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter for the first time without the consent of a sovereign government for 
explicitly humanitarian reasons. This was deemed a necessary step since there was no 
legitimate governing body to invite the UN into the 'failed state' of Somalia.98 
Senator Richard Lugar, a former chairman of the American Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, concurs that post-Cold War a new understanding of international 
relations began to be developed. Interest in the integrity of territorial borders shifted to 
a morally-justified concept of acceptable intervention in 'intra-state' issues. The cases 
for which interventions were justified, however, had no set principle. American 
positions on intervention ranged from a new form of semi-isolationism to a universalist 
notion of US security being intimately tied to total global stability.99 Variations between 
these two extremes appeared at the international level, between the US and the UN; at 
the American bureaucratic level, between various US institutions; and within 
98 See Mayall, The New Interventionism 1991-1994,94 and Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian 
Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 172. 
99 Senator Lugar, PBS Frontline" Ambush in Mogadishu" interview, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/lugar.html (accessed July 18, 2007). 
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leadership agendas, such as Bill Clinton's. Lugar uses an example within the Clinton 
administration to illustrate oscillation between these two tendencies. Clinton had 
criticised Bush during the election campaign for his failure to show commitment to 
ending conflict in Bosnia and Somalia and he strongly promoted US involvement in 
multilateral peacemaking efforts. Clinton's key motto for his election campaign, 
however, had been 'It's the economy, stupid', indicating his alternative, and perhaps 
incompatible, wish to turn most of his attention to improving America's social services 
and to focus on its domestic agenda.1oo 
At the bureaucratic level, as a large-scale US intervention in Somalia became 
more likely, parts of the American leadership, especially within the military sector, 
increasingly voiced their concerns regarding the deployment of troops into an insecure 
situation with no clear end goals. Academic Jon Western conducted elite interviews 
and concluded that action was taken on Somalia due to the "political interplay of 
competing foreign policy elites, who held different normative beliefs about when and 
where the United States should intervene".101 In the case of both Somalia and Bosnia, 
the framing of these conflicts as intractable and not within America's national interest 
sphere, the dominant view within the US military establishment, was in direct conflict 
with the beliefs of NGOs and humanitarian liberals, who tended to be pro-intervention. 
Western's opinion is that the battle of these two viewpoints resulted in a 
'compromise' situation of action being taken in Somalia in an attempt to prevent US 
involvement in Bosnia, which had been assessed as more costly and difficult. After 
Clinton's election victory: 
President Bush and General Powell concluded that liberal 
humanitarianism would dominate the new administration ... Given the 
shift in power in Washington and the intensity of mobilized political 
100 This contradiction was noted by Paul Wolfowitz in his article "Clinton's First Year", Foreign Affairs 73, 
no. 1 Gan/Feb. 1994): 28-43. Here Wolfowitz discusses the importance of a strategic American foreign 
policy focused on clearly articulated national interest goals. Activities undertaken should be followed 
through to successful completion, not conducted on a testing or trial by error manner which shows 
weakened American resolve. 
101 Jon Western, "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. 
Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia", International Security 26, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 117. 
pressure to respond to humanitarian emergencies, Bush and Powell 
decided that if the United States was going to intervene, it would be in 
Somalia- not in Bosnia. Somalia was the easier of the two missions.102 
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Economic considerations, as well as strategic ones, also likely produced an abrupt 
policy turnaround situation whereby the Pentagon's resistance to becoming involved in 
Somalia under Bush shifted to a more positive outlook on the mission under Clinton. 
Tension between military officials and incoming members of the Clinton administration 
would likely have been increased by the perception within the armed forces that 
Clinton was anti-military and ready to slash defense budgets.103 Patrick Gilkes argues 
that the collapse in Pentagon resistance to intervention in Somalia happened because 
the military establishment saw activity in Somalia as a way of helping to present a new 
humanitarian image and preserve their budget in a post-Cold War setting, especially 
since Clinton had agreed to the mission in advance, perhaps without realising how 
high the price would be.t04 
Interviews with senior American officials appear to confirm these 
interpretations. Walter Clarke, Deputy Chief of Mission for the US Embassy in Somalia 
between March and July 1993, also suggests that President Bush wanted to leave office 
on a 'high note', after receiving much criticism during the 1992 election campaign for 
his apparent unresponsiveness to events in Somalia and Bosnia. Clarke states: "I think 
he chose Somalia because it looked like it was gonna be the easier of these two major 
humanitarian crises."105 Before the intervention took place in early December 1992 
there were already calls not to allow 'mission creep' to take place.106 This concern 
would prove to be a major source of disagreement and policy confusion between the 
102 Western, "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention", 118. 
103 Ambassador Oakley, PBS Frontline" Ambush in Mogadishu" interview, 
htij?:ljwww.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.htrnl (accessed July 18, 2007). 
104 Patrick Gilkes, "From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Somalia Precedent", Middle East Report, 
no. 185 (Nov-Dec. 1993): 22. 
105 Walter Clarke, PBS Frontline-" Ambush in Mogadishu" interview, 
htij?://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/clarke.htrnl (accessed July 18, 2007). 
106 "Do It Right in Somalia", The New York Times, December 1, 1992. 
US and the UN, which favoured more long-term involvement in Somalia to assist in 
rebuilding the country's destroyed infrastructure and civil society. 
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Walter Clarke also offers an alternative but complementary perspective. He 
argues that America's Cold War-era policies and engagement with the Horn of Africa 
carried on to an extent after 1989, despite attempts to draft new policies that would 
largely remove the US from this area and encourage multilateral responses to conflicts 
there rather than those driven by superpowers. Clarke believes that even in 1992 there 
was still doubt as to whether the Cold War was really over and this doubt influenced 
the ways in which Somalia's situation was approached.107 Others, such as the last US 
Ambassador to Somalia, James Bishop and former Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, 
have suggested when interviewed for ABC news108 that the continuation of older ways 
of engaging with the region may merely have happened due to a sudden drop in 
American levels of interest and engagement with the area throughout the 1980s. With 
little impetus and few resources to change forms of engagement, old, Cold War 
patterns of understanding and behaviour remained the de facto standard. 
In summary, it appears that the US, while keen to participate in a mission that 
would give them positive credentials for compassionate feeding and protection of 
civilians, wanted to be in and out of Somalia quickly for reasons of finance and national 
interest. Although one editorial writer argued that Somalia was not a complicated 
enough situation to become another Vietnam, he did express concern for how and 
when 'victory' could be declared. Was the delivery of aid supplies enough to constitute 
an international humanitarian 'victory' or was political and military involvement 
essential? As journalist RaymondBonner argued, "It may be possible to re-create 
Somalia, but it will take years. Are we prepared to stay that long, or would we, in the 
end, lose heart and pull out prematurely?"109 This question accurately predicts the final 
stages of US involvement in Somalia, despite its publication days before the troops even 
entered. These comments will be echoed in media coverage; decision-making 
107 Walter Clarke, PBS Frontline," Ambush in Mogadishu" interview. 
1os ABC Nightline in Somalia, December 8, 1992. 
109 Raymond Bonner, "Buy Up the Somalis' Guns", The New York Times, December 2, 1992. 
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regarding intervention and what form it would take were heavily based on competing 
discourses of what America's role should be in a post-Cold War world and how acting, 
or not acting, in Somalia would reflect on this role. Factors on the ground in Somalia 
became a lower priority in the decision-making process and this would become evident 
later as the mission began. 
Americans Arrive: Somalia During UNIT AF 
After the jump in coverage in August and September, Somalia drifted on and off 
the radar of American policymakers more often throughout the autumn of 1992. 
Despite still infrequent coverage, American military planes and personnel were 
increasingly being used to airlift supplies to more remote parts of Somalia, although 
this approach was controversial with relief agencies who often felt it was ineffective 
and caused increased tension on the ground. Because it was an election year, however, 
it was not until after the Clinton victory over Bush was official in November that media 
attention and political action regarding the Somali situation began to increase steadily. 
Images of starving Somali women and children contrasted with shots of young 
Somali men with guns appeared in more intensive media coverage and references were 
made to high percentages of relief supplies being looted, with eighty percent becoming 
a commonly-cited figure. 110 Quoted statistics vary considerably throughout media 
coverage and between different aid agencies, however, just as the level of enthusiasm 
for a large-scale intervention varied considerably among aid workers. While a small 
amount of media time was given to some cautious viewpoints, the more prevalent 
message was that existing conditions in Somalia were disastrous and would get worse 
if action was not taken. Mayall and John G. Fox claim that President Bush was a key 
figure in supporting the Somalia mission after he lost the election. According to Fox, 
President Bush was given three possible plans of action at a November 25 meeting and 
no ABC and BBC TV news reports & ABC Nightline, December 1, 1992. BBC did not cite this figure but 
mentioned that over 250 thousand deaths have resulted from the famine, BBC 9 o'clock news, December 4, 
1992. 
chose to go with the most aggressive option of sending a full US military division to 
Somalia; the one division was soon increased to two by Pentagon planners.111 
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On November 29, 1992, Boutros-Ghali brought an American letter to the 
Security Council; the letter offered US military and logistical assistance in the 
establishment of an operation to create a secure environment in which to deliver aid in 
Somalia. Resolution 794 followed this letter on December 3, 1992, authorising member 
states cooperating in the new mission in Somalia to use "all necessary means to 
establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in 
Somalia."112 The Security Council's acceptance of this resolution set the stage for a 
transition in interventions from UNOSOM I to the United Task Force for Somalia 
(UNITAF). On December 4, 1992, following the acceptance of resolution 794, President 
Bush announced on television his decision to initiate Operation Restore Hope. 
With the approval of resolution 794, the US was to assume unified command of 
the new operation in Somalia. Its forces in Somalia would grow to approximately 28 
thousand personnel, with an additional17 thousand UNITAF troops arriving from over 
twenty other countries.113 According to Hirsch and Oakley, Boutros-Ghali and the UN 
clearly recognised that this was an opportunity for US military might and influence to 
do what they could not. Allegedly, Boutros-Ghali made it clear that the UN would be 
unable to take over from UNIT AF with a comparable force size and that UNIT AF must 
therefore reach aggressive targets of disarmament and security for all Somalia. 
Obvious differences in the goals of the two groups involved would later lead to 
difficulties. The American military, operating on Powell-Weinberger doctrine, wanted 
to be in and out of Somalia quickly while UN leadership wished to see more than a 
strictly humanitarian mission take place.114 
111 John G. Fox," Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of Somalia", SAIS Review 
XXI, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2001): 149. 
112 UN Security Council, S/RES/794 (1992), December 3, 1992. 
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It was clear from the text of the resolution that international troops participating 
in the US/UN UNITAF mission would be given greater freedom to 'shoot to protect' 
both themselves and aid supplies; American political figures were direct about using 
this threat. Ambassador Robert Oakley, an American diplomat who was brought in to 
negotiate with clan leaders, made this point repeatedly during media interviews and 
President Bush himself declared during his televised speech to the nation on his 
decision to send American troops to Somalia that "the US won't tolerate armed gangs 
ripping off their own people and condemning them to starvation."115 Perhaps 
surprisingly for many observers, Aidid accepted the arrival of US troops willingly. 
Drysdale explains this acceptance as expedient due to Aidid' s dislike of Kittani and the 
remaining components of the UNOSOM I mission. Aidid allegedly hoped that US 
forces would be more willing to allow him a powerful place at the negotiating table for 
Somalia's future, where UNOSOM leaders had hoped to marginalise him. His hopes 
appeared to be justified when Oakley immediately bypassed Kittani. On December 11, 
two days after US troops had arrived without opposition on Mogadishu's beaches, 
Oakley went straight to both Aidid and Ali Mahdi to arrange the signing of a ceasefire 
in Mogadishu and the removal of heavy weapons from the city.116 
At dawn on December 9, 1992 the first groups of US Marines began to land on 
the beaches of Mogadishu. Rumours of the American arrival had spread for weeks so 
the 'surprise' landings were in fact watched by hordes of Western journalists, curious 
Somali citizens and, through the lens of journalists, audiences at home in the West. The 
arrival in Somali time worked perfectly for American primetime viewing the evening 
before and, as mentioned above by Gilkes, was co-ordinated by military media-
relations officers in an attempt to best show the military in its new role. While some of 
the troops seemed visibly both surprised and annoyed at their welcoming parties, 
115 ABC Special Report with Peter Jennings, December 4, 1992. 
116 Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?, 87. 
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senior military personnel appeared to expect the attention and military press officers 
were among the first of the massive group to land on Somali soil.117 
These officers soon had several difficult 'situations' to explain to journalists; 
cultural differences between the Somalis and arriving US troops were huge and there 
were only a very small number of Somali speakers among the arriving troops.118 
Immediately after the American arrival, tense interactions occurred between troops and 
Somali workers at Mogadishu port and airport because, as one US Marine admitted to 
Ted Koppel: "There are good factions and bad factions and the Marines don't know 
which is which so we have to keep ourselves secure first."119 The intervention period 
was marked throughout by these kinds of misunderstandings, which were 
unsurprising given the interveners' lack of knowledge about the people whose country 
they had entered and the ways in which the US and UN troops' presence often 
unwittingly altered the existing balance of power and economics in Somalia. 
Jonathan Stevenson comments that "the most powerful military machine in the 
world could tell a big missile to hit a tiny target and ferry millions of tons of equipment 
and supplies to a faraway land. But for most American soldiers, just saying 'hello' in 
Somali was impossible."120 He also suggests that most information that was provided 
to US troops on Somali people concerned their potential to be carriers of disease and 
thus arriving troops were often wary of engagement with civilians.121 A statement by 
Paul Lowe confirms this attitude of paranoia and uncertainty, as he describes a moment 
when US troops refused to share a locally-bought watermelon with him due to fears it 
was poisoned.122 On a broader scale: 
117 Thomas Keenan, "Live From ... ", in Back to the Front: Tourisms of War (New York: Princeton Architectural 
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the glancing treatment the military gave Somali culture created 'the 
image of a Somali as a khat-chewing thug lying under a long-hauler' 
commented Mark Stirling, UNICEF' s representative. It was an image 
that ill-served the objective of providing humanitarian relief, for which 
it helps if you have at least guarded respect for the people you are 
trying to save. Moreover, the military's derisive characterization of 
Somalis led to a severe underestimation of their fighting ability.123 
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In terms of getting their own messages to Somalis, UNIT AF created a Psych-Ops 
unit and employed Somali-American translators to create a newspaper, Raja, and a 
Somali language radio broadcast to explain UNIT AF activities. There was concern 
among senior figures involved in UNIT AF that the BBC Somali language service, from 
which most Somalis received their news, often reported inaccurately or had a political 
'bias'.U4 The success of such ventures into media production by Somalia's interveners 
remains highly questionable but, as will be seen below, control over media 
communication with Somalis was a sought-after and fought-for privilege. For many 
Somali civilians, however, it was the actions of both Somali factional leaders and 
US/UN troops in attempting to control events in the country which spoke louder than 
any media framing of them could have. 
Although Ambassador Oakley was clearly featured as a 'diplomatic' part of 
UNIT AF, the primary thrust of the mission, rhetorically and in practice, appeared to 
remain distributing food to needy areas and leaving quickly. Despite the fact that op-
ed writers, letters to the editor and televised news debates had raised the issue of what 
good it would do to feed Somalis for a few weeks without attempting to alter the 
situation that had led them to their desperate condition, the US forces in command of 
UNIT AF appeared to believe these questions could be postponed until the takeover of a 
second UNOSOM mission.125 
Consultations were held in Washington with relief specialists. 
Recommendations for a smaller and more targeted humanitarian operation in the 
123 Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia, 62-63. 
124 Hirsch & Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, 61-62. 
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famine 'triangle' were rejected in favour of using conflict-ridden Mogadishu as the base 
for landing most international troops. This meant that from the outset of Operation 
Restore Hope the American leaders of the mission had to deal with Ali Mahdi and 
especially Aidid, who controlled major routes out of the city and the majority of heavy 
weapons.126 Oakley acknowledges that there were almost daily meetings between the 
Aidid and Ali Mahdi factions at the American Conoco oil company compound under 
UNIT AF supervision. He feels that UNOSOM II made a big mistake ending these 
meetings in May 1993 and thereby alienating these 'warlords'.127 The issue of how to 
deal with the Mogadishu factions, either through isolation or by active involvement, 
remains to this date a point of debate in literature on Somalia. 
Despite statements of neutrality and non-engagement with Somali politics, 
American actions actually had the very political effect of both preserving and in many 
cases actively supporting the current situation on the ground in Somalia, in ways that 
were often obvious to others, including Somali leaders and citizens. According to De 
Waal, Oakley and the American forces made choices which supported Aidid's business 
ventures. Oakley rented a house in Somalia from Aidid' s chief financier, Osman A to, 
and used Aidid' s moneychangers for a large amount of business converting American 
dollars to Somali shillings. These exchanges allegedly continued during the later UN 
attacks on Aidid, in which case the US/UN would actually have been bankrolling their 
, enemy' .128 
As a result of the above choices, and also because they did not want to be 
involved in long-term reconstruction in Somalia, Oakley made it clear that the factions 
would not be disarmed, as this would be too "imperialistic" .129 Oakley, Lieutenant 
General Robert Johnson, commander of US troops in Somalia, and Brigadier General 
Anthony Zinni referred to past experiences in Lebanon and Vietnam to justify their 
restraint. All three associated a more active political approach with the necessity of 
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dangerous and increased levels of American involvement in the Somali civil war.130 
Much to the disappointment of many Somali citizens, 'natural' leaders were expected to 
emerge without any process of organised disarmament. Somali distrust of long-term 
American commitment to peace in their country made many reluctant to give up their 
personal weapons until they were convinced that security would last. Given the 
American National Rifle Association's own position on the second amendment right to 
bear arms, many American officers found it difficult to criticize this stance. "Colonel 
Peter Datto, the marines' chief disarmament officer, became enough of a believer to 
profess at the Addis Ababa conference in March 1993, 'It isn't fair to disarm 
everybody."'131 Somalia· thus remained a heavily armed society, into which a large 
amount of free food, aid and external influence was injected. This combination was to 
prove ineffective for developing long-term peace and security. 
While this reluctance to disarm disappointed many UN pro-interventionists and 
Somali citizens, Drysdale expresses the alternative belief that any active programs of 
disarmament and peacekeeping beyond the larger cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo 
were unnecessary and potentially damaging to clan political balances. Although they 
tried to balance raids on Ali Mahdi and Aidid to avoid claims of choosing sides, the 
minimal arms seizures attempted by UNITAF were almost totally ineffective in any 
case, given that UNITAF only operated in small'islands' of land in Somalia. Factional 
leaders could thtts simply hide or remove arms from UNITAF areas temporarily to 
avoid giving them up.132 Drysdale suggests that the facilitation of a political 
atmosphere of tolerance and the development of mixed clan Somali policing units were 
key prerequisites to prevent a return to violence and that coerced disarming could not 
provide long-term peace for Somalia.t33 
Regardless of a frequent lack of understanding between Somali citizens and 
American troops, the American-led coalition had the support of the majority of the 
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Somali population during the early stages of the intervention. One of the greatest 
surprises for international troops was the extent to which the famine that they had been 
sent to ease had already subsided by the time they arrived. Weather conditions had 
improved for crop re-planting and, with assistance from aid agencies, even some of the 
most hard-hit Somali communities had been able to improve their general health and 
material resources enough to allow more economic activity to resume. Photojournalist 
Paul Lowe comments that by the time UNITAF began, the famine situation in Somalia 
was dramatically improved and many saw it as a gesture rather than a necessary action: 
(B)y December it pretty much felt like the famine was under control. By 
the point of the US intervention, you did feel, a lot of us felt that, it was 
a useless gesture, too much too late. And it was very much staged for 
US domestic; the feeling of people on the ground was that it was a very 
stage-managed thing and was predominately for US consumption, 
domestic consumption, rather than the good of Somalia.134 
The securing and safe delivery of aid supplies began happening relatively swiftly after 
the UNIT AF mission began, especially in the vicinity of Mogadishu. Since Ali Mahdi 
and Aidid had given initial blessing to UNITAF's presence, the airport and seaport 
were secured by American forces within forty-eight hours.135 There was plenty of 
positive Christmas imagery of US troops handing out food to thin Somali children and 
President Bush arrived for a brief visit on New Year's Eve for photo opportunities with 
the troops. 
By January 1993, several major routes to inland towns had been opened up and 
food was reaching the once-starving towns of Baidoa and Bardera. Discussions began, 
both between policymakers and in the media, about when most of the American troops 
would pull out, having done the basics of their humanitarian mission. The UN and 
most Somali citizens, however, favoured a more extended peace-building role for the 
American-led force. They wanted policing and disarmament campaigns as well as 
efforts to re-engage elders and traditional Somali leaders in political discussions about 
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the country's future. This was precisely the long-term political role which the US had 
been hoping to avoid and so difficult talks about the nature of mission handover began 
between US and UN officials. 
By early 1993, Aidid was beginning to question the value of having the 
American-led force in Somalia. UN forces on the ground did not intervene to support 
his troops in a battle for the southern city of .Kismayo with the rival forces of General 
Hersi Morgan, whose forces overran the city under the watch of US and Belgian 
troops.136 News of this UN failure to act led to rioting by Aidid supporters in 
Mogadishu for several days in late February 1993 and for the first time since they had 
arrived US troops were confined to their base. Scott Peterson points out the 
significance of this moment: "The US was unable or unwilling to stop the unrest, and 
within hours the lesson was clear: Aidid was still in control, easily able to disrupt the 
calm on his whim. He no longer trusted US or UN 'neutrality'."137 
After this incident, US officials became increasingly anxious to finish their part 
of the mission and hand over to the UN; Boutros-Ghali submitted his recommendations 
for this transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II on March 3, 1993. The new mission 
was to have the ambitious peacemaking goals that had been planned for Somalia early 
on by UN personnel, once again with the enforcement powers from Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. UNOSOM II was formally established by Security Council resolution 814 
on March 26, 1993 but was not to assume full responsibility from UNITAF until May 
1993.138 
Drysdale comments that a March 1993 conference including UNIT AF forces, UN 
personnel and Somali groups did not plan enough for the daily administrative tasks 
that would be crucial, especially in Mogadishu, for development programs to work in a 
cohesive fashion. He feels that at the end of these talks some senior US and UN officials 
seemed afraid that the Somali talks had gone too far towards discussions of re-emerging 
Somali sovereignty, something he claims that he and UN Deputy Special 
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Representative Lansana Kouyate found nonsensical.I39 Although departing US official 
rhetoric glowed about the changes that had been wrought under their command, 
Peterson reports that violence against aid workers was on the rise again and that a 
general atmosphere of tension pervaded during the May 1993 changeover, especially 
around Mogadishu.140 'Technicals' were back on the streets at near pre-intervention 
numbers and a lack of disarmament programs meant that Somali looting groups and 
militias were still well-armed. When the majority of American troops left, many 
Somalis were in a generally better-fed state than when the Americans had entered, but 
little had been done to tackle issues of disarmament, policing, re-engagement of Somali 
civilian leaders and elders in peace talks, and economic stability, all issues which were 
crucial for Somalia's long-term rebuilding. 
UNOSOM II: The Road to 'Black Hawk Down' 
When the UN took over, it had significantly less staff than its UNIT AF 
predecessor but a hugely more ambitious agenda- total forced disarmament, the 
creation of a new government and the rebuilding of Somalia's governing infrastructure. 
The UN force was twenty percent smaller than UNIT AF but was responsible for all of 
Somalia, an area over twice the size of the nine relief sectors covered by UNIT AF .141 
Drysdale claims this goal was far too broad and allowed excessive use of force by 
UNOSOM personnel. In his view, UNOSOM II was threatened by Aidid's independent 
stance and was sensitive to ''being upstaged" by his actions; Aidid rivals such as Ali 
Mahdi allegedly only encouraged UNOSOM to feel this way.142 UNOSOM II's twenty-
three state, 18 thousand+ troop force was backecl by a US logistics team and contained a 
1,300 man, Us-commanded Quick Reaction Force but funding for both military 
endeavours and humanitarian rebuilding had been significantly cut.143 Despite this 
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handover and the scaling down of forces, UNOSOM II was still run almost totally by 
Americans. Boutros-Ghali's Special Envoy was Admiral Jonathan Howe from the 
American Navy and all US forces which were to become involved in Somalia's affairs 
were controlled by US commanders who reported directly back to CENTCOM in 
Florida, not the UN. 
The first major UNOSOM II disaster, which brought the unspoken UN policy of 
diminishing Aidid's power into open acceptance, was the killing of twenty-four 
Pakistani UN troops who were sent to search Aidid' s Radio Mogadishu station 
headquarters for weapons. The UN troops were ambushed and killed by Somali 
gunmen said to be affiliated with Aidid. The station had become notorious with the 
UN in recent months for its alleged broadcasts condemning the UN mission as 
imperialist and neo-colonial.144 The killing of the Pakistanis brought Western media 
attention back to Somalia, especially as it became clear that the UN would not permit its 
troops to be attacked in this way and would respond by punishing Aidid, the suspected 
organiser of the attacks. UN resolution 837 was passed the day after the attacks, 
authorising UN forces to take "all necessary measures" to apprehend those responsible 
for the attack.145 
There were immediate dissenters to this position. John Drysdale had been 
brought to the country by the UN as an advisor and had had unparalleled access to all 
the faction leaders. He was not convinced that Aidid alone was guilty of organising the 
attacks or could have controlled the scale of them even if he was. Drysdale argues that, 
from the Somali perspective, the inspection was a hostile takeover of their radio station, 
followed by an incident of UN troops opening fire on civilian demonstrators against the 
operation. After reviewing transcripts of Radio Mogadishu's broadcasts from May 1 to 
June 3, Drysdale concluded that "(t)here may have been virulent broadcasts on 
Aideed's controlled radio before May, but certainly the transcriptions of May 1-June 3 
broadcasts by Mogadishu Radio did not justify the fear, expressed by senior UNOSOM 
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Tom Parer of American University was recruited to gather evidence and 
descriptions of what had happened during the attack. According to Peterson and 
Drysdale, however, Parer was not permitted off the UNOSOM base and could not 
guarantee protection for those who testified. His evidence that Aidid-aligned fighters 
attacked UNOSOM soldiers comes almost exclusively from the soldiers themselves; no 
Somali eyewitnesses were interviewed. Any attempts to bring Aidid before an 
impartial tribunal were thus essentially curtailed before they could start. Reprisal 
attacks by the UN seemed inevitable, drawing them into the civil war as yet another 
violent party in many Somalis' eyes. Although Drysdale does not deny the horror of 
the attacks, he argues that an example needed to be set through the use of a fair trial, 
not through a resort to retaliatory violence. Drysdale explains that he advised Admiral 
Howe to proceed with a trial but instead, in preparation for their attacks, the UN 
moved the majority of its personnel into the newly-rebuilt and heavily-fortified US 
Embassy compound in Mogadishu, an area they would rarely leave in future due to 
security concerns.147 According to Peterson, "Somalis, now completely cut off from the 
UN operation that would make so many devastating decisions about their future, 
referred with disgust to the walled compound as the 'Camp of the Murderers."'148 
The first UN offensive attacks in Somalia were carried out by American forces 
on the morning of June 12, 1993 and involved the aerial destruction of Radio 
Mogadishu and several of Aidid's weapons sites. These attacks would continue 
throughout the summer of 1993, leading to a worsening of already strained relations 
between UN interveners and Somali citizens. Angered by the civilian deaths and 
property destruction caused by the attacks, Somali citizens protested the bombings and 
set up barricades near the US Embassy. They were shot at by Pakistani peacekeepers, 
who were sent out to guard the compound, which led to several deaths, many injuries 
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and further bad feeling. Despite this furious atmosphere on the streets, Peterson 
reports that inside the Embassy compound Admiral Howe and other senior UN figures 
were declaring success, arguing that they would not let a few dead Somalis stand in the 
way of their productive bombing of Aidid and Osman Ato's weapons sites.149 This is 
confirmed by Drysdale, who says that while he did not speak in such terms himself, 
Howe was surrounded by American military commanders who openly stated that their 
goal was to kill Aidid, not capture him. UNOSOM IT's political and humanitarian goals 
were put on the back burner by the triumph of this militaristic viewpoint over voices 
like Drysdale's. Drysdale suggests that their confidence in being able to deal with 
Aidid and his supporters through military attacks on Mogadishu was severely misled: 
"Without the remotest knowledge of Somali society or culture, Psy-ops attempted to 
play psychological tricks on Somalis. These three nights of devastating shell blasts, 
mixed with flares and loudspeakers, were designed to reduce Aideed's psyche to pulp 
so that he would throw up his arms and surrender. They did not know their target-
Aideed stayed calmly in his house throughout the raids."150 
Those journalists who were still on the ground and able to negotiate the dangers 
of Mogadishu's streets to go to the sites of destruction were faced with conflicting 
accounts. When it became obvious that the UN could not deny its own part in the 
'collateral' violence and destruction, it alleged that 'hard core militia' elements were 
using Somali women and children as human shields and firing into crowds of their 
own demonstrators in order to incite more rage and violence. While a few Somalis did 
agree that there was incitement, many others vehemently rejected these claims. Relief 
workers were for the most part deeply disturbed by the attacks, arguing that they were 
doing nothing except creating a large rift between all foreigners and Somalis.151 As UN 
attacks continued, errors in targeting inevitably occurred and Somali casualty numbers 
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mounted. Peterson notes that, due to the risk of Somali reprisal attacks, media were 
increasingly unable to visit bombed sites to report on attacks. Coverage of the conflict 
suffered, with media having to judge between trumped-up reports from both sides.152 
Throughout the summer of 1993, the anti-Aidid attacks and escalating Somali 
violence continued in Mogadishu. The UN missile attacks on Digfer Hospital in mid-
June constituted a war crime in the eyes of many, breaching the Geneva Conventions153, 
and caused casualties among the primarily Somali doctors and patients within the 
hospital. These attacks were prompted, however, because Somali snipers were using 
the hospital roof as a shooting point at UN forces. This incident graphically illustrates 
the ways in which the militias versus US/UN battle often had dire consequences for 
citizens uninvolved in the 'dispute'.154 Admiral Howe declared Aidid a wanted man 
and put a twenty-five thousand dollar price on his head in 'Wild West' style; psy-ops 
teams scattered flyers to this effect over Mogadishu. Thus Aidid joined the ranks of 
General Manuel Noreiga, Saddam Hussein and others as a 'Hitler'-like figure, made 
responsible for all Somalia's ills, whose capture or death would eliminate problems to 
what had rhetorically become world safety. In ironic response, Somalis put up a $1 
million reward for the capture of' Animal' Howe. 155 UN and US propaganda had failed 
to convince them that bombing Mogadishu was an appropriate way to deal with Aidid. 
Ironically, many who had not supported Aidid previously rallied to his side once the 
American attacks increased. 
The resort to this type of approach indicated a failure of the US commanders of 
UNOSOM II to understand the principles and motivations of the Somali public. In his 
heroic defiance of an aggressive UN, Aidid came to represent aspects of historical 
Somali anti-colonial fights that many could relate to and respect. Tyrannical though he 
was, Aidid' s charisma and clan ties helped to protect him as he continued to 
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successfully hide from UN troops in his south Mogadishu stronghold. Somalis, 
primarily those of Aidid' s own Habr Gedir clan living in south Mogadishu, were now 
willing to overlook many of his flaws given the new risks to their lives at the hands of 
the UN forces.156 
The US/UN anti-Aidid activities at times took on further elements of farce and 
tragedy. As Aidid continued to evade capture, Howe requested and was granted a unit 
of elite counter-terrorism and extraction troops, both US Army Rangers and some Delta 
Force operatives. This request took the UN capabilities in Somalia far beyond what any 
non-American or even American civilian leader could likely have attained. These new 
forces, however, reported only to their separate US commanders and did not 
necessarily work in conjunction with other UN forces. 157 On July 12, US helicopters 
fired rockets into a building where senior members of Aidid' s clan were holding a 
meeting in an attempt to secure a peace agreement with the Americans. De Waal 
quotes ICRC estimates that at least fifty-four Somalis were killed, including some who 
had been in contact with Admiral Howe only days before. Casualty figures ranged 
from twelve to seventy, however, depending on whether UNOSOM or Somali groups 
were spoken to. Many of the dead were said to be clan elders and religious figures 
with few or no ties to Aidid's militia units and women who had come to serve food and 
drink at the event. 
When journalists arrived to cover the attack they were set upon by angry 
Somalis and four, including twenty-three-year-old Dan Eldon, were killed.158 By this 
point, conditions were so dangerous in Mogadishu that many international UN troops 
stationed there refused to patrol. Relations between US forces and specific national 
troops who deeply opposed the anti-Aidid tactics taken by the Americans, such as the 
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Italians, were strained almost beyond any form of cooperation.159 Various relief 
agencies accused UNOSOM II of breaching the Geneva Conventions. The mission's 
own legal advisor sent a memorandum to Admiral Howe the day after the attacks on 
the Habr Gedir council in which he warned that Security Council authorisation to find 
the Pakistanis' killers did not support disregard for international humanitarian law.l60 
The events of October 3 and 4, 1993, the days of the failed final mission to 
capture Aidid and the downing of two American Black Hawk helicopters, represented 
the nadir of deteriorating conditions between many Somalis and their UN interveners. 
The plan was once again to use the Rangers and Delta Forces to drop by helicopter into 
an alleged meeting between Aidid and his clan leaders, arrest them and then pull out in 
an armoured convoy. Somali clan militias, as well as many frustrated citizens, were 
tipped off to this planned arrest, however, and began converging on the meeting point, 
deep in Hebr Gedir-controlled south Mogadishu, instead of fleeing. After two 
helicopters had been shot down with shoulder-held rocket propelled grenades, the 
Somalis had many US soldiers trapped on the ground in territory they knew well, 
perfect for ambushing. Following American military protocol, the remaining soldiers 
refused to leave their comrades, dead or alive, to the enemy. They consequently took 
most of their eighteen losses and seventy-seven injuries trying to rescue bodies and 
survivors around the two crash sites. Two Delta operatives were killed attempting to 
save one injured Black Hawk pilot, Michael Durant, who was taken hostage by Aidid's 
forces. 
British and Canadian journalists were among the few Western media personnel 
still in Somalia; American media had been evacuated due to the poor security situation. 
These journalists were taken to see the wreckage of the helicopters after the battles. 
Paul Watson of The Toronto Star newspaper was able to photograph the now-notorious 
images of mutilated American bodies being dragged around by triumphant Somali 
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citizens; a Somali cameraman recorded the video footage. 161 These images were briefly 
shown on many Western TV networks and as photographs in newspapers before a 
basically unanimous and largely uncoordinated editorial decision was made not to 
show them because of their graphic nature. 
While the eighteen dead Americans were heralded for their bravery and 
mourned by their nation, the Somali death count as a result of the pitched battles 
remains an area of uncertainty and debate. De Waal quotes initial estimates at about 
200. Mark Bowden, author of Black Hawk Down, an in-depth study of the battle, 
estimates nearly 500 and De Waal notes that this is lower than some counts done by 
Somali elders.162 Many accounts mention that doctors in Mogadishu's main hospitals 
were flooded with hundreds of casualties. Numbers will likely remain difficult to 
assess due to the poor state of many of Mogadishu's hospitals, which were barely able 
to provide basic services, let alone keep records. In short, as suggested by De Waal, the 
US doctrine of overwhelming force ensured minimal US casualties but was a disastrous 
policy for Somalis living in a situation of urban warfare, where a cautious approach 
was essential if there was to be any distinguishing between civilians and combatants.163 
As has been discussed above, breaches of the Geneva Conventions were unavoidable 
under the anti-Aidid policy mandate, and US 'high-tech' solutions of directly targeting 
Aidid repetitively failed to accurately pinpoint 'the enemy' while frequently resulting 
in more civilian deaths and infrastructure destruction. The demonization of Aidid was 
simplistic and failed to recognise the deep dissatisfaction of many Somali citizens with 
UNOSOM policies. In attempting to isolate Aidid as the sole 'cause' of Somalia's 
problems, the UNOSOM II mission essentially created a whole host of new enemies 
within the Somali public. 
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Leaving Somalia: Narrating the Aftermath 
As has been suggested in Chapter Two, the Somalia intervention is an important 
case study largely because the tragic results of the 'Black Hawk down' mission severely 
damaged US support for more robust peacekeeping missions in the future. Although 
there was strong rhetoric about 'beefing up' American military personnel and 
equipment in Somalia post- 'Black Hawk down' events, these reinforcements were only 
to stay in the country to facilitate a full American pullout by March 31, 1994. This 
withdrawal date was announced by a shaken President Clinton only days after the 
October 3-4 events. The Administration was under intense Congressional and public 
pressure to pull American troops out of such an 'ungrateful' place and had, in fact, been 
under increasing pressure to do so for several weeks before the tragedy. The final 
straw was almost certainly the widely- if only briefly- seen images which prompted 
public remembrance, and then outrage, at the Somali situation. American attitudes 
towards Somalia had largely changed in less than a year from compassion for suffering 
'innocents' to disgust at their troops' involvement in such a barbaric mess. Images 
showing women and children involved in the post-Black Hawk body-dragging had 
likely irrevocably altered Western perceptions of 'innocence' and 'responsibility' in 
such a situation. 
The pullout of such a major source of troops and equipment resulted in fourteen 
other nations leaving Somalia around the same time as the US, effectively ending any 
hopes of nation-building. The manhunt for Aidid was immediately called off and 
Aidid, perhaps sensing his victory, released his hostage, Michael Durant, a little over a 
week after the events. Much to the disgust of Rangers and Delta Force soldiers who 
had participated in the mission, Aidid's treatment by the US began to improve rapidly. 
Ironically, this was because of his perceived power and constituency in Somalia, at least 
partially re-created by the US reprisal attacks on south Mogadishu. On November 16, 
1993, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 885, accepting that the exclusion of 
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Aidid from future Somali political negotiations was not feasible.164 In December 1993, 
Aidid was flown in an American plane to new peace talks in Addis Ababa.165 Although 
they usually remained on base or high above Mogadishu in planes and helicopters, 
American soldiers' relationship with Somalis remained at an all-time low. Peterson 
reports revenge killings of civilians and rules of engagement stretched to the limit by 
angry servicemen. Many simply couldn't understand what they were still doing in 
Somalia, given their lack of activity.166 
Estimates have been made that during the UNITAF(UNOSOM II missions 
ninety percent of funding was spent on the military forces and operations themselves; 
just four and a half percent had trickled into the local Somali economy.167 Additionally, 
the anti-Aidid battles had led to the destruction of yet more Somali infrastructure 
around Mogadishu. Because relations between UN troops and Somalis were so bad, 
soldiers had no idea where to donate leftovers from the mission. Many valuable 
medical supplies were destroyed because of this overall inability or unwillingness to 
communicate with Somali civilians and leaders. Many aid agencies packed up at the 
same time as the UN mission; they acknowledged that it had been a disaster and made 
conditions on the ground too hostile for them to stay. 168 In legislative terms, US 
Presidential Decision Directive 25, signed by President Clinton shortly after the Black 
Hawk events, resulted in the US administration placing restrictions on the amount of 
support and participation Americans would give to future humanitarian operations.169 
A prominent opinion in the US towards the end of the Somalia mission and 
after the American pullout was that humanitarianism had gotten out of hand. That is 
to say, the mission had been undertaken without the rational'goals', 'policies' and 
'objectives' characteristic of 'good politics', or at least supposedly characteristic of the 
military effectiveness and efficiency for which the US wished its forces to be known in 
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the aftermath of their overwhelming technological and televisual victory in the 1991 
Gulf War. The UN was often blamed for overstepping the reasonable bounds set by the 
actions of UNIT AF and dragging US forces into unnecessary combat. Many Americans 
involved in the UNOSOM II mission scoff at these suggestions, however, pointing out 
that US Special Forces, who conducted the vast majority of the anti-Aidid raids, acted 
with specific orders from the Pentagon, without informing all UN personnel. 
UNOSOM II's overwhelming management by Americans also challenges the idea that 
sections of the US government were not involved in deciding on the actions of 
American troops. This being said, a biographer of the Clinton presidency claims that 
Clinton himself had stopped monitoring the Somalia situation closely after the 
UNOSOM II takeover and thus was not fully aware of the military escalations in the 
hunt for Aidid during the summer of 1993. He was purportedly furious that he was not 
told about the 'Black Hawk down' mission and its potential downsides in advance; he 
is said to have thought the raid a 'dumb' idea and immediately suspected the UN was 
to blame for authorising it.17o 
In Somalia, the crippling of the UNOSOM II mission by the pullout of the 
Americans and a majority of other forces allowed the faction leaders, especially around 
Mogadishu, to return to their pre-intervention activities. Violence and skirmishing 
increased dramatically, prevented the remaining, mostly under-equipped troops from 
operating; the last of the UN troops were pulled out in March 1995. In a symbolic 
moment, the luxurious UN compound, complete with shopping mall, was vigorously 
looted down to its foundations by Somalis. "This represented a kind of literal'dust to 
dust' as the international operations that had proudly heralded the 'new world order' 
were finally buried in Somalia."171 Stevenson also notes that: "As its parting gesture, 
Washington donated five thousand M-16s, five thousand handguns, and nearly three 
million rounds of ammunition to outfit the new Somali police force. A few diplomats 
merely fretted that now they just had to trust the Somalis. The searing irony that it was 
170 Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994}, 317. 
171 Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, 276. 
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precisely superpower profligacy with weapons that had greased Somalia's skid into 
hell to begin with was lost on Washington."172 A new generation of Somali factional 
leaders would soon emerge in southern Somalia, rising to prominence through money 
made as scrap merchants and from forcefully acquiring sole access to profitable areas of 
the country such as ports, airports and farmlands. 
While it has suffered continued violence in specific areas, particularly in and 
around Mogadishu, much of Somalia has achieved a degree of stability since the 
intervention period due to localized, cooperative efforts. The northern breakaway 
region of Somaliland escaped much of the violence in the south altogether and has been 
more successful in its efforts to establish a national governance structure for itself, with 
little to no external assistance.173 Other areas exist under a mixture of factional and clan 
leadership, combined with Islamic law and judicial influences. Despite its creation in 
2000, the success of a single Somali Transitional National Government has been 
hampered by its inability to raise significant international funds for development and 
services, internal opposition from some powerful factional groups, and the distrust of 
immediate neighbours such as Ethiopia, who are fearful of Somali interaction with the 
broader Islamic community.174 Although formal government structures have struggled 
and thus far failed to establish themselves, as Paul Lowe commented frequently during 
his interview, many economic and social functions of Somali life, such as the khat trade, 
were not brought to a halt by the civil war and intervention violence and continued 
with important effects throughout, whether these systems were recognised by UN and 
US interveners or not.175 
With first Western and then all UN troops out of the country, Somalia's 
seemingly ongoing and repetitive story of violence and in-fighting no longer had 
appeal for Western media or policymakers. The stateless territory was left to its own 
devices, with little evidence remaining of the US/UN missions at all. Despite its 
172 Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia, 110. 
173 Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?, 139-148. 
174 Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2005), 87-88. 
175 Author's interview with Paul Lowe, November 2005. 
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disastrous exit, however, there is little question that America has learned much from its 
failed intervention in Somalia. A primary lesson, according to Stevenson, has been that 
the Powell-Weinberger doctrine of applying overwhelming force to a situation for a 
'quick win' does not necessarily apply well to the complex politicat social and 
economic problems of 'The New World Order'. Troops entering such situations must 
be as competent in close urban conflict, intelligence gathering and winning 'hearts and 
minds' as they are at operating high tech military equipment.176 Hirsch and Oakley also 
cite American concern with rigidity and bureaucracy at the UN, which it feels must 
learn to better coordinate participants in peacekeeping ventures.177 Evidence of these 
new approaches and attitudes clearly emerges when the American approach to the Iraq 
war of 2003 is considered, as will b~ seen in Chapter Six, which is focused on the 
Fallujah, Iraq case study. 
Somalia has only recently returned to marginal media awareness, as it has 
become known as a lawless hiding and breeding ground for Islamic terrorism. The 
threat from Somalia is now presented as potentially having spill-over effects for the 
international community, rather than its anarchic state simply damaging conditions of 
life for those within its borders.178 While Somalia's unpatrolled and porous boundaries 
may allow the entry of Muslim extremists, the majority of the population itself has not 
traditionally practiced or supported fundamentalist forms of Islam. The success of the 
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in and around Mogadishu has likely been due to the 
civilian population's desire for law, order and basic service provision. Created by a 
group of Mogadishu businessmen after the failure of a UN-supported Transitional 
National Government (TNG) meeting in February 2006, the Union have helped to 
prevent banditry, re-open some schools, and allow aid agencies to operate in the 
southern and central regions of Somalia. Since its creation, the TNG has been primarily 
based in the town of Baidoa, a significant journey from Mogadishu, and has not been 
176 Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia, 165. 
177 See Chapter 8 in Hirsch & Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections 011 Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping. 
17B For example, see the introduction to Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle, ix-xi. 
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powerful or popular enough to undertake much national rebuilding. Factional leaders 
are seen by most of the Somali population as corrupt and have done little to assist with 
social redevelopment, rendering themselves unpopular.179 
Despite acceptance of the UIC by much of southern Somalia's population, the 
American government, groups within the UN, and Ethiopia are said to be unhappy 
with the rise of Islamic influence in the territory and the US, among others, is rumoured 
to be funding some of Mogadishu's factional leaders to fight against the UIC.I80 Areas 
of southern Somalia deemed to be 'terrorist' hideouts have been bombed by Ethiopian 
planes, supported by American technology, and unrest is spreading again following 
Ethiopian troops' entry into the country in an effort to re-install the TNG in Mogadishu. 
Life for Somali citizens thus continues to be significantly effected by geopolitical forces, 
despite long periods of neglect by much of the world community. Both case studies 
used for this project are now caught up in aspects of 'the war on terror', and directions 
this discourse takes will likely have major impacts on them. 
The next two chapters will overlay predominant media representations of the 
Somalia intervention onto the basic frame of the history that has been presented here. 
This primarily academic history of Somalia has provided a sense of the ways in which 
the country has been understood in the West by those who have chosen to study it at 
various depths. As will be seen when the focus is on media representations, many 
details of this already generalized history are lost in the coverage, resulting in an even 
more selective narrative of Somalia during the time of the intervention. The history of 
the intervention above hints at the complexity of the situation in Somalia, the range of 
policy options available, and the gradual narrowing of this range which occurred due 
to a myriad of interpretative, bureaucratic, financial and geopolitical factors. When this 
history is compared to the narrative presented by selected Western media outlets, the 
reductive and selective nature of the coverage themes should become clearer. 
179 Michael Shank, "The Future of Political Islam in Somalia", Foreign Policy in Focus, 
http://www.f.:pif.org/fpiftxt/3872 (accessed July 4, 2007). 
180 Emily Wax & Karen DeYoung, "US Secretly Backing Warlords in Somalia", The Washington Post Online, 
May 17, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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From: I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in 
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Somalia From Statelessness to Statelessness? (Utrecht: International 
Books, 2001). 
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Chapter Four- From Beachhead to 'Black Hawk Down': 
Somalia & 'Africa'; 'Dark' Places, 'Failed' States 
This chapter will begin analysing the Somalia case study through an exploration 
of some major narrative and visual themes in selected media coverage of the 1992-1993 
US/UN intervention. As was outlined in Chapter One, for the purposes of this project 
textual and visual discourses of Somalia are primarily understood as having developed 
through dynamic processes of creation, alteration and reinforcement of particular 
understandings between Western media, policymakers and commentators on the 
events, various organisations and media audiences. Deconstructing predominant 
discourse themes used by Western media can highlight how decisions to understand 
the Somali conflict in specific ways precluded and in several cases actively silenced 
alternative possibilities. 
While they will discuss the types of information that British and American 
media coverage failed to provide to public consumers\ the chapters analysing media 
coverage of the Somalia intervention will be structured around the powerful and 
enduring discourses which the coverage regularly drew upon and reinforced. 
Discursive trends will be divided into two major categories: "Somalia & 'Africa': 'Dark' 
Places, 'Failed' States" and "Stereotypes in Somalia: Passive Victims, Aggressive Killers 
and Their 'Saviours"', with an important sub-category, "Aidid: 'the man who makes 
Somalia worse"'. This chapter, "Somalia & 'Africa"', will deal specifically with 
representations of 'Somalia' as a place. The two following categorizations, which deal 
with representations of people, will be analysed in the following chapter. "Somalia & 
'Africa"' and "Stereotypes in Somalia", the two dominant theme categories, will be 
broken down into smaller sub-sections for closer analysis. The categories of 'place' and 
'people' have been broadly used to structure coverage in both case studies because they 
are routinely the building blocks of media items. While some stories often emphasize 
the description of particular individual'characters', group characteristics or human 
1 See Frank J. Stech, "Winning CNN Wars", Parameters, Autumn (1994): 37-56. 
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interactions, others are geared to explanation and categorization of a place, be it 
historically, geographically, politically etc. The two are also routinely interlinked. The 
citizens of a particular 'place' thus tend to be imbued with certain characteristics 
deemed to be broadly representative of this area, for example. In terms of 
photographic history, these two categories also 'capture' common subject matter in 
Western imagery: landscapes and portraiture. A survey of the analysed coverage 
indicates that these are important visual elements of both case studies. 
A brief introduction before the coverage analysis will illustrate how discursive 
media strategies helped to delimit what their viewers know about 'Somalia'. 
Borrowing concepts from David Campbell's work, National Deconstruction: Violence, 
Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, 'Somalia' will be understood in this analysis through 
exploration of the ways in which media images and narratives problematized it as an 
entity. The term 'problematization' in this sense refers to the ways in which elements 
constituted as 'part of' or 'related to' Somalia were defined and understood in order for 
the 'problem' of Somalia to be approached.2 These considerations are particularly 
relevant given how little was generally known about Somalia in the Western world, 
before and after the intervention. Somalia literally had to be created as a 'place' in the 
eyes of Western audiences and the media had considerable freedom, due to almost non-
existent bases of knowledge, to do this. 
A general lack of knowledge about Somalia's history, as was briefly outlined in 
the previous chapter, often led to representation of the country as yet another example 
of' Africa', a concept which is more established in Western imaginations. In opposition 
to a strongly-differentiated 'First World',' Africa' has been routinely represented as 
violent, undeveloped and perpetually in need of outside aid. In the case of Somalia, 
when external intervention did not result in immediate improvements in the country, 
declarations of its 'hopelessness' were rapidly made, suggesting that this 'failed' state 
was not prepared for a peaceful existence. While some media coverage did recognise 
2 David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia (London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998), x. 
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and comment on the negative effects of past external involvement in the country, 
particularly during the Cold War, this history was rarely explored in depth, leaving 
Western audiences to assume that there was little to connect 'their' world with that of 
'war-torn' Somalia. 
Media coverage of the intervention therefore acted to both highlight certain 
discourses while restricting others, functioning for audiences as a way of seeing which 
of a limited range of possibilities would 'play itself out' 'in the end' in Somalia. The use 
of such mildly cinematic or theatrical terms is important; images from the media, and 
later film, were the only means by which the vast majority of Westerners experienced 
Somalia. In this sense, Thomas Keenan's article focusing on the mediatized Mogadishu 
beach landings is relevant for the entire discussion of Somalia intervention images. 
Keenan views the actions/events of the Somalia intervention as being undertaken not 
solely to accomplish the tactical aims of restoring a measure of safety, food and 
governance to the Somali people. These actions were also undertaken, and specifically 
rendered into media images and narratives, to tell Western audiences a story about 
America, and broadly 'the West', and its values and position in the immediate post-
Cold War period. 
Moments when the 'creation' of Somalia by Western media was particularly 
obvious are thus important for exposing 'the West's' role in simultaneously 
constructing both 'Somalia' and its own identity. In many ways, the greatest strains 
between the media and the military came when this reality was made too obvious, with 
the initial landing in Mogadishu being a clear example. According to Keenan, "Glare, 
or what the [New York] Times called 'too bright a light', means the becoming public of 
the effort at publicity, the live coverage not of the landing, but of the live coverage."3 In 
these moments, the 'created' rather than any 'given' nature of 'Somalia' becomes more 
visible. 
3 Thomas Keenan, "Live From ... ", in Back to the Front: Tourisms of War (New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press, 1994), 149. 
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A 'Failed' State: Placing Somalia 
In the coverage studied, two general ways of understanding 'responsibility' 
with regards to Somalia emerged. Although the issue of responsibility was a popular 
element of media and academic representation of Somalia, some more extreme 
discourses did not deal with this concept at all, viewing the events as outside any such 
notions. Somalia, a part of' Africa', was simply like this, with 'like this' meaning 
violent, undemocratic and primitive. If Somalia was primordially and unchangingly 
'like this', responsibility and agency were not relevant concepts and involvement in any 
meaningful sense between 'the West' and Somalia would be useless. While some 
examples of this strong fatalism are evident in analysed media coverage, most fits 
somewhere in between, positioning Somalia as responsible for its own disasters yet also 
a victim of Cold War geopolitics, for whom 'the New World Order' should take 
responsibility. 
Tied into these discourses of responsibility were questions of value: Somalia 
was unquestionably a humanitarian disaster but was it a disaster of enough global 
significance to warrant intervention? Such wider conceptual discussions can be closely 
linked in policy terms to America's own uncertainty about its new national roles in the 
post-Cold War world order. Were internal conflicts in countries now perceived as 
unimportant America's prerogative to solve through multilateral work with 
international institutions like the UN or were these complex problems better left to the 
affected state's own citizens or a single state actor to deal with? Was a mission in 
Somalia to be a broad-based, long-term commitment to nation-building or just 
humanitarian aid? These strategic debates remained ongoing and unresolved between 
the various personalities, bureaucratic bodies and international institutions involved in 
Somalia and media coverage picks up on these multiple, and sometimes contradictory, 
possibilities. 
The overarching discourse of 'failed states' pervades the entire spectrum of 
understandings mentioned above and is a crucial feature of Somalia's representation by 
many Western media, academics and policymakers. The first academic use of the term 
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appears to have happened in a Foreign Policy journal article, entitled "Saving Failed 
States", published in the winter of 1992-1993 during the height of the Somalia 
intervention.4 Use of the term proliferated after this point in academic, policyrnaking 
and public circles; terminology around the discourse became established, much of it 
based on metaphors of personal 'health' and 'illness'.5 Much academic literature on 
'failed states' was not published until after the Somalia intervention had ended; the 
country was, in fact, cited as a prime example of the concept. Discussion of issues 
resulting from decolonisation and Cold War practices, however, were already regular 
media features during the intervention period, as will be evident in analysed coverage. 
'Failed state' discourses were crucial elements of theoretical debates about the apparent 
collapse into self-destruction of a sizable group of countries at the advent of a 'New 
World Order' but also of 'practical' attempts to develop standard criteria for how to 
classify and repair these political entities. 
In February 1994, in the wake of the Somalia intervention, an article entitled 
"The Corning Anarchy" was published in The Atlantic Monthly. It was soon faxed to 
American embassies around the world as essential reading. The article, by well-
travelled foreign correspondent Robert Kaplan, outlined in detail the horrors of an 
increasingly poor, urban, violent, and disease-ridden' Africa'. Despite the article's 
publication after the Somalia intervention and its primary focus on West Africa as 
opposed to the Horn, many of the sentiments expressed have strong resonance with 
discourses which surrounded events in Somalia a few months earlier. Kaplan believes 
that "We are entering a bifurcated world. Part of the globe is inhabited by Hegel's and 
Fukuyarna's Last Man, healthy, well-fed, and pampered by technology. The other, 
larger, part is inhabited by Hobbes's First Man, condemned to a life that is 'poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short."'6 This polarised world, however, is not presented as one in which 
the divides between these two kinds of 'men' may be bridged. The article instead 
4 Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States", Foreign Policy 89, Winter (1992-1993): 3-20. 
s For an excellent example of this, see Jean-Germain Gros, "Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New 
World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti", Third World Quarterly 17, no. 3 (1996): 455-
471. 
6 Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", The Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2, February (1994): 60. 
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functions as a warning to First World readers, who must recognise that their way of life 
is increasingly threatened by the poor and disenfranchised. 'The New World Order' is 
a space of myriad and diffuse threats, which appear to require management and 
containment before engagement. 
The Kaplan article touches upon but neglects to explore in depth the complex 
web of interaction and connection between the 'First' and 'Third' Worlds, particularly 
in economic and political senses.7 Resistant cultural divides between 'us' and 'them' 
are given primary importance, illustrated in Kaplan's general support of Samuel 
Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' theory.8 In a similar manner, the principles of non-
intervention held by the UN, upon which the differentiation for a 'New World Order' 
of international involvement was often based, fail to recognise much of international 
practice at a bilateral level. During the Cold War, various forms of military, economic, 
social and political intervention took place beyond UN auspices and continue to take 
place in the present. 
Although these new discourses of 'failed states' and 'coming anarchy' were 
widely accepted, they did not necessarily replace older understandings of the state 
system, which often merely adopted some of the new terms. Somalia was often also 
understood through narratives of 'Vietnam', a 'quagmire' in an unimportant state that 
would drag the US into an unwanted and long-term relationship with a developing 
country. A nostalgia for the Cold War itself was occasionally evident in media items 
bemoaning new situations of 'ethnic' or 'tribal' chaos, supposedly released from 
dormancy by the ending of old Cold War relationships. 
A variety of coverage styles and representations of Somalia find bases and 
justification in the 'failed state' discourses and illustrate the pervasive level of fatalism 
that existed regarding the situation of the country. In media coverage, the civil war and 
7 Kaplan's article is very detailed and informative, but neglects to illustrate Western involvement in 
Africa's situation. For example, Kaplan details the destruction of primary rainforests and the sale of the 
timber, but the description stops at African ports. The destination of this raw material is not given and the 
economies which fuel demand for it are not explained. 
8 Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations?" article, published in Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3 (Summer 
1993) suggests that "World politics is entering a new phase ... The great divisions between humankind and 
the dominating source of international conflict will be cultural", 22. 
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conflict were simultaneously hyped up through widespread quoting of humanitarian 
disaster figures while comments were also repetitively made, in both explicit and subtle 
ways, about Somalia's unimportance on a global scale. While reports on the 
possibilities of 'saving' Somalia through the use of well-armed and equipped US 
soldiers were occasionally published and aired, these did little to ease the suspicions of 
many commentators that Somalia would soon be left to its own devices. The clash of 
views between hopeful liberal interveners and those cynical about the likelihood for 
success of multilateral endeavours is evident during these discussions, although 
specific media commentators often changed their views from day to day. In-depth 
engagement with particular trends in coverage which relate to the abovementioned 
themes of responsibility, 'failed states' and fatalism will now be undertaken, using 
examples from selected media coverage. 
Responsibility & the 'Failed' State 
For those who wished to see states like Somalia 'saved', a more accepting 
geopolitical climate led to various practical suggestions of actions that the UN could 
take to promote peace in conflict areas. Analysed coverage of the Somalia intervention 
began with a New York Times article, written by Senators Nancy Kassebaum and Paul 
Simon in early 1992. They called on the UN to appoint a full-time special envoy to 
Somalia and adopt a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and arms embargo on 
Somalia.9 Another article in The Times of London on January 2, 1992 echoes the urgency 
mentioned above regarding the UN's possible functions in a 'New World Order' and is 
optimistic about its possibilities: 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali...takes over as the United Nations secretary-
general at a time when the UN has never before commanded such 
international support or faced challenges in so many parts of the 
world ... The revitalised world body is playing a central role in 
brokering ceasefires, supervising the deployment of peacekeeping 
9 Nancy Kassebaum & Paul Simon, "Save Somalia From Itself", The New York Times, January 2, 1992. 
forces and organising humanitarian missions to help the victims of war 
and famine.10 
As illustrated in the introduction above, however, this new optimism was often 
accompanied by a sense of growing risk and threat. In a proclaimed 'new' period of 
global optimism and opportunity, there was clearly the potential for 'failed' states to 
remain in crisis as well to succeed with multilateral assistance.11 
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Historical events in Somalia were often briefly called upon in media coverage of 
conflict there to illustrate a sense of hopelessness, reminiscent of the Kaplan article. A 
cynical features piece in The Times explains that "Ethiopia and Somalia took advantage 
of global naval competition between the superpowers to lease their coastlines in return 
for modem weapons ... Now the Cold War is over both have been left to their own 
devices, engulfed by famine and anomy."12 A New York Times editorial on February 9, 
1992 also expresses horror and doubt about the Somali conflict, calling it a "senseless 
war between rival clans waged by teenagers with automatic weapons."13 While 
insisting that it is "morally and politically unthinkable" for the world not to try and 
save Somalia from "national suicide", the article also states that "it is far from clear 
what the world can do" but warns that "chaos and famine will certainly spread" if 
action isn't taken. 
These articles are a reflection of the tone of the infrequent coverage during the 
first few months of 1992, when international recognition of the Somali crisis began to 
gamer media attention. Despite escalating levels of violence and civilian suffering in 
Somalia throughout 1990 and 1991, media reporting had been minimal until this point 
for a variety of reasons, explored in the previous chapter. Reports on events in Somalia 
tended to be short and merely outline factual information that could be gathered from 
outside the country such as the beginning or cessation of fighting, estimated numbers 
10 Michael Bin yon, "Daunting Challenges Face Boutros Ghali'', The Times, January 2, 1992. 
11 See Gearoid O'Tuathail, 'The Postmodem Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the 
Millenium', Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90, no. 1, March (2000): 166-167. O'Tuathail 
shows that discourse change doesn't necessarily equal abandonment of old ideas. 
12 "Africa's Patrons Depart", The Times, January 24, 1992. 
13 "Help Needed for Forsaken Somalia", The New York Times, February 9, 1992. 
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of casualties in fighting and a few sentences on why fighting was occurring in Somalia. 
As the UN began to become involved in Somali affairs again in early 1992, some longer 
media reports began to suggest a variety of approaches for dealing with Somalia's 
conflict. Doubt and pessimism were expressed, however, about whether the 
implementation of any of these options would actually be undertaken and, if action was 
taken, how it might work to create viable improvement. New York Times articles which 
mention the ongoing fighting in Mogadishu despite the signing of a ceasefire 
agreement in early February 1992 by Ali Mahdi and Aidid provide a setting for this 
pessimism. 
The New York Times reported UN official James Jonah as being "exasperated by 
the unrelenting fighting in the Somali capital". Jonah warned the two sides in a 
paternalistic matter that such ''behaviour" could be punished by a withholding of aid: 
"It should not be taken for granted that the international community, in the face of such 
behaviour, will continue to exert all efforts to bring food to Mogadishu when there are 
equally competing demands in other parts of the world."14 Articles such as this one, 
which indicated that it was the responsibility of Somalis to create a basic situation of 
peace before the UN could start its work, often alternated with ones which highlighted 
American reluctance for the UN to become involved in peacekeeping in Somalia. In 
late April1992, The New York Times reported that Security Council plans to send a force 
of 500 armed troops to protect relief workers in Mogadishu had been put on hold due 
to American reluctance to fund these numbers and that a force of fifty unarmed 
military observers would be sent instead.15 
The UN' s lack of commitment to Somalia was noted by both Somali citizens and 
aid agencies who had worked in the state throughout the civil war. Articles during the 
early stages of international involvement in the Somalia crisis alternately blamed this 
failure on disorganisation and excessive bureaucracy within the UN system or 
highlighted the ways in which the Western powers on the Security Council, especially 
14 "UN Halted By Somalia Shelling, Says Food Relief Could End", The New York Times, March 7, 1992. 
15 Paul Lewis, "Reined In By US, UN Limits Mission to Somalia", The New York Times, April26, 1992. 
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the US, were not meeting their financial, military and moral responsibilities to 'The 
New World Order'. Sam Kiley, writing for The Times on July 6, 1992, quotes the 
director of a key aid agency in Somalia as saying: "I doubt that the UN has the will to 
really follow things through. It is clear that armed UN soldiers would get shot and 
killed after a while and then they would run away leaving more chaos behind them 
than there is already if that is conceivable."16 There was only a brief announcement in 
The New York Times of the early June 1992 arrival of observers. Although the observers 
were "cordially greeted and wished well in their work", the article also declares that 
"more than 30,000 people, mostly women and children" have been killed in the 
Mogadishu fighting and Somalia remains "carved into fiefdoms of clan warlords" 17, an 
ominous-sounding situation which is not further elaborated. Again, the quoting of 
such figures and statements tended to highlight the large scale of the Somali crisis 
rather than inspiring confidence in UN efforts to improve the situation. 
There is a strong sense, again reminiscent of Kaplan, in many of the articles 
published in mid-1992 that the situation in Somalia was to be expected, given that this 
state is part of the African continent, a place historically perceived to be full of chaos 
and human tragedy. The implication appears to be that Somalia was not a particularly 
hopeful case for international intervention; at its most extreme, such actions are 
perceived to be futile due to Somalia's inherent tendency to violence. A June 7, 1992 
article in The Times describes the plight of thousands of Somali refugees pouring over 
the Kenyan border but expands on its description of the difficult situation of the 
refugees to comment on the state of most of Africa: "While the never-ending horrors of 
the Horn of Africa make it into the headlines, other conflicts, mostly tribal in origin, are 
flaring across the continent, including in Kenya itsel£."18 A long New York Times article 
by Jane Perlez, published in May 1992, calls states such as Somalia and Ethiopia. 
"orphans of the post-Cold-War era". While she points out that the new strategic 
unimportance of these states for Russia and the US means that many African despots 
16 Sam Kiley, "UN Observer Team Arrives in Somalia to Mixed Reception", The Times, July 6, 1992. 
17 
"UN Truce Observers Reach Somali Capital", The New York Times, July 6, 1992. 
18 
"Ragged Refugees Flood Into Kenya", The Times, June 7, 1992. 
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may no longer be able to play one superpower against another and may therefore fall 
due to lack of external support, Perlez also quotes African leaders who are not 
optimistic about many African states' abilities to create new democratic opportunities 
for themselves.19 There is discussion, both in Perlez's article and in academic and 
policy literature, about the need for African-designed and implemented solutions, 
rather than strategies driven by outside powers. This seemingly anti-colonial impetus, 
however, was occasionally read as neglectful by those arguing that African state 
problems were being ignored by the rest of the world. Paul Lewis, writing for The New 
York Times, notes that: "For officials of African and other third-world countries, 
America's reluctance to see the United Nations get involved in Somalia smacks of 
racism because they remember how it encouraged the Security Council to rush a 14,000-
strong peacekeeping force into Yugoslavia at a cost of $630 million earlier this year, 
when civil war erupted in that European country."20 
The sentiments in this article and a further editorial piece in The New York Times 
are predictive of a larger debate which developed in July and August 1992, as tension 
rose between Boutros-Ghali and the Security Council over the body's apparent lack of 
commitment to Africa in general. According to a New York Times article, 
Mr. Boutros-Ghali challenged the Security Council's decision to expand 
the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia if this was to 
occur at the expense of urgently needed peacekeeping and relief 
operations in black Africa ... the dispute has festered and at times has 
erupted into a collision of cultures between the Secretary General, who 
feels compelled to speak for the less powerful nations of the third 
world, and the Western powers who dominate the Security Council.Z1 
Media coverage articulated the views of various policymakers and journalists, 
illustrating the broad scope of sometimes-conflicting perspectives on Western policy 
towards Africa which were circulating at this time. Conflicts and schisms largely 
19 Jane Perlez, "After the Cold War: Views From Africa; Stranded by Superpowers, Africa Seeks an 
Identity", The New York Times, May 17, 1992. 
20 Paul Lewis, "Reined In By US, UN Limits Mission To Somalia", The New York Times, April26, 1992. 
21 Patrick E. Tyler, "UN Chiefs Dispute With Council Boils Over", The New York Times, August 3, 1992. 
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reflected divides between liberal interventionists, intervention sceptics, and those 
strongly against humanitarian intervention. While intervention scepticism was based 
on a large variety of concerns, the preponderance of fatalism and cynicism based on the 
casting of Somalia as 'beyond' hope of Western aid, rather than illustrations of how it 
was perhaps receiving ineffective forms of Western assistance, tended to mean that 
binary divisions between 'Somalia/Africa' and 'the West' were reinforced. The ways in 
which this binary was perpetuated will be explored in further sections below. 
'Discovering' Famine: Death Statistics & Moral Comparisons 
The fervency of the debate on if and how to intervene in Somalia was likely 
intensified by the increase in media coverage of humanitarian conditions in the country 
as 1992 progressed. Shortly after complications in negotiations with General Aidid 
prevented the fifty person observer team from patrolling, Jane Perlez wrote an article 
filled with dire quotes from Red Cross officials. The Red Cross was among the most 
respected of aid agencies working in Somalia, as it remained in the country throughout 
the entire civil war in areas where many other agencies refused to operate. A well-
quoted figure of approximately thirty thousand deaths in the Mogadishu fighting prior 
to the March 1992 ceasefire had been used by media in the early months of 1992 to 
represent numerically the scale of the humanitarian disaster in Somalia. However, the 
Geneva-based director general of the Red Cross announced to Perlez in mid-July that 
the land, sea and air operation that has brought a meal a day to 500,000 
Somalis was proving insufficient. 'Another 500,000 will starve if our 
program is not doubled immediately.' ... Dr. Fuchs [the director general] 
described conditions in Somalia, a mostly desert country of about 5 
million people on the Hom of Africa, as a 'disaster' and 'quantitatively' 
much worse than that in the former Yugoslav republics.22 
22 Jane Perlez, "UN Observers Delay Visit to Somalia", The New York Times, July 12, 1992. 
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Further new and powerful figures emerged in this article, where realisation of 
previously undisclosed suffering in the countryside outside Mogadishu emerged. Dr. 
Fuchs estimated that two and a half million Somalis in rural areas were "wandering in 
search of food and safety" and in certain particularly hard-hit areas, like the former-
farming town of Baidoa, severe malnutrition rates were at eighty to ninety percent.23 
A few days later, Perlez wrote a more descriptive article, which appears to have 
been influenced by the legendary Michael Buerk commentary from Korem, Ethiopia 
during the infamous 1984 famine in that country24: 
In the damp, gray dawn in this remote Somali bush town, 25,000 men, 
women and children, their rib cages protruding, their eyes listless, 
shuffled with their last bit of strength today toward outdoor kitchens 
for a scoop of food. Hundreds, too feeble to eat, died while they 
waited ... 'Here is hell', said Mr. Loane, [a Red Cross official] who 
worked in Ethiopia during the 1984-85 famine. 'I thought I would 
never see Ethiopia again, and I didn't think we would allow it to 
happen again.' Red Cross officials say they believe about one-third of 
Somalia's people, estimated to number anywhere from 4.5 to 6 million, 
are likely to die in the next six months unless more food is pumped into 
the country.25 
The comparison between Somalia and Ethiopia was intensified by the fact that, 
according to Red Cross estimates, Somalia faced a greater absolute and proportional 
famine threat than its infamous neighbour, known primarily to the West for its 
mediatized famine in the 1980s. The numerical scale and qualitative description of 
suffering in Somalia was thus dramatically increased at this point. Mention is also 
made of a severe drought taking place across all of Eastern Africa, again expanding the 
horrors outwards to encompass more of' Africa' generally. Perlez does, however, make 
clear that the Somali famine has developed primarily due to ongoing internal fighting, 
23 Jane Perlez, "UN Observers Delay Visit to Somalia", The New York Times, July 12, 1992. 
24 On October 24, 1984, BBC reporter Michael Buerk and cameraman Mohamed Amin exposed 
humanitarian suffering in Ethiopia to Western publics. Buerk opened his narrative to Amin's footage, 
"Dawn, and as the sun breaks through the piercing chill of night on the plain outside Korem it lights up a 
biblical famine, here, in the Twentieth Century," www.randomhouse.co.uk/minisites/road taken! 
(accessed April25, 2007). 
25 Jane Perlez, "Deaths in Somalia Outpace Delivery of Food", The New York Times, July 19, 1992. 
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which has made the delivery of food extremely difficult, thus returning to more 
specified discussion of the Somali situation. The media's general belief in the power of 
numbers to make human suffering significant in developing countries is evident in the 
article. It quotes figures on the numbers of people in the feeding camp mentioned, the 
number of people who have died in Baidoa alone, total numbers of Somalis at risk in 
the country, numbers of displaced persons and refugees, numbers of Red Cross feeding 
centres and the thirty thousand figure for deaths due to fighting in Mogadishu. 
The impact of this article on further coverage of the Somalia famine appears to 
have been significant. The dramatic increase in numbers of potential disaster victims 
and the authority of a key Red Cross figure in making these statements likely helped to 
provide media with important quotable 'sound bites' and gave justification to 
policymakers who supported taking action. The figure of one third of the Somali 
population at risk of death began to be used routinely in following New York Times 
articles; mentions of the famine as perpetuated by the inability of relief agencies to 
deliver aid in dangerous conditions also became common. As more journalists 
travelled to Somalia to get the story 'live', television images and items began to emerge 
alongside press articles and 'first hand' styles of reporting appeared more often. The 
Times of London published a similar article to Perlez' s, which additionally brought 
individual accounts of the human suffering in Somalia to the forefront. Sam Kiley 
opened an August 4, 1992 Times article by describing the plight of six-year-old Nor Isaq, 
the only member of his family to avoid starvation. Kiley also estimated that one and a 
half million, or about one third, of the Somali population was at risk of starving and 
detailed the struggles of Red Cross officials to transport food to the needy without it 
being looted. 26 
Strongly-worded articles about the devastation in Somalia and reluctance, 
particularly American, to fund a UN mission there encouraged media debate and 
speculation about why there appeared to be little Western interest in 'saving' this 
'failed' state. Throughout the summer of 1992 rhetoric about the scale of the disaster 
26 Sam Kiley, "Orphaned Somali Children Wait For Their Tum to Die", The Times, August 4, 1992. 
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remained dramatic, with the UN joining the Red Cross in calling Somalia the worst 
humanitarian situation in the world.27 Shortly after Perlez's story, a New York Times 
editorial bemoaned: "war, drought, the collapse of civil authority: these are the malign 
toxins that threaten the very existence of Somalia, a husk of a country on the Hom of 
Africa." The article calls on Western powers, especially the US, to endorse Boutros-
Ghali' s idea of a UN quick-reaction peacekeeping force and warns that as George Bush 
says nothing about the proposal"a third of a country inches toward the grave."28 
An editorial piece in mid-August used less dire vocabulary but also appealed 
for a moral basis to American policy on Africa, which it claimed was not being 
implemented due to racism and ignorance. A comparison to the situation in Bosnia 
was made, which was unsurprising given Boutros-Ghali's earlier comments on the 
disparity of responses to these cases of state collapse and their existence as 
simultaneous media 'events'. "Ci~ war and unconscionable internment in Bosnia 
seem man-made evils, subject to man-made solutions. But Africa is a mystery to our 
Eurocentric nation, even to many African-Americans. Its troubles seem like Old 
Testament plagues, irresolvable and inevitable."29 While the moral impetus for the 
West to help Africa is still present in the article and there is some attempt to explore the 
'othering' of this continent's problems by Western commentators and audiences, there 
remains a tendency to re-state, rather than challenge, the exceptional nature of Somali, 
and 'African' violence. The article offers vivid descriptions of how Africa is imaged 
and imagined by 'the West' but does not offer alternative ways of interpreting the 
conflict there which might challenge these dichotomies. 
27 This statement was allegedly first made in early 1992 by Andrew Natsios, Director of the US Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance, but was not widely commented upon since the OFDA was a small 
bureaucratic body in Washington without considerable influence at high government levels. See Africa 
Watch & Physicians for Human Rights, Somalia, No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the Conflict and 
The Struggle for Relief, Human Rights Watch publications, March 26, 1992, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/somalia/ (accessed September 19, 2007) and Steven Livingston & Todd 
Eachus, "Humanitarian Crises and US Foreign Policy: the CNN Effect Reconsidered", Political 
Communication 12, no. 4 (1995): 413-429 for more on Andrew Natsios. 
28 "The Hell Called Somalia", The New York Times, July 23, 1992. 
29 Anna Quindlen, "Public & Private: Somalia's Plagues", The New York Times, August 12, 1992. 
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A Times piece published around the same time also attempts to go beyond 
merely reporting the 'facts' of the Somalia situation to explore the question of 
compassion fatigue in terms of ongoing images of suffering in Somalia and Bosnia. It 
discusses the importance of images of children, who are often portrayed as innocent 
victims of violence who are outside the politics of a conflict and have a moral claim to 
aid and compassion. The author points out the different ways in which European 
versus African disaster images are understood; she argues that African child images 
tend to alienate rather than arouse compassion. While it is claimed that the aid 
community has done much to try to change this image of an 'othered', destroyed 
Africa, beyond the reach of Western aid, there is again little optimism that audiences 
are able to look beyond the allegedly obvious plight of a needy child to the deeper 
complexities of conflict situations and there are no suggestions for how this 
predominant style of imagery might be challenged or changed. 30 
A New York Times article in early September also asks the question: "Would the 
signals have excited journalists more if they had come from somewhere else instead of, 
yet again, black Africa? Just more pictures of flies on sickly black faces?" 31 The article 
moves on to claim that no "catharsis" is available for audiences viewing the Somali 
crisis because over half the food sent by donors is looted "to enrich the thugs who are 
responsible for the massacre." The moral impetus to act and to question existing, and 
potentially damaging, images of Africa is again slightly diminished by a sense of the 
Somali disaster as beyond the scale of possible aid or as one more crisis on a continent 
full of such crises. The mentioning of 'thugs' stealing food aid can also be seen as 
functioning to remind readers of the futility of aid efforts and the greed of segments of 
the Somali population, who are positioned as undeserving of aid. Contemporaneous 
with the publication of these articles discussing representations of Africa, the potential 
numerical scale of the Somali tragedy was predicted to have increased, although 
estimates of numbers at risk soon returned to the well-quoted, if vague, one third of 
30 Patricia Holland, "Taking a Picture of Pain", The Times, August 25, 1992. 
31 Walter Goodman, "Critic's Notebook: Why It Took TV So Long To Focus On The Somalis", The New York 
Times, September 2, 1992. 
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four and a half to six million figure. A short August 7, 1992 article in The New York 
Times raised the risk of starvation number from one-third to two-thirds of the Somali 
population, estimated at seven million total.32 The Times also briefly upped its predicted 
numbers of Somalis at risk to nearly three-quarters of a population of eight million.33 
Although it may have been coincidental and merely an accidental recording of figures, 
this occurrence again highlights the perceived importance of numbers in representing 
Somalia's suffering to the outside world. 
In general, while the summer 1992 period of media coverage appears to be 
important in terms of an increase in media, policymakers', and likely public, awareness 
of events in Somalia, the content of articles appears primarily focused on the quoting of 
dramatic death and suffering statistics. Stories that personalised these numbers, and 
articles which attempted to discuss the ways in which coverage was being presented, 
continued to rely on vocabulary which encouraged understandings of the horrors of 
conditions in Somalia in ways that seemed to indicate that there was little possibility for 
improvement and change in the country. 
Fatalism vs. Western 'Saviours' 
As the above section has suggested, the overriding sense of fatalism in much 
media coverage of Somalia is often related to the frequent citing of dramatic 
humanitarian statistics. This style of presentation routinely involved a heavy emphasis 
on the overwhelming nature of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia; some editorialised 
items actually stated that Somalia appeared a 'hopeless' case and that efforts by the 
international community to assist its people were futile. When the inevitability of 
Somalia's humanitarian disaster was not openly stated, it was often implied when 
media items concluded with grim descriptions of yet further chaos. Importantly, these 
descriptions were almost always through Western eyes, with little or no apparent input 
from Somali citizens themselves. 
32 
"UN Meets With Rival Factions in Somalia", The New York Times, August 7, 1992. 
33 Ian Glover-James, "Airlift to Head Off Disaster in Somalia", The Times, August 16, 1992. 
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In seemingly contradictory fashion, many media items reported with tangible 
enthusiasm and confidence on American potential to 'save' Somalia; this tone was 
particularly obvious when the military technology and capabilities of arriving US 
soldiers were discussed. The images associated with the arrival of US and UN aid to 
Somalia were almost universally ones of military equipment. These seemingly 
opposing themes in coverage, pessimism about Somalia's hopelessness and optimistic 
zeal for high tech solutions, both had the effect, however, of minimising media focus on 
Somalia beyond the scope of possible American actions and of removing Somali people 
as important actors in events in their own country. Both discourses helped to create 
narratives that were far more informative about American international relations and 
policies than about Somalia's internal situation. 
Articles throughout early August 1992 in The Times tell a story of continuing 
difficulties and failure in the distribution of food aid. The deployment of 500 armed 
peacekeepers was approved by both the UN and most Somali factional leaders at this 
time but further action was delayed. An August 17, 1992 article describing the 
blockading of supplies leaving Mogadishu port quotes an aid worker describing the 
situation as "just bedlam ... a completely anarchic situation."34 American plans to assist 
the air relief effort being organised by the UN were well-publicised in both newspapers 
and provided an occasional contrast to grim reports of death figures and failures to 
deliver relief.35 The first line of a September 1, 1992_New York Times article announced: 
"The US cavalry has finally arrived in Somalia, bringing food and sympathy to a people 
beset by civil war and famine."36 The article goes on to describe the desperation and 
helplessness of Somali famine victims and contrasts this to the hopeful possibilities that 
could be provided by US forces or, in a best case scenario, a permanent, multinational 
reaction force as recommended by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. 
34 "Somali Gunmen Loot UN Food and Fuel", The Times, August 17, 1992. 
35 See "Airlift to Head Off Disaster in Somalia", The Times, August 16, 1992 and "With UN' s Help, US Will 
Airlift Food to Somalia", The New York Times, August 15, 1992. 
36 "A Foreign Legion For The World", The New York Times, September 1, 1992. 
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On August 20, 1992, a features article in The Times suggested that the only 
answer for Somalia was a form of UN protectorate status. Bringing in food was only 
the beginning; the UN would have to assume many of the former roles of the Somali 
government to get the country back on its feet. An incredibly bleak picture of the 
country was outlined in this article; "Somalia has ceased to exist as a functioning 
country ... No independent nation in modern times has collapsed into such squalor, 
chaos and misery as Somalia."37 Throughout August and September 1992, articles in 
both newspapers followed the incremental moves by the UN to secure permission for 
troops to protect relief supplies entering Mogadishu and being airlifted to other parts of 
the country. Articles were short and tended to focus on actions taken by Western 
powers, along with giving the opinions of Western aid workers on the ground in 
Somalia on the status of UN involvement. However, general expectations about what 
the mission could accomplish in Somalia remained low. 
A Times of London Features piece in early October summed up a variety of civil 
crises in Africa with the conclusion that: "Most civil wars end not in truces but 
starvation and exhaustion ... The cold logic forces a primitive and awful conclusion: 
fighting in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Somalia will not stop until death and 
destruction threaten entire populations."38 Although this article acknowledges that for 
'conscience sake' relief attempts must continue, it expresses little hope that these efforts 
will do anything to shorten or ease the conflict. A Jane Perlez article in late August, 
which attempts to provide some background to the clan rivalries dividing Somalia, also 
illustrates Perlez' s lack of conviction that peace or stability will come easily to Somalia. 
Instead, Somalia is seen as an "extreme example of what could occur elsewhere on the 
continent." According to a quote in the article from the deputy chief of mission at the 
United States Embassy in Nairobi, "'We could end up with Africa the way it was before 
the colonialists came, divided up into tribal enclaves."'39 The assumption here, that 
'Africa' was improved by the colonial practices and later state-creation missions of 
37 
"Rescue for Somalia", The Times, August 20, 1992. 
38 "How Civil Wars End", T11e Times, October 5, 1992. 
39 Jane Perlez, "Barrier to Somali Unity: Clan Rivalry", The New York Times, August 30, 1992. 
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Europeans, again suggests that Somalia has been largely responsible for its own 
suffering since independence. Agency to change situations in Africa is placed with 
Westerners, whereas' Africa' is expected to simply revert to 'tribal' conditions if left to 
its own devices. The West is represented solely as a force for' good' in this destructive 
place; its past activities are unquestioned and unexplored. 
The predominately self-interested nature of Western fear of these 'tribal 
enclaves' is evident in a later article in The Times, which warns about the perils of large 
amounts of emigration from the developing world. The author, Bernard Levin, picks 
up a quote from a UN official in Somalia, marvelling at the fact that gangs who steal 
relief supplies and then sell them at market prices are ethnically, linguistically and 
ideologically the same as those from whom they steal. The official declares that the 
groups are '"only interested in power, and it cannot be shared"' .40 Levin asks, "what 
did the world do when Genghis Khan was on the move? The kind of border controls 
with which we are familiar will be meaningless; indeed, practically everything we 
regard as normal will be meaningless."41 He grimly predicts the arrival of new groups 
of 'barbarian hordes' into Europe and the West, classifying ethnic groups as diverse as 
former members of the USSR together with northern Africans as poverty-stricken 
peoples who will soon demand a piece of the West's success. Kaplan's theme of 
'coming anarchy' is particularly evident in this article, where any relationship between 
the privileged position of 'the West' and disastrous 'other' parts of the world remains 
unrecognised. 'Others' appear to matter only to the extent that they are threats to the 
First World's way of life. Greed and selfishness also re-emerge as key attributes 
applied only to 'others', whose immoral actions, such as stealing, are emphasized, 
rendering the delivery of such aid pointless, since it will end up in the hands of 
'thieves' rather than innocents. The dominant discussion of looting aid as indicative of 
moral depravity in Somalia, instead, for example, of interpreting the stealing as a 
40 Bernard Levin, "When Continents Collide", The Times, November 9, 1992. 
41 Ibid. 
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political survival strategy for specific groups or as part of a larger aid 'economy', will 
remain a common theme picked up in later coverage. 
In the wake of the shelling of a relief ship in Mogadishu harbour in late 
November 1992 and continuing reports of the failure of aid to reach the needy, the US 
government indicated its willingness to consider sending upwards of thirty thousand 
American troops to Somalia. This announcement brought regular television coverage 
to the crisis. Interest had ebbed and flowed in both print and television journalism 
since the initial' discovery' of the degree of the famine in August, with television 
having the more noticeable decline. The American presidential election had largely 
overshadowed the Somali crisis for much of the autumn of 1992. The announcement of 
American troop deployment was a major change in a situation whose parameters had 
already been well-explored by the media; it led to another burst of articles and opinion 
pieces in both papers and expert debates on television. 
Framing Intervention: 'Saviours' Arrive or Doomed to Failure? 
As American intervention in Somalia became a certainty in late November 1992, 
alternating views of the mission continued to veer between faith in American military 
might and predictions of failure. Several articles in The Times were doubtful about the 
possibilities for positive action by the troops. Simon Jenkins wrote cynically about the 
implications of an intervention organised on the basis of media denunciations against 
suffering and again outlined two predicted outcomes of intervention in Somalia: 
"Washington will have either to rule Somalia indefinitely and against growing local 
resistance, or support one of the warlords, swamp him with weapons and get out. In 
the latter case, anarchy and famine will simply resume until, as in Mozambique and 
Liberia, exhaustion or a neighboring power takes over."42 For Jenkins, the idea of 
"intimidat(ing) the warlords by 'blowing up one of their pickups with an M1 tank", 
setting up new Somali political and administrative structures in a little over a month, 
42 Simon Jenkins, "This Caring Imperialism", The Times, December 5, 1992. 
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and leaving was blatantly naive and impossible. He points out that "much the same 
was said in Vietnam".43 
Despite a next day appeal in the paper by former President Ronald Reagan for 
"a humanitarian velvet glove backed by a steel fist of military force"44, a December 9 
article by Ben Macintyre followed Jenkins's line of argument and questioned the 
supposed moral certainties of the Somalia intervention, coming as it was just before 
Christmas. Macintyre felt that the nightly news encouraged belief in the simplicity of 
the moral compulsion to act in Somalia through the use of "nightly television footage 
juxtaposing starving Somalis with grinning, gun-toting fighters riding around on Jeeps. 
The fact that in most instances these men are not Somali gangsters but protection units 
employed by the television crews is lost on most Americans because the anchormen 
usually do not care to point it out."45 Conor Cruise O'Brien, writing on December 15, 
also agreed with Macintyre's sentiments: 
Though designed to appeal to the genuinely humanitarian instincts of 
millions of Americans, the US intervention is a cynical pseudo-
humanitarian publicity exercise. Its political objective could be readily 
divined from its timing. Troops were available for deployment in 
Mogadishu the weekend before last, but stayed aboard the ships. The 
reason was explained by a television producer in Mogadishu: 'At the 
weekend, American television news bulletins are not long.'46 
Norman Macrae stands out in The Times's commentary as a supporter of the 
deployment, agreeing with the opinion of Ronald Reagan. Whether they believed 
intervention was the correct course of action or not, however, all the commentators 
doubted the likelihood of long-term US and UN commitment to rebuilding Somalia. As 
Macrae declared, "The best course for American soldiers would be to confiscate every 
Kalashnikov in the country, round up and deport all the warlord-politicians, and 
43 Simon Jenkins, "This Caring Imperialism", The Times, December 5, 1992. 
44 Ronald Reagan, "Better Tomorrows as a Noble Vision Approaches Fruition", The Times, December 6, 
1992. 
45 Ben Macintyre, "Americans Embrace the Moral Certainties of Somali Crusade", The Times, December 9, 
1992. 
46 Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Blundering into Bosnia", The Times, December 15, 1992. 
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temporarily impose a new colonial rule whether American, French or any other does 
not matter. This will not be allowed."47 
This primarily-British cynicism over the prospect of long-term development 
success in Somalia was an importance difference between UK and US media coverage; 
American coverage, particularly television, was generally more positive about what 
their troops could achieve in Somalia, particularly after their dramatic arrival. British, 
and some American, doubts about the mission's longevity were, however, often 
supported by informational articles which reported American forces' desire to hand-off 
to UN troops as soon as possible. The Americans' desire for a quick handover was 
contrasted to the UN's, and particularly Boutros-Ghali's, belief in the need for long-
term peace-building in Somalia. A New York Times editorial piece on December 1 warns 
that a timetable for withdrawal should be set up immediately; "The way to avoid a 
dreaded quagmire is to fix a deadline for renewal of troop authorizations that are 
written into any Security Council resolution."48 Most print articles repeated the 
dominant American administration statement that the US was primarily interested in 
leading the early stages of an intervention but saw long-term peace-building as a UN 
job. At this point, when predictions of easy American troop success at quelling the 
activities of Somali gunmen were still prevalent in many media items, concerns over 
Somalia becoming another Vietnam-style quagmire were balanced by discussion of 
who would preside over Somalia's necessary long term reconstruction; "It may be 
possible to re-create Somalia, but it will take years. Are we prepared to stay that long, 
or would we, in the end, lose heart and pull out prematurely?"49 
Many articles stuck with the sense of cynicism evident in Times items, 
suggesting that the American administration was more concerned with doing the 
Somalia mission quickly and with good publicity than with doing it 'right'. Jane Perlez 
highlighted how this type of strategy would cause serious problems in relations with 
the Somali population: "Many Somalis welcome the imminent American military 
47 Norman Macrae, "Blast the Lily-Livered Peaceniks", The Times, December 13, 1992. 
48 "Do It Right in Somalia", The New York Times, December 1, 1992. 
49 Raymond Bonner, "Buy Up the Somalis' Guns", The New York Times, December 2, 1992. 
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intervention in their country, but they view the narrowly focused goal of protecting the 
delivery of food to the destitute as a mere sideshow to what really interests them: an 
end to the clan violence, economic reconstruction and political reconciliation. And they 
expect America to deliver on all counts."50 
The American Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, was among the 
clearest of fatalistic voices in a media spectrum of opinion where British commentators 
appeared generally more pessimistic than American. Hempstone felt that military 
intervention in Somalia posed more risks than the American administration was aware 
of and that, while humanitarian, did not serve the country's vital national interests. 
111Somalis, as the Italians and the British discovered to their discomfiture, are natural-
born guerrillas,' Mr. Hempstone said ... 'They will mine the roads. They will lay 
ambushes. They will launch hit and run attacks. They will not be able to stop the 
convoys from getting through. But they will inflict- and take- casualties."'51 Despite 
their questionable basis in regarding identity formation as 'primordial', Hempstone's 
predictions, along with those of Jenkins and Macintyre, turned out to be fairly accurate. 
At the time Hempstone's statements were published, they added to the doubts already 
circulating about the Somalia mission in both newspapers, even before the landing of 
American troops on Somali beaches. 
To a large extent, increased television coverage around the time of the American 
decision to intervene echoed many of the doubts and concerns of various print media 
pieces while continuing to rely on 'powerful' images of starvation and human 
suffering, which had driven coverage from the early stages of the crisis. A November 
30 ABC Nightline debate opened with a montage of' classic' famine shots, which had 
been making brief appearances in nightly news broadcasts. Scenes of small, crying 
children with bloated bellies were flashed up for only seconds, followed by images of 
young Somali men with guns and then Somalis moving roughly-wrapped body bags. 
The montage concluded with scenes of what appear to be Western troops in uniform 
50 Jane Perlez, "Mission to Somalia: Expectations in Somalia", The New York Times, December 4, 1992. 
51 Michael R. Gordon, "Mission to Somalia; Envoy Asserts Intervention In Somalia Is Risky And Not In 
Interests Of US", The New York Times, December 6, 1992. 
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marching in a desert area. Speaking over top of this montage, anchor Forrest Sawyer 
declared, "First you need to understand just how bad things really are in Somalia. It is 
a place that no longer exists as a nation. There are only swirling gangs who loot and 
fight while millions around them starve to death."52 Somalia was thus again reduced to 
a space of anarchy and destruction, populated in this description by dearly-definable 
victims and aggressors. Sawyer goes on to open the report and debate by asking many 
of the important questions that were being debated in print media: what would happen 
if our "boys come home in body bags?", "what is the US getting into and will it be able 
to get out?" and "if US troops leave quickly will Somalia collapse again?". These 
questions were routinely asked throughout the entire intervention period, with few to 
no new insights being given. 
Images throughout the report section echo those shown earlier in the news item 
but also resemble the still images shown in print coverage, flashing between shots of 
gun-wielding men on trucks and crying women and children. Close-up images of dead 
Somali bodies are shown, faces visible (see Image 3), along with shots of children 
fighting and pushing for bits of dropped dry grain. The American network's 
willingness to use this clear shot of a dead body is important to note, particularly in 
light of general UK and US media reluctance to show images of other categories of 
bodies, particularly American ones. According to the later standards of acceptability 
for showing bodies given by American media after incidents in Fallujah, it is the 
anonymity of this particular black Somali woman which makes her a usable image for 
American television. She represents one of many 'African' victims, whereas American 
victims tend to be viewed as recognisable 'individuals'. 
The responsibility for this situation is clearly placed on the UN. UN forces in 
Somalia are called "token" and are said to have "failed miserably". An interviewed 
World Vision worker says Somalia is "like a Mad Max movie", referring to situations 
where gunmen have hijacked much of the food aid destined for the starving. These 
comments are reminiscent of many made by aid workers interviewed for print articles. 
sz ABC Nightline, November 30, 1992~ 
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Despite significant improvements in famine areas by December 1992, Somalia 
continued to be represented almost exclusively as a disaster area, through imagery of 
seemingly malnourished women and children contrasted with gun-wielding men. UN 
efforts are denigrated, reinforcing the idea that only US military could 'save' Somalia. 
As will be seen below when compared with BBC coverage, this view was primarily 
aired by American media. It echoed comments made by President Bush in his televised 
address to the nation, which stressed America's unique capabilities to feed and enforce 
peace in Somalia. These comments were likely intended to bolster public support for 
the agreed-to actions, which, in a cyclical fashion, were being justified as at least partly 
due to public demand after seeing famine imagery in the media. Bureaucratic analysis 
of the American decision to intervene, significantly that undertaken by Livingston and 
Eachus, suggests that these webs of perception and influence between media, 
government bodies and individuals, and audiences were likely as important a factor in 
the decision to intervene as direct evidence and information from Somalia. 53 
Immediate pre-intervention coverage by the BBC, while not expressing any 
dramatically different information from ABC, did take a slightly different visual 
approach and reporting style to the Somali situation. A December 4, 1992lead story on 
the deployment of US troops to Somalia began with graphics showing a map of Somalia 
along with counts of troop numbers from countries other than the US involved in the 
Somalia intervention. Viewers were thus given a sense of the multilateral element to 
the mission, which was not commonly mentioned or imaged in ABC coverage. In the 
December 4 BBC item, clips from Bush's televised speech to the American public are 
interspersed with images of American policymakers speaking to reporters. Voiceover 
commentary and the comment of an American senator explain that some are concerned 
that Somalia will become a quagmire similar to Vietnam, illustrating the sense of doubt 
about the mission which regularly pervaded almost all media coverage. 
Some use of traditional'famine' images, comparable to those of ABC, occurred 
in a second BBC item on December 4, which is introduced by anchor Martin Lewis 
53 See Livingston & Eachus, "Humanitarian Crises and US Foreign Policy". 
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using a small image of an emaciated toddler with a UN symbol behind it. This item 
begins with shots of a crying, skinny child held by its mother with rows of other thin 
women and children sitting behind, indicating the scale of problems in Somalia. The 
current estimated death toll of a quarter of a million people is announced over this 
image, which changes to take in a shot of a single young boy staring at the camera, flies 
crawling on his face. This conjunction of imagery and statistics works to both create a 
sense of immense scale while also linking the famine problem to single 'innocent' 
individuals, such as the boy. 
Imagery is used in combination with statistics again as Somali men are shown 
standing on large piles of food, which viewers are told is in a warehouse in Mogadishu. 
Commentary explains that there is enough food in the warehouse to feed one million 
people for a month but it cannot be moved because of gunmen on the streets. The 
reporter declares that, "where children carry machine guns there are too many rival 
gangs"54 as images appear of three young men and a boy with a large gun and young 
boys fixing guns. Although the transitions are less abrupt, the BBC item's narrative 
works like the ABC report to create distinguishable categories of 'innocent' and 'evil' 
Somalis. The visual representation of boy children on both sides of this spectrum 
serves to complicate the situation slightly, but is not commented upon, except to the 
extent that young children's armed participation in gang activities indicates the 
dramatic amount of disorder in Somali society. In both cases, however, imagery assists 
in showing Somalia's destitution and distance, geographically and socially, from the 
lives of those coming to 'save' it. This divide is also emphasized in commentary which 
declares that: "The most sophisticated force in the world is headed for pre-industrial 
squalor with no power or running water."55 Shots which accompany this dialogue 
show women and children trying to gather water from a muddy, shallow well. 
The contrasts between the 'horrors' of life in physically and socially demolished 
Somalia and the role of American and Western forces as high-tech 'saviours' of this 
54 BBC 9 o'clock news, December 4, 1992. 
55 Ibid. 
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state were a constant feature during the final days of build-up before the troop arrival. 
ABC opened a December 7, 1992 report with images of American jets streaking over 
Mogadishu; it then cut to Somali men lying injured on makeshift hospital beds and 
chewing khat. Commentary over this report declared that the "violent nightmare" in 
Somalia had to be stopped. Images of armed Somalis carrying food aid ashore by hand 
and guarding it in jeeps were overlaid with commentary explaining that Marines 
would soon be responsible for these roles. The visible contrast between the military 
'might' of the US compared to the antiquated or 'low-tech' options of Somali guards 
and gunmen are thus made visually even when they are not stated explicitly. BBC 
reports on December 7 and 8, 1992 also focused on displaying American military 
equipment arriving in Somali air and sea space, as well as areas that would soon be 
under US control. The fact that Somalis with guns in these areas would be considered a 
threat after these takeovers was mentioned. 
Print media also encouraged this 'saviour-victim' dichotomy and revelled in 
military technologies. A December 9, 1992 article in The Times included a large graphic 
of the various American planes, ships and helicopters that would be used in Somalia, 
with captions explaining their capabilities, carrying capacities and duties for the 
mission. Much was made rhetorically of the new conjunction of military might and 
humanitarian 'goodness'. Headlines for this Times article read: "Marines bring mercy at 
the end of a gun", "US troops sweep in before dawn to rescue starving Somalis" and 
"Two thousand US marines in Somalia are welcomed as saviours. Support at home 
could be eroded if the troops become bogged down."56 (See Image 5) 
Coverage of the actual arrival of US troops by both TV stations continued the 
heavy focus on images and descriptions of American troops and military hardware, 
with occasional attempts to explore current conditions for Somalis in Mogadishu and 
beyond. These attempts were often hampered by technological problems for media 
networks, however, and the importance of representing this faraway tragedy through 
Western eyes and points of view is made evident in many ways. The introduction and 
56 Martin Fletcher and Sam Kiley, "Marines Bring Mercy at the End of a Gun", The Times, December 9, 1992. 
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cuts to commercial breaks during the ABC Nightline in Somalia special broadcast 
showed a map of the Horn region with various images of US troops and equipment 
superimposed across it, next to Somalia. (See Image 4) Viewing publics were 
presumed to need constant reminding of Somalia's location; their views of the country 
were restricted almost completely to such computer-generated maps, along with up-
close shots of US troops and equipment and the two Somali categories, starving women 
and children and armed men. 
Somali citizens literally became witnesses to this huge 'show' of force in some 
similar ways to Western TV viewers. This curious "sightseeing" was repeatedly 
commented on by ABC anchor Ted Koppel, who also stood above the beaches of 
Mogadishu to be filmed surveying the desert landscape and arriving forces. Koppel 
called it "a public relations exercise" by the US military, who might otherwise have 
chosen to seal off the area of open tarmac close to their arrival point for safety reasons 
but instead allowed hundreds of Somalis to stream across the area in order to watch the 
troops. Because of technical issues, but also seemingly as a matter of style and 
approach, ABC coverage on December 8 largely focused on the image of Koppel, 
backed by arriving military equipment and personnel, with only occasional cuts to 
other reporters throughout Mogadishu. The way in which media-military relations 
became a source of discussion on many special television reports of the landing was 
noted in a New York Times article, which quoted comments from all three major 
American news anchors (ABC, NBC and CBS).57 The article commented specifically on 
the attempts of the Pentagon to improve and re-shape media-military relations in the 
post-Cold War world. "'It's clear that since Vietnam, they have learned the lesson of 
television- how to use television in a way that's helpful to them,' he Uohn Katz, media 
critic for Rolling Stone] said."58 
ABC images of hovercraft and armoured vehicles coming ashore on what 
audiences are told were Mogadishu beaches are interspersed with shots of Marines 
57 James Barron, "Mission To Somalia; Live, And In Great Numbers: It's Somalia Tonight With Tom, Ted 
And Dan", The New York Times, December 9,1992. 
58 Ibid. 
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creeping into the city as if entering a hostile environment, their guns drawn as they 
move past curious-looking Somali citizens. (See Image 6i) The day in Mogadishu was 
described by Koppel as "normal", with an image shown of a busy market. This image 
was a fleeting but important contrast to common images and written descriptions of 
Somalia as completely "anarchic", filled only with victims and 'thugs'. Marines 
interviewed for the program confirm that they are not worried about Somali citizens, 
just armed gangs "strung out on drugs". These gangs appear to be nowhere in sight 
and the ease and safety of the American arrival was brought up in interviews with 
officials by Koppel. The unnecessary show of force visually illustrated ways in which 
arriving foreign forces were out of touch with conditions and public opinion in 
Somalia. Given that the Marines had only very basic knowledge about Somalia and its 
people, could communicate with almost no Somalis, and were told to treat all Somalis 
as potential threats, the issue of differentiating 'normal' Somalis from 'gangs' would 
soon become problematic. 
BBC' s December 9 report also begins visually with mapping; Mogadishu is 
shown on a map of Somalia, along with other Somali towns that will be used as bases 
from which to deliver food. Again, images are primarily of soldiers disembarking from 
military hardware and helicopters flying over desert terrain. The confused reaction of 
American troops, told they were coming ashore to a dangerous situation only to face 
nothing more hostile than large groups of Western journalists, is made particularly 
explicit in the BBC footage, with troops in desert fatigues and black face paint shown 
smiling sheepishly at cameras, illustrating the 'staged' nature of their arrival to 'save' 
Somalia. (See Image 6ii) Some tried to ignore the cameras and reporters while others 
actively took direction to pose for shots, both of which created a more cinematic effect. 
A few photojournalists, including Paul Lowe, shot images which deliberately 
illustrated the media-orchestrated nature of the situation, where heavily-armed troops 
moved defensively through terrain that appeared to show no threat whatsoever trailed 
by hordes of journalists eager to capture 'the arrival'. (See Image 7) While both 
networks comment on the publicity-oriented style of the American landing, BBC 
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coverage is more clear about both illustrating this aspect of the situation visually, by 
showing the interactions between media and troops on the beaches, and by later 
suggesting in the item's narrative that the whole landing appeared to have been timed 
to coincide with American primetime broadcasts. 
Coverage examples in this lengthy section illustrate that although speculation 
about the possible outcomes of the intervention was often cynical, particularly in British 
media coverage, once the decision to send American troops to Somalia became a 
certainty the American media, particularly television, 'rallied round' them. The troops' 
military technological capabilities became an area of media interest once the 
intervention began. Several items expressed confidence that such technology would 
allow troops to solve the problems of Somalia's famine and conflict quickly and easily. 
Somalia itself continued to be represented primarily as a place of anarchy and famine; 
while media coverage of its situation increased, the style of its coverage did not change 
dramatically. Gradual improvements in the country's situation, which had largely been 
achieved by the localised efforts of NGOs and more successful UN negotiators such as 
Sahnoun throughout the autumn of 1992, were not widely represented in media 
coverage. Somalia was thus portrayed as needing to be 'saved', implying that it had 
few to no resources to do this itself and would require an effort led almost completely 
by new characters in its story: American, and to a lesser extent UN, troops and 
policymakers. 
Somalia in Context: Exceptions in Coverage 
Media coverage which explored issues other than the Marine arrival and actions 
was rare in Decemb~r 1992 and exceptions to this trend are therefore important to note. 
In January 1993, Jane Perlez wrote an article which ventured outside common 
parameters of informational material about the Americans in technological and 
humanitarian terms and Somalia's general'chaos'; she attempted to put the arrival of 
UNIT AF troops in a larger context. In the article, she questions the prevailing 
assumption in much media coverage that the Americans could only possibly bring 
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good to Somalia and instead explores the complex economic relationships at play in the 
country. Perlez speaks explicitly about the arrival of the major American networks in 
Somalia just before the troop landings and the influx of money and expensive 
equipment that they brought along with their top anchors. These networks rented 
places to stay in Mogadishu for inflated prices from local Somalis; highly secure 
compounds were the most desirable. 
As it turns out, Perlez explains, when anchor Dan Rather did many of his face-
to-camera shots, "a specially rented, theatrically painted 'technical' would be wheeled 
through the front gate, its anti-artillery gun cocked at a provocative angle providing 
trouble-free but menacing atmospherics for the viewers back home."59 Perlez points to 
the fact that the famine had already been easing substantially before American Marines 
landed in Mogadishu. This was largely due to efforts of aid agencies and the American 
airlift from Kenya, which led to the price of rice plummeting in and around Mogadishu. 
When looting food became less profitable, Perlez explains, opportunistic Somalis found 
other methods for profiting, including manipulating the Somali shilling currency and 
stealing from wealthy Western journalists. This new perspective on the situation in 
Somalia, one where the effects of Western intervention were considered and criticised, 
exposes the critical shortcomings of much of Somalia intervention coverage to this 
point, challenging many of the simple dichotomies that had been created and 
supported. The example below from television coverage of the troops' arrival is a less 
common attempt in this media genre to provide context for Somalia's current situation. 
ABC included one of its most detailed reports on the background to the Somali 
conflict during its special primetime coverage of the intervention landings. Created to 
answer the question 'why are the Marines in Somalia?', the item began with scenes of 
Somalis herding skinny camels on a dry, dusty landscape. A human skull and bones lie 
on the ground nearby, visually representing the hardship and proximity to death for 
those living in Somalia. In an interview with the item's lead reporter, John 
Hockenberry, Ken Hackett of Catholic Relief Services declares that "the entire world 
59 Jane Perlez, "Gunmen, $150 a Day", The New York Times, January 24, 1993. 
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community was late" in aiding Somalia. As images of skinny, singing children flash by, 
Hackett says "the world just wanted to put Somalia aside, not look at it".60 Again, 
close-ups of children's faces are shown: some covered in flies, some emaciated, some 
crying. Commentary by Hockenberry claims that this is a society where "the only 
functioning devices are weapons". Initially, the report thus appears to draw on many 
of the 'classic' visual tropes representing 'poverty', 'famine' and' Africa' to introduce 
Somalia as a place. 
The tone of the report changes during an interview with Rakiya Omaar, a 
Somali who was a former director of the NGO Africa Watch; she begins to put the 
current situation in Somalia into historical context. Omaar tells Hockenberry that the 
only aspects of the conflict in Somalia which could not have been predicted were the 
scale and extent of violence and cruelty, but that the last twenty years of history have 
set the stage for this catastrophe. Hockenberry states, "it's as though a nation took 
poison"; Omaar retorts, "a government poisoned its own people". American Rep. 
Howard Wolpe, a former chair of the Africa subcommittee, admits in an interview that 
he blames the US government for continuing to arm and aid the autocratic President 
Siad Barre despite evidence of his corruption and violent repression of dissent in 
Somalia. Alexander Haig, a former Secretary of State, acknowledges that the 
"sideshow" African conflicts of the Cold War became "tit for tat" operations, where 
funding and arming continued in response to the dynamics of the Soviet-American 
rivalry, rather than with any reference to local conditions. 
Archived footage of the beginning of the Somali uprising and overthrow of Siad 
Barre is shown, filmed mostly from American embassy windows. Hockenberry 
explains that reports from Somalia did not make news headlines in late 1990 and early 
1991 due to the escalation of the Gulf War; consequently, very few Westerners were 
aware of the deteriorating situation in Somalia. James Bishop, the last US Ambassador 
to Somalia, is interviewed saying that his staff paid a Somali officer to lead Soviet 
diplomats to the American embassy so that they could be evacuated with other 
60 ABC Nightline, December 8, 1992. 
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diplomatic personnel. Hockenberry comments on the irony of the fact that 
representatives of the two rival countries who had done so much to arm and damage 
Somalia should end up leaving the country together. Bishop responds that he and the 
Soviet ambassador were friends and regularly played tennis together, expanding on the 
absurdity of the situation. Wolpe responds to Hockenberry's final question of "did we 
walk away from Somalia?" with a "yes ... as if we had no connection to these past 
events".61 Reports such as this one are extremely rare throughout coverage of the 
Somalia intervention, and thus a detailed summary of this report is justified. The 
length and scope of the report were unprecedented in viewed television coverage of the 
Somali conflict to this point and were matched only by a few lengthy print articles. 
Several interviews with Somalis led Hockenberry through sites of importance in the 
country, explaining atrocities committed by Siad Barre and the country's rapid arming 
under alternating Cold War patronage. These moments of Somali involvement in their 
country's representation, along with previously unseen imagery of Somalia, are not 
often repeated in later coverage. 
After this particular piece, television coverage largely remained fixated on US 
troops, who became new protagonists in the drama of Somalia. Discussion began about 
when US troops would reach the interior villages of Somalia with aid; on December 11 
both BBC and ABC reported on conditions in Baidoa, a former farming village that had 
had high death rates during the worst of the famine. BBC briefly showed white-
sheeted bodies being loaded into a truck and a single body being buried. Reporter 
George Alagiah commented over these images that ninety people a day were still dying 
in Baidoa.62 For a short while, Baidoa was able to provide the 'famine' images for 
which many media were still looking. Western audiences had been prepared to expect 
conditions to 'justify' their troops' involvement in Somalia; the gradual cessation of the 
famine during the autumn of 1992 had not been largely covered, especially by 
television media, and thus a healthier, less 'chaotic' Somali population would have 
6
' ABC Nightline, December 8, 1992. 
62 BBC 9 o'clock news, December 11, 1992. 
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appeared out of place to many Western viewers, previously warned of mass civilian 
deaths. As American troops rapidly spread across the 'famine triangle' of Somalia, 
images and stories of troops delivering food to 'needy' Somalis were shown only 
briefly; discussion began, particularly in print media, about where the intervention 
would go from this point. A resurgence of fatalistic commentaries began after an initial 
period of troop arrival coverage; the new and recurrent parts of this theme will be 
explored below. 
Fatalism Resurgent: The Land of No Hope 
By January 3, 1993, The Times was already reporting that gang and gun violence 
was rising again in Mogadishu; a report by Richard Ellis highlights the cynicism with 
which the return to violence was viewed by many Western journalists: "Mogadishu 
returned to normal last week. Large-scale clan fighting lit up the new year's eve sky, 
and on the streets of Somalia's war-devastated capital it was business as usual for Abri 
the killer ... Three weeks after the marines stormed ashore to save this war-torn country 
from suicide, Somalia is in danger of degenerating back into anarchy."63 The Ellis 
article is accompanied by an image of three scowling Somali men on a 'technical' 
vehicle with guns, a young boy looking on. Quotes from Somali men included in the 
article involve the men bragging about how much money they have been able to extort 
from media agencies and relief organisations. Rakiya Omaar and various aid workers 
who were interviewed express doubt and concern about US and UN commitment to 
long-term disarmament and peace-building in Somalia. Once again, a sense of fatalism 
appears to condemn Somalia to a violent existence that is deemed to be its norm. Sam 
Kiley, writing the next day in The Times, attributed this reluctance to get involved in 
Somalia to "Vietnam syndrome", a phrase that had been used since before American 
troops arrived in Somalia. Kiley maintained that "more energy had been spent by 
generals and State Department officials in planning the withdrawal of American troops 
from the shattered country than was spent on working out what exactly to do when 
63 Richard Ellis, "Gun Gangs Rule Again On Streets of Somalia", The Sunday Times, January 3, 1993. 
they got there."64 Bush's outgoing Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney appeared to 
confirm this statement when he said that although Somalia remained "a nasty, 
dangerous neighbourhood" the US would begin slowly downscaling its numbers of 
troops in the country after incoming President Clinton's inauguration.65 
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February's print coverage further encouraged dire predictions about Somalia's 
potential for improvement and about conditions in Africa in general. A features piece 
on January 31, 1993 which urges the British government to consider rebuilding rather 
than decreasing its armed forces, stated that "the Third World is full of festering 
Somalias."66 Three days later, a February 2 features piece began with the sub-heading 
that" Africa's would-be democrats deserve more Western attention" and concluded 
that innovative, long-suffering elements of various African states' civil societies deserve 
more Western help. The overwhelming bulk of the article, however, was devoted to 
describing the Mobutu dictatorship in Zaire and environmental disasters and hardships 
in other African states.67 While such articles made the case for a changed approach to 
understanding and engaging with parts of Africa, their primary substance remained 
descriptive narratives about the long-term suffering, violence and corruption in many 
African states. The beginning of clashes in Mogadishu between Somali gunmen and 
UN and US troops appeared to be justification for the standard, pessimistic view of 
Somalia and with it Africa at large: "An unprecedented military expedition on purely 
humanitarian grounds, Operation Restore Hope is perhaps the most stark example of 
the powerlessness of the international community to bring order to the growing chaos 
across the African continent which has followed the end of the Cold war."68 
The New York Times' coverage of the UNITAF mission past its initial arrival 
stages echoed more pessimistic Times coverage, although there are more descriptive 
quotes from American troops in the country, likely due to perceived public interest in 
the activities and opinions of their national soldiers. A February 14, 1993 New York 
64 Sam Kiley, "'Vietnam Syndrome' Blurs US Vision in Somalia", The Times, January 4, 1993. 
65 David Watts, "Somalia Remains 'Too Nasty' For Quick US Pullout", The Times, January 3, 1993. 
66 "Rebuild the Forces", The Sunday Times, January 31, 1993. 
67 "One Man in a Boat", The Times, February 2, 1993. 
68 Sam Kiley, "Mogadishu Clashes Threaten to Delay Pullout By Marines", The Times, February 27, 1993. 
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Times story quotes a US Marine Corporal facing II ghosts of his own. 'When I look at 
this place, I see Lebanon,11 he said. 'It looks just like Beirut."'69 The story describes the 
fears of many experienced soldiers that they are becoming involved in a conflict they 
know very little about, a situation which in Lebanon resulted in the deaths of 241 
Marines caught up in a long-term factional struggle. A February 16 article, which 
follows a group of Marines on house-to-house weapons searches in Mogadishu also 
quotes a Marine discussing the similarities of the Somali situation to Beirut and 
indicates the general high level of frustration felt by the Marines in their interactions 
with Somali citizens, who they view as primordially violent and unmanageable; II'This 
was going on 800 years before we got here, and it'll be going on 800 years after we're 
gone,' Captain Rababy said. 'I'm getting tired of being played for the sucker.' ... 'This is 
a sewer that's going to suck us in,' Captain Rababy said. 'It's going to be worse than 
Beirut. Beirut had two sides. Here, we got 14."'70 
Growing Western frustration with the failure of Somalia to improve quickly also 
found voice in articles which cynically described the need for 'realistic' aspirations for 
Somalia, where no 11 oasis of democracy1171 was expected to emerge anytime soon. The 
implication appears to be that Somalia was not ready for democracy, although 
comments are focused on the idea that Western political systems should not be forced 
on a non-Western country. Comments by Somalis in a February 21, 1993 New York 
Times article are used to suggest that democracy has little meaningin Somalia and that 
the language of democracy is simply used by rival factions who wish to take power to 
benefit only themselves. 
Cynicism about the possibility of improvement in Somalia, tied not to the 
problematic history of Cold War Western involvement in the country but primarily to 
the 'nature' and structures of the society and people themselves, had been a pervasive 
aspect of media coverage despite occasional optimistic media items around the time of 
69 Diana Jean Schemo, "On Mogadishu's 'Green Line', Nothing Is Sacred", The New York Times, February 14, 
1993. 
70 
"Troops in Somalia Face 'Hatfields and McCoys"', The New York Times, February 16, 1993. 
71 Diana Jean Schemo, "Nearly Everything in Somalia Is Now Up for Grabs", The New York Times, February 
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the troop intervention. The killing of Pakistani peacekeepers in June 1993, a little over a 
month after the UNOSOM II mission took over from UNITAF, was to act as 
confirmation for the many who had predicted the eventual failure and ru.in of the 
Somalia intervention from before its inception. From the remains of speculation and 
commentary pieces, a new series of 1 action' images and narratives emerged, beginning 
a story of decline which lasted until the dramatic final images of the intervention. 
Somalia Doomed: Violence in Mogadishu & Echoes of Vietnam 
As UN retaliatory strikes continued after the Pakistani deaths and the hunt for 
Aidid was intensified, newspapers increased their positioning of the situation in 
Somalia within familiar discourses of fatalism and institutional overstretch. A New 
York Times article was quick to point out that, since they had highly varied levels of 
training and equipment, the UNOSOM II forces were much less effective than the 
twenty-six thousand US Marines and troops who had served from December 1992 to 
early May 1993.72 Another New York Times article on June 18, 1993 highlighted that 
despite President Clinton's pronouncement that the operation against Aidid was 
"over", the situation in Somalia remained highly unsettled, with Aidid still at large and 
Pentagon plans for an open-ended military operation in place.73 
Warnings from within the US administration about the dangers of focusing 
policy on one individual were mentioned, using quotes from General Coli.J;l Powell. 
Although New York Times articles tended to remain focused on recounting the factual 
details of almost daily UN attacks on Aidid 1 strongholds' in Mogadishu, one editorial 
piece pointed out the dangers of such actions; "Although the punitive actions seem 
justifiable, the operation now stands at a dangerous point. The US and UN could slide 
unthinkingly into deep involvement in Somalia's internal chaos."74 The Times of 
London's coverage of Somalia at this point tended to be more editorial, with a range of 
72 Michael Gordon, "US Intensifies Attack to Oust a Somali Clan", The New York Times, June 17, 1993. 
73 Michael Gordon, "Ointon, Praising 'Success', Says Goal Was Not to Capture Aidid", TI1e New York Times, 
June 18, 1993. 
74 "Drawing the Line in Somalia", The New York Times, June 20, 1993. 
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opinions being expressed on the ongoing violence. A June 14 piece supported the UN's 
tough line against Aidid, suggesting that only a full-scale disarmament of faction 
leaders would reduce anarchy and violence in Somalia for the good of its citizens.75 The 
possible side-effects of a disarmament 'policy' which mainly involved airborne attacks 
on heavily-populated urban areas were not commented upon. 
Media focus on the potential of new military technologies to exact revenge on 
Aidid also had the effect of shifting attention away from those who would live (or die) 
with the damage inflicted by these attacks. Articles.in the days following the attack 
featured lengthy descriptions of AC-130H 'Specter' gunships, which were set to arrive 
in Somalia immediately to assist with retaliatory attacks on Aidid's resources.76 The 
Sunday Times ran a major article on these planes, as well as the first series of bombing 
raids against Aidid's weapons sites and radio station, on June 13. The article headline 
is in bold: "Enter The Terminator: US takes its revenge for massacre of the 
peacemakers", endorsing the predominant vocabulary of Aidid versus the UN, using 
primarily US troops, in a military showdown. The initial UN Security Council 
resolution to arrest and prosecute the killers of the Pakistanis drops to a mere mention 
in a New York Times report77 and is not mentioned at all in The Times "Terminator" 
article. (See Image 8) 
The "Terminator" article is dominated by large graphics of military weaponry, 
describing the technological capabilities of the Specter gunship and giving a close-up, 
labelled look at its interior. The choice to target Radio Mogadishu was justified with 
the explanation that it was transmitting "anti-UN propaganda". A June 12, 1993 New 
York Times article also calls the radio station part of Aidid's "power base", thereby 
reinforcing the idea that there is legitimate cause to bomb it. Initial media acceptance of 
the bombings as legitimate can be linked to the representation of Mogadishu primarily 
as a space of 'targets' as opposed to a living space. While vivid descriptions of US 
75 "Death in Mogadishu", T11e Times, June 14, 1993. 
76 Douglas Jehl, "US Is Sending Planes to Bolster UN in Somalia", The New York Times, June 10, 1993. 
77 Michael R Gordon, "US Attacks Somali Clan Chief to Support UN Peacekeepers", The New York Times, 
June 12, 1993. 
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bombings' effects on Mogadishu are not uncommon, they only rarely link the 
destruction of the bombings with the city as a lived-in space. The following quote is an 
example of such irregular coverage, describing how attacking helicopters "skimm(ed) 
less than 50ft above the heads of watching Somalis" and "thick black smoke belched 
into the night sky as red and orange flames leapt from burning buildings in what is one 
of the city's most densely populated areas."7s 
As had occurred in earlier coverage, articles outlining military capabilities of US 
forces regularly alternated with media coverage that expressed strong doubts about the 
possibilities for mission success. Simon Jenkins reinforced this opinion with an article 
on June 16, 1993 in which he discussed the naivety of the American decision to become 
involved in Somalia: 
There was no way the Somalian venture could have brought more than 
a temporary ceasefire. Even 28,000 soldiers cannot disarm a nation, let 
alone bring peace and democracy in six months. The strategy of 
restoring law and order and handing stable administration over to the 
UN was ludicrous, and the Americans knew it...The [aid] agencies 
remain the real heroes of Mogadishu. They must now hope the UN 
gets out. They must reassert their independence, buy their own 
protection and let Somalians resume their bloody search for a new 
regime.79 
Jenkins goes farther to declare that Somalia and several other African countries 
such as Liberia, Sudan and Mozambique, while "unappealing political entities to the 
Western mind" provide no risk to Western interest or world security; "They are proper 
objects of charity, but not for soldiers or so-called 'peacekeepers"'. He concludes that if 
America wishes to undertake "moral imperialism" it should do so with a long term 
strategy, reminiscent of British approaches to colonialism, and resist the urge to quick 
fixes in order to end painful television images of suffering. While Jenkins makes 
important points about failures and difficulties with the US/UN strategy in Somalia, his 
article falls back on the well-illustrated theme of deep cynicism with regards to 
78 Mark Huband, "Enter the Terminator", The Sunday Times, June 13, 1993. 
79 Simon Jenkins, "The Black Man's Burden", The Times, June 16, 1993. 
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development and change in Africa. The entire continent becomes understood as a place 
best left to its own "bloody" devices and the moral imperative to intervene, an 
underlying theme in earlier coverage of the famine, is reversed in meaning to become 
an immoral approach. Positive engagement strategies for the West are limited to 
charity. 
Media coverage of Somalia began to pick up on fractures within the UN and aid 
community coalition more frequently throughout the summer of 1993. Aid workers 
were quoted expressing frustration with the insecurity in Mogadishu which prevented 
them from doing their jobs and prominent American policymakers were quoted 
expressing their discomfort with the new, aggressive nature of the UNOSOM II 
mission. The media had been largely uncritical of UN strategies until discord became 
obvious among the policy elites. Dissenting views, however, were only heard through 
Western voices, rather than from many Somali leaders and citizens who had been 
urging alternative strategies from the beginning of the UN attacks. 
By mid-July and August 1993, coverage levels of Somalia had dropped off 
considerably; editorialized statements about the situation in the country were made in 
both newspapers, expressing cynicism that was now linked to American and UN 
handling of the intervention as well as portrayals of Somalia as doomed its violent 
situation. A July 18, 1993 New York Times article argued that "Somalia is turning out to 
be the UN's Vietnam- easy to get into, hard to get out of, very costly and, perhaps, 
unwinnable?"80 On August 1, Thomas Friedman, writing in The New York Times, 
followed the thoughts of Simon Jenkins by describing Somalia as part of a "diplomacy 
of lost causes"; he suggested these were situations which touched the American public 
through media coverage but were not "vital interests" for the US.81 Times articles 
focused on the confusion and contradiction evident in American and UN policy 
towards Somalia. An August 11 piece claimed that The New York Times had reported 
that the Clinton administration continued to support the presence of American troops 
80 Richard Bernstein, "The World: Against New Odds, The UN Insists on Helping in Somalia", The New 
York Times, July 18, 1993. 
81 Thomas Friedman, "The World: A New Diplomacy of Lost Causes", The New York Times, August 1, 1993. 
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in Somalia as long as Aidid remained a fugitive while The Washington Post announced 
at the same time that the administration was "stepping up plans for the withdrawal of 
American forces". 82 Along with this confusion over the direction of policy, Americans 
and other UN troops were described in the article as having drifted from their 
humanitarian goal and become involved as a party in the Somali civil war, leading to 
their alienation from the population. 
Sporadic media coverage of events in Mogadishu in late August and early 
September 1993 continued to highlight actions taken by American-led UN forces 
against Aidid. On September 10, both newspapers reported on an incident in which 
approximately 100 Somalis died in a street battle with UN forces. In each article, 
comment is made on the growing eagerness in the American Congress and Senate to 
extricate US forces from the Somalia conflict. For The Times, this merely reinforced 
prevalent belief that the UN had lost sight of its humanitarian role in the country while 
The New York Times' more extensive piece pointed to the political chaos that could be 
unleashed if America pulled out of Somalia too abruptly. The incident was labelled as 
"reminiscent of Vietnam" in a September 11, 1993 Times article; allusions were made 
that the open-ended and unclear mission in Somalia was "casting its shadow" over 
proposals to send US peacekeepers to Bosnia.83 A September 16 New York Times 
editorial again argued in favour of setting up a neo-colonial protectorate to stop 
violence in Somalia until' good' leaders could emerge.84 By September 23, however, a 
report in The New York Times announced that the Clinton administration was planning 
to define new limits for any future US role in UN peacekeeping, suggesting that 
extended· involvement was not a serious American consideration. In summary, media 
coverage in late summer 1993 had begun to represent the increasingly fractured 
viewpoints of governments, NGOs and international organisations on the Somali 
situation. Options for dealing with the renewed violence and civilian suffering in the 
country, however, went largely unconsidered. In the prevailing mood of cynicism 
82 Ian Brodie, "Elusive Aidid Throws American Strategy Into Disarray", The Times, August 11, 1993. 
83 Ian Brodie, "Congress Demands Clear Somalia Goals", The Times, September 11, 1993. 
84 Caleb Carr, "The Humanitarian Illusion", The New York Times, September 16, 1993. 
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about the entire mission, Somalia and its people were again left to fend for themselves, 
both literally and in coverage of their situation. A little more than a week later, the 
major 'closing' incident in the Somalia intervention story would occur, carrying on 
themes of 'Vietnam-like' overstretch while acting as the catalyst for new ways of 
thinking about American military strategy and UN intervention. 
'Black Hawk Down': The Unexpected Expected 
An editorial piece by George Kennan shortly before the 'Black Hawk down' 
events, along with the events themselves, had the effect of returning a sizable segment 
of Somalia media coverage to the nature of 'Somalia' itself, and its suitability and 
worthiness of aid. The published excerpt from Kennan's diary, allegedly written in 
December 1992 when American troops first entered Somalia, acted as a fatalistic 
premonition of the intervention's outcome in Somalia. For Kennan: 
the situation we are trying to correct has its roots in the fact that the 
people of Somalia are wholly unable to govern themselves and that the 
entire territory is simply without a government. The starvation that we 
are seeing on television is partly the result of drought (or so we are 
told), partly of overpopulation, and partly of the chaotic conditions 
flowing from the absence of any governmental authority ... The fact is 
that this dreadful situation cannot possibly be put to rights other than 
by the establishment of a governing power for the entire territory, and a 
very ruthless, determined one at that. It could not be a democratic one, 
because the very prerequisites for a democratic political system do not 
exist among the people in question. 85 
The publication of Kennan's dire predictions at a point when the intervention 
appeared in many ways to have gone off course and when parts of Somalia remained 
troubled by violence could function as confirmation of the need for immediate 
American withdrawal for those who favoured such action. Like many of the previous 
narratives which present Somalia as the 'failed' state unable to be saved by the 
benevolent West, Kennan portrays the American public as well-meaning and idealistic, 
85 George Kennan, "Somalia, Through a Glass Darkly", The New York Times, September 30, 1993. 
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deeply moved and motivated by images of suffering on their television screens and on 
newspaper pages. Kennan suggests that this sympathy is na!ve, "an emotional 
reaction, not a thoughtful or deliberate one." He insists that 'rational' policyrnaking 
must be separated from these emotional urges. The implication of this separation 
between moral and rational is that Somalia can then be reduced to a place of chaos and 
problems which America is unable to resolve. In the stronger terms used by Kennan as 
well as several others, Somalia is portrayed as a place of endemic conflict and violence, 
where such an existence is 'natural' and to be expected. It is thus excusable to leave 
such people to "ruthless" governance, since they are not 'naturally' inclined to 
democratic systems. While this particular article is an extreme example of this 
perspective, it was soon to become more commonplace after the disastrous events of 
October 3-4; 1993. 
Initial reports of the 'Black Hawk down' events carne on October 4 in both 
newspapers. They report that at least five American troops were killed and many more 
wounded when two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down during a mission over 
Mogadishu which involved the capture of twenty high-ranking Aidid supporters. 
Because only minimal information about the incidents had been confirmed by 
American and UN military leaders in Mogadishu and also because of low numbers of 
journalists on site to report the incident directly, further details of events did not fully 
emerge in print until October 5. 
While an October 5 BBC item claims that infamous images of US soldiers' bodies 
have increased American desire for revenge against Aidid and mention of the extra 
troops being sent is made, the report, like the other media items, also emphasizes 
growing US domestic pressure for troops to leave Somalia. Footage of two 
Congressmen urging an immediate American exit from Somalia depicts Republican 
Curt Weldon calling Somalia "an urban guerrilla nightmare" brought onto the US 
because it allowed its troops to be used for "the grand designs of United Nations 
bureaucrats" .86 This discourse for understanding Somalia works on the premise that 
86 BBC 9 o'clock news, October 5, 1993. 
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the missions against Aidid had been almost exclusively designed, pursued and 
commanded by UN forces, not US troops, a fact which, as mentioned in past chapters, 
neglects to acknowledge the extent to which UNOSOM II command was comprised of 
American personnel. Closing on more imagery of the downed helicopters, the BBC 
report comments that growing casualties and the sight of American hostages will have 
brought back "haunting memories" of Vietnam, Iran and the Gulf War, but suggests 
that a desire for revenge could draw the US deeper into a "regional quagmire" ,87 
An ABC Nightline program on October 5 devoted to discussion of the situation 
in Somalia spent more time analysing and viewing the 'Black Hawk down' images, 
showing footage similar to the BBC item. The images of bodies being dragged were 
quickly self-censored by most American media outlets after only one to two days of 
airing but they were shown extensively on this program, which airs much later than 
primetime. The program opened directly with the controversial images of a dragged 
soldier and the hostage Durant and then moved to interviews on the street with 
American citizens. The quotes were cut to sound bites which included, "we went to 
help them and now in return they're killing our men", "we have no business over 
there" and "they're making toys of us".88 Each of these comments reflected different 
ways of interpreting the events including obfuscation of the change in operations, a 
national interest only view, and concern over the way that US prestige and standing 
had been affected by the events. 
Cokie Roberts introduced the program following these clips by describing them 
as American "outrage and anguish over what's happening to Americans in Somalia" 
and with this choice of words delimited the program's scope of concern to American 
losses over all others. Unsurprisingly given this choice in focus, the program goes on to 
explore opinion polls of US citizens' views on how operations in Somalia should 
continue which includes the statistic that 79% of those polled believed that the US 
should pull out of Somalia even if this could lead to another famine. These poll figures 
s7 BBC 9 o'clock news, October 5, 1993. 
ss ABC Nightline, October 5, 1993. 
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are interspersed with footage of Somalis cheering over the American corpses and 
beating scraps of destroyed military equipment. Journalist Mark Huband is quoted 
saying that the US and UN have lost control of the streets in Mogadishu, meaning that 
they are easy targets for Somali gunmen. 
Senators Paul Simon and Phil Gramm were guests on the program; their 
divergent views on the issue of what to do after the Black Hawk incident made up the 
final half of the news item. Roberts pushed both men on the idea of sending 
reinforcements to protect existing troops, asking if this is not like the "incrementalism 
that got us into Vietnam". This issue is not picked up directly by either senator, 
although Phil Gramm believes that existing troops must be protected until they can be 
removed as quickly as possible from a "fuzzy" operation in nation-building. Paul 
Simon agrees that the hunt for Aidid has driven the mission off course but emphasises 
that positive developments are occurring elsewhere in Somalia, where many UN troops 
are undertaking logistical work rather than 'search and destroy' missions. Gramm 
articulates what is perhaps the most important point of the night when he counters this 
statement with the issue that audiences don't see troops doing development work but 
rather those who have drifted into combat situations that they shouldn't have. The 
importance of public perception for policymaking is made particularly explicit here. In 
a sense, the value of what has been accomplished elsewhere in Somalia is devalued due 
to its lack of media coverage. These activities are already not what Somalia will be 
remembered for because they were rarely represented as valuable parts of the mission's 
work. This situation is a good illustration of the cyclical processes of agenda-setting 
and reinforcement of particular stories in which both the media and government were 
engaged. Low media coverage of Somalia in general, and particularly in areas outside 
of Mogadishu, may have been a result of many factors including perceived lack of 
public interest in these people and places and dangers or difficulties of travel on the 
part of the media. Within Mogadishu, the attacks on suspected Aidid hideouts offered 
more 'dramatic' military imagery and stories concentrated on US troops. If the media 
reported on these events, UN and US forces' leaders were asked for comments; these 
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'official' statements then tended to generate more news. In a media sphere where print 
space and air time for a 'developing' country, even one where US troops were involved, 
is generally low, reports from Mogadishu came to dominate media coverage of Somalia 
after June 1993. 
Following the initial appearance of the 'Black Hawk down' images, editorialized 
items in all media sources began to adopt a fairly consistent and interconnected range 
of explanations for why the events had happened and what they 'said' about American 
and UN policies. A common approach, as suggested by the inclusion of dissenting 
American voices to the intervention in the initial coverage of 'Black Hawk down', was 
one of outrage or frustration at the naivety of the US for getting involved in the UN 
phase of the intervention, thus creating a divide between 'good' American policy and 
'bad' UN approaches. An October 6, 1993 editorial piece in The New York Times urged 
the US to get out of Somalia, arguing that "the nature of the mission changed 
dramatically in June, right after Washington turned control over to the UN."89 Boutros-
Ghali and Admiral Howe were specifically criticized for their role in encouraging the 
policy of hunting down Aidid and the 'success' of the US-run UNITAF mission is 
distanced from the disasters of UNOSOM II, despite the extensive presence of 
Americans in senior leadership positions of UNOSOM II. Another editorial reinforces 
this opinion, claiming that "the heart of the problem remains the highly personalized 
vendetta that has developed between the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 
and a single Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aidid."90 UN direction of the summer 
1993 hunt for Aidid is thus specifically positioned as the goal of a non-American figure. 
Americans are portrayed as needing to feel"no shame in withdrawing" since 
the mission in Somalia changed from a humanitarian gesture to an armed conflict 
which, according to this argument, happened withoutAmerican approval. Several 
articles in The Times also support this explanation of the failure. A Sunday Times article 
expressing the views of John Drysdale, a senior political advisor to the UN in Somalia, 
89 "Spell It Out to the UN on Somalia", The New York Times, October 6, 1993. 
90 "Time to Get Out", The New York Times, October 8, 1993. 
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quotes him claiming that "[Admiral] Howe had created a 'make believe' world in his 
reports back to America about the situation in Mogadishu. He has created illusions 
which have resulted in a total misreading of the political situation and thus 
inappropriate measures have been taken".91 
The failure of the Somalia mission is tied in several following Times articles to 
larger issues of rapid American disillusionment with "UN-led multilateralism in 
foreign policy" and the foreign policy "inconsistency, not to say incoherence" of the 
Clinton administration.92 One Times article, whose sentiment is echoed in other items, 
declares that the UN has realized, in the wake of the 'Black Hawk down' events, that it 
is not capable of undertaking peace enforcement operations with mixed groups of 
forces. This realization is used to justify suggestions of a reversion to traditional 
peacekeeping and a re-thinking of the cooperative possibilities that had been praised at 
the beginning of the UNOSOM operations.93 More than two weeks after the 'Black 
Hawk down' events, longer items, for example in The New York Times, began to explore 
"a more complex picture of a policy with wider support in Washington than the 
Administration has acknowledged"94 but these investigations received less air and print 
space than official comments from both Congressional leaders and President Clinton. 
Both these groups worked hard to distance the American policy from the disaster of 
'Black Hawk down'. 
Because of the perceived shift from a 'proper' US-led humanitarian mission to 
the 'disastrous' UNOSOM II manhunt, guilt is lifted from an American public that "did 
not sign on to armed intervention in the clan politics of a chaotic country that poses no 
international threat."95 A Times editorial which quoted several Congresspeople whose 
offices were flooded with calls from horrified American television viewers after the 
airing of the dragged body images also holds examples of the 'quagmire' perspective 
91 Richard Ellis, "UN Aide Blasts 'Incompetence' in Somalia", The Sunday Times, October 10, 1993. 
92 Wolfgang Munchau, "Widows and Yellow Ribbons Feed American Anguish", The Times, October 11, 
1993. 
93 James Bone, "Somalia Debacle Curbs UN Ambitions on World Stage", The Times, October 12, 1993. 
94 Michael Gordon with John Cushman Jr., "Mission in Somalia; After Supporting Hunt for Aidid, US Is 
Blaming UN for Losses", The New York Times, October 18, 1993. 
95 "Time to Get Out", The New York Times, October 8, 1993. 
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and the idea that Somalia is not strategically worth the cost of losing American troops. 
This cost calculation also appears to take on a moral and personalized sense in the 
statement of a Congresswoman: "Somalia was 'not worth one American life/ said Dana 
Rohrabacher, a Californian Republican."96 
Several editorial pieces which favoured a measured, slow American withdrawal 
from Somalia, as advocated by President Clinton, also remained critical of the UN and 
convinced that UN forces would have much to learn from the US military before the 
two could operate together successfully. The prevailing belief that US troops should 
never be placed under UN command appears to have only been reinforced by the Black 
Hawk episode, as was the belief that Somalia was not going to be a successful case for 
this unlikely joint relationship. Hope for Somalia was easily dismissed using the 
Orientalist terms that had been used so frequently before: "we should have no illusions 
that we, or anyone, will ever create a democratic government there [Somalia] ... The 
diplomats should get the Somali factions together, declare a Somali government and 
pronounce the UN operation over. And soon."97 
The portrayal of Somalia as a hopeless situation which needed to be abandoned 
and avoided in future was also continually perpetuated through use of the now 
familiar 'Vietnam' comparison. A further October 6, 1993 article in The New York Times 
quotes bereaved relatives and friends of American victims of the 'Black Hawk down' 
events despairing that America is about "to get embroiled in another Vietnam-type 
situation" and commenting that their sons' deaths were in vain given that many troops 
were never able to assist with the humanitarian aspects of the intervention, which were 
known about and supported by the American public.98 These feelings reflected those of 
many Americans who became disillusioned with the actions of the military in Vietnam 
after initially supporting American involvement there. A New York Times editorial 
piece on October 7 supports a perception of the Somalia intervention as a flawed and 
96 Martin Fletcher, "Clinton Dilemma as Congress Erupts Over Somali Taunts", The Times, October 6, 1993. 
97 Bob Kerrey, "Not So Fast on Somalia", The New York Times, October 7, 1993. 
98 Don Terry, "The Somalia Mission: A Search for Words to Mourn Troops Who Died in Somalia", The New 
York Times, October 6, 1993. 
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perhaps impossible mixture of two objectives, one military and one humanitarian. The 
situation is again related to Vietnam as a case where Americans naively became 
involved in an area of which they had little understanding.99 Americans' surprise, 
anger and ignorance about the dramatically altered nature of their involvement in 
Somalia since the deaths of the Pakistani peacekeepers was obvious in comments like 
those of Senator Phil Gramm of Texas: "The people who are dragging American bodies 
don't look very hungry to the people of Texas."Ioo 
An article for the cultural desk of The New York Times illustrates the ways in 
which the UNIT AF and UNOSOM II operations, though commonly separated and 
contrasted in media coverage, could also be conflated. The article claims that the young 
soldier dragged by Somalis in the infamous image "was in Somalia as part of an effort 
to feed people."101 Such comments overlooked four months of ongoing violence 
between American troops and Somalis and neglecting the fact that Special Forces 
troops like the Rangers and Deltas were in Somalia specifically to hunt Aidid. They 
allowed some audiences and readers to overlook many of their country's more 
destructive acts in Somalia by extending and emphasising the initial humanitarian 
efforts. The Ridley Scott-directed action film depicting the events, Black Hawk Down, 
made a similar omission in its introduction, failing to describe any of the negative 
impacts of months of attacks on Mogadishu, while emphasising the American role as 
humanitarians. The opening scene of the film involves American troops witnessing 
alleged Aidid gunmen attacking civilians at a food delivery point as late as October 2, 
1993; civilians are shown desperately grabbing for spilled grain. This scenario is 
unlikely, given that the famine situation in Somalia, particularly around Mogadishu, 
was largely under control by then. The scene reinforces a sense of Somali civilian need 
99 Anna Quindlen, "Public & Private: We're Outta There", The New York Times, October 7, 1993. 
100 Clifford Krauss, "The Somalia Mission: White House Tries to Calm Congress", The New York Times, 
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and desire for the Americans' presence, which would have been dubious at this point in 
light of their recent actions.1o2 
The end result of such discourses, however, like interpretations of the mission as 
fatally flawed due to the supposedly differing goals of the UN and US, was that 
Somalia came to be viewed as a hopeless case initially taken on by an overly generous 
America, but which now had to be abandoned. A first page October 9, 1993 article in 
The New York Times, reminiscent of the ABC Nightline piece, expressed the desires of 
many Americans to bring the troops home as quickly as possible, despite President 
Clinton's stated plans for a gradual withdrawal. Interviews with several American 
citizens are used to illustrate the power of the 'Black Hawk down' images to shift public 
opinion on an issue that previously had not been creating very much interest. The 
comment of one man sums up many of the shared feelings expressed in the article: 
"Somalia is not a sophisticated Western society," said Pat Finley, a 
retired paper company executive from Atlanta. "We keep blundering 
into these kinds of places because of our natural American generosity. 
But sooner or later we're going to have to face up to the cold fact that 
this is another of those countries where we can't impose democracy at 
an acceptable cost, if at all. They're not ready for it, can't handle it 
yet."l03 
Interestingly, some American troops who had been involved in the raids against 
Aidid, along with a few of their family members, were among what appeared from 
media reports to be a minority who supported a continued hunt for Aidid. In their 
case, it was largely the American policy u-turn from hunting Aidid to negotiating with 
him, occasionally labelled a policy of 'constructive ambiguity', which was the key issue 
of contention. Brought to Somalia with the understanding that taking out Aidid was 
crucial for peace in the country, the troops resented seeing the man responsible for the 
deaths of their colleagues suddenly treated as a legitimate party in peace talks. 
Although the switch in discursive and policy approaches towards Aidid irritated some, 
102 Black Hawk Down, a Ridley Scott directed film, screened 2001. 
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many others, however, came to much the same 'hopeless' position on Somalia as other 
Americans: "'I don't see anything in this country worth our people dying for," said Sgt. 
Kevin Cook, a squad leader in the company's third platoon. 'This is an African 
problem. Let Africans fix it. These people are killing each other just because they 
can."104 
Television coverage after the initial airing of the dragging images and shots of 
Michael Durant overwhelmingly focused on the controversy surrounding how to 
handle the incident in the Western world. An October 6 item on BBC showed almost 
no images from Somalia, instead depicting President Clinton making short comments 
about the need for a measured withdrawal as well as shots of American senators on 
both sides of the debate about withdrawal timing. While a brief image shows 
Americans patrolling Somali streets on foot, given the extremely tense relationship 
between UN forces and Somalis post-'Black Hawk down' there is good reason to 
suspect that this may not be current footage, though the voiceover does not tell viewers 
otherwise.105 ABC likewise showed and had very little to say about conditions for 
Somalis post-'Black Hawk down' incidents. Conditions in the country are described as 
dangerous enough that few American journalists have returned; ABC consequently 
relied on the BBC's Roger Hearing to provide additional information in reports on 
October 7 and 8. Like BBC, these items also focused on images of Clinton discussing 
his belief in the need to "stay the course" and not to let the helicopter downings shake 
American resolve in Somalia.106 Images of military equipment being loaded and 
unloaded also dominate the visual aspect of these reports. 
As time passed after the October 3-4 events, news coverage of the area as a 
whole dropped off dramatically both in quantity and in depth of coverage. An October 
20, 1993 report in The New York Times mentioned that American troops had ended any 
efforts to patrol Mogadishu, confining their role solely to defending other UN patrol 
groups as needed. A further article on October 21 described life as "returning to 
104 Douglas Jehl, "Somalia GI's: They're Bitter and Grousing", The New York Times, October 15, 1993. 
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normal" in Somalia but mentioned tension in Mogadishu over whether fighting would 
recommence as soon as US troops pulled out at the end of March 1994. This fear 
appeared to be justified on October 25, when an ABC report opened with the statement 
that Aidid and Ali Mahdi had aimed their guns at each other again and US troops had 
this time been ordered to stay out of the way.1o7 
Reports of violence in Mogadishu continued sporadically after this particular 
item but, once the new American policy of gradual withdrawal was articulated post-
'Black Hawk down', coverage generally fell off to levels comparable to before media 
recognition of the famine. Although the US attempted to play the role of tough 
mediator and chair at Somali peace talks neither the Americans themselves nor many of 
the Somali factional leaders wanted any more US involvement in Somalia and eagerly 
awaited the withdrawal of American and UN forces. Somali citizens, the ongoing and 
principal victims of the conflict and intervention, remained invisible during this period 
in media coverage of Somalia. With few exceptions, they had disappeared from view 
before the tragic events of 'Black Hawk down' had even taken place. Representations 
of the Somali people, so often lost from view in broader discussions of Western policy 
and its relationship to their country, will be explored in the following chapter. 
Sum-up of Major Themes 
Through its categorisation of analysed media, this chapter has suggested that 
most themes in the coverage of Somalia revolve around broad ideas of 'place' and 
'people'. With reference to 'place', the timing of events in Somalia immediately at the 
end of the Cold War period meant that long-held discursive distinctions between the 
capitalist 'West', communist states, and non-aligned areas were becoming less 
meaningful geopolitical classifications. New vocabularies for understanding world 
affairs, while often optimistic about the increased possibilities for multilateral action, 
were often equally cynical about the hope of international interventions, and more 
generally about the future of much of the recently-decolonised world. In many cases, 
107 ABC news, October 25, 1993. 
the choice of hope or pessimism appeared to depend on what role the US decided to 
take as the world's predominant superpower. 
Media discourses regarding Somalia reflected the vacillations between these 
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two generalised positions amongst predominately Western policymakers and 
commentators. While occasional items appeared expressing hope in UN bodies, or 
alternately the bodies and technologies of American soldiers, cynical reporting 
regarding Somalia's possibilities of transformation from 'failed state' status were more 
numerous. This cynicism was based both on doubt that the 'developed' world had the 
long-term will to assist these states but also hinged on deficiencies attributed to Somalia 
as a place. Somalia was presented as 'doomed' to failure in a variety of ways, which 
have been illustrated above with coverage examples. Significantly, although Western 
and Soviet Cold War involvement in Somalia was occasionally recognised to have had 
an impact on the Hom state's decline into violence, the political, and often economic, 
specifics of how these relationships with 'developed' states had previously worked and 
were, in fact, continuing to affect the situation were only rarely explored. Instead, 
colourfully-worded descriptions of Somalia's disasters placed this state among a group 
of nations, particularly within' Africa', destined for 'failure'. In many cases, 
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Chapter Five- From Beachhead to 'Black Hawk Down': 
Stereotypes in Somalia; Passive Victims, Aggressive 
Killers & Their 'Saviours' 
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The ways in which people were represented during the Somalia intervention are 
closely linked to themes in coverage regarding Somalia as a place. Cynicism about the 
possibilities for peace in Somalia was visually and rhetorically developed not only from 
broad statements about the country's collapse into anarchy but through specific 
discussions of how its citizens had directly contributed to its decline. This chapter will 
focus heavily on the cultural stereotyping of Somalis, which tended to encourage an 
overwhelming focus on violence and discord within the culture. Specifically, the 
actions of 'protection' squads and factional leaders were routine subjects of discussion, 
rather than collaborative rebuilding work which was being done. Similar to the 
structure of 'place' discourses, this understanding played down the long-term effects of 
the Siad Barre dictatorship in the country, and Western and international involvement 
with this regime. Media coverage primarily focused on description of present 
situations, where two extreme categories of 'Somali' appeared to be evident. 
Through this polarised interpretive lens, women and children were presented 
overwhelmingly as victims, although their involvement in later violence against 
Westerners was remarked upon. Women's efforts at promoting peace and rebuilding 
were rarely given more than passing reference except in very occasional' special 
interest' stories, which were mostly confined to print media. Men, particularly youths, 
were made responsible for the bulk of societal problems and a certain degree of fatalism 
about their behaviour could often be read as an indictment against the 'character' of the 
entire population. This gendered stereotyping is a common representational element 
of other 'African' humanitarian problems, suggesting a widespread linking of 
discourses of irrationality, violence, cruelty and aggression with 'black' men. As a 
chapter section discussing the near-contemporaneous beating of African-American 
motorist, Rodney King by white police officers will show, these discourses are not 
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solely developed along inside/outside lines which are congruent with the borders of 
nation-states. The 'threat' of black, particularly black male, violence is often portrayed 
as lurking just under the surface of domestic life within America and other Western 
states as well. 
As UNOSOM II' s mandate progressively narrowed to focusing almost 
exclusively on the hunt for General Aidid in Mogadishu, the narrow nature of the 
mission's own vision became clear. Somalia's success or failure in rebuilding itself was 
increasingly tied to the actions of one factional leader, who was focused upon to the 
detriment of other sectors of international effort in the country. To a large extent, the 
mainstream Western media followed and supported this policy simplification by 
narrowing their own scope of coverage to the Aidid 'hunt'. Geographically, the focus 
on Mogadishu literally turned audiences' vision away from other regions and stories 
within Somalia, while the focus on a single Somali leader as the primary cause of the 
country's problems illustrated a significant oversimplification of Somalia's political, 
social and economic situation. 
Western aid workers and policymakers also were often portrayed in binary 
opposition to those they had come to aid. Westerners, rather than Somalis, were often 
key media informants during early stages of the intervention; a frequent focus on the 
comments and opinions of American troops in later coverage tended to reinforce 
America-centred understandings of what had occurred in Somalia. Again, as with 
gendered stereotypes, there are deeper currents of Orientalism in this approach. 
Westerners are frequently presumed to have greater 'objectivity' and interpretive 
capability to comment on Somalia than is possible for residents of the country. Further, 
it is the Western and American angle to the situation which matters; this is the 
perspective from which action and solutions are expected to come to Somalia. While 
they were imaged and described extensively during certain key time periods, one of the 
obvious similarities across all media coverage is that Somali citizens rarely narrate their 
own stories and experiences in any depth. While particular journalists, such as Jane 
Perlez of The New York Times, quoted Somali relief workers and citizens regularly in 
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articles, many media items, particularly on television, did not do this. Western media 
more regularly depended on Western aid workers, leaders and spokespeople for the 
UN and US interventions in Somalia and, once they had arrived in the country, on 
American troops to provide 'first hand' information for their stories. The problems 
created by Somalis being spoken for, rather than spoken to, went beyond merely 
affecting their media representation. It likely also significantly influenced the way in 
which negotiations with warring factions were handled and the ways that Western 
organisations involved themselves in the state. 
With important exceptions, predominantly in The New York Times and on BBC, 
Western media coverage, and later the Black Hawk Down film, conceptualized events in 
Somalia not in terms of Somali politics, economics and social structures but instead 
through this conflict's implications for American foreign policy and international 
peacekeeping practices. In many cases, this practice literally caused the daily lives and 
realities of Somalis to disappear from foreign vision and planning practices. To a 
significant extent, this lack of Somali voices may be a practical consequence of the low 
numbers of Westerners who spoke Somali languages, thus making translators a 
necessity for conducting many media interviews or engaging with much of the local 
population. Adding to this problem, violence in Somalia led to large refugee flows and 
many Somalis who were able to leave the country were those with significant education 
and Western language skills who might have acted as local coordinators and 
spokespeople. It often appears, however, that media personnel did not make 
significant efforts to communicate with Somali citizens, choosing instead to present 
stories whose content did not require public engagement. Communication was also a 
major obstacle for the US military once they arrived in Somalia. Of 1.8 million 
members of the US armed forces, only seven people spoke Somali. A New York Times 
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article mentions that one of these speakers had to be tracked down to record messages 
for use in the military's pacification program.1 
In a similar fashion to the previous chapter, predominant themes under the 
broad "Stereotypes in Somalia" category will now be studied in depth with specific 
examples from media coverage. The sub-sections will cover representations of Somali 
men and boys, who were often perceived as violent threats to social and economic 
stability in ways which are reminiscent of the 'ghetto' threat commonly used to 
describe black men outside of Somalia as well. The Rodney King example will provide 
evidence of the widespread currency of these discourses. Women and children's use 
primarily as visual representations of passivity, suffering and need will also be 
investigated, along with limited media attempts to challenge this representation, as 
well as the positioning of Western aid workers, policymakers and, later, soldiers as 
primary voices for describing the condition of Somalis, in place of citizens themselves. 
A final focus on representation of 'Black Hawk down' and the lead-up to its taking-
place will conclude by illustrating the ways in which this event ended up rendering all 
Somalis as ungrateful threats to caring, primarily-white interveners, a theme which, 
again, is commonly used in other circumstances to explain the continued suffering of 
those in' developing' countries or stigmatised social groups. 
Aid Workers: Primary Storytellers & Trusted Voices 
With some exceptions, aid workers were the primary narrators of analysed 
stories about Somalis and their crises in the early days of Western involvement. Sam 
Kiley's articles on the work of Italian doctor Analena Tonelli present her as a hero, 
running her medical care and food service programs with privately-raised funds "(i)n 
the face of overwhelming logistical problems and extreme danger".2 The article's 
discussion of Dr. Tonelli's Somali patients revolves primarily around children; many of 
1 Eric Schmitt, "Mission to Somalia: Ready for Battle, Troops Storm Beach But Find No Enemy", The New 
York Times, December 9, 1992. This article also provides the information that there are only seven Somali 
speakers in a 1.8 million-strong US armed services. 
2 Sam Kiley, "Treatment Fails to Help Starving Somali Children", The Times, May 18, 1992. 
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whom are said to be unlikely to recover due to "holocaust" -like scenes they have 
witnessed. A Kiley article in The Times documents the starvation deaths of three 
children in the streets of the Somali city of Merca and describes aid workers as 
"staggered by the indifference of wealthy Somalis to the plight of their own people." 
'"There are still plenty of people stealing what they can and stashing the money 
overseas. One thing is sure, nothing comes back here unless it is to buy arms or pay 
soldiers,' a director of an aid programme said. 'They are just terribly selfish,' Dr. 
Tonelli agreed."3 Somali adults, particularly men, are thus represented as threatening 
the survival of Somali children, for whom they are portrayed as unwilling or unable to 
care. This job must thus fall to the hands of primarily white Westerners, who, in 
contrast, are risking their lives to do unselfish good. Jane Perlez similarly based one of 
her New York Times articles on the personalisation of a single, heroic aid worker. In this 
case, Irish Concern nurse Anita Ennis is followed through her daily routine at a Baidoa 
feeding camp and her devoted work to save a young boy is described in depth.4 
This focus on aid workers' perspectives may be partly explained by the 
circumstances under which many photographers and journalists operated in Somalia. 
According to Paul Lowe, a photojournalist in Somalia during August and December 
1992, it was common for media personnel to base themselves at an aid agency 
compound, as it was possible to live cheaply this way and to use the agencies' bases for 
security and local connections.5 Western aid workers spoke European languages and 
were thus easier to communicate with than the average Somali for most journalists. 
Likely because of the challenges involved in communicating with Somalis themselves~ 
aid workers' comments frequently were used as authoritative and informative sources 
for reports on the condition of Somali people. 
Frequent discussion of aid as needing to be directed specifically and 
overwhelmingly at children is evident in many articles and is likely indicative of the 
3 Sam Kiley, "Famine Invades a City Spared by War", The Times, May 13, 1992. 
4 Jane Perlez, "As Much of a Nation Starves, a Young Somali Grasps Life", The New York Times, August 17, 
1992. 
5 Author's interview with Paul Lowe, November 2005. 
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belief of media and aid industry personnel that children would inspire the most 
generosity from Western publics and were the most 'innocent' and 'helpless'victims in 
the conflict. This focus was especially evident when aid workers attempted to speak 
through the media to potential aid donors: "'Despite the barriers in Somalia-the 
violence, the looting, the wackos with guns out there-the cause is not totally helpless, 
and some good is being done,' Mr. Clark said. 'People can indeed make a contribution 
to a private relief group and have confidence that some children will be reached."'6 
Images of' suffering' children and mothers also predominate during a high point of 
media famine coverage of Somalia in August and September 1992, again likely 
indicative of the media's belief in the visual power of children to capture the concern 
and interest of Western audiences. This type of imagery was actually persistent 
throughout much of the entire intervention period. BBC opened its December 7 and 8, 
1992 coverage of the build-up to the US intervention with an image of an emaciated 
toddler as representative of Somalia's story, despite the fact that famine in the country 
had largely been brought under control by this point.7 This focus on imagery of 
children, while likely assumed to be a valuable approach for fundtaising, was of 
questionable value in fostering more complex understandings of the factors promoting 
and prolonging the conflict in Somalia. 
During the early stages of the UNOSOM I mission, a May 9, 1992 article 
describing starvation and dismal conditions in one of the only remaining Mogadishu 
hospitals also mentions the large daily numbers of gunshot victims; "'The figure is an 
indication of how extreme violence has become the only form of conflict resolution that 
Somalis understand,' said one aid worker."8 While a quote from a Somali doctor 
immediately following this comment attributes the high levels of violence to the 
desperate shortages of food for large segments of the local population, the implication 
in the first quote that Somalis are 'intrinsically' violent is not wholly shaken. Months 
later, images throughout a December 7, 1992 ABC piece still appeared to support this 
6 Barbara Crossette, "Crisis Is Seen For Sub-Saharan Africa", The New York Times, September 17, 1992. 
7 BBC 9 o'clock news, December 7 and 8, 1992. 
8 Sam Kiley, "Patients Vie for Food Scraps Amid Ruins of Mogadishu", The Times, May 9, 1992. 
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earlier aid worker's categorisation, showing khat-chewing Somali men with guns, white 
aid workers treating injured Somali male patients, recycled 'famine' imagery of thin 
children covered in flies, and dead Somali bodies. White volunteer doctors explained 
that they were mostly treating gun shot wounds and declared that violence was even 
worse than before, as Somalis were stealing what they could in advance of US Marine 
arrival. The doctors are portrayed as sensitive and shocked by levels of violence in 
Somalia, which they claim is perpetrated by teenagers high on khat.9 
Throughout these comments, Somali 'victims' remain mute behind the aid 
workers, who are positioned as spokespeople for tragedies occurring in Somalia. The 
relevance of khat and its link with Somali men will be explored in greater depth in a 
later section. These frequent portrayals of aid workers as Somali 'saviours' in contrast 
to murderous elements of its population not only failed to explore the reasons why 
armed gangs had come into existence but also underrepresented the many Somalis who 
worked for and with aid agencies, rather than merely looting or opposing their efforts. 
Various articles by Jane Perlez for The New York Times are an important deviation from 
this trend; Perlez often used quotes from Somali doctors and aid personnel who were 
actively trying to improve the situation of their fellow citizens.10 
While relief workers were represented as desperate for international action on 
the Somali situation during the early months of 1992, their opinions of the decision to 
send large numbers of American troops for the UNIT AF mission appeared to split 
when it became a possibility in November of that year. Despite difficult working 
conditions, many aid workers were reported as sceptical about whether armed troops 
would help relief shipments reach Somalis. An article in The Times just before the 
official announcement that almost thirty thousand American troops would be sent to 
bolster the UN relief efforts in Somalia declared that this offer would be almost 
universally rejected by aid agencies if it was their decision to make. 11 New York Times 
9 ABC news, December 7, 1992. 
10 See Jane Perlez, "Somalis Try a Food Center Without Gunmen", The New York Times, October 29, 1992 
and Jane Perlez, "Hungry Somalis Still Die But Crops Grow Too", The New York Times, October 23, 1992. 
11 James Bone & David Watts, "Somali Agencies Reject 30,000 US Troops", The Times, November 27, 1992. 
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reports concurred, describing the fears of aid workers that outside force which was not 
supported by local leaders would result in a unification of Somali forces against 
foreigners.12 
This apparent u-turn in opinion highlights the ways in which a lack of 
contextual reporting on the economic and political factors driving the Somali famine 
and conflict often resulted in seemingly contradictory and confusing media coverage. 
By early December 1992, however, when the US had made its decision to act, comments 
by aid workers were less frequent and, when they were reported, more favourable. In 
at least one case, those who were not supportive appear to have been censored. On 
December 5, The Times reported that "Rakiya Omaar, a leading Somali activist in the 
United States, has been dismissed by Africa Watch, the human rights organisation, for 
her outspoken opposition to planned United Nations military intervention in the 
country."13 
Once American troops entered Somalia, they briefly became important new 
sources of quotes and stories for media and aid workers faded somewhat from 
coverage. While their voices returned in a minimal sense once UN/US attacks against 
Aidid began, primarily as voices of opposition to these actions, Western commentators 
for media during this period were predominately policymakers and UNOSOM IT's 
leaders. Their similar role in appearing as voices of reason in comparison to Somali-
driven chaos will be analysed in further sections. The next four sections will now turn 
specifically to the representation of Somali citizen groups. 
Passivity & Helplessness: The Dominant Representation of Women & Children 
The representation of Somali women predominantly followed patterns familiar 
to both audiences and media personnel from other famine situations in the 'developing' 
world. In this 'tradition', victims of catastrophic events, such as famine or conflict, are 
12 Jane Perlez, "Somali Aid Workers Split on Troops", Tile New York Times, November 27, 1992 and William 
E. Schmidt, "UN Weighs Terms By US For Sending Somalia Force; Europeans Cautious", Tiw New York 
Times, November 28, 1992. 
13 Tom Rhodes, "Activist Sacked By US Rights Group", T11e Times, December 5, 1992. 
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primarily shown to be women and children, frequently clustered together in large 
groups to illustrate the scale of the crisis but also routinely pictured as individuals, 
particularly lone children, as a reminder to audiences of the humanity and 
individuality of these 'victims'. Victims are rarely given the opportunity to speak for 
themselves, instead commonly having their plight explained by relief workers or policy 
experts, usually from the 'developed' world. In the case of Somalia, this type of 
representation was a lasting feature of the cov~rage, with 'famine' style images being 
shown months after the worst of the famine conditions had been addressed and often 
accompanying print articles whose subject was not famine. As with other situations in 
which this representational style is used, this coverage often failed to illustrate the 
productive activities of Somali citizens to better their own situation. In the Somali case, 
the dichotomization between women/victims and men/aggressors minimised the 
agency and abilities of women and ignored the many peaceful men whose lives were 
disrupted or ended by the civil war and famine. (See Image 9) 
Because of the dominance of this style of representation, it is important to 
recognise attempts to report differently. During the first major media 'discovery' of the 
Somali famine, a Jane Perlez article, which appeared with photos on the front page of 
The Sunday New York Times, was one of the first times that individual Somali citizens 
were given press space to describe their own personal losses as a result of warfare and 
famine. Three of the five interviews in the article were conducted with women, two 
mothers and a Somali feeding station worker, who had just witnessed the death of one 
. of their own children or a child being cared for. The images included, one of which 
made the front page, are of children waiting for food at a feeding centre in Baidoa and 
women described as 'pleading' for food at a centre.14 Although the imagery appears to 
follow traditional patterns of representation, the use of interview material with Somali 
citizens is significant and relatively rare, with Perlez's articles being an exception. A 
similarly-styled article in The Times in March 1992 followed the story of a young Somali 
female aid worker's struggle to help her family flee the dangers of Mogadishu to 
14 Jane Perlez, "Deaths In Somalia Outpace Delivery Of Food", The New York Times, July 19, 1992. 
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refugee camps on the Kenyan border. The story illustrates the creative and productive 
efforts of a young woman to save her family and continue her vocation in relief work; 
she is not merely a passive victim of her circumstances.15 
The extent to which these articles deviated from media 'norms' of who Somalis 
were and how they behaved can be seen as the situation of 'famine' and 'anarchy' in 
Somalia became a more widely-covered media story in mid to late 1992. Few Western 
media cameras had been on location to record the earlier and worst stages of the famine 
in 1991 and early 1992; estimates of deaths and predicted deaths had to serve instead to 
illustrate the scale of the Somalia disaster. When the decision was made for US troops 
to intervene in late 1992, however, these 'famine' images became important for 
reinforcing why troops were being sent. Montages of images which introduced 
television items on Somalia as American troops prepared to enter the country 
represented life there through images of crying children and thin women alternated 
with images of men and boys with guns.16 While a few stories emerged in December 
' and January 1993 which highlighted the success of US troops at delivering aid supplies 
to these 'victims', television coverage of Somalia in particular was already in decline 
and 'feel-good' images quickly disappeared from screens along with most others. 
After the killing of the Pakistani UN troops in June 1993, imagery of women and 
children was briefly redeployed, particularly by ABC, in what appeared to be an 
attempt to remind audiences of why UN and US troops had initially intervened in 
Somalia. One viewed ABC item on June 21, 1993 attempted to redefine life by 
exploring successes and improvements in rural areas outside the capital. Images of 
women and children are used in this item to illustrate health and well-being, as 
opposed to their previous role indicating social collapse. Initially, however, graphic 
images are shown of rotting corpses near huts and houses alongside images of starving 
people and fly-covered babies. These are described as images from the previous year 
15 Ian Glover-James, "Somali Civil War Leaves 1.5m Facing Famine and Disease", The Sunday Times, March 
29, 1992. 
16 See ABC coverage on Nightline November 30, 1992; December 7, 1992 news; Nightline December 11, 1992; 
and BBC 9 o'clock news, December 4, 1992. 
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and an aid worker reinforces their horror by saying that during famine times "bodies 
were left rotting, eaten by rodents and insects".17 (See Image 10) Contrasting shots 
then begin immediately to show the difference a year can make; a montage of images 
appears showing healthy, running children and a man holding wads of money at a 
market stall. A group of 'healthy-weight' children laugh and hold out food to the 
camera in what appears to be an orchestrated shot which then cuts to women gathering 
water and homes being rebuilt. (See Image 11) White aid workers attest to the massive 
changes the rural Somali town has undergone and the telling of a personalized story of 
a young Somali girl who lost her entire family to famine but now lives happy and safe 
in a Mogadishu orphanage adds to the theme of redemption and success. 
Such a media item could not have better anticipated and supported the opinion 
of US Ambassador Madeleine Albright, who visited Somalia in July 1993. Albright 
publicly stated that she felt too much media focus was being placed on the violence in 
Mogadishu while positive UN work in rural areas was being ignored. While this 
particular item goes some way to illustrating the existence of optimism and 
improvement in Somalia, it is by no means representative of standard media coverage 
of this period which, as Albright noted, continued to focus almost exclusively on the 
continuing violence in Mogadishu. The item, while positive in focus, also fails to 
challenge the many prevailing images and narratives of Somalis which had been 
developed in earlier famine coverage. Voiceover emphasizes the actions of foreign UN 
troops or aid workers which allow Somalis to thrive, whether it be through renewed 
delivery of food or supervision of development in a rural setting. No Somalis are 
interviewed during the item but they are instead imaged and spoken for, either by the 
Western 'experts' present or through the use of voiceover. Despite the use of narrative 
to 'refer' these images to older, colonial discourses of a 'simple', undeveloped Africa, 
requiring European-assisted development, these images do at minimum provide 
glimpses of women and children in active roles. It is an important contrast to many 
17 ABC news, June 21, 1993. 
previous portrayals of them in passive, close-up shots which do not allow the 
surrounding circumstances and location, urban or rural, to be viewed at all. 
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Just one New York Times article stands out throughout two years coverage of the 
Somali situation in its exploration of women's involvement in the Somali economy, 
politics, and aid industries. Through an interview with a Somali woman who runs 140 
Red Cross feeding centres in Mogadishu, the author, Donatella Lorch, discusses the 
diverse trading, money-changing and managerial roles that Somali women are 
successfully taking on in the wake of the deaths of traditional male providers and 
dramatic social upheaval. Dahabo Isse, Lorch's primary English-speaking interviewee, 
attributes the success of the women to their willingness to work on neutral terms across 
clan lines in ways that men will not. The article details the work of three other Somali 
women but also elaborates on their concerns about whether new governmental systems 
in Somalia will recognise and allow them to maintain their new statuses.18 
Following their general disappearance from media images and narratives after 
the initial 'famine' pictures which accompanied the planning and start of the UNITAF 
intervention, women, and to a much lesser extent children, reappeared in coverage 
during the violent protests in Mogadishu in summer 1993. A September 3, 1993 photo 
in The Times showed angry Somali women, described as chanting support for Aidid. 
This type of image was a dramatic change in the portrayal of Somali women who, 
before the attacks on the Pakistanis, had been almost exclusively represented as victims 
of the Somali conflict. A further section will explore this change in their representation, 
particularly with regards to the events of 'Black Hawk down'. 
The Somali 'Ghetto': Somali Men as Drug-Users & Violent Delinquents 
As has been illustrated in the previous section, the famine and 'anarchy' taking 
place in Somalia required an explanation or justification, however minimal, in media 
coverage of the events. A statement from Paul Lowe sums up the connections that 
18 Donatella Lorch, "Somali Women Stride Ahead Despite The Scars of Tradition", The New York Times, 
December 22, 1992. 
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many journalists made: "I was looking for images that would juxtapose the suffering of 
the famine with the conflict related to it which was ... very much the sort of warlord-led, 
clan-led conflict for control, for power."19 While this statement broadly captures some 
of the issues involved in Somalia's crisis, it was the detail within comments such as this 
which media in Somalia often failed to investigate. Often originally brought into urban 
centres like Mogadishu by factional leaders during the civil conflict to expel Siad Barre, 
numbers of young Somali men were left after his fall from power with little possibility 
for employment in the country's war-ravaged economy. While some found work 
privately or with NGOs, others ended up putting their weapons to use through looting 
and extortion of aid supplies. It was these groups who were extensively documented 
and made responsible for Somalia's famine by the Western media. Widespread 
chewing of a stimulant leaf called khat was an important part of the characterization of 
these men and boys. 
On a broad scale, Somalis in general, but Somali men in particular, were 
regularly portrayed as greedy and violent detriments to the peace-building processes. 
Rather than potential productive members of society, the majority of Somali men were 
understood through discourses which denoted them as 'problem' people with childlike 
tendencies and little comprehension of their own needs for long-term peace and 
development. This conceptualization had consequences for peace-building efforts and 
media representations of Somalia but it also relates to wider racialized discourses 
pertaining to non-white peoples worldwide. As with the above section on 
representations of women and children, media representations which attempted to 
challenge this portrayal of men are rare and deserve mention. One such article, 
published in August 1992 by Jane Perlez, describes the difficult choices that had to be 
made by many Somalis: whether to take up arms to secure food, mon~y and their 
properties and whether to avenge family members who had been killed. Tracing an 
educated Abgal Somali man's struggle for non-violent survival with his extended family 
in Mogadishu, the article brings to light the perils of food shortages but also, primarily, 
19 Author's interview with Paul Lowe, November 2005. 
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the extent of gun ownership, attacks and looting in and around Mogadishu. Because of 
his fluent English, Omar Sabrie Abdulle, the protagonist in Perlez' s story, is more able 
than many Somalis to tell his story and detail his concerns; he makes the point that one 
of the most useful things aid agencies could do to help control violence could be to buy 
up Somali weapons or offer food in exchange for them.20 
Jane Perlez was again responsible for a detailed article on life in rural Somalia in 
September 1992.21 With a strong focus on interview material with two Somali men, 
Perlez exposed the plight of Somalia's destitute rural inhabitants, whose suffering is 
shown to have been created not primarily by drought but by having been driven off 
their lands and robbed during conflict in Somalia's agricultural areas. The political and 
economic aspects of this fighting, while described in academic research in Chapter 
Three, were not discussed in analysed media coverage. The provision by the Red Cross 
of seeds and equipment to Somali farmers is described by both men as aiding a 
primarily Somali-driven effort to return to home villages and re-start agricultural 
livelihoods, despite the destruction of large amounts of farming infrastructure during 
the conflict. The above articles are important, as they provide challenges to the 
common gendered stereotypes into which Somali citizens were often slotted. The 
articles featuring stories of men highlight their efforts to support themselves and their 
families through non-violent and cooperative ventures. 
Predominant representations of Somali men and boys are significantly different 
from these perspectives by Perlez. Sam Kiley of The Times wrote an early news item 
which focused particularly on the dangers of young Somali men. His 362 word article, 
a personal narrative about his trip to a Mogadishu gun market, describes Somalia as "a 
country which has collapsed into geno-suicide fuelled by khat, a strong narcotic plant 
which stains its users' mouths green."22 Kiley describes how joking with Somalis at the 
market became serious when shots were fired at him by a young boy. His reaction to 
20 Jane Perlez, "Mogadishu Journal: Amid Somalia's Frenzy, Family Fights to Survive", The New York Times, 
August 26, 1992. 
21 Jane Perlez, "Somalis Rediscover Hope in a Handful of Seeds", The New York Times, September 23, 1992. 
22 Sam Kiley, "Killing Jokes Down At the Gun Market", The Times, July 14, 1992. 
the situation is illustrative of the often difficult relationship between Somalis and 
Western interveners: "My gaze fell on the green lips of a child of no more than 14 
curled back in a drug-crazed rage. The little blighter deserved nothing but a good 
hiding, a thought I keep to myself as I was bundled into my car by well-wishers 
howling insults at those who wanted to see whether my blood ran as red as theirs 
did."23 
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A month later, Kiley wrote another satiric article, this time documenting a road 
trip with some hired Somali guards. Once again, the young men are portrayed as 
volatile and potentially violent: "At the mercy of four uptight gunmen who, given that I 
had pockets full of dollars and was wearing a pair of jeans, could have stripped me and 
abandoned me ... Or they might have just shot me for fun, so male bonding seemed the 
only way to get to Mogadishu."24 This bonding occurs over the shooting of a small 
antelope, which Kiley describes as incredibly difficult given that "Somalis are unable to 
shoot straight. Keeping the sight close to the eye means the bang is too loud, and in 
any case that is not the way Rambo does it. .. So abandoning pacifist scruples, I taught 
them to aim and, after a couple of absurd misses, a male dik-dik was shot".25 These 
grim assessments of a few Somali men nonetheless can be read as applying to the male 
population as a whole, suggesting that there is little reason for hope in a country . 
composed of such characters. Such articles are especially problematic given that young 
Somali men, while routinely imaged, are almost never interviewed in Western media 
coverage and therefore are rarely permitted to exist outside their descriptions by 
foreign interveners. 
Such anecdotal articles are rare in media coverage of Somalia; most coverage 
discussing problems in Somali society begins with local examples but makes these 
examples representative of larger, country-wide issues. Both The Times and The New 
York Times published articles on the looting of aid convoys, attempting to explain why 
this practice took place. Their coverage is similar, although The New York Times appears 
23 Sam Kiley, "Killing Jokes Down At the Gun Market", The Times, July 14, 1992 .. 
24 Sam Kiley, "Teenage Gunmen Hunt Food in Somalia", The Times, August 14, 1992. 
25 Ibid. 
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to devote more articles to this issue and to approach it from a greater variety of angles. 
Sam Kiley opened his September 16, 1992 Times piece with a description of a group of 
starved Somalis staring at a dead man they were too tired to bury. Meanwhile, "fit and 
healthy" teenage gunmen loot food aid nearby with impunity. Kiley quotes Aidid in an 
effort to expose his failure to stop these gunmen, who are allegedly "his" although he 
claims to have no control over their actions. Aidid is described as blocking UN efforts 
to send troops to protect aid and, along with other "warlords", is said to be "both 
profiting from the Somali holocaust and by so doing ensuring that it will continue until 
there are no Somalis left to feed."26 As will be seen in a further section, Aidid was 
routinely represented as responsible for most of Somalia's ills. His position as an 
important and often intransigent factional leader provided media with an 'enemy' 
figure in their Somalia stories, although there is evidence that factors in international 
handling of the Somali situation helped him garner much of his support. 
A Kiley article on August 31, 1992 explores further injustices in Somali society 
by using an example of clan divisions at a feeding centre in Belet Huen, where some 
Somalis are alleged to have starved to death because they were told not to share a 
feeding centre with another clan group. For an interviewed aid worker, this is an 
obvious example of the greed of local Somali leaders: "'They clearly thought that there 
would be something in the building and administration of the centre for them. But we 
don't work that way. Adele is just a typical example of the mafia system of 
administration here. The authorities will watch people die rather than pass up the 
chance of a fast buck,' said Joanna Robinson, a New Zealand nurse with the fund."27 
The opening paragraph of the article illustrates the direct victims of this avarice to be 
Somali children; Western aid workers are shown to be prevented from saving children 
due to deliberate Somali obstruction of their work. Somali leaders are portrayed as 
indifferent to the suffering of their own people. 
26 Sam Kiley, "Looters Add to Somalia's Suffering", The Times, September 16, 1992. 
27 Sam Kiley, "Elders Find Rich Pickings Among Misery of Camps", The Times, August 31, 1992. 
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The New York Times published a similar article on February 9, 1993. Aid workers 
in and around Somali villages near Baidoa express their disgust that so much foreign 
aid is held and sold by village elders and leaders at the expense of their own people. 
Somali workers for various NGOs interviewed for the article are described as greedy 
and looking to profit from the famine situation by demanding high wages for work. 
Some contrasting aid worker opinions are given, indicating that they believe some 
trading of food aid, even if it is stolen, could help to re-establish a functioning market 
system in Somalia.28 For the most part, however, these opinions and any exploration of 
issues arising when a post-conflict economy is flooded with free food were not 
investigated. 
The major message coming out of these articles, in The New York Times' case 
supported by a comment from a Somali journalist, is that Somalis are historically 
tolerant of looting; these comments imply that greed and selfishness, as understood 
through Western eyes, are part of the cultural landscape. The chief US diplomat in 
Mogadishu, Robert Oakley, condensed and clarified the tone and assumptions of much 
media coverage when he was quoted saying, "the biggest challenge for Somalia will be 
its ability to assume responsibility for its own future after decades of reliance on 
western help ... 'This country has lived off the dole for as long as I can remember. In 
future, Somalis will have to work harder at earning it rather than getting it."'29 
The New York Times' approach to the issue of looting is significantly different 
when investigated by Jane Perlez on September 4, 1992. While a "handful of well-
connected merchants" are said to have organised the theft of much relief food in order 
to hoard for sale at higher prices, quotes from aid agency officials do not show 
particularly great concern at the statistic of only half offood aid actually reaching 
hungry Somalis. The director of the UN World Food Program is quoted saying that this 
is a reasonable amount given conditions in Somalia. A Red Cross official, while 
acknowledging that looting is intolerably high, is said to believe that "far more than 
28 Diana Jean Schemo, "Donors Find Much Somali Aid Stolen", Tite New York Times, February 9, 1993. 
29 Donatella Lorch, "US Envoy to Somalia Says American Mission Has Been Achieved", The New York 
Times, March 3,1993. 
241 
half of its food reaches the hungry."30 A Somali dealer in stolen food is interviewed and 
expresses moral discomfort with his practices but points out that in a country with no 
government, no jobs and with a large family to provide for he has little choice. The 
politics of stealing and selling food coming into the Mogadishu port and the connection 
of the price of food to the value of the Somali shilling on a black currency market are 
investigated by Perlez through an interview with a Somali journalist. This politics is 
also linked to violent episodes between Ali Mahdi and Aidid, helping to give some 
meaning to the situation of 'violence' and 'anarchy' which is constantly stated to exist 
in Mogadishu while illustrating that the situation cannot be simply blamed on the 
dominant factional leaders or 'warlords' who receive most Western media coverage. 
This approach is more structural than Kiley's, focusing on larger socio-economic 
mechanisms rather than on personalities. Situational experiences of media personnel in 
Somalia, such as that of Paul Lowe, appear to support Perlez' s analysis, suggesting that 
many socio-economic factors continued to exist and to be relevant throughout the 
conflict period. These factors are valuable to consider, as evidence beyond national 
character types, to determine why particular events and actions take place: "In these 
situations routinely words like chaos and anarchy, madness, craziness are used, 
bandied about, but I think ... if you learn how societies like that operate ... they do have 
very clear relationships between people and places, motivators for what's going on and 
it's not anarchy ... there's a hierarchy ... you're in a place that basically functions .. .in 
some form. "31 
Attempts, such as the one described above, to explore reasons beyond the mere 
existence of 'violent gunmen' for the conflict and crisis situation in Somalia were not 
common. A December 2, 1992 article in The Times describes the criminalization of 
Somali society, with a shocking incident chosen to open the report. A Somali child, 
standing on the edge of a road, is shot by a group of teenage gunmen while other 
30 Jane Perlez, "Theft of Food Aid Is a Business in Starving Somalia", The New York Times, September 4, 
1992. Debate arose over this issue particularly when OFDA official, Andrew Natsios began to quote a 
figure of 80% of relief being looted to media and policymakers in November 1992. See Jane Perlez, "Somali 
Aid Workers Split On Troops", The New York Times, November 27,1992. 
31 Author's interview with Paul Lowe, November 2005. 
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Somalis look on and do nothing. While the article mentions that there is little work for 
men in the destroyed Somali economy besides looting, guarding or soldiering, most of 
the article discusses the need for a Western-style protectorate or "humanitarian 
recolonisation" to fix Somalia's governing structures. Sam Kiley, the author of the 
article, asks how Somalia could collapse into such a state and then offers a broad 
answer based on Somali 'traits' and supposed historical worldviews: "The Somalis, 
predominately nomadic pastoralists living on the edge of starvation for much of their 
lives, inevitably regard their relationship with the world as a battle for existence. They 
attach no great sentimentality to family or clan bonds but see their social system as a 
means of survival."32 The New York Times presented a similar view of national 
decomposition and failure in a December 13, 1992 article which declared Somali 
nationalism to be a "myth" that hid nepotism, corruption and social discord: "In this 
Somalia, the narrow aim of self-advancement and political tenure ruled despite all the 
leaders' protestations of serving nationhood alone ... The calculus of clan politics is one 
that dictates the country's present fragmentation into such closed visions of self-interest 
that even the stick-thin hordes of the starving from one clan draw no empathy from the 
warriors of another."33 
A culture understood as so 'naturally' prone to violence and conflict was also 
one which could be portrayed as incapable of change by outsiders and which needed to 
be engaged with as a potential threat rather than as a group of people with potential for 
social, political and economic regeneration. This understanding of Somali culture was 
partly evident on American arrival in Somalia in December 1992 when the Marines 
came onto the beaches of Mogadishu in 'combat mode', and actually arrested Somalis 
who had contracts to work with the UN, various NGOs and media agencies. 
Accompanying media images of Somali men being frisked, ordered to put their hands 
up or to lie prone on the ground were reminiscent of media coverage of an important 
32 Sam Kiley, "Gunmen Fire At Children on a Road of Terror", The Times, December 2, 1992. 
33 Alan Cowell, "The World; One Language. One Faith. No Unity", T11e New York Times, December 13, 
1992. 
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American national event, which will be discussed further below.34 Marines, when 
interviewed, described their major security concern as armed gangs "strung out on 
drugs". Awareness of these groups, however, had not prepared them for the task of 
differentiating 'good' from 'bad' on the ground in Somalia, as was acknowledged by a 
Marine commander interviewed by Ted Koppel on ABC's special December 8, 1992 
coverage of the troop landing. 
BBC' s coverage of the arrests during the landing was more openly critical on 
this point. The arrests of Somalis were labelled as a negative way to start winning 
hearts and minds. The images of Somali men being arrested and searched under media 
spotlights were shown, with voiceover declaring that the men were guarding the port, 
appeared unarmed and were treated in a humiliating fashion by US troops. The item 
explains that it took the intervention of General Imtiaz Shaheen, who had been in 
Mogadishu with his Pakistani group of UN peacekeepers for a few months, to explain 
that the men were not a threat and have them released.35 
The American military's answer to the question of disarmament on a systematic 
and large-scale basis, which was desired by many UN personnel and Somali civilians, 
also appeared to have been influenced by a particular interpretation of the Somali 
'character'. While many aid workers, Somali citizens and international personnel 
understood the widespread presence of weapons as dangerous both for peacekeepers 
and Somalis themselves, several key figures in the US military and administration 
countered that the process of disarmament itself was too big and too dangerous to be 
taken on by American troops. There was also the suggestion that such an action was 
not the will of the general population and was counter to their right to bear arms; 
"'There are three things important to a Somali-his wife, his camel and his weapon,' 
said President Bush's special envoy to Somalia, Robert B. Oakley. 'In the Somali soul 
there is the right to have a weapon. So when they hear foreigners are taking weapons 
34 ABC's special broadcast on US troop landings, December 8, 1992. 
35 BBC 9 o'clock news, December 9, 1992. 
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by force, they say, 'No, never."'36 Within this article, Perlez quotes the former Somali 
national police commissioner urging a program of full-scale national disarmament, 
which he believed the vast majority of war-weary Somalis would support. This view 
and other statements of Somalis' desires for peace, however, were often subsumed in 
Western coverage by descriptions of conflict and violence and by comments on the 
intransigence of Somali factional leaders such Aidid and Ali Mahdi. 
Khat: Fuel to the Fire of Conflict? 
The use of khat by Somali men was occasionally mentioned in print coverage of 
the Somalia conflict which discussed the looting of aid convoys and the activities of 
armed groups of young Somali men. A Medecins Sans Frontieres co-ordinator, writing 
in The Times in August 1992, commented that: "Colombia has its coca leaves, Thailand 
its opium, the West Indies its hashish and Somalia its qat a small tree whose succulent 
leaves are the fuel of this war."37 Few other print pieces state this cause-effect 
relationship so bluntly. Only one article in two years of print coverage, however, was 
found which gave a detailed report about the role of khat in Somali culture and also 
challenged the theory that it was primarily fuel to the fire of conflict there. This New 
York Times article from mid-December 1992 discusses why khat has not become popular 
in the US but also features interviews with members of the Somali and East African 
community in New York to understand its effects and use patterns. Interviews in cafes 
with visiting Somalis and various East African immigrants to the US expose many 
diverse beliefs about khat's effects on its users. While some claim that khat merely gives 
added energy, others insist that a preoccupation with the drug can negatively affect 
productivity. 
Despite these divergent views, "(f)or most of the men gathered in the cafe, it 
was hard to think of khat as a drug. 'It's just like drinking strong coffee,' said the cafe 
36 Jane Perlez, "Must US Strip A Land Of Guns?", The New York Times, December 15, 1992. 
37 Geoff Prescott, "The Clans", The Sunday Times, August 30, 1992. 
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manager."38 US drug enforcement officials who are interviewed admit to paying khat 
little attention; it is in the fourth of five dangerous drug categories, along with 
prescription diet pills and valium. The depth of coverage and mix of perspectives in 
this piece is unique; its setting, however, is New York rather than Somalia. When 
investigated with regards to the situation in Somalia, khat use is never explored 
culturally or economically but seen only as fuel to the existing conflict. 
Discussion of khat was minimal but important in an ABC Nightline program on 
November 30, 1992. The program, which brought in experts to debate the possible 
challenges for American interveners in Somalia, opened with scenes of crying children 
with bloated bellies interspersed with shots of young men holding guns. Anchor 
Forrest Sawyer narrated over the images, describing "just how bad Somalia really is". 
A further report on conditions in Somalia also used montages of imagery to create a 
visual link between armed men and violence in Somalia. Shots alternated between 
Somali men holding guns and crying women and children. Footage of dead Somalis, 
including faces, were then shown, along with children fighting for bits of grain 
dropped from food sacks.39 
The US is presented as the only power capable of stopping this suffering. Sam 
Kiley, however, is interviewed as a counter voice to optimism about the ease with 
which US involvement will improve Somalia. Kiley believes that: "People will take 
potshots at them [US troops deployed to Somalia]. It's rather good fun being a teenager 
stoned on khat or valium or they're even getting hold of pharmaceutical cocaine 
now ... charging around in a 4-wheel drive Toyota Land Cruiser with a cannon on the 
back. The idea of shooting a well-muscled Marine would be tremendously thrilling to 
them."4° Combined with the information in the report, Kiley's statement positions khat 
as 'fuel to the fire' of conflict in Somalia, in much the same way as The Times item on 
August 30, 1992. The actions and motivations of groups of young armed men become 
tied specifically to drug use. Their existence throughout Somalia is not explained in 
38 Joseph B. Treaster, "From Somalia to US Khat Finds a Foothold", The New York Times, December 14, 1992. 
39 ABC news, November 30, 1992. 
40 Sam Kiley, for The Times, quoted on ABC Nightline, November 30, 1992. 
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terms of broader economic and political issues but rather is posited as the primary 
cause of famine. Such a discourse fails to acknowledge the events and impacts of the 
civil war years preceding the famine and the dynamics of the famine itself, which had 
largely been eased by the time when plans for American troops to intervene in Somalia 
were being made. 
The day before the US landing in Somalia ABC carried another feature on 
conditions in Somalia which focused extensively on khat chewing. The primary 
problem with youth chewing khat, one aid worker claims, is that it encourages them to 
cause trouble. Numerous shots are shown of young men chewing khat and driving in 
weaponized 'technicals'; one man wears a hood in a style frequently attributed to 
African American urban youth in the West. Voiceover again explains that these men 
used to have 'normal' jobs; now they earn hundreds of dollars looting or working as 
guards and are estimated to spend half of this on khat. 41 Although a few shots are 
shown of a white reporter asking questions of some Somali men who appear to be 
selling khat, for the most part the entire series of images in the item is explained 
through voiceover. (See Image 12) Again, the item does not investigate khat's historic 
place in Somali society or solicit opinions from many users. 
While khat use is mentioned in both newspapers surveyed and in ABC coverage 
of Somalia, it is almost completely absent from analysed BBC footage. Although Somali 
men in a crowd shot are shown chewing what appears to be khat, there is no particular 
mention of its use by gunmen in reports on days surrounding major news stories. The 
absence of stories on khat is in line with BBC's generally lower focus on Somali 'gangs' 
and gunmen. More time is devoted to interview footage with factional leaders, 
primarily Ali Mahdi and Aidid, and with aid workers. The result, while not giving a 
significantly different visual picture of Somalia, does provide a voice for a greater 
number of perspectives beyond the American and UN intervention leadership. 
As mentioned above, what is conspicuously missing from much media coverage 
of khat is analysis of its place in Somali culture and economics during the pre and post-
41 ABC news, December 7, 1992. 
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state collapse periods. The size of the khat market in Somalia is never explored. 
Although it is suggested that khat is widely used among young Somali men, the extent 
of its use by other segments of the population remains unclear. Photojournalist Paul 
Lowe elaborated in an interview that throughout the entire conflict and famine period 
in Somalia regular flights would arrive several times a day from Kenya and Ethiopia, 
bringing fresh khat to Somali markets. Lowe also makes the point that throughout the 
Somali famine, a variety of food remained available at market stalls, hinting at the 
extent to which the famine was a problem of access, rather than solely of shortages. 
According to Lowe, khat can be used as a key example of the fact that social and 
economic processes, though often informal, continued to exist in Somali society 
regardless of state collapse and in contrast to Western media coverage, which often 
labelled the country as an anarchic hell only salvageable by international aid workers 
and peacekeepers.42 Khat is one of many such industries and networks whose impact 
on life and the conflict in Somalia remained unexplored in media coverage. 
From Somalia to South-central: The Persistence of Black 'Ghetto' Discourses 
Media images and narratives of young, Somali men riding in weaponized 
'technical' vehicles, carrying guns and chewing khat are significant not only for the way 
in which they present conditions in Somalia but also for the ways in which they 'refer' 
to other images and narratives of national significance to Americans during the early 
1990s. Khat's portrayal in the Somalia narrative echoes the ways in which drug trading 
and drug culture has often been associated with Western ghettoized youth. The ABC 
December 7, 1992 item makes these comparisons particularly clear. Two of the Somali 
men filmed for the ABC report wear hoods in a manner frequently associated with 
American 'ghetto' street culture. (See Image 13) Some of the apparently self-aware 
posing of the men for the camera recollects the aesthetic of best-selling rap music artists 
from the time period. Accompanying comments are also significant; the voiceover 
declares that: "Until the civil war they were mechanics, farmers, school kids. Now they 
42 Author's interview with Paul Lowe, November 2005. 
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earn up to $200 a month as hired guards. They spend as much as half of that on 
khat... They say that khat makes them feel bold, more powerful. Youth, guns and khat-
it's a lethal combination."43 This comment could as easily come straight out of an 
American national media item, detailing the waste of inner-city lives in a dangerous 
culture of fast money and high risks. Any uncertainty or ambiguity about the effects of 
khat and its role as a trigger for male aggression, which is only highlighted in any depth 
in the single New York Times article, is swept aside in broad statements such as this one. 
There is little attempt to explore many of the underlying economic and social reasons 
for the existence of groups of young men and their destructive behaviour while the 
emphasis, instead, tends to be on violence, which is understood as senseless and 
irrational. 
The next day, December 8, ABC's footage of the arrival of American troops at 
dawn showed images of Somali men lying prone on the ground as media spotlights 
were shone upon them. (See Image 14) The commentary explains that these men were 
guards for media organisations and at Mogadishu's port; they were mistakenly arrested 
by US Marines told to treat all Somalis as potentially hostile. The images themselves 
are reminiscent of footage from popular docu-dramas, such as COPS and America's 
Most Wanted, which follow various American police units on both daily routines and 
special-ops such as drug-busts. 'Criminal' apprehended individuals in these programs 
are often African American or non-white while police are primarily white. These 
images from Somalia also evoke images of the violent arrest of African American 
motorist, Rodney King, an event which provoked passionate and violent debate about 
race relations in the US. This event occurred in the year preceding the Somalia 
intervention, March 1991, with subsequent events reverberating in American national 
media months afterwards. 
Despite evidence of numerous incidents of UN peacekeeper violence towards 
Somalis, the most notorious images to come out of Somalia illustrated white American 
bodies being beaten and put on display by groups of Somalis. These images revived 
43 ABC news, December 7, 1992. 
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and were used to support what this section will show is a long-standing white anxiety 
about potential'black' violence. The beating of white truck driver Reginald Denny 
during the uprisings in South-central Los Angeles following the trial verdicts in the 
Rodney King case provided support at the national level for these discourses of fear 
and racialized understandings of violence. The strength of these discourses and the 
ease with which they were used are particularly remarkable not necessarily with 
reference to the cases which confirm the stereotype, such as those mentioned above, but 
with the videotaped and supposedly 'obvious' case of a reverse situation of white-on-
black violence, the case of Rodney King. The reinterpretation of Rodney King's beating 
from a shocking and offensive example of racism, which virtually no one on the 
American political spectrum could tolerate, to a case of the proper application of police 
practices against a potentially violent, brutal and drug-fuelled offender is relevant for 
understanding the ways in which Somali 'victims' could be re-conceptualized as people 
inherently prone to violence and suffering. 
The setting of South-central Los Angeles in the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
already discursively compared, often by both 'sides' of the conflict, to the terrain of 
urban warfare, subterfuge and 'gang' style activities that later came to characterize 
media descriptions of Mogadishu, especially during the 1993 summer of the hunt for 
Aidid. Like many Mogadishu citizens, residents of South-central were subject to 
sudden 'search and destroy' missions. While the American Special Forces in 
Mogadishu hunted Aidid and his supporters, high-tech branches of the Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) aimed to eradicate drug-trading gangs occasionally referred 
to by local politicians and police officers as "the murderous militias of Beirut" and "the 
VietCong abroad in our society".44 Similar politicized and racialized names were 
applied to Somali groups. 
The extent to which urban, predominantly black areas were perceived as hostile 
spaces of violence and chaos, whether discussing South-central or Mogadishu outside 
the UN/US compound, was also made evident through geographic discourses. An 
44 Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Pimlico, 1998), 268. 
250 
example is provided in a statement by the defence lawyer of LAPD officer Laurence 
Powell. In the first trial, he summed up the streets of South-central as "the jungle out 
there."45 In both cases, there were a variety of social, political and economic reasons for 
·the problems faced by these areas. Much of Mogadishu's infrastructure had been 
destroyed by some of the worst of the civil war fighting during the ousting of Siad 
Barre; the city was divided along factional lines and had no fully accepted governing 
bodies, making the creation of stable jobs and the provision of even basic necessities 
major challenges for residents. South-central had faced hundreds of thousands of job 
losses throughout the 1980s, as industry moved from the blue-collar sectors of the 
developed to the cheaper labour of the developing world. New immigrant groups to 
the region, such as Latinos and Koreans, largely replaced blacks in the remaining 
minimum wage jobs where they had been strongly represented. According to John 
Fiske, the fifty percent black male unemployment rate in South-central therefore did 
not appear to many living there to have been created by "the raceless free market, but 
by racism recoded into economics".46 In practical terms, both situations created little 
opportunity for employment outside of 'informal' industries, such as the drug trade or 
the looting and selling of aid supplies. 
Both environments were fraught with tension which there had been little or no 
attempt to ease through non-violent means at the time of their uprisings. As mentioned 
above, Mogadishu residents had been subjected to routine American air attacks against 
buildings thought to house the fugitive Aidid or his supporters. These attacks had 
killed many uninvolved bystanders and created a high level of resentment towards US 
and UN forces. In several cases, Somali casualties were not acknowledged by UN 
personnel when reporting these incidents to Western media. No non-military 
organisation had been set up to deal with abuse complaints by Somali citizens against 
UN personnel in the country. Although some high profile cases of abuse against 
Somalis were made public after the bulk of the foreign intervention in Somalia was 
45 John Fiske, Media Matters: Race and Gender in US Politics (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 
146. 
46 Fiske, Media Matters, 153. 
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over, Africa Watch director Alex De Waal has noted that very few trials and sentences 
were ever carried out.47 These reports of abuse went almost completely uncovered by 
mainstream Western media, both at the time of the intervention and afterwards.48 
Citizens in South-central had faced a difficult decade in the 1980s, as the growth 
of the crack cocaine trade had been used to justify increasingly violent police 'sweeps' 
through the neighbourhood. Both before and after the uprisings following the King 
verdict, many black men articulated their fear and hatred of the police where it was 
possible to do so, often through rap music but also through media which allowed their 
voices to be heard. They almost universally explained that these emotions had 
developed through regular incidents of harassment by police. For many African 
Americans, such harassment and suspicious treatment were not confined to police 
forces but extended into the job market, government and consumer spheres. The fatal 
shooting of South-central black teenager Latasha Harlins by a Korean shopkeeper, who 
was given a fine and public service sentence rather than jail time, was perceived by 
many African Americans across the US to be yet another example of the ways in which 
the American justice system did not produce justice for specific racial groups.49 
The infamous Rodney King video was filmed on March 3, 1991, when, after a 
brief case, King was pulled over for speeding. King was confronted by twenty-one 
police officers from California Highway Patrol and the LAPD. In full view of all 
present, King was severely beaten by three white LAPD officers. The incident was 
recorded by a citizen witness, George Holliday, on a home video camera without the 
47 Alex De Waal, "US War Crimes in Somalia", New Left Review, July (1998): 137. Also see the De Waal 
article for the more general information above on failures to acknowledge Somali casualties. 
48 An important exception to this statement, as noted by De Waal, is the beating death of Somali teenager, 
Shidane Arone at the hands of a regiment of Canadian peacekeepers. Arone's death prompted a major 
national trial and media investigation in Canada and resulted in the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne 
Regiment, whose members were shown to have exhibited deeply disturbing racist and violent behaviour 
both in Somalia and at home in Canada, htt:p:Uarchives.cbc.ca/IDC-1-71-723-4320/conflict war/somalia/ 
(accessed May 17, 2007). 
49 Fiske, Media Matters, 159. According to Fiske, video surveillance cameras in the store showed Harlins 
carrying a bottle of orange juice to the shop counter. Harlins and shop owner Soon Ja Du appear to have a 
verbal altercation. Du grabs Harlins's sweater and yells at her; Harlins hits Du three times in the head. Du 
throws a stool at Harlins. Harlins puts the bottle on the counter, turns and begins to walk away. Du pulls 
a gun from beneath the counter and fires. The bullet hits Harlins in the back of the head and kills her. 
252 
officers' realization and was sold to a local television station. This particular instance of 
police brutality was thus made visible to large audiences and rendered important, 
individual and significant "despite the fact that the city [of LA] paid more than $20 
million between 1986-90 in judgments, settlements and jury verdicts against Los 
Angeles police officers in over 300 lawsuits dealing with the excessive use of force." 50 
For the majority of African Americans in LA, such evidence was not needed to 
convince them that police brutality against blacks occurred; this was known already, 
often through personal experience. What created hope for many about the videotape 
was that it would satisfy 'the law' and white-dominated institutions that this violence 
indeed occurred. 51 Fiske highlights the politicization and contestation of thevisual in 
this inddent, along with the Denny beating and the shooting of Harlins; "(t)he trials 
were trials by and of video, of what each did and did not show, and of what meanings 
could and could not be made out of what it showed."52 
New events in the build-up to the trial of the officers and discussion regarding 
historic racism and corruption in the LAPD were mainly told in mainstream media 
through narratives of romantic redemption. According to Ronald Jacobs, although 
different heroes and anti-heroes were chosen by various media the trial was presented 
as an event that would offer a cathartic conclusion to the horrors of the videotape. 
There was a clear expectation in most mainstream media that the officers would be 
found guilty and that the concerns of the African American community regarding 
police racism could be resolved through the law and 'normal' political channels. 53 
Much research surrounding the Rodney King trial has explored the ways this 
initial consensus on the 'horror' of the video was shaken and altered in court by a re-
interpretation of the tape itself by the police officers' defence teams. For each of these 
50 Ronald N. Jacobs, Race, Media and the Crisis of Civil Society: From Watts to Rodney King (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 81. 
s1 Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, "Reel Time/Real Justice" in Reading Rodney King/Reading Urban 
Uprising, ed. Robert Gooding-Williams, 65 (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
52 Fiske, Media Matters, 126. 
53 For information here and in above paragraph, see Jacobs, Race, Media and the Crisis of Civil Society, 17 & 
84-105. 
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studies, conclusions were similar.54 The defence's strategy involved breaking down the 
tapes into a series of still shots. The low-quality sound on the tape, where some racial 
and sexual slurs made by police officers could be heard, was removed altogether by the 
defence team and replaced with technocratic voiceover. Importantly, King was not 
present at the original trial and thus was not allowed to speak and respond for himself. 
King was shown to have brought each level of police response onto himself 
through his own actions. What had originally appeared for many watching the tape as 
self-protective reactions to blows and the infliction of a fifty thousand watt Taser strike 
were frozen and isolated to become King's attempts to respond violently against police; 
"This discursive strategy puts Blacks in control of their own subordination through 
their control over the degree of their submissiveness, and erases white power and 
responsibility from the picture."55 King's body itself was described alternately through 
gun metaphors, making his prone body into a potential weapon, and through 
references to his 'bear-like' qualities, evoking images of a huge, hunted and injured 
animal which might make a sudden desperate attempt to survive and injure its 
hunters. 56 While King later described his movements as actions he took "just trying to 
stay alive", a response that many African Americans could relate to, white jurors were 
led to different conclusions. According to a book chapter by Judith Butler, one juror 
was later to say that King had in fact "been in total control" of his entire beating. Such 
a dramatic shift in the reading of the King video relied on the defence's tapping into 
persistent currents of historic American racism: 
The fear is that some physical distance will be crossed, and the virgin 
sanctity of whiteness will be endangered by that proximity. The police 
are thus structurally placed to protect whiteness against violence, 
where violence is the imminent action of that black male body. And 
because within this imaginary schema, the police protect whiteness, 
their own violence cannot be read as violence; because the black male 
body, prior to any video, is the site and source of danger, a threat, the 
54 See Fiske, Media Matters; Gooding-Williams ed., Reading Rodney King/Reading Urban Uprising; and Jacobs, 
Race, Media and the Crisis of Civil Society. 
55 Fiske, Media Matters, 134. 
56 Gooding-Williams, "Look, a Negro!", 166. 
police effort to subdue this body, even if in advance, is justified 
regardless of the circumstances.s7 
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After the not-guilty verdicts were delivered, many in the South-central black 
community 'spoke' their rage and frustration at the verdicts through a variety of 
means, including the setting of fires and looting of stores in the South-central area. The 
verdicts shook the liberal mainstream media's belief in its own abilities to bring about 
reform; high public disapproval ratings of the verdict were reported alongside 'man on 
the street' interviews and the criticism of many experts and policymakers. Coverage of 
the 'uprisings' or 'riots', however, presented these events as unrelated to the King 
verdict. Jacobs explains that much media coverage approached the subject through the 
tragic geme; none of the 1960s issues of the urban black underclasses had been 
resolved; "Romance was undercoded throughout the crisis in all the news publics, 
encouraging a sense of tragic resignation, fatalism and, ultimately, inaction."58 For 
Robert Gooding-Williams, neither the liberal nor the conservative interpretations of the 
uprisings dealt with the King issue. For conservatives, the 'rioting' was an act of 
"repressed opportunism just waiting for an excuse to flout the law"; the liberal view 
emphasized some social causes of the uprising. Like the conservative view, however, it 
did not see the rioting as having to do with moral indignation over the outcome of the 
King verdicts.59 The 'rioting' was read as 'senseless' and 'chaotic' despite recorded and 
mediatized accounts of participants. 
Participants, when asked, spoke of the targeting of specific businesses for 
looting and burning, the ethos of respect and helpfulness among 'looters', the many 
community members who did not loot but supported the actions, and the South-central 
community's need to be heard by whatever means necessary. While Oprah Winfrey 
stood out in her willingness to allow 'rioters' and 'looters' to speak on her television 
talk show program, her position while hosting the program was to equate the looting 
57 Judith Butler, "Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia", in Reading Rodney 
King/Reading Urban Uprising, ed. Robert Gooding-Williams,18 (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
58 Jacobs, Race, Media and the Crisis of Civil Society, 114. 
s9 Gooding-Williams, "Look, a Negro!", 169. 
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with stealing and to see no possible reason for it. A black woman speaking on 
Winfrey's program expressed regret for the way in which Korean-American businesses 
had been targeted by looters but pressed the point that the uprisings had gained 
important national attention. "We are here, we are here,"60 she insisted, likely referring 
not only to her own and other South-central residents' presence on national television 
but also alluding to the attention gained from white Americans because of the 
uprising's mediatization. 
Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the Rodney King story was its lack of long term 
impact on American race relations, at least in the discursive realm of political 
administration and policymaking. Cultural theorist Cornel West points out that the 
urban upheaval in LA was not mentioned at all during presidential debates later in 
1992, illustrating in his mind how difficult it was to fit issues raised by the uprisings 
into existing political discourses. For West and many other intellectuals, neither the 
standard liberal model of inclusion nor the conservative model of merited acceptance of 
blacks into American society can be acceptable, for neither acknowledges that African 
Americans are not merely additions or detractors from 'America' but a constitutive 
element of American life.61 In other terms, blacks must no longer be seen as a 'problem 
people' and their past and potential contributions to various aspects of American life 
must be viewed as relevant and valued. Gooding-Williams suggests that: "For many 
whites ... black speech is not the speech of fellow citizens, but the always-complaining 
speech of spoiled children."62 
This particular statement resonates with the tone of many media reports about 
Somalis, another group of disempowered black citizens, half a world away but also 
involved in confrontational relations with American authorities. In returning to 
narratives of Somalia, the American media experience of the Rodney King incident and 
uprisings can be used as an interesting comparative moment to explore continuities in 
60 Extract from Fiske, Media Matters, 174. 
61 Cornel West, "Learning to Talk of Race", in Reading Rodney King/Reading Urban Uprising, ed. Robert 
Gooding-Williams, 256 (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
62 Gooding-Williams, "Look, a Negro!", 170. 
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racialized images and narratives. Despite the fact that they originated from a 
profoundly different part of the world, visual and rhetorical strategies used to represent 
groups of 'black' people as violent and socially destructive were similar in stories about 
Somalis, particularly men, and Rodney King. Voicing-over specifically chosen images 
of black males allowed white producers control over how the images 'spoke'; older 
narratives which linked 'black' bodies to inherent violence and child-like tendencies 
were evoked. Various calls to recognise the 'truth' of image-based evidence actually 
ended up illustrating the possibilities for politicization and multiple readings of specific 
events. 
In both cases, the use of the tragic genre of narrative works to minimize the 
social, economic and political context in which events occur. The tragedies of blacks 
acting out violently despite the 'reasonable' actions of predominately white American 
soldiers and police to do their jobs and in contravention of 'normal' laws and behaviour 
encourage simplistic interpretations of this hugely diverse 'group' of people as 
ungrateful, inherently violent and 'doomed' to their difficult situations. The extensive 
use of quotation marks in the previous sentences is deliberate to re-enforce the view 
that many of these categories of people and concepts are constantly contestable and 
fluid; their use is inevitably political. The above analysis is intended to emphasise the 
importance of the socio-economic and political spheres in which various identities are 
created and applied to certain groups. For the purposes of this work, it is the enduring 
nature of the 'blacks as violent and hopeless social group' narrative which is important 
to consider and challenge. As will be seen in the following section, as violence 
increased in Mogadishu after the attacks on Pakistani peacekeepers, residents were 
often represented as having provoked UN and American attacks by engaging in violent 
actions against UN troops. For Somalis, however, these attacks were understood in a 
dramatically different way, one which only increased animosity between the groups. 
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Warfare in Mogadishu: Somalis As Threat & Under Threat 
Initial reports regarding the June 1993 fighting between forces loyal to Aidid 
and the Pakistani peacekeepers were focused on recounting the events that had 
occurred and describing Western responses to these events. This approach emphasised 
quotes from UN and American policymakers rather than from most other involved 
parties in the attacks. From the beginning, therefore, concern over the impacts of 
increased tensions in Mogadishu was primarily focused on American and UN forces. 
The humanitarian role of these forces in Mogadishu was stated in the form of 
background information in many articles on the attacks, working to highlight the 
senselessness of such violence against those who had merely come to help Somalis. 
The communications failures and frustrations of the intervention, which had led 
to growing Somali suspicion and resentment of foreign peacekeeping forces, were not 
often discussed in media items after the attacks, which were understood instead in 
terms of their strategy and benefits for the 'warlord' Aidid. The attacks were thus often 
seen as evidence of the renewed danger posed by factional Somali leaders as opposed 
to being investigated as a possible indication of the dissatisfaction and unease of Somali 
citizens with the UN intervention. Several weeks of 'hunting' for Aidid passed before 
Western media in Somalia began to question the appropriateness of these attacks; this 
questioning became consistent only after fractures appeared between key policymakers 
in the US and UN. While print journalism continued to cover events during the 'hunt 
for Aidid' with some regularity, television journalism decreased considerably, meaning 
that many Western citizens had little knowledge of the deteriorating situation in 
Mogadishu until it was largely unrecoverable. 
The New York Times' June 6 report on the incident included the unofficial 
Pakistani casualty toll at that time, twenty-six killed and ten missing, but did also 
mention reports from Mogadishu's hospitals on numbers of Somali casualties, reported 
at twenty-three killed and over 100 wounded. The article described the fighting as 
occurring because of rumours amongst the Somali population that UN troops were 
planning to occupy Aidid's radio station and attacks involving several groups of UN 
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forces are said to have occurred throughout the capital afterwards.63 No visual footage 
of the attacks themselves was aired. A June 6 BBC lead story on the events used 
voiceover with shots of armed Pakistani peacekeepers in vehicles to explain what was 
known about the story. Imagery of Somalis is confined to a brief image of Aidid in a 
crowd of cheering, mainly male supporters. No indication is given of when this shot 
was taken, but its use throughout later coverage suggests that it became a 'stock' image 
to represent the Somali leader.64 
By June 7, the UN Security Council had condemned the attacks and published a 
report on them which called for the arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and 
punishment of those responsible. Aidid and his supporters were stated to be the prime 
suspects. The report immediately became a source of quotable statements for media; 
both newspapers highlighted the deliberateness of the fighting. According to The New 
York Times, quoting UN officials, it was a "'a calculated, premeditated series of major 
ceasefire violations' that were intended to 'challenge and intimidate' United Nations 
forces in Mogadishu."65 Although Aidid was personally named as accountable for the 
attacks, descriptions of the fighting routinely mentioned the involvement of crowds of 
civilians at several different locations, hinting that civilian support for such actions 
could be easily found. Detailed description of the attacks in The New York Times' June 7 
item described some Somalis as deliberately inciting crowds to violence during the UN 
inspections and noted that some weapons were found to be missing from the depots. 
Pakistani and Somali casualty figures vary across The Times and The New York Times, 
depending on whether the decision was made to include numbers killed and wounded 
on both sides or only one figure for each. This inclusion or exclusion can be used in a 
variety of ways to emphasize or downplay losses on either side. A still image 
accompanying the June 7 article showed a Somali boy tossing a muffler into the burned 
wreckage of a vehicle in Mog<)dishu, emphasizing the destructive nature of the fighting 
and the "lawlessness" of Mogadishu, which was described in a following article on 
63 
"26 UN Troops Reported Dead in Somalia Combat", The New York Times, June 6, 1993. 
64 BBC 9 o'clock news, June 6, 1993. 
65 Paul Lewis, "UN Asks Arrests Of Somalia Killers", The New York Times, June 7, 1993. 
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June 8.66 Similar images in February 1993 had showed violent, anti-US/UN 
demonstrations in Mogadishu, which were again said to have been encouraged by 
Aidid. Photos of these events in The New York Times are strongly reminiscent of LA riot 
images; a front page image on February 25, 1993 depicts a single black man running 
against a burning, urban background, again highlighting the state of' chaos' Mogadishu 
has been reduced to by its own residents. 
Despite Aidid' s denials of any role in the battles, both newspapers suggested 
that these incidents delivered "a clear warning of things to come from Somali 
warlords"67 and predicted continued tension in Mogadishu and retaliation from UN 
forces. Discourses and terminology which placed Somalis in the role of disobedient 
and ungrateful children were an occasional part of Western policymaking and media 
reported these comments. A June 15, 1993 Times article quotes a senior Washington 
official saying of Aidid and his forces: "We are going to smack them as they need to be 
smacked, hitting them as circumstances demand."68 
Early television reports of the incident announced many of the same facts as the 
newspapers were reporting; however, the absence of Somali comment and 'reading' of 
the events was also made visually obvious. BBC's June 6 coverage of the events 
primarily featured sound bites from the UN officials in New York and images of 
Pakistani troops in non-combat situations.69 On June 7, BBC news that two Somalis had 
died after being shot by Pakistanis was introduced using a still shot of a young Somali 
man in a black headscarf behind a large gun on the back of a truck. The only imagery 
of Somalis in the entire item showed four Somalis in brightly coloured dress running 
away from the camera through shrub and bits of destroyed buildings. Again, 
numerous shots are shown of Pakistani troops, mostly preparing defences against what 
are called "carefully planned attacks" by Somalis. A Pakistani general is interviewed 
and says that the trust his troops worked hard to build with Somalis is destroyed and 
66 Donatella Lorch, "UN Moves Troops to Somali City and Vows Punishment for Attack", The New York 
Times, June 8,1993. 
67 Sam Kiley &James Bone, "UN Moves to Crack Down on Somali Warlords", The Times, June 7,1993. 
68 Sam Kiley," Aidid Offers Talks As UN Rocket Injures Civilians", The Times, June 15, 1993. 
69 BBC 9 o'clock news, June 6, 1993. 
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that UN troops are justified in being more cautious. The item ends with imagery of two 
Somali men seen attempting to fix an old military jeep; voiceover explains that the UN's 
current levels of weapons aren't enough to allow troops to respond adequately to 
potential Somali attacks and should be increased.70 Although this item opens with a 
description of the shooting deaths of Somalis, the almost complete visual focus on 
Pakistani troops, along with the interview with their general, function to confer 
legitimacy and credibility with the Pakistanis. The primary Somali image in the item is 
one of a gunman, representative of nearly all major threats to international personnel 
and Somalis alike, rather than a civilian. Thus, a stated incident of violence against 
Somalis is represented with images of Somali aggression. 
After the UN began to take retaliatory actions against parts of Mogadishu in an 
effort to forcibly weaken and disarm Aidid, images of Somalis became more common 
but the identification of Somalis as threats to UN troops also increased. On June 12, 
1993, US forces launched air strikes as part of the UN' s response to the killings of the 
Pakistanis. An ABC report on the strikes illustrates the bombings taking place with 
images of troops watching large explosions in the distance and with shots of helicopters 
in the air. General Montgomery, a key US military figure in Somalia, is quoted calling 
the attacks "extremely successful" and the item's narrative declares that they will be a 
"blow against lawlessness and killing". Although he was again said to be a key figure 
responsible for the violence, the item claims there are no plans to arrest Aidid, instead 
shots are shown of US troops with arrested Somali citizens on the backs of trucks. 
Angry Somali crowds, including women, are also portrayed setting up burning 
barricades; a dead Somali body is depicted, allegedly killed by UN troops. Voiceover 
explains that Somalis are demanding to know why the UN is attacking them.71 
A BBC report on June 12 also initially highlighted the extent and scope of the air 
strikes and mentioned the taking of 200 prisoners in an attempt to destroy "criminal 
elements" in Somalia. Images of weapons and vehicles allegedly confiscated by UN 
7o BBC 9 o'clock news, June 7, 1993. 
n ABC news, June 12, 1993. 
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forces are shown along with shots of Somali captives sitting under US guard and being 
moved on the backs of trucks. Like ABC, this item also calls these UN missions 
"successes", but acknowledges that they were not popular with Somali citizens who 
must be kept supportive of the UN mission. Similar shots to those on ABC are shown 
but in greater depth; crowds of demonstrating women, men and children are imaged 
ducking for cover and shots are heard. An injured woman is shown being dragged 
away and is said to have died later in hospital.72 (See Images lSi and 15ii) 
The issue of UN forces shooting at crowds alleged to be peaceful demonstrators 
recurred for several days in television coverage, probably because of the continuation 
of the air strikes. BBC' s June 13 nightly news program opened with this issue; the 
initial image in the report shows Somalis carrying an injured person to safety. Images 
of dead Somali bodies are also shown later in the item.73 ABC's June 14 news program 
also included immediate footage of a demonstrating crowd. Somalis yell at the filming 
camera as they drag a victim to safety and images of a charred body along with dead 
and injured are shown.74 In both cases, the footage is taken under tense conditions and 
appears shaky and slightly blurred at times, emphasizing the dangers of the situation 
and, by extension, the dangers of Somali streets and those on them. No shots are 
shown of UN troops firing at Somalis, although audiences are told that this has 
occurred. Voiceover is used in both cases, rather than any interview footage with 
Somali civilians or leaders. 
While they do not provide Somali civilians with a place for any comment on 
events, these items hint at the differing interpretations of the Aidid-capture mission by 
Somalis and UN and US forces. For Somalis living in Aidid-controlled areas of 
Mogadishu, the air strikes appeared to be aimed not only at Aidid but also at them. 
Although UN rhetoric stressed that the air strikes were geared only at destroying 
Aidid's weapons stores, the strikes lacked the desired precision and resulted in civilian 
deaths and further infrastructure destruction. For many UN policymakers in Somalia, 
72 BBC 9 o'clock news, June 12, 1992. 
73 BBC 9 o'clock news, June 13, 1992 
74 ABC news, June 14, 1993. 
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success or failure of the mission in Somalia had become tied to the capture of Aidid. 
Somali citizens were an ongoing source of problems to which they no longer knew how 
to respond. The situation became especially difficult as Somali 'threats' to troops 
increasingly appeared not simply classifiable as young men on jeeps with guns but as 
all members of the population. 
There-inscription of the entire Somali population as 'threat' was made even 
clearer in the print coverage of both newspapers. Television coverage does not deal 
with this issue explicitly but, as mentioned above, does show mixed crowds of Somali 
men, women and children as participants in anti-UN demonstrations. On June 8, an 
article in The Times referenced the commander of the Pakistani troops explaining that 
his men had "been pinned down when they came under attack from three sides in a 
well-organised ambush. They had been unable to return fire because of the shield of 
women and children."75 A June 14, 1993 New York Times article confirmed this 
perspective, arguing that on June 5 Pakistanis had been killed because they were shot at 
"from behind a screen of women and children."76 
After these events, Pakistani troops in particular but also UN troops in general 
were said to consider any crowd of Somalis as a potential threat, raising tension during 
the already minimal amount of time that troops interacted with Somali citizens. The 
declaration by several key policymakers and by media outlets that women and children 
were being used as 'human shields' left ambiguous the issue of whether these shields 
were willing participants in the fighting or not. While there was acknowledgement, 
particularly in print coverage, that Somali demonstrations were linked to anger about 
UN bombings, the involvement of women and children in the fighting threatened to 
tum a number of those who had been previously seen as 'victims' of the Somali conflict 
into combatants and threats. At the very least, this practice was cited to suggest that 
Aidid's forces were using 'guerrilla' and 'terrorist' tactics to fight the UN. A New York 
Times article on June 20, 1993 points out that the 'human shield' approach "exploit(s) 
75 Sam Kiley & James Bone, "UN Forces Come Under Renewed Attack in Somalia", 11Je Times, June 8, 1993. 
76 Eric Schmitt, "US Expresses Regret At Shooting Of Somalis", 11Je New York Times, June 14, 1993. 
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the unwillingness of the United Nations soldiers to open fire on civilians"77, allowing 
much smaller Somali forces to inflict losses on better-armed UN and US troops. 
Other brutal tactics used by Aidid' s Somali forces, such as torture and 
mutilation of bodies, were also occasionally hinted at, primarily in print stories which 
routinely went into greater depth than television items. A New York Times article on 
June 17, while mentioning the numbers of Pakistani casualties, adds that "many of the 
dead Pakistanis were mutilated"78 without any further detail. This statement is further 
elaborated in Lorch's June 20, 1993 item: "On June 5, when a wounded Pakistani 
captain was captured by Mr. Aidid's men, they mutilated him while he was still alive, 
said Lieut. Brian Mcinerney, the United States Army liaison officer with the 
Pakistanis."79 While no further mention was made of mutilation at this point, this issue 
was to return with the downing of Black Hawk helicopters later. 
Media coverage of Somalia from June 1993 onwards was reduced almost 
exclusively to Aidid-hunting events in Mogadishu. On September 10, a particularly 
violent event occurred when UN troops, including a contingent of US forces, were 
attacked while trying to clear a roadblock. According to Maj. David Stockwell, the chief 
UN spokesman in Mogadishu, Pakistani and American forces were justified in opening 
fire on the crowds, including women and children; mwe saw all the people swarming 
on the vehicles as combatants,' he was quoted as saying in news agency reports. 
'We've seen this before. If they reach our soldiers they tear them limb from limb."'80 
This comment recalls statements made earlier about the brutality of Somali fighters and 
the alleged mutilation of Pakistani bodies in June. The article also discusses the issue of 
whether some women in the mixed crowds of civilians and fighters should be 
considered "armed collaborators" rather than as angry civilians. The article ends with a 
77 Donatella Lorch," Aidid's Forces Still Strong, UN Aides in Somalia Say", The New York Times, June 20, 
1993. 
78 Donatella Lorch, "Somali Clan Chief Poses Tough Problem for UN", The New York Times, June 17, 1993. 
79 Donatella Lorch, "Aidid' s Forces Still Strong, UN Aides in Somalia Say", The New York Times, June 20, 
1993. 
80 Michael R. Gordon, "US Troops Fire on Somalis; Death Toll May Reach 100", The New York Times, 
September 10, 1993. Further Stockwell comments to this effect were published in The Times- Sam Kiley, 
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description of the American Congress' push to remove US troops from Somalia. The 
new legislative consensus appeared to be that Somalis could not be worked with 
politically and that continued involvement in the country risked American deaths, 
which were worth more than those of Somalis. 
The first downing of a Black Hawk helicopter in late September built on already 
existing narratives and images of dangerous Somali threats in urban Mogadishu and 
ended up being an example of things to come. On September 26, 1993 both newspapers 
reported the downing of a US helicopter, along with claims that "jubilant" crowds of 
Somalis danced around the wreckage holding pieces of metal, burnt human flesh and a 
charred torso. 81 The Pentagon's insistence that the remains of the American soldiers 
had been safely recovered was recognised in both stories yet this corrective information 
did not alter the sense of Somali 'barbarity' suggested by the incident. A photo 
accompanying the article in The New York Times showed Somalis holding up a piece of 
an American helicopter but the caption also mentioned that Somalis claimed to be 
holding burnt flesh as well. UN spokesman Maj. Stockwell, quoted in another New 
York Times article, was unable to confirm the rumours of body parts being paraded one 
way or another but declared that: "If they are bragging and boasting, if it's true, then 
these people are barbaric and animalistic."82 
While The New York Times mentioned the pull-out of many aid and media 
organisations from Mogadishu because of high levels of threat, a Times article by Paul 
Watson during this period focused on the story of a single US Marine to illustrate 
defiance against Somali violence. Major Mike Collier, known to be especially tough on 
Somali gunmen, describes his adversaries in dismissive terms: 111These guys ... they're 
fighting for money,' he said. 'We are US Marines willing to die for a cause. All they 
understand and respect is intimidation and brute force."'83 Collier's failure to recognise 
8I Donatella Lorch, "Hunted Somali General Lashes Out", The New York Times, September 26, 1993 and Paul 
Watson, "UN's Big Tobacco Becomes Somalia's Most Wanted Man", The Sunday Times, September 26, 1993. 
82 Eric Schmitt, "US Vows to Stay in Somalia Force Despite An Attack", The New York Times, September 26, 
1993. 
83 Paul Watson, "UN's Big Tobacco Becomes Somalia's Most Wanted Man", The Sunday Times, September 
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any .underlying rationality or 'cause' for the Somalis' anger and his downplaying of 
Somali capabilities taps into broader issues of American overconfidence in their 
technological and strategic advantages over Somalis. While Somalis were 
acknowledged to be a threat on the streets of Mogadishu, the American sense of 
security in its air advantage meant that, while Somalis were viewed as destructive to 
peace-building and the lives of some UN personnel, they were not yet seen as a serious 
danger to many American lives. (See Image 16) 
Although he is slightly caricatured in the article as a gone-native cowboy figure, 
Collier nevertheless emerges from the article as an individual of commitment, in his 
own words, to the safety of Somali children, while the Somalis themselves appear 
random, brutal and unorganised. They are primarily portrayed by Western interveners 
and media coverage as 'urban guerrillas', 'terrorists' and 'rag-tag militias'. Somalis' 
unifying sentiment of anti-UN and American feeling, tied as it was into much older 
currents of anti-colonialism, was not taken seriously until many more lives had been 
lost on both sides. 
'Black Hawk Down': Images of 'Savagery' & Ungratefulness 
Seen through this chronology, the events of 'Black Hawk down' merely 
confirmed what many Western media consumers would already have been encouraged 
to believe. Somalia was a region in total disarray, populated by selfish warlords who 
would not 'reasonably' negotiate and by a brutal population, including women and 
children, who readily attacked those who carne to help them. Although other 
alternatives to this scenario were available, especially in print coverage, the media's 
interest in the Somalia story had not been consistent throughout 1993; consequently 
many media readers and viewers were only to 'return' to Somalia as a result of the 
circulation of the controversial and powerful 'Black Hawk down' images. 
The full-scale of the 'Black Hawk down' incident was not apparent for many 
hours after the crashes and fighting. The release of the images was a key factor. On 
October 4, ABC showed what it labelled German video footage of Somalis applauding 
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as bodies of US troops were dragged through dusty streets; ABC reported twelve killed, 
seventy-eight wounded and twelve missing.84 Paul Watson, a Toronto Star reporter who 
had been able to capture some of the images, narrated over the footage: "I saw one 
[body] being pulled by ropes for about 10 minutes. A second body, burnt beyond 
recognition, was being pulled by small crowds of children."85 Images of Somali women 
and children are shown smiling at the US bodies at this point. BBC' s October 5 footage 
also showed extensive footage of Somali crowds beating the downed helicopter 
wreckage. A white body described as that of an American pilot is also shown being 
dragged along a dirt road; children chase the body and jump and play on the helicopter 
wreckage.86 In both cases, these images are immediately contrasted with close-ups of 
captured pilot Mike Durant, looking beaten and nervous. The juxtaposition of the 
dragged bodies, whose faces are not visible, with the isolated face of Durant works to 
individualise and humanize the dead, missing, and kidnapped American troops, The 
Somalis are described as a "mob" in BBC coverage. (See Images 17i, ii, iii and 18) 
Times coverage echoed this sentiment in an October 5 article, commenting that 
Somalis were "gloating" and "parading" the corpses.87 The New York Times described 
events in more 'neutral' language, only mentioning Somalis "watching" as a US 
soldier's body was dragged through the street with rope. The paper showed an image 
of this scene on its front page, along with a screen capture of Durant's face on a later 
page, on October 5, 1993.88 In a further article that day, a photo appeared of Somalis 
displaying camouflage trousers they claimed belonged to a dead US soldier. This 
particular emphasis on American troops as individuals and on Somali citizens as an 
'evil' "mob" was also evident in Ridley Scott's blockbuster film interpretation of the 
events. As Debbie Lisle and Andrew Pepper suggest in their work on the film: "Set 
against the well-meaning and disciplined US forces are hoards of ill-disciplined, gun-
84 ABC news, October 4, 1993. 
85 Ibid. 
86 BBC 9 o'clock news, October 5, 1993. 
87 Martin Fletcher & Eve-Ann Prentice, "Gloating Somalis Parade Corpses of US Servicemen", T11e Times, 
October 5, 1993. 
88 R.W. Apple Jr., "Clinton Sending Reinforcements After Heavy Losses in Somalia", The New York Times, 
October 5, 1993. 
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toting Somalis cast in none-too-subtle terms as marauding savages."89 With only a few 
exceptions, Somali characters in the film are unidentified. They function as unspecified 
enemies for American forces to attack and be attacked by; they routinely appear 
accompanied by 'ethnic' music, without any dialogue. 
The dragging images were quickly deemed to be too disturbing for mainstream 
viewing and images of the dragged bodies were not shown again on BBC 9 o'clock 
news after October 5. After their initial October 4 showing on ABC, the only 
subsequent coverage on this station which showed the dragging images was a late-
night Nightline special programme on the 'Black Hawk down' events. If this decision 
was based on issues of good-taste it would be contestable, given that images had been 
regularly shown of dead Somalis who had died during the famine, been killed in 
Somali fighting or by UN forces. Media censoring of the footage was likely based on 
fears that American families might recognise their missing loved ones. 
Discussions regarding Somali citizens in the aftermath of 'Black Hawk down' 
were minimal; much media interest was instead devoted to predicting the future of the 
UN mission and to policy critiques and tributes to lost loved ones by relatives of 
American soldiers killed in the incident. While the numbers of dead and wounded 
American troops were established within a few hours of the event, Somali casualties 
were difficult to pinpoint and thus took time to be reported. Red Cross estimates 
released by The New York Times on October 6, 1993 suggested anywhere from 500 to 700 
Somalis had been killed, as the bulk of the fighting had taken place in a heavily-
populated area of south Mogadishu.90 By October 14, a figure of 300 killed had been 
settled on, with up to 700 treated in hospitals; one third of the victims were women and 
children.91 A single New York Times article on December 8, 1993 made an attempt to 
discover the number of Somali casualties inflicted by both the hunt for Aidid and the 
89 Debbie Lisle and Andrew Pepper, "The New Face of Global Hollywood: Black Hawk Down and the 
Politics of Meta-Sovereignty", Cultural Politics 1, is. 2 (2005): 174. 
90 Donatella Lorch, "The Somalia Mission; Somali General Denounces Further Peace Talks", The New York 
Times, October 6, 1993. 
91 John H. Cushman Jr., "Death Toll About 300 in Oct. 3 US-Somali Battle", T1le New York Times, October.14, 
1993. 
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'Black Hawk down' events. Robert Oakley and Maj. Gen. Anthony Zinni, after talks 
with Aidid and rival clans, estimated that there were between 6,000 and 10,000 Somali 
casualties in the four month period of the manhunt; "General Zinni said that two-
thirds of the casualties were women or children, many of whom were used as shields 
by militia fighters, and that a vast majority occurred in southern Mogadishu, General 
Aidid's stronghold."92 While the October 6, 1993 New York Times article quoted Maj. 
Stockwell as calling the displaying of American bodies "very barbaric", New York Times 
coverage turned almost immediately to the American foreign policy implications of the 
incident. Polls appeared to show that Americans were not interested in exacting violent 
revenge on Somalis but merely wanted to leave the country to deal with its own 
problems. Several New York Times articles quoted Aidid urging Somalis to defend 
themselves against "colonialism", but this quote tended to be cited without much or 
any further interpretation. 
Media interest in 'Black Hawk down' had been overwhelmingly focused on the 
incident's implications for American multilateralism and the future of UN 
peacekeeping. Somali people were spoken about and reported on but conditions in the 
country were generally portrayed as insolvable by the UN; the renewed military 
activities of factional leaders such as Aidid were viewed cynically as evidence of 
Somalis' 'natural' tendencies to violence. The UN, largely influenced by the political 
mood in the US, had made it clear that it would do nothing to interfere with factional 
fighting. According to an October 29, 1993 article in The New York Times, ''bitterness 
(was) evident". "'If the Somalis want warlords, they can have warlords,' the senior 
United Nations official said."93 Increasingly, the Western world was positioned as a 
tired parent giving up on a delinquent and ungrateful child. Coverage of Somalia in 
The Times plummeted in November 1993; New York Times coverage was significantly 
decreased and overwhelmingly cynical. A November 1, 1993 photograph in the paper 
92 Eric Schmitt, "Somali War Casualties May Be 10,000", The New York Times, December 8, 1993. 
93 Donatella Lorch, "Tensions Are Rising in Somalia Amid Fears of Renewed Civil War", The New York 
Times, October 29, 1993. 
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illustrated Somali men brandishing weapons94 and a November 29 article reported that 
Aidid was rearming his militias and unwilling to participate in UN-sponsored Somali 
peace talks.95 
Television coverage of Somalia also plummeted after 'Black Hawk down' had 
been reported. In a sense, after the controversial pictures of dragged American bodies 
were shown and then self-censored there was little new imagery to display. On 
October 10, 1993, crowd shots were used on both BBC and ABC to illustrate the relief of 
Somali citizens over the reopening of peaceful negotiations with Aidid' s faction. The 
imagery was similar to that of 'violent' demonstrations but without the sound of 
gunfire. Voiceover was required to make clear that such displays were 'positive' 
actions; for Western audiences it was likely difficult to understand the banners and 
chants seen in the footage. By October 25, ABC was televising scenes which were 
equally reminiscent of times before 'Black Hawk down'. Women and children were 
shown assisting gunmen said to be loyal to Aidid after the one and a half year ceasefire 
in Mogadishu collapsed. This report then moved to Somali refugee camps in northern 
Kenya, showing lines of people waiting near roughly built houses and tents, recalling 
earlier media coverage of famine and civil disruption. 
Such images worked to reinforce themes of intrinsic violence and failure that 
had been prevalent throughout the media coverage of Somali people. The voiceover 
declared that three hundred thousand Somalis are "helpless refugees from a hopeless 
homeland"96, tying all Somalis irrevocably to their 'failed state'. The devastation and 
civilians deaths inflicted upon Mogadishu by the hunt for Aidid, rarely depicted or 
discussed in media coverage to begin with, had now vanished from media narratives. 
Just as these reasons for Somali anger with UN and US forces were absent from 
Western public view, so too were many of the positive developments occurring in other 
areas of the country. Factors which would have complicated or challenged 
representations of Somali citizens as 'doomed' to suffering and violence were thus 
94 "Tensions On Eve of Envoy's Arrival in Somalia", The New York Times, November 1, 1993. 
95 "Aidid's Attendance At Aid Talks Is Tied to Backers' Release", The New York Times, November 29,1993. 
96 ABC news, October 25, 1993. 
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absent from media narratives and imagery of Somalia, leaving this state's population 
within its now-familiar binaries of feminised victim and masculine aggressor. 
Aidid: 'The Man Who Makes Somalia Worse' 
Despite frequent media discussion of 'anarchy' in Somalia, as in most other war 
narratives 'heroes' and 'villains' were used to structure the situation for Western 
audiences. Mohammed Farah Aidid quickly came to be understood as an 
uncooperative figure for UN negotiators and intervening troops. Aidid was the 
military leader of the Somali National Alliance, the Somali political and factional group 
which had overthrown Siad Barre's forces. By the summer of 1993, he had become "the 
man who makes Somalia worse", "a megalomaniac who lusts for power and who 
believes that since he was the leader of the armed forces who ousted Mohammed Siad 
Barre, the former dictator, he should have been anointed as the country's leader."97 The 
designation of Aidid as the prime obstructer of peace in Somalia became especially 
pronounced after his alleged ordering of the June 1993 attacks on Pakistani UN 
peacekeepers. After this event, media coverage of Somalia became reduced almost 
completely to the urban space of Mogadishu and to the UN manhunt for Aidid, which 
was to leave so many Somali citizens and UN troops dead and wounded. 
While he was not caricatured, imaged or discussed to the extent of other 'third 
world dictators' deemed to be threats to Westerners and to their own people, media 
representations of Aidid link him to this Orientalist lineage, with the discursive 
contradictions that it entails. Portrayals of Aidid fit especially well with Anne Norton's 
descriptions of "(t)he particular form of masculinity ascribed to Arab men in general, 
and to the holders of Arab power in particular, [which] emphasizes violence. Arab 
'strongmen' and 'madmen' are identified with the making of war and the sponsorship 
of terrorism, with military rule, and with the violent repression of dissent."98 Aidid' s 
97 Steven A. Holmes, 'The World; The Man Who Makes Somalia Worse', The New York Times, August 15, 
1993. 
98 Anne Norton, "Gender, Sexuality and the Iraq of Our Imagination", Middle East Report, November-
December (1991): 26. Norton suggests that these assumptions are not limited to Arabs and that threatening 
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successes against far stronger UN forces were discursively minimised through 
comments about his use of 'terrorist' tactics, such as involving women and children in 
his attacks and using Mogadishu's urban architecture to his benefit. (See Image 19) 
These comments implied that Aidid had 'won' due to his willingness to use violence 
against his own people; they failed to recognise his successful use of his own narratives 
of anti-colonialist struggle, which became a rallying cry to many Mogadishu Somalis 
who had become disillusioned with the UN intervention in their country. The US and 
the UN quickly walked away from Somalia with comments which indicated their 
disgust and frustration with Somalis', but particularly with Aidid's, irrationality, greed 
and violence. The large amounts of new American military planning and design which 
followed the 'Black Hawk down' events in Mogadishu, however, illustrate the extent to 
which this particular "tin-horned dictator"99 had influenced American military 
strategies for the twenty-first century. 
As the conflict in Somalia began to filter into media coverage in January 1992, 
Aidid emerged as one of two Somali factional leaders battling for control of Mogadishu 
after the ousting of Siad Barre. His opponent was Ali Mahdi Mohamed, another key 
member of the Somali National Alliance in the political, rather than military, wing of 
the party. Ali Mahdi was labelled "interim president" of Somalia in several early 
articles on the conflict despite the fact that he controlled only a small section of north 
Mogadishu.100 As the horrible conditions in Somalia were outlined throughout the 
spring of 1992, Aidid was repeatedly described as "leader of one of the warring 
factions, who still opposes a cease-fire and outside mediation."101 This contrast works 
to emphasize Aidid' s indifference to Somalis' suffering; since Somalis died because of 
fighting prompted by forces under his command. Some articles in The Times also 
masculinity can also be applied to Muslim Persians as well. I would additionally extend this suggestion to 
Somalis (African Muslims) and link it to violent portrayals of African men. 
99 From a comment made by California Democrat Diane Feinstein. Aired on ABC Night line, October 5, 
1993. 
10° For example, see Jane Perlez, "As Fighting In Somalia Rages On, African Neighbor Seeks a Truce", The 
New York Times, January 6, 1992. 
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1992. 
272 
portrayed opposition to UN intervention as a sign of distrustful and reckless behaviour 
and recognised the claims of those who did support it. Ali Mahdi, who was said to be 
among the few clan leaders supporting international intervention in Somalia, was 
labelled "President" by this publication as well.I02 In July 1992, as word of the 
desperate famine conditions in parts of Somalia was spread through the media, Aidid 
was shown to be directly responsible for delaying the arrival of fifty UN observers to 
Mogadishu. Aidid was said to have "complained that a United Nations plane flew 
money to his chief opponent". UN spokespeople are quoted denying the incident 
while, interspersed between Aidid' s refusal and this denial of the incident, Red Cross 
estimates of possible famine deaths are outlined.103 Again, Aidid is positioned as 
deliberately blocking altruistic Western attempts to care for his own people. 
As violence against aid workers and the looting of aid convoys were more 
frequently discussed in the media during the autumn of 1992, the contrasts between Ali 
Mahdi and Aidid continued. More media were now on the ground in Somalia and 
there was more time and space to define the parameters of the conflict. Although both 
major factional leaders are described as having to perform the same delicate balancing 
act to maintain the loyalty of their disparate followers, Aidid is labelled "a Soviet-
trained military officer who lays claim to being the rightful leader of Somalia" while Ali 
Mahdi is called "a mild-mannered hotelier who goes by the title Interim President of 
Somalia".104 Not only is Ali Mahdi made to sound more personally appealing than 
Aidid, but his claim to the leadership of Somalia is again rendered more legitimate by 
the use of his self-bestowed title. Aidid, meanwhile, is someone who "lays claim" to 
the presidency but his legitimacy and case for doing so are never explained. A similar 
article in The Times in December 1992 which features short descriptions of the two main 
contenders for leadership of Somalia calls Aidid "a rangy man in his sixties with shifty, 
102 Sam Kiley, "UN Observer Team Arrives In Somalia to Mixed Reception", The Times, July 6, 1992. 
103 Jane Perlez, "UN Observers Delay Visit to Somalia", The New York Times, July 12, 1992. 
104 Jane Perlez, "Chaotic Somalia Starves As Strongmen Battle", The New York Times, October 4, 1992. 
distrustful eyes" while Ali Mahdi has the "glib tongue of a service industry 
professional" and is called "a short and affable character" .105 
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Such categorizations, though often appearing minimal and trivial, nonetheless 
established a particular understanding of Aidid from early on in the conflict. It was 
speculated by The New York Times that Aidid had accepted the American intervention 
proposal because he was at a moment of political and military weakness in Somalia and 
hoped to gain American sympathy. Such an action was likely to be understood, given 
existing characterizations of Aidid, as evidence of a crafty change in approach to 
achieve his own personal ends. Aidid's gesture was called "uncharacteristically 
conciliatory", given that he had "threatened to send United Nations troops home in 
body bags" .1°6 
Although armed gunmen were part of all the major factional groups involved in 
the Somali conflict, their particular association with Aidid was important as these 
groups were considered responsible for much of the suffering of the Somali population. 
As television coverage of Somalia increased dramatically with the announcement that 
American troops would lead a large scale intervention, the gangs were given more 
media time and were usually linked with imagery of Aidid. A December 7, 1992 ABC 
report opened with a montage of US jets flying over presumed Somali air space; then 
images of Aidid were followed by video of injured men lying on hospital beds and khat-
chewing young men on Somali streets. Aidid was thus visually linked to the social 
disorder of Somalia. BBC footage from December 8, 1992 showed Ali Mahdi embracing 
and shaking hands with American diplomat, Robert Oakley. Aidid was shown several 
shots later, surrounded by microphones. He announces his cooperation with the US 
mission by explaining that he has asked armed Somalis not to go near the port and 
airport, which were to be secured by US forces. Aidid' s association with and ability to 
command Somali gunmen is illustrated in this clip. A December 4, 1992 BBC item also 
features shots of stockpiled food unable to be delivered, according to voiceover, 
105 "How the Factional Warlords Line Up", The Times, December 2, 1992. 
106 Jane Perlez, "US Plan To Guard Convoys Is Backed By Somali General", The New York Times, November 
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because of the risks of gunmen on the streets; it then cuts immediately to images of 
Aidid walking with what appeared to be armed guards. The voiceover commentary 
explains that warlords like Aidid are welcoming US and UN troops despite blocking 
aid in the past because they figure the "power game" can now be better played with 
"words rather than weapons". An Aidid spokesperson explains Aidid' s desire for the 
intervening troops to stay only long enough to distribute food and to eliminate the 
gangs who loot the aid.to7 
Despite frequent reminders of his ties to aid-looting gunmen, December 1992 
also represented a high point in Aidid' s media representation, albeit from a very low 
start. Aidid' s agreement to the intervention of foreign troops in Somalia did allow him 
to be presented as slightly more cooperative. During the December 8, 1992 Marine 
landing special on ABC, Ted Koppel referred to Aidid as a "self-appointed general", 
mentioning that "warlord" was no longer an appropriate term and that "regional 
leader" was also acceptable. The comment was also made that Aidid' s son lived in the 
US and was himself a US Marine; confirmation of whether this son was participating in 
the Somalia intervention was not given in the report.l08 Aidid' s agreement to a ceasefire 
with Ali Mahdi and their willingness to send gunmen out of Mogadishu and to store 
heavy weapons at monitored depots also won both leaders some favourable media 
coverage. A December 11, 1992 report on BBC shows Ali Mahdi and Aidid walking 
from a building together, smiling and shaking hands to visually confirm this deal. 
This mildly positive coverage did not last long. By January 13, 1993, The Times 
reported the first UN troop death in Somalia and also reported that peace talks in Addis 
Ababa were stalled because Aidid was demanding special privileges. On February 25, 
1993, violent demonstrations against UN peacekeepers broke out in Mogadishu, incited 
by Aidid because of attacks against his troops by rival forces in the southern city of 
Kismayu. A February 25, 1993 article in The New York Times credited American forces 
107 BBC 9 o'clock news, December 4, 1992. 
1os Aidid's son, Hussein Aidid, did participate in the UNITAF mission to Somalia in 1992. He describes his 
involvement in Somalia to Mark Bowden in an American 'History Channel' documentary entitled The True 
Story of Black Hawk Down. 
275 
for their restraint and characterised the incident as a "show of strength" by Aidid, 
suggesting that more violence was likely to follow.109 The Times bemoaned these events 
as illustrating the "powerlessness of the international community to bring order to 
growing chaos in Africa".110 In both cases, Aidid was associated with 'havoc', 'rioting' 
and general destruction in Mogadishu, which was described in depth in the February 
25 New York Times article. The article also illustrated Aidid's reversal from denouncing 
to praising foreign troops once American forces drove his rival to withdraw from 
Kismayu. It was this capriciousness which American diplomat Robert Oakley 
appeared to be criticizing a few days later with his March 3, 1993 comments about 
Somalis being "petulant children" who had "relied on the dole" for too long. This 
particular incident set the stage for worsening relations between Aidid and US/UN 
forces, an animosity clearly evident by the time of the June 1993 attacks on Pakistani 
peacekeepers. 
The immediate blaming of Aidid for the June 5 killings of the Pakistanis meant 
that he remained a key 'villain' figure in Western media coverage after this incident. 
His skilful eluding of American efforts to capture him only added to the drama of the 
media storyline following the attacks. By June 17, 1993, The New York Times was 
quoting several US and UN officials saying that only Aidid's arrest could bring about 
peace in Somalia.111 The article reviewed Aidid's past criminal actions and mentioned 
the mutilation of Pakistani bodies to emphasize the savage nature of Aidid's 
supporters' attacks and confirm his assigned place as among the worst, if not the worst, 
of the warlords. Both newspapers, however, acknowledged the already contradictory 
nature of UN and US policy towards Aidid. While President Clinton declared the air 
strikes against Aidid's weapons depots "over" and said that Aidid's arrest was not a 
priority, open-ended military action against Aidid continued across Mogadishu and 
109 Diana Jean Schema, "Rioting By Warlord's Supporters Creates Havoc in Somali Capital", The New York 
Times, February 25,1993. 
uo Sam Kiley, "Mogadishu Clashes Threaten to Delay Pullout By Marines", The Times, February 27, 1993. 
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attempts to kill or capture him were ongoing.112 Aidid made the most of his continued 
freedom, giving press conferences at which he portrayed Somalis as victims and 
accused the UN of being colonisers. He also visited wounded Somalis in hospital and 
held rallies, refraining from responding militarily to stronger UN and US forces. 
Despite his occasional, impromptu press conferences, television footage of 
Aidid was limited during this time. BBC coverage of the attacks on the Pakistanis on 
June 6, 1993 presented the most shots of Aidid, in crowds of mainly male, gun-wielding 
supporters. All the images are fairly similar and several appear to be older, archived 
footage. In the first image, Aidid is shown kissing the hands of children who approach 
him while in the third and final image he appears to address a rally from a balcony. A 
June 17, 1993 New York Times article also includes a still image of Aidid addressing 
supporters at a rally protesting UN military strikes. ABC footage of Aidid was 
minimal; a June 14, 1993 item features shots of Aidid surrounded by Western press to 
whom he describes the UN strikes on Somalis as "terrorist attacks" but otherwise 
footage is focused on Somali civilian protesters and on discussions with Western 
experts and aid workers. The abovementioned shots are strongly reminiscent of other 
'dictator' imagery, especially given the recent Gulf War footage of Saddam Hussein in 
1990 and 1991. Hussein was routinely imaged firing a gun on a balcony during a public 
rally and famously had himself filmed with women and children hostages, perhaps an 
attempt to present himself as kind and reasonable. This gesture backfired and 
produced moral outrage in the West; McKenzie Wark argues that when Westerners 
were prevented from understanding Hussein through the discourse of' Arab 
fundamentalist' he was instead presented through the other Orientalist extreme, the 
decadent pederast.113 Aidid was not so explicitly associated with either of these 
stereotypes, although some Western experts and a few media items did speculate that 
he could ally himself with militant Islamic groups should it benefit him personally.114 
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Like Hussein, however, Aidid was regularly represented as a violent and selfish leader, 
with personal ambitions which had little to do with the good of his own people. Any 
supporters Aidid was shown to have were routinely linked to the violence, aggression 
and greed associated with him personally. 
As UN/US strikes against Aidid increased in mid-June 1993, the rhetoric against 
him also accelerated; this was especially noticed in print and ABC television coverage. 
A June 17, 1993 ABC item showed reporter Ron Allen standing in Aidid's destroyed 
headquarters as a manhunt for the warlord was announced by Admiral Howe. Aidid 
was called a "threat to the safety of Somalis and the international community" by 
Howe. Boutros-Ghali marked the UN' s entry into local political disputes when he was 
quoted calling Aidid a "power hungry warlord responsible for killing and starving to 
death hundreds of thousands of Somalis"; Ted Koppel's voiceover explained that the 
UN had bombed and then occupied Aidid' s headquarters, as it was no longer willing to 
"tolerate his behaviour".115 The strong discursive coverage trend which represented 
Somalis as ungrateful and child-like is recognisable in these comments; Aidid appears 
as a disobedient child who needed to be punished for his actions. 
Both sides in debates about who was 'responsible' for Somalia and to what 
extent used Aidid to justify their positions. While difficulties with Aidid were 
presented by anti-interventionists as local politics with which international troops 
should not interfere, those who supported intervention insisted that UN and US troops 
could not leave Somalia until Aidid was removed from power so that humanitarian 
work could continue. Importantly, alternative approaches to dealing with Aidid rarely 
were featured in media coverage; forceful removal of Aidid from power is presented as 
the only option. This position was often presented in terms of UN and US troops 
needing to reclaim their strength and masculinity following the Pakistani deaths by 
'taking out' Aidid; "The destruction of Aideed's ragtag militia had marked a turning 
point for the UN's peacekeeping image. 'For the first time we've shown we've got 
ns ABC news, June 14, 1993. 
balls,' gloated one senior UN military chief in Mogadishu. 'We're no longer sitting 
ducks for any Tom, Dick or Mohamed who wants to practise his shooting."'116 
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By July 1993, media coverage of the Aidid manhunt was generally less 
favourable of the UN' s approach under Admiral Howe and Boutros-Ghali. Both a July 
1, 1993 Times article and a July 11, 1993 New York Times article point out that UN 
officials and troops are "virtual prisoners" in their compound, having been intimidated 
by Aidid's "straight gangster tactics". Aid workers are quoted in The Times article 
expressing disillusionment with the UN policy, which rendered Mogadishu so 
dangerous to Westerners that they could no longer work freely. The New York Times 
piece discusses growing dissension in UN ranks over the leading Americans' approach 
of singling out Aidid for attack.117 By early August 1993, The Times reported growing 
Congressional dissatisfaction with US involvement in Somalia. While Admiral Howe 
was still quoted calling the landmine deaths of four US troops in Mogadishu part of the 
"terrorist campaign" of Aidid, American interest in capturing this particular 'terrorist' 
appeared to be waning.11s 
Despite this change in attitude with regards to the UN mission, general media 
opinion about Aidid himself did not change and his personal responsibility for his 
country's failed state was, if anything, re-emphasized. An August 15, 1993 New York 
Times article explains that "current and former United States officials who have dealt 
with General Aidid describe him as a megalomaniac who lusts for power" and the. 
headline labels him "the man who makes Somalia worse". The same article quotes 
American Secretary of State Madelaine Albright, an ongoing supporter of an 
internationally-involved America, claiming that Somalia could "fall back into the 
abyss" if left by UNOSOM II and that its people should be "lifted" from "the category 
116 Richard Ellis, "Hide-and-Seek Warlord Defies UN", The Sunday Times, June 20, 1993. 
117 Donatella Lorch, "UN Troops Begin An Effort To Take Over Somali Streets", The New York Times, July 
11, 1993 and Sam Kiley," Aidid Cache Hit By Missiles As UN Braces For Attacks", The Times, July 1, 1993. 
118 Wolfgang Munchau et al, "Warlord Told US Deaths In Somalia Will Be Avenged", The Times, August 9, 
1993. 
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of a failed state into that of an emerging democracy."119 Debates between those in 
favour of pulling out of the Somalia 'quagmire' versus intervention supporters 
continued and were highlighted again in late August and early September 1993 with 
discussions about whether the Ranger and Delta units sent to Somalia should be used 
to capture Aidid. The possibility of such a dramatic raid led CNN to bring more 
equipment into Somalia in readiness to document the capture or killing of the elusive 
Aidid.120 
On September 14, The New York Times published two separate articles focusing 
on Aidid. One article explained that Aidid had offered to submit to the judgment of a 
special UN investigative commission appointed by the Security Council. This offer had 
been given to former US President Jimmy Carter to put forward on Aidid' s behalf. 
Carter claims that he passed the message on to Boutros-Ghali but "could not vouch for 
General Aidid's sincerity in making the offer."121 Neither The Times nor ABC 
commented on Aidid's offer. 
On the same page in The New York Times, a longer article provided a character 
profile of Aidid, laying out the difficult situation in Mogadishu and Aidid's role in 
creating it. Aidid is described as "a master of honeyed words, shifting alliances and 
brutal tactics", his elegant, Western dress style is outlined, the fact that he has two 
wives and fourteen children is mentioned, and he is said to be "willing to sacrifice 
anything to achieve his goal."122 While this article in some ways associates Aidid with 
'Western' values, he dresses like a "retired business executive" and is a "workaholic", 
the mention of his polygamous marital status and his training in Moscow are among 
other factors which exoticize and differentiate him. As in most of the past coverage of 
him, Aidid's ruthlessness and brutality are emphasized. 
11 9 Steven A. Holmes, "The World; The Man Who Makes Somalia Worse", The New York Times, August 15, 
1993. 
120 Donatella Lorch, "UN Counts On US Rangers To Find Warlord", The New York Times, August 26, 1993 
and Richard Ellis, "Can 'Delta Farce' Now Get It Right?", The Times, October 5, 1993. 
121 Neil A. Lewis, "UN Still Struggling With Somali General's Militia; Aidid Proposes UN Panel", The New 
York Times, September 14, 1993. 
122 Donatella Lorch, "UN Still Struggling With Somali General's Militia", The New York Times, September 14, 
1993. 
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Aidid's image was unaltered by the events of 'Black Hawk down', while they 
represented a great shock and serious troop losses to the US, they were not significantly 
'outside' behaviours which had long been part of his Western media representation. 
Aidid, along with the rest of the Somalia story, disappeared quickly from media 
coverage post-'Black Hawk down'. Aidid's successful evasion and survival of the raid 
and subsequent street battles were taken as confirmation of the success of his 'guerrilla' 
tactics. Much superior American firepower and technology had failed spectacularly at 
achieving its often-denied objective. Immediate press interest largely turned to 
understanding the failure of the mission in terms of the disastrous organisation of the 
mission due to poor UN policy and the perceived resistance of Somalia as a country to 
Western democratic development. Images and commentary on Aidid remained 
unchanged and often contained a hint of self-satisfaction; this 'villain' had indeed 
proved to be what had been predicted. 
Immediately after the 'Black Hawk down' events, Aidid was portrayed as 
unwilling to negotiate with the US and the UN. This stance apparently came as no 
surprise to officials who believed that "the general will only talk if he feels at a military 
disadvantage."123 Visual imagery of Aidid was also minimal; in all media sources he 
was shown only briefly addressing crowds of supporters. Some of these shots 
appeared to be old, archived footage, suggesting that few media personnel had 
ventured back into the dangerous conditions of Somalia post-'Black Hawk down' to 
capture new images. ABC's October 4, 1993 news briefly showed him walking, 
unharmed, while voiceover commented on how US casualties and the continuing 
failures to catch Aidid were leading to more criticism from Congress. Those opposed to 
leaving Somalia presented the situation in terms of the need to resist backing down to 
morally reprehensible leaders like Aidid; to be seen to "turn tail and run from any tin-
horned dictators who come along"124 was understood as intolerable Western weakness 
in the face of unworthy threats. This theme of 'holding the course despite Aidid' was 
123 Donatella Lorch, "The Somalia Mission; Somali General Denounces Further Peace Talks", The New York 
Times, October 6, 1993. 
124 Comment by Diana Feinstein (Democrat-California) on ABC Nightline, October 5, 1993. 
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advocated by President Clinton who argued that it would be "open season on 
Americans" if "aggressors, thugs and terrorists" were allowed to think that killing US 
troops would create changes in US policies.125 These statements were reiterated in all 
media sources. Just as Aidid' s alleged attacks on the Pakistanis had appeared to 
demand reaction and punishment, this incident also was seen as an unacceptable action 
against benevolent Western institutions that had Somalia's best interests in mind. 
Regardless of these sentiments, the political reality after 'Black Hawk down' 
was that the American Congress stepped up pressure on President Clinton for a US 
withdrawal date from Somalia. This deadline was set for March 31, 1994 and 
significantly influenced the participation of other UN contingents in the mission, given 
that many were highly dependent on US troops for their security and supplies. This 
reality also influenced media coverage in the sense that the Somalia intervention itself 
was seen to have failed and to essentially be 'over' even before US troops had left the 
country. There appeared to be little hope for further peace-building measures and this 
cynicism regarding any further involvement in Somalia was evident. A gap between 
the aggressive, Aidid-hunting policies of Admiral Howe and Boutros-Ghali and the 
more diplomacy-focused approach favoured by the American administration was made 
clear in media quotes of policymakers following 'Black Hawk down'. Much media time 
was spent pointing out these policy discrepancies in the week following the attacks. 
The vague approach of maintaining the UN resolution calling for Aidid's arrest, 
but also letting it be known that if he ceased attacking UN troops Aidid would be 
allowed a place at peace-building talks was soon adopted and labelled a strategy of 
"constructive ambiguity" by US leaders.126 As was stated by President Clinton, the US 
was no longer going to be involved in decisions about who ruled Somalia after their 
troops' removal from the country; the knowledge that US and UN troops would leave 
regardless of conditions in Somalia put Aidid in a no-lose situation. Aidid's declared 
ceasefire with regards to US and UN troops, announced on October 10, 1993, was 
125 Clinton's televised speech to the US nation on ABC news, October 7, 1993. 
126 Thomas L. Friedman, "Mission in Somalia; Dealing With Somalia: Vagueness As a Virtue", The New York 
Times, October 15, 1993. 
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reported by all the media sources analysed; it was greeted with joy by Somali citizens 
who hoped it would provide an end to violence in Mogadishu. 
ABC and BBC both covered Aidid' s release of American hostage Michael 
Durant and a Nigerian peacekeeper on October 14, 1993. In both items, Aidid is shown 
corning out of hiding to talk to reporters. While still concerned about whether he 
would be arrested, Aidid stated his desire to be part of Somali peace-building 
negotiations and hinted that UN forces were no longer needed in Somalia and should 
leave. This willingness to negotiate appeared to be undermined by renewed fighting 
between Ali Mahdi and Aidid in Mogadishu, reported in The New York Times and on 
ABC on October 25, 1993. Reporter Paul Watson, one of the few Western journalists on 
the ground in Somalia, pessimistically stated that the UN did not get involved in any of 
the fighting since its troops were not at risk and suggested that this fighting was 
"almost certain to provoke more clan wars."127 Although media coverage of Somalia 
rapidly decreased after October 1993, a New York Times article on November 9 claimed 
that Aidid's forces were guilty of taking shots at UN peacekeepers and were being very 
"uncooperative" with UN efforts.128 A November 29, 1993 article reported rumours that 
Aidid was rearming, planning new attacks and not interested in participating in UN/US 
sponsored peace talks.t29 
In a manner similar to portrayals of Somali citizens, Aidid was presented as a 
wily and difficult child in much of this coverage, unable to be restrained by his 
reluctant 'parent' figures, namely the UN and the US. Somalis, including Aidid, were 
often discursively presented as ungrateful, squabbling children who would be best 
abandoned to their own devices. The American gesture of flying Aidid to Somali peace 
talks in Addis Ababa in early December was seen as ironic by some, given that Aidid 
had so recently been considered a figure who should be marginalized and shut out of 
the peace-building process in Somalia. These events, however, were met with only 
127 ABC news, October 25, 1993. 
128 
"Somali Gunmen Again Open Fire On UN Peacekeepers in Capital", The New York Times, November 9, 
1993. 
129 
"Aidid's Attendance At Aid Talks Is Tied To Backers' Release", The New York Times, November 29, 1993. 
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minimal comment by the media. Just as policymakers involved in Somalia appeared 
eager to end their role as this failed state's "baby-sitter" and "problem solver"130, the 
media had quickly moved on from Somalia after 'Black Hawk down'. Somalia again 
disappeared from Western public view, remembered only vaguely with mentions of 
words such as 'famine' and 'Black Hawk down'. 
Sum-up of Major Themes 
The 'people' of Somalia are an extremely important category of analysis, as it 
was their particular 'character' which was often suggested to be the primary reason for 
the state's failure. Women and children were mostly slotted into traditional' African 
famine' stereotypes of 'passive' victims, often providing a backdrop of suffering before 
which the debates on new American foreign policy trends took place. In sharp contrast, 
Somali men and boys were frequently presented as 'gang' members whose looting and 
violence was destroying their country. General Mohammed Farah Aidid was perhaps 
the most extreme example of this type of 'evil', 'selfish', 'third world' man. The visual 
and narrative style in which Somali men and boys were represented was at times 
highly reminiscent of other 'black' people deemed threats to the 'white' West, most 
notably African American men in ghettoised regions of America. Although important 
exceptions exist, Somali citizens were not widely permitted to narrate their own stories 
of their state's collapse; this was done primarily through Western 'experts'. Such 
patterns in coverage meant that towards the end of the intervention the anger and 
resentment of Somali citizens towards the interveners were not well understood. On a 
spectrum of interpretation, the events of 'Black Hawk down' thus appeared more often 
as an extreme, but not atypical, example of Somali violence and ungratefulness towards 
their 'saviours' rather than as a response to many perceived incidents of UN and US 
aggression and violence towards Somali civilians. 
130 Oakley's comments are in: Donatella Lorch, "At Their Peace Talks, Somalis Mostly Shout", The New York 
Times, December 6, 1993. 
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Post-'Black Hawk down', memories of Somalia remained within the US 
government and lessons were learned, despite the event's rapid disappearance from 
media agendas, particularly television. Policies and military practices changed 
substantially in order to allow American troops to meet new urban-based threats like 
Aidid and his followers more effectively. The role and position of media and 
communications during conflict periods and in conflict zones also clearly appears to 
have been considered and re-organised. The result has been significantly increased 
military and government efforts to 'manage' media and communications during recent 
conflicts involving the US, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, in comparison to 
Somalia. These efforts have been accepted by some segments of the media and strongly 
rejected by others; increasingly technological abilities are upping the abilities of both 
'sides' to work around the other. 
In terms of broader discourses for understanding global events, the 9/11 attacks 
have also proved important for the re-defining of America's conception of its role in the 
world. The occasional use of the term 'terrorism' by media and policymakers during 
the Somalia conflict only begins to hint at the new and powerful discourses in which 
this term would be central, redefining large parts of the world as bastions of terror and 
threat. Countries like Somalia were no longer merely a danger and tragedy for their 
own inhabitants; they would soon be viewed as places of direct threat to citizens of the 
Western world as well. Despite these changes in the media's sphere of operational 
abilities and governments' and militaries' conduct, however, many far-reaching 
discourses for understanding 'place' and 'people' during intervention and conflict have 
remained similar from events in Somalia to current times. The following chapter's 
analysis of major discourses in media coverage of the 2004 American sieges of Fallujah 
will help to illustrate the extent to which ways of understanding 'other' people and 
places have followed similar patterns despite the passage of more than a decade and a 
significantly different context of intervention. 
Image 9: Famine and hardship in Somalia - August 23, 1992 
Photographer- Scott Peterson 
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Image 10: A human skeleton and clothes lie in the dirt - August 23, 1992 
Photographer- Scott Peterson 
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Image 11: Healthy Somali children with food- ABC, June 21, 1993 
Image 12: Somali men selling khat - ABC, December 7, 1992 
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Image 13: Hooded Somali man- ABC, December 7, 1992 
Image 14: Somali guards and workers arrested by US troops- ABC Nightline, 
December 8, 1992 
Image 15(i): Demonstrators assemble in Mogadishu- June 14, 1993 
Photographer- Scott Peterson 
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Dressed to kill: 'Bix Tobaa:o' Collier rudy for aqion in Mogadishu Picture: Paul Watson 
UN's Big Tobacco becomes 
Somali~'s most wanted man 
THE MOST feared man in 
Somalia was out on Moga~ 
dishu's streets last week, his 
shotgun slung across his back, 
two nine·inch knives tucked 
in hi s belt, and a trademark 
cigar bull hanging from his 
mouth. Major Mike Collier, a 
one·man fighting machine 
known as Big Tobacco by the 
gunmen who want to kill him, 
wa" ready for !let ion. 
Collier, an American mar· 
ine, has the task nfmaking the 
Somali capital safe for aid 
agencies to feed the hungry. 
The unconventional way he 
by Paul Watson 
Mogadishu 
has gone ahout it, st icking his 
pistol-&rip shotgun at the head 
of anyone who challenges 
him, confiscating weapons 
and rounding up dozens of So-
mali suspects, has made him 
enemy no I to militiamen. 
to tribute to \he efficiency 
of Tobaako JJie)•11e, the gun-
men are advenising a $25,000 
bounty to anybody who kills 
him; the reward is the same 
amount the United Nations is 
offering for the capture of 
General Mohammed Farah 
Aideed, the Somali warlord. 
Collier, though, is uncon-
cerned about having a price 
on his head. ''It's easy to say, 
well, there's thi• reward for 
this guy," he said in his Ten-
nessee drawl. ''It's quite 
another thing to find the first 
two or three guys willing to try 
to collect it." 
Yesterday the Somali gun-
men showed themselves to he 
capable of horrific revenge. 
Three American soldiers were 
Continurd on page 18 
Somalia's "Rambo", Major Mike Collier- Sunday Times, 




Dragged and bound soldier's body - ABC October 4, 1993 
Another soldier's body dragged through streets- ABC 
October 4, 1993 
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Image 17(iii): Dead US soldier's body- ABC, October 4, 1993 
Image 18: Michael Durant held hostage - ABC, October 4, 1993 
General Aideed, the UN's first 'wanted' man, taunts US: 
'I have been bombarded at my house, but after that I was 
1YllJ~aUl0 0 oll and they never came close to me' 
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Welcome to 
th·e lair of 
the warlord 
GENERAL Mohll.Qled Far.h Aideed did not look 
like a man who ha1 bHn hidinJ fol 97 days from 
~.ooo uoops bacW by heliooptt:r JWUhip&, •PY 
plarau, the CIA and Amcrian spccill forta. 
frub-factd and a.mUiaa. be seemed to b.avt put 
on weiJbt. In red tie and pusxd &triped shin., with 
r!::~r:re: ,r~S::u:!.iuf~'!::!~~: 
''warlord" accused of causina the det.thl of tbou-
tandl of hh own rouatrymen agd more than 60 
UN peac:c-k«:pen. Even when 1 US helicopter 
thudded ovuhead the UN's fir.~: "wanted., man 
did not blench. 
It had been • ruanre journey from the journll· 
isu' hotd wbrrc Ges:u:nl Aidced't aides bad met 
u1,ncinJ through the 1mu.hed •trttts of Mog.adl-
'bu. ""·eninc past raared dilldrtu. wndc.ed C"'.ts, 
donkeys and piles of bumina rubbish. We paned 
the butnt..out wr«-k of an Amerian army crvdt 
uted by the CS Ran.aen tn their flld\IJ nid of 
!~obk!::: ~ .. rur~~~~~o !~icr!::S~ 
wd! of blood". 
It it Genera.! Aideed's snonsbOid. In all alley we 
Wtte utbered out ol Cl\lr cati and iri.to a Land 
Cruiser and took off apill. At a smalJ houn we 
wen: 1aken tO a darkes~ed room and Jiven 1 thor-
ouib body uarcb, then bad into the Land Cruiser 
and a furtheJ dri?e.. 
Then: was no •irn of wc:apons at the aman, 
ocwly"'Jiainted bo~ when we ltopped. We wen: 
tlhn th rough a uaaU courtyard into a sinin,· 
room with tbid:. cupeu and plu&b wCas. Thett 
were pluli<: Oowen on lht able and a hint of per-
fume in the ai r. Genenl Aideed came in aur· 
rou.ndt:d by youn1 men who d id not tppear to be 
umed. "Hdlo, Richard, welcome. Nice to set you 
apjn," be Mid, and took my hand with a bony grip 
u hard as hi' ey«. 
Sirnificantly be bqiln with the lhric:Mepeated 
' 'Allaha~ Alhm., ("God i1 mou trtal")- be ia try· 
ine to dn.~- the Islamic t'und.ammmlistt into his 
ranks - md thea. I"Cid fwm tn eittu-pqe docu-
ment written in btllpouu on lined sbetu: of ptper. 
It was, he &aid, a sttttme.nt iuued by the lpecial 
mcct.i.ns of the Lc.adcnbip Council of the Somali 
Ntliooal Alliance. It announe<d the unconditional 
release of the Amerinn pilot and the Ni$trUn tal· 
diet" and calltd foe the immediate and Wlcondi· 
tional rdease of the Somalis "who have been un· 
l.niully abduc1ed b)" the US Rt~cn". Most of 
~C::d :: :Dc~!~::f u':~~d~~~~ :!: 
vntiption into ttudu on UN forces. 
The smenJ called for a pcsceful dialogue on 1he 
problem& and tbe put, il.lld wdcomed Prt!idrnt 
Bill <linton's chanae of policy on Soauli.L But the 
statement ahlO said that the <kploymcnt of an tttn 
5,000 American t:rOOP' in Som.alia wu unnfCCSW1' 
aad •""Duld have a nqative dfect. "The US and UN 
croops in SomAlia should be !'l:duced aad the 
money apcnt on development," Genual Aideed 
Slid. 
He bltmed lhe United Nationa for killing or in· 
~t:~O: ~~td! ~s.d:~~o~!~ 
the UN mistakes, btd "pursued, promoted and en· 
coura1td the s~ destructh't polkiu., and u 1 
Richard Dowden in 
Mogadishu meets the man 
hunted by 30,000 US troops, 
who accuses the UN of killing 
or injuring 9,000 Somalis 
result merci.lcu military ope-rations which l'DIUI· 
cmt bundmls of Somalis wm: launchtd", 
Tbc SNA, the statement nid. wu "lhe on ly 
movement in the country 1111ilb a national political 
ttenda IDd is supponcd by more than 70 per cent 
of the people". 
The UN ruuJutioru orderin1 his caprure he dc-
EaibeJ as "siniSict plots tpinst this popular 
monmeat (t he SNA) and the interests of the So-
mall peopk"'. Aoswtrina questiona, the gmuU 
::~db~! ~Jb~~~~!i~M~~~~:~.~~~U:; 
bml bombarded 11 my house at the beginning, but 
t.ftcr t}la t I was alw'lys in MopdiJhu tnd they 
ncverc:amedou tome." 
The US bas kept up 24·hout lut1'cillance of the 
city tince Admin! jouthao H~. tbe UN special 
rcpresennti•e, iuued 1. "wanted" order for General 
Aideed in July, put a S2S,OOO reward on his head 
and - it is believed - increased the CIA pretence 
in the city. Spy plaoes patrol day and n igb1and the 
US Qukk Reaction Fotte b.as launched at leas;. fh·.: 
ancmpiS to kill or capture him, led by <he US 
Ran.sen, lhe special forces. In qch raid many So-
malil w~ killed but Gc:nett.l Aideed wu ne\·er 
""'- I 
He said that he wt1uld remain in hiding for tht 
~;n:h:C~ =uN~~:~~'"~1~ ~~!e~~~ 
~~W~cw:!du~l!~~':.dc~o:_~~mdit~~~ 
for instipti nr the killina of24 Pakistani troops tjn 
~i!:t~~~!io:':;i::v~ ":Ccdsc~; ~on~::~; I 
1nd find out the respoas~ty of all those crinJn 
commitud from 5June." ! 
He reserved plrtieultr venom for the UN 5ellre· 
tsry-Gcll.enl, Bouuos Boutrof.-Ghali, who i• ~ue 
htte next we-ek. "He bu done lhc wtJtit ac~D 
apinst tht Somali people," be said, 111d ace d 
him of heine: allied to cbe former Pruidtnt iad 
Butt. Admirvl H owe be described u .. bann u l", 
an~~ ~: ~~u~k~dif ~':!!!~d to be tbe ~Ut 
president of Somalia be laughed and Wd <km~<dy 
that it wu for tbc Somali people to fkddc, b 1 he 
desaibed himst.lf u .. having pii}IM • major r tin 
~:u~eace process" with &n important poli~cill 
The term "warlord", ht u..id. bad been 1nveQted 
1odamage hislmqe. " l am not warlord, .. be s;id. 
Atked bow it feh to have defc:a ted both the Un~ftd 
~~~~1u~J~:~~cd ~~:';!~ =::::~ 
~~"~/ ~~:.~.h my supporter& fairly and in !de-
Image 19: "Warlord" Aidid - The Independent, October 15, 1993 
Chapter Six- Fallujah 2004: Lessons learned & Bodies 
That Didn't Matter 
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Just over ten years after the 'Black Hawk down' images of US soldiers' bodies 
being dragged by Somalis shocked television viewers, a similar incident, at least in a 
visual sense, occurred in a new American 'theatre' of operations, Iraq. Two vehicles 
carrying four American civilian contractors were attacked by Iraqis using small-arms 
fire and rocket-propelled grenades. Crowds of Iraqis then pulled the bodies of the 
contractors from the burning vehicles, desecrated the bodies, dragged them through the 
streets and hung two of them over a bridge spanning the Euphrates River. The setting 
of these events, on March 31, 2004, was the predominately Sunni Muslim city of 
Fallujah, thirty miles west of Baghdad.1 
As in Mogadishu in 1993, despite claims of 'saturation' media coverage Western 
publics were given only about two days of exposure to images of this 'event' before 
they were self-censored by the media. Even with the images gone, however, audiences 
were encouraged to 'remember' the killings in a variety of ways and at various times, as 
will be seen throughout this chapter. Both the White House and the Pentagon 
condemned the killings but followed with statements "hoping" that news managers 
would exercise "responsibility" and "good judgment" with regards to showing the 
images, rather than with outright opposition to their exposure.2 While editorial debates 
are common in newsrooms when controversial or 'graphic' imagery arrives, 
discussions over which images from Fallujah should be shown became media stories in 
their own right. The day after the killings, the CNN Newsnight program ran an expert 
discussion on the affects and ethics of showing 'difficult' images. The Fallujah shots 
were thus immediately placed in a tradition of' conflict' images, including those taken 
in Somalia after 'Black Hawk down', which, according to some analysts, had had an 
1 Charles Geraci, "7 of Top 20 Papers Published Front-Page Fallujah Body Photos", April1, 2004-
www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/article brief/eandp/1/1000477951 (accessed September 30, 2006). 
2 Lynn Elber, "US TV Avoids Graphic Iraq Images Seen Worldwide", The Associated Press, March 31,2004. 
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important impact on American foreign policy, although others contested this 
assessment.3 
Communications scholar Barbie Zelizer noted this reflective mood in the media 
but also pointed out discrepancies between verbal and visual accounts of the events: 
After the photos of four dead US contractors and the defilement of their 
bodies by an Iraqi mob in Falluja surfaced in April 2004, the news 
stories were graphic, detailed and unrelenting in their verbal accounts 
of what had happened. Yet the pictures were presented with a marked 
degree of ambivalence, as journalists pondered questions of decency, 
appropriateness ... and worried about possible charges of 
sensationalism, political bias, and lack of patriotism.4 
Zelizer suggests that in the last ten years the American public has become less willing 
to see 'graphic' war pictures. She cites a 1993 survey which suggested that the US 
public was evenly divided on whether images should be used as well as words to 
describe situations of war and murder. A more recent survey in 2004, after the 
contractors' deaths, is then referenced in contrast: "a full 71 percent of the American 
public felt that the pictures had been either too gruesome or sufficiently explicit."5 
Following from Zelizer' s claims, a key question that this chapter will address is 
whether The New Republic's Adam Kushner was justified in suggesting that: "The 
Fallujah riots reveal something fundamentally amiss in American journalism- that an 
instinct to protect viewers is trumping an instinct to inform."6 Issues and images from 
which viewers are being 'protected' will be as important an aspect of debate in this 
chapter as an analysis of what was shown of Fallujah in selected Western media. 
Media sources that had aligned themselves most closely with the Bush 
administration appeared to be most ready to censor the Fallujah images. The 
conservative and pro-war Fox News channel in the US showed only shots of the 
3 CNN Newsnight with Aaron Brown, "Images of War/History{furnley and Bums Interview", Aprill, 2004. 
4 Barbie Zelizer, "Death in Wartime: Photographs and the 'Other War' in Afghanistan", Press/Politics 10, no. 
3, Summer (2005): 32. 
5 Ibid, p. 30. The 1993 survey was conducted by Times Daily Mirror while the 2004 survey is cited as a 
Time/CNN poll. 
6 Adam B. Kushner, "See No Evil", The New Republic (online), April2, 2004, 
hHJ?:Uwww.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=express&s=kushner040204 (accessed July 10, 2004). 
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burning vehicles in which the contractors had been riding and clips of yelling Iraqi 
crowds. CBS contemplated showing larger amounts of the footage but by airtime had 
decided against it. CNN was the only American broadcaster mentioned which decided 
to air a few unedited seconds of video showing two burned bodies dangling from the 
bridge, preceded by a viewer discretion warning. Overseas, other Western media 
mentioned in a report on the extent of coverage of the attacks were more explicit in 
their stories; several showed blurred images of bodies being dragged through the 
streets as well as unaltered shots of the corpses hung on the bridge.7 
Newspaper coverage was bolder than television in the US, but many still chose 
not to feature the images too prominently. A report on newspaper coverage the 
following day by Charles Geraci announced that "only seven of the 20 highest 
circulating papers chose to display photos of the bodies on their front pages." Of those 
that did, the most commonly shown image was one of Iraqis chanting anti-American 
slogans in front of two charred bodies hanging from the bridge; some images were 
zoomed in so that the corpses were more visible, while others chose to keep them in the 
background (See Figures 6 and 7); "Arguably, the most graphic front-page images 
were shown by The Washington Post and USA Today. Both displayed Iraqis taking turns 
beating the burned corpses with shoes." (See Figure 8)8 While some of the papers 
showed more graphic photos on inside pages but avoided them on their covers, Geraci 
notes that "many smaller publications ran photos featuring a charred body or bodies on 
their front pages."9 
Geraci's report is corroborated by research that I conducted on the 
Newseum.org website, which carries the front pages of many top American and world 
newspapers. The Guardian also showed the photo of men and boys beating the charred 
corpses with shoes. In all cases, however, the original photo, taken by Ali Jasim, was 
7 Elber, "US TV Avoids Graphic Iraq Images Seen Worldwide". 
8 Although this image illustrates the front coverage of 71te Guardian newspaper, this is a very similar shot to 
that used by The Washington Post and USA Today. 
9 Charles Geraci, "7 of Top 20 Papers Published Front-Page Fallujah Body Photos". The 2 quotations above 
are also from this source. 
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cropped to varying degrees and edited to make the ashes appear less 'corpse-like'.10 A 
very rarely shown image appeared on the cover of The New York Sun (see Figure 9); in 
this image, a body, including arms and hands, is clearly seen on fire. A survey of 
Newseum.org found that this image was shown in only two other world newspapers 
which the site carries, The National Post of Canada and the Italian La Stampa. Many 
papers chose front cover images which did not show the bodies at all; only yelling 
Iraqis and burnt vehicles are depicted. (See Figure 10) 
Such evidence suggests, following Zelizer' s comments, that issues of taste and 
decency strongly influenced which images many media organisations decided to show 
of the Fallujah attacks. The airing of special discussion programs also indicates that 
such issues were probably more explicitly on the minds of media producers than 
during the Somalia intervention. In the wake of 'Black Hawk down', the ways in which 
these images might recall US government policies and actions around the 1993 event 
for audiences and possibly inflame anti-Iraq war sentiments were considered by the 
media, and likely by American policymakers as well. While issues of taste were 
important, political considerations regarding how the images would be 'read', 
particularly by American audiences, were also significant once the images existed. 
As time passed, the most repeated images tied to the Fallujah killings by 
television media were shots of the burning frame of one of the SUV s driven by the 
contractors with a cut to images of yelling crowds of Iraqi men and boys. These images 
were neither highly 'graphic' nor did they obviously distinguish this violent occurrence 
from many others taking place in Iraq. They required the variety of supplemental 
descriptions which were attached to them in order to create a meaningful'event' and to 
both tie them back to and take them beyond the now-invisible desecrated bodies. 
In both cases studied in depth for this work, Mogadishu in Somalia and 
Fallujah, the killing and desecration of US bodies was almost immediately linked to 
1o For views of the newspaper front pages, see 
http:Uwww.newseum.org/todaysfrontpages/default archive.asp?page=S (accessed July 11, 2007). For 
original Ali Jasim photo, courtesy of Reuters, see www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/04-2NRSummer/71-
74V58N2.pdf (accessed July 11, 2007). 
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discussions of what these events meant for 'America' and its role in Somalia and Iraq. 
These debates occurred in spheres of popular culture, political debate and military 
planning and often sought to fill gaps in public knowledge, which had allowed events 
in Mogadishu and Fallujah to appear as 'out of the blue' for many in Western 
audiences. Mark Bowden's work chronicling the viewpoints of the US soldiers 
involved in the October 3-4 raids led to the publication of his book Black Hawk Down, 
which subsequently was made into a Ridley Scott-directed action film with support 
from the American military establishment.l1 Events in Fallujah, which were compared 
early on to those in Mogadishu, have also grown to fuel their own media creations, 
mainly in the realms of video games, but also with some rumours of a potential film. 
In both cases, efforts were made to re-narrate the events and their aftermath as 
stories of success and redemption for American forces. In Black Hawk Down, the 
bravery and patriotism of individual American soldiers is emphasized; those who play 
Fallujah-based video games have the opportunity to act as members of the US military 
and to win the city back for American forces. Western media coverage of both events 
had frequently supported these narrative framings by focusing intensively on US 
personnel and the policy implications of specific occurrences for America and the West. 
To the extent that it did, other important aspects of both events often' disappeared'; this 
is particularly true of the people and places being subjected to intervention. Thus, as 
with the Somalia case, an exploration of how selected media coverage facilitated these 
disappearances will be of key importance throughout this chapter. 
Despite the limited appearance of images of the contractor attack in newspapers 
and on TV screens, there is little question that the event had some effect on American 
military policy with regards to Fallujah. The strongly-worded media descriptions of 
the attack, and the linkages made with past incidents including Mogadishu, were 
integral to it, although it cannot be definitively proved that they had direct influence on 
policymakers. What is known is that according to Marine Colonel John Toolan, whose 
11 See Debbie Lisle and Andrew Pepper's specific work on this subject, "The New Face of Global 
Hollywood: Black Hawk Down and the Politics of Meta-Sovereignty", Cultural Politics 1, is. 2 (2005): 165-192. 
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forces were in the process of taking control of Fallujah from an army unit in late March 
2004, the killings fuelled military action, which then likely generated media coverage in 
a cyclical process. Toolan explained in an interview for PBS Frontline that he had hoped 
his forces could resolve the tensions with Fallujans in a more peaceful way. The 
contractors' deaths resulted in orders from his superiors to retake Fallujah by force: 
"Blackwater [the security company for which the contractors worked] guys were killed 
and then within 24 hours we were given the word that we need to go back and into the 
city."l2 
Only occasionally mentioned in media coverage of the US intervention in Iraq 
up to this point, Fallujah now became a centre of media and American military 
attention. According to some descriptions, the city of Fallujah and its residents had 
been 'problems' since the beginning of the American intervention in Iraq; occasionally 
disturbances were traced back further to the days of rule by dictator, Saddam Hussein. 
Residents of Fallujah, when discussed outside the umbrella term of the city's name 
itself, were often described en masse in a variety of derogatory ways including as 
'Saddam-supporters', terrorist sympathizers and Islamic extremists. These were people 
who, unlike much of the rest of the Iraqi population, were often seen to have benefited 
from Hussein's rule and were thus suggested to have the most reason to oppose 
American actions in Iraq as a whole. As conditions in Iraq fluctuated, Fallujah and its 
residents were commonly used as a symbol for most of the challenges Americans faced 
in 'pacifying' and 'democratizing' the country. It is this media coverage, and the major 
themes developed within it, to which this chapter will know turn. 
Analysing Fallujah: Background & Coverage Overview 
Although the case study of Fallujah will not be analysed using the same volume 
of media coverage or attempt to span as long a time period as the Somalia intervention 
case study, the theoretical and methodological approach to this case will be similar. 
12 See "Interview with Marine Col. John Toolan" on the website for PBS Frontline, "Private Warriors", 
htQ?:Uwww.pbs.or~/w~bh!pa~es/frontline/shows/warriors/interviews/toolan.htrnl (accessed June 21, 2005). 
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Analysis of media coverage of events in Fallujah will thematize and scrutinize 
predominant frameworks used for interpreting circumstances as they were presented. 
These frameworks will then be challenged and explored with reference to alternative 
narratives and less-covered perspectives. This chapter will also investigate the new 
developments and conditions in conflict reporting which changed the ways in which 
conflicts such as Fallujah could be reported, thus bringing a more recent case study to 
bear on many issues of media representation of conflict already presented in the 
Somalia coverage chapters. This chapter will be structured, however, around themes in 
coverage which indicate that, to a significant extent, not much has changed since 
Somalia. Although this is a case which needs to be studied in its own right, the 
similarities noticed in coverage themes warrant further recognition and exploration in a 
concluding chapter. 
Although many aspects of Fallujah's history have undoubtedly been subject to 
debate long before the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, it is important to establish a 
timeline of some events preceding the deaths of the American civilian contractors there 
in March 2004 which could be deemed relevant to this particular moment in time. This 
background will provide additional information not available in selected media . 
coverage of the two American 'sieges' of Fallujah in April2004 and November 2004. 
The April assault on the city was rhetorically tied directly to the contractor deaths. Its 
stated aim was to 'pacify' Fallujah, where incidents of violence against American forces, 
international contractors and American-supported Iraqi forces had recently occurred, 
and to capture and try those responsible for the deaths and mutilation of the 
contractors. The long-anticipated November 2004 attack was designed to finish what 
had been started in April. All'insurgent' forces and 'foreign fighters' were to be killed 
or driven out of Fallujah in order to again to 'pacify' the city before the first Iraqi 
elections post-US invasion. 
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An Associated Press summary of events categorizes the first major negative 
incident between US forces and Fallujan citizens as occurring on April28, 2003.13 
Media estimates varied between thirteen and sixteen Iraqis reported killed and up to 
seventy-five wounded after a crowd demonstrating against the occupation of an 
elementary school by American troops came under fire from US forces. Fallujah had 
been taken over by American Special Forces in early April, about two weeks after the 
commencement of the ground war in Iraq, but had remained without a permanent US 
military presence until the arrival of the 82nd Airborne regiment in the week before this 
initial incident.14 
Perceptions of this incident varied widely among Americans and Iraqis and 
these divergent positions were represented by Western media. American troops 
claimed that the demonstration had been violent and that they had been shot at by 
members of the crowd before returning fire in self-defense. Fallujah's residents for the 
most part said that they were shot at without warning and in an overreaction to stones 
thrown by the crowd at troops occupying the building. For some media commentators, 
these events alone were seen as sufficient and potentially critical for provoking later 
incidents of resident and insurgent aggression against US forces. Most sampled media 
coverage read this violent incident as indicative of things to come across Iraq. An 
Independent article declared that "(h)atred is taking hold here, and throughout Iraq" and 
claimed that the violence in Fallujah "goes to the heart of the problems the US forces 
face on the ground in a country which- though glad to be rid of Saddam Hussein- is 
ambivalent about living under occupation".t5 This framing of Fallujah, and others like 
it, tended to focus more on Iraqis' perceptions of the intervention, its historical context 
for them and its impacts on their lives. Alternative framings suggested that "support 
remains strong for fallen president Saddam Hussein" in Fallujah and described many 
13 Associated Press, "Summary: a Timeline on Events in Fallujah", November 8,2004, 
http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/sns-ap-fallujah-timeline,0,799615.story?coll=ny-
worldnews-toputility (accessed July 10, 2004). 
14 Scott Wilson, "US Forces Kill 2 More Civilians; Tensions Remain High in City in Central Iraq", Tlte 
Washington Post, May 1, 2003. 
15 Phil Reeves, "The War Is Over (Except for Iraq)", The Independent, May 1, 2003. 
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powerful groups in the city as owing their positions and influence to Hussein.16 These 
groups, which were occasionally said to include clerics, were positioned as instigators 
of anti-American activities in contrast to 'most' residents, although at times the media 
represented the situation as if all Fallujans supported the insurgency. This early 
coverage of Fallujah hints at the multiplicity of interpretations available, and their 
possible impacts on the American approach to Fallujah, which will be explored in more 
depth below. 
Less than forty-eight hours after the April 28, 2003 incident, US troops shot dead 
two more people and injured at least eight after another resident protest was held to 
condemn the earlier killings. Again, American forces claimed that they had been 
attacked first by evil-doers who were deliberately using residents as cover for their 
shooting. According to a Guardian article describing the events, however, "protestors 
started throwing rocks and shoes at the [US] compound and troops opened fire about 
10:30am, scattering demonstrators."17 The tense situation between Fallujah residents 
and US troops continued throughout May 2003. In two separate incidents, troops were 
reported injured and killed when a grenade was thrown into their base in Fallujah and 
later in an attack on a military checkpoint in the city. In June 2003, hundreds of US 
troops swept through Fallujah in an alleged operation against guerrilla resistance in the 
city. 18 After this incident, news from Fallujah was minimal in Western media until the 
March 2004 contractor deaths. As was highlighted in the methods chapter, the April 
and November 2004 sieges represented high points in Western media coverage of 
Fallujah after the contractor deaths so it is these periods will be now investigated in 
depth. 
16 Scott Wilson, "US Forces Kill2 More Civilians; Tensions Remain High in City in Central Iraq", The 
Washington Post, May 1, 2003. 
17 George Wright and agencies, "US Troops 'Shoot Dead Two More Iraqis", Guardian Unlimited, April30, 
2003, www.~mardian.co.uk/print/0,4658721-103681.00.html (accessed July 10, 2007). 
18 Guardian Unlimited online Fallujah timeline, www.~mardian.co.uk/Iraq/page/ (accessed September 30, 
2006). 
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Fallujah: 'A Dangerous Insurgent Hotbed' 
Derek Gregory effectively highlights an important aspect of Fallujah' s 
representation as a place when he discusses the reduction of Iraqi cities to areas of 
"object-space" rather than people-space in his work, The Colonial Present. A result of 
this strategy was that damage inflicted on Iraqi cities during the American invasion of 
Iraq, which had massive impacts on civilians given Iraq's high level of urbanisation, 
could be viewed as the successful, or unsuccessful, targeting of enemy territory rather 
than as often deadly actions against a civilian population growing increasingly angry at 
such treatment. Gregory cites passages from Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations, a report 
prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff which was published in September 2002, as well as 
media coverage to illustrate the ways in which "imaginative geographies were mapped 
onto the American public sphere to align military and civilian geographical 
knowledge."19 Practically, this transfer of framing and language often resulted from the 
terminology and imagery used in briefing papers and presentations given to media 
through the embedding process and specialised media centres, which put involved 
journalists in constant contact with military units. As was discussed in the work of 
Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer in Chapter One of this work, these processes often 
had the effect of bombarding media personnel with only select and specialised forms of 
information, while physically preventing them from exploring other aspects of the 
intervention. In both subtle and obvious ways, the media were encouraged to adopt 
the American administration's framework and vocabulary for Iraqi space. (See Image 
20) 
As suggested by the heading of this section, frameworks for understanding Iraqi 
cities including Fallujah often involved efforts at both visually and rhetorically 
distancing Western viewers and readers from the human element fundamental to all 
urban spaces. Comments on the three-dimensionality of urban terrain evoked images 
of cities as dense, dangerous places, full of potential hiding places for ambushes and 
19 Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Group, 
2004), 201. 
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sniper attacks. The complex and varied physical structures in cities were thus 
presented as 'problems', inhibiting total surveillance of urban areas by American 
military technology and rendering difficult the 'accurate' targeting of perceived enemy 
bodies and infrastructure. As will be discussed in a further section, these references to 
'dark', 'complex' and 'dangerous' physical geographies in cities were often 
transplanted directly onto city residents as well. 'Dangerous' cities would logically 
contain 'dangerous' people- snipers, insurgents and other terrorist forces- rather than 
being viewed as networks of vital services and peoples' homes. 
Interestingly, common historical references and comparisons to the situation in 
Iraq were often appropriated by opposing sides of the conflict. Gregory comments that 
the new American military discourses on urban geographies not only drew directly on 
Israeli experiences in the occupied Palestinian territories but also called to mind 
American studies of the complex system of bunkers and tunnels used by the Viet Cong 
during warfare in that country.20 Explicit comparisons were made to strategies of the 
Vietnam War by those opposing American intervention as well: "Tariq Aziz [former 
Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq] had warned that Iraq aimed to create 'a new Vietnam' 
for the United States in its cities: 'People say to me you are not the Vietnamese. You 
have no jungles and swamps to hide in. I reply: Let our streets be our jungles, let our 
buildings be our swamps."21 Those opposed to American intervention in Iraq and 
elsewhere around the globe were well aware of the American public's perceived 
sensitivity to casualties amongst their troops. Their lesson was that in asymmetrical 
warfare, where the Americans clearly held the upper hand in terms of military 
technology and equipment, fighting in the open would result in quick defeat. The 
physical density of cities would help to render surveillance technology less effective 
and, provided the Americans did not simply decide to level a city altogether, would 
result in the necessity of dose-quarters fighting where newer technology did not hold 
such a massive advantage. American forces, on the other hand, wanted to deny the 
2o Gregory, The Colonial Present: 201-202. 
21 Scott Peterson, "Iraq Prepares For Urban Defense", Christian Scimce Monitor, October 4, 2002 cited in 
Gregory's The Colonial Presmt, 201. 
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possibility that Iraq could become a Vietnam-style 'quagmire', consisting of largely 
ineffective aerial bombing combined with brutal ground warfare. Confidence in new 
technology was high, and US forces intended to use their aerial dominance, 'smart' 
weapons, and urban combat-trained troops to reveal any hidden traps lurking in Iraqi 
cities. 
For both sides, 'civilians' remained a contested and highly significant category. 
Foreign and 'insurgent' forces, if and where they had a presence in various Iraqi cities, 
could not afford to completely alienate civilians, as they often required a certain 
amount of tolerance in order to exist amongst the local population in dense city 
environments and protecting Islamic countries from foreign domination was one of 
their stated goals. Similarly, the presence of American forces in Iraq was largely 
justified on humanitarian grounds, especially as evidence of Iraq's production and 
stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction and its pre-existing connections with al-
Qaeda remained unproven. American actions which injured or killed Iraqi civilians 
were thus obviously counter to stated American goals of protecting and developing 
Iraq as a country; they further had the potential to fuel beliefs in the Middle East that 
the US had alternative, largely-imperialist, motivations for its involvement in Iraq. 
Importantly, however, the civilian-insurgent dichotomy was not one that could be 
easily perpetuated in Iraq, especially in Fallujah, where it was often suggested that 
citizens who might one day protest and fight against invading US troops might the next 
day return to their normal occupations and lives when US troops withdrew from the 
city limits. The deaths of civilians at the hands of either the Americans or the insurgent 
forces remained a political tool which could be used by both sides to condemn the 
other. One result of this factor, an absence of Iraqi casualty figures in Western media 
coverage during times of US military activity, will be discussed in detail in a following 
section. Its link to the 'places' theme of condemning Fallujah as a city will be evident, 
however, through this section. 
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The Islamic city: linking Fallujah to Sunni fundamentalism' and Saddam Hussein 
Because there had been minimal coverage of Fallujah in Western media until the 
contractor killings at the end of March 2004, it is important to explore the ways in 
which this event was contextualized with background information provided on 
Fallujah as a place. This sub-section will analyse how Fallujah was represented as a 
Ba' athist, extremist city in American newspapers, UK newspapers and in CNN 
television reports, a comparative approach that will be followed throughout further 
sections. American newspaper coverage studied indicates that some initial media 
descriptions of Fallujah repeatedly focused on its alleged status as a highly traditional 
Islamic city. In an Associated Press (AP) article, this piety is linked with anti-American 
sentiments: "The fight against the US-led occupation has strong religious undertones 
in Fallujah, reflecting the Sunni Muslim city's conservative nature, its reputation for 
piety and deep anti-US sentiments .. .It also is part of Iraq's Sunni heartland, a large 
swath of land that stretches north and west of the Iraqi capital where armed resistance 
to the US occupation is fierce."22 This quote also mentions an important association of 
Fallujah geographically with 'the Sunni triangle', an area which would come to be 
repeatedly associated with support for Saddam Hussein. 
Another AP article locates Fallujah in the Sunni triangle after describing the 
killings of the American contractors in detail; "Fallujah is in the so-called Sunni 
Triangle, where support for Saddam Hussein was strong and rebels often carry out 
attacks against American forces."23 The day after the violence, when the Fallujah 
killings made the front page of The New York Times, Khalid Mohammed's image of 
Iraqis cheering in front of the suspended, burned bodies was placed next to an article 
which also presented Fallujah in ominous terms; "Since the war in Iraq began, Fallujah 
has been a flashpoint of violence. Of all the places in Iraq, it is where anti-American 
hatred is the strongest. The area is predominately Sunni Muslim. Many families 
22 Hamza Hendawi, "Marines Seek to Pacify Fallujah With Show of Force; Residents Are Skeptical", The 
Associated Press, March 31, 2004. 
23 Sameer N Yacoub, "Bodies of Foreigners Dragged Through Streets of Fallujah; Bomb Kills Five US 
Troops", The Associated Press, March 31,2004. 
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remain loyal to the captured dictator, Mr. Hussein, who is also a Sunni Muslim."24 The 
above articles present Fallujah as a city with a history of violence into which the 
contractor deaths are added as one more example. Only a Jeffrey Gettleman article 
(details in footnote 22), gives a one sentence mention of the violence committed by US 
troops against civilian protesters. Violence in Fallujah is otherwise exclusively 
described as being perpetrated by Iraqis against US forces. 
In the citations above, a link is also made between Sunni Muslims and support 
for Saddarn Hussein, a connection which in some other articles is challenged by 
alternative explanation from Fallujan residents, who link their frustrations and anti-
Americanism to US troop actions in Fallujah rather than to any lingering ties to Saddarn 
Hussein. Indeed, Hussein ran a comparably secular government to some others in the 
region and tended to use religion instrumentally to manipulate his public support 
which may have proved unpopular with the more religious elements in Fallujan 
society. An important explanatory factor, briefly brought up later in the above 
Gettleman article, recognizes the patronage that Sunni communities such as Fallujah 
had received from the Hussein regime. Its collapse meant a loss of power, businesses 
and jobs for many Sunni communities, who as a minority in Iraq were already 
concerned about their role in a new democratic system. The simple equation of benefits 
and privileges with support for Hussein personally can obscure important economic 
dynamics of the previous Iraqi regime which American interveners often struggled to 
navigate. 
As Marine incursions into Fallujah began following the contractor deaths, these 
more subtle points regarding the position of Fallujah in post-intervention Iraq 
continued to be overshadowed in US newspaper coverage by a focus on the city as a 
place of violence and turbulence. The term "hotbed of Sunni resistance" was used 
repeatedly, along with depictions of Fallujah as /'boiling". A history of Fallujah as a 
"problem" city was reinforced by US military commanders. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt 
24 Jeffrey Gettleman, "4 From US Killed in Ambush in Iraq; Mob Drags Bodies", The New York Times, April 
1, 2004. 
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called Fallujah no "garden paradise" and said "Fallujah has been a problem, a 
significant problem for the coalition and for Iraqi security forces for many, many 
months."25 Following from these statements came imperatives; Fallujah could not be 
allowed to continue as 'out of control' and now required strong handling. The above 
article closed with a statement from army officers calling Fallujah a "hornet's nest", 
which had been stirred up by Marine failures to act firmly enough. 
As the April fighting wound down, the characterization of Fallujah as both a 
"fundamentalist" and a Ba'athist city returned to newspaper pages. A May 1, 2004 New 
York Times article discussed the involvement of Islamic political parties in negotiations 
with the Americans in both Fallujah and the Shi'a city of Naja£. An Iraqi professor from 
the University of Baghdad was quoted supporting these efforts because Fallujah was "a 
fundam~ntalist city" and "(t)he people there are very religious". Although 
complicating factors involving the marginalization of Sunni people from governing 
structures due to the Americans' de-B a' athification program were also described in this 
article, the broad-scale association of Fallujah with both Islamic extremism and support 
for Saddam Hussein continued to predominate and was chosen for quotable material.26 
Occasionally, an important counter-narrative emerged from American 
newspaper coverage, suggesting that Fallujah, rather than being a unique stronghold of 
insurgency, was simply representative of larger anti-American sentiments across much 
of Iraq. Shortly after the March attacks, a New York Times article proposed that: "(t)o 
dismiss Falluja as a tragic aberration, it is first necessary to place the city in a separated 
class, as General Kimmitt did when he said, 'Falluja remains one of those cities in Iraq 
that just don't get it,' as though most of the others did ... But Falluja is not the only place 
where mob violence has taken over once insurgents have killed foreign soldiers or 
civilians."27 
New York Times articles did occasionally compare uprisings in Fallujah with 
those in the city of Naja£ and violence in other Iraqi centres continued to be reported. 
25 Eric Schmitt, "Test In a Tinderbox", The New York Times, April28, 2004. 
26 Edward Wong, "Falluja Role Gives Stature to Islamic Party", The New York Times, May 1, 2004. 
27 John F. Burns, "The Long Shadow of a Mob", The New York Times, April4, 2004. 
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These comparisons were likely unsettling for the US administration, as they tended to 
expose large-scale failures and inconsistencies in the American effort to democratize 
Iraq, rather than to highlight areas which due to their own dynamics were said to be 
resisting peace and democracy. The infamy of the contractor killings remained a 
distinguishing point for Fallujah, however, and despite violence in other areas of Iraq 
this Sunni city's notoriety remained. Interestingly, the accompanying photo for the 
Burns article above, which contests Fallujah's uniqueness, is one of the more 'graphic' 
images of the contractor killings, described as Iraqi children pointing to a body part 
after the mutilation of the contractors. 
UK newspaper coverage utilized some of the same frames of understanding as 
the analysed American newspaper coverage but tended to regard the American 
intervention in Iraq as a whole in a more sceptical light, probably reflecting the greater 
sense of discomfort of their readership with the war and its aims. While American 
coverage had tended to present Fallujah as a particular 'problem' city in Iraq and to 
explain why this was the case in military and political terms, British coverage more 
often explained Fallujah as a reflection of broader problems with the entirety of US 
policy in Iraq. 
Initially, representations of Fallujah as a dangerous, highly-religious and 
Ba' athist city were rhetorically reminiscent of American portrayals, especially in certain 
newspapers. A Daily Telegraph article immediately following the contractor killings 
declared Fallujah to be "one of the most violent, restive towns in Iraq since the U5-led 
occupation began. It is an extremely pro-Saddam town in a staunchly pro-Saddam area 
known as the Sunni Triangle. Residents are famously religious: women are rarely seen 
in public and even the kebab shops have prayer rooms."28 A further Telegraph article on 
April6, 2004 elaborated on the dangers Fallujah posed to attacking US troops: "Fallujah 
is awash with illegal arms, including heavy weapons, and any incursion into the city is 
28 Jack Fairweather, "American Dead Butchered 'Like Sheep'. Jubilant Crowds Drag Mutilated Bodies 
Through Streets of Pro-Saddam Town They Call a 'Cemetery For Americans", The Daily Telegraph, Aprill, 
2004. 
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fraught with risk."29 The invasion by American troops was shown to have had little 
effect on Fallujah's dangerous status by late May 2004: "Foreign insurgents suspected 
of links to al-Qaeda have established a firm foothold in the flashpoint Iraqi city of 
Fallujah. A well-armed group infiltrated the city before fighting erupted in March and 
is continuing to mount operations against the coalition and Westerners in the area- in 
defiance of Fallujah's mosques, the army and the police force." 30 
Despite the use of similar terminology as the American newspapers, there 
appeared to be more attempts in some of the British coverage analysed to investigate 
Fallujah' s situation in ways which questioned why it had become a danger zone for 
coalition troops. Even before the contractor killings, a Guardian article warned that 
Fallujah's population was already "resentful" and that the behaviour of the Marines 
towards the population there seemed to risk making the same mistakes as their army 
predecessors.31 A further Guardian article interviewed Fallujah's city council chief and 
quoted him discussing one of the biggest problems with American assumptions 
regarding Fallujah: "'They are dealing with the Sunnis as if they are all supporters of 
Saddam Hussein and that is a big mistake,' Mr. Hassan says."32 Further articles, mostly 
found in The Guardian, quoted other Iraqis supporting this view.33 Several articles 
recognized the disastrous consequences of the Fallujah invasions for American-Iraqi 
relations all over the country, pointing out that the levels of violence during the assault 
had made the Americans enemies of both extremist and moderate Iraqis alike.34 
29 David Blair, "US Marines in Fallujah Sweep", The Daily Telegraph, April6, 2004. 
30 Lee Gordon, "Iraqi Fighters Turn Against 'Out Of Control' Al-Qaeda Insurgents, Saudi-Backed Terrorists 
Defy the Army, Police and Religious Leaders in Their Push For Final Showdown With the Coalition", The 
Sunday Telegraph, May 30, 2004. 
31 Patrick Graham, "Falluja Fury As Marines Move In to Restore Calm: Iraq's Death Toll Climbs Over 
Weekend As US Forces Clash With Guerrillas", The Observer, March 28,2004. 
32 Rory McCarthy, "Iraqi Politician Hits a Wall of Frustration In Attempt to Build a Future For His Town: A 
Year After the Assault On Iraq, the Guardian Finds a Local Leader Frustrated By a Lack of Aid From the 
US", The Guardian, March 17,2004. 
33 See, for example, Luke Harding, "Iraq Conflict: 'It's Heii ... Everything Will Be Destroyed': Refugees, 
Troops Don't Care Who They Shoot, Say Fleeing Locals", The Guardian, April30, 2004. 
34 Rory McCarthy, "Uneasy Truce In the City of Ghosts: Rory McCarthy Talks to Survivors of the US Forces 
Assault on Falluja, the Bloodiest Battle of the Uprising_ Which Doctors Say Killed Up to 600 Iraqis", T11e 
Guardian, April 24, 2004. 
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Like the American coverage, the UK media used Fallujah as a symbol but it was 
not only made the representative of Islamic fundamentalism and support for Saddam 
Hussein. The city also became synonymous with failures and u-turns in US Iraq policy, 
especially in newspapers which routinely expressed strong scepticism about or 
opposition to the Iraq invasion. British newspapers were also more explicit about the 
difficulties faced by the media in covering the Fallujah sieges and the ways in which 
this factor restricted the types of coverage that could be produced: 
Part of the problem in determining whether the coalition's tactics have 
been appropriate is that, by the very nature of the siege, with the town 
surrounded by coalition troops, it is impossible for media or outside 
agencies to determine what is happening inside. Observation from 
outside is confined to aircraft, explosions and fires. It is impossible to 
confirm figures on casualties or to establish whether they include many 
civilians and children, as Iraqis allege, or are mainly male fighters, as 
US forces say.35 
CNN television coverage of the incidents in Fallujah in 2004 uses similar 
vocabulary to that identified in both American and UK newspapers but, because of the 
medium's more extensive visual aspect, it allows for a more thorough investigation of 
how these frameworks are developed through imagery as well as textually/verbally. 
From the first reports of the contractors' deaths, CNN coverage also linked Fallujah as a 
city with support for Saddam Hussein. Images of Hussein were shown immediately 
following those illustrating the contractors' deaths with the explanation that Fallujah 
was at the heart of the 'Sunni triangle', the area which had the highest level of support 
for the deposed dictator.36 The association of the city with support for Hussein 
continued throughout coverage of the Marines' April attack on Fallu}ah and a tendency 
also developed to associate it with other figures viewed as enemies of the US invasion, 
thus distinguishing it as a 'problem' city. A Western expert on an April6, 2004 CNN 
35 Bronwen Maddox, "Fallujah Becomes a Symbol For Both Sides As US Changes Its Tactics", The Times, 
April30, 2004. 
36 Iraq/Attacks/Fallujah, Habbaniyah, CNN news, March 31,2004. This title style exactly replicates the way 
in which television items which can be streamed are referenced in the Vanderbilt Television Media 
Archive. CNN items will be footnoted consistently in this way throughout this chapter. 
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program described Fallujah as being a "tough nut" which had "always been solidly 
anti-American."37 Iraqis in other parts of the country were said to be urging the US to 
keep up its military actions in Fallujah, as the city had apparently long been a source of 
insecurity in Iraq.38 An "Insider's View" item on the Fallujah situation, which purports 
to explain why Fallujah is violently resisting American occupation, also begins by 
calling the city a "tough town", even under the Hussein regime. Although the item 
concludes by calling Fallujah "a company town for Saddam's military", it was said to 
be a rebellious area that was occasionally willing to challenge the dictator's policies.39 
Fallujah's alleged opposition to both old and new forms of authority in this case 
appears to be used to confirm its status as a long-term 'problem' city which must now 
be brought under control, with the implication seeming to be by any means necessary. 
As US troops began the final late April push to take Fallujah, rhetoric focusing 
on Fallujah as 'pro-Saddarn' and mentions of the need to 'pacify' the city by violent 
means were explicitly stated. Several CNN reports in April opened with statements by 
anchor Aaron Brown calling Fallujah "a city which has long bedeviled US forces" and 
"a measure of how difficult things have become in Iraq", thus situating Fallujah as a 
city holding back positive development in the country.40 An April23, 2004 report 
described Fallujah as a "last stand" for elements of the old regime and the American 
administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer, was quoted describing the rebels as former 
intelligence officials and republican guards who were some of Hussein's best troops.41 
Crushing the resistance in Fallujah was therefore positioned as a rational part of the 
Americans' original goal of removing Saddam Hussein and his supporters from power. 
As the April 23 item continues, shots of men in headscarves firing guns are shown with 
voiceover explaining that the worst of the rebels are now expected to have been pinned 
down in Fallujah and "wiping them out now might provide the best opportunity to 
break the back of the resistance." In items on both April14 and 19, 2004, unidentified 
37 Iraq/Attacks/Ramadi/Nordland interview, CNN news, April6, 2004. 
38 Iraq!Uprising/Hostages/Fallujah/Troops, CNN news, Aprill4, 2004. 
39 Iraq/Fallujah/An Insider's View/Aerial Vehicles, CNN news, Aprill9, 2004. 
40 See Aaron Brown's April23, 2004 and April28, 2004 reports, CNN news. 
41 Iraq/Fallujah, CNN news, April 23, 2004. 
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men are also seen both in headscarves shooting around a corner and down a street and 
in crowds shouting anti-US slogans as US troops with guns drawn perform crowd 
control operations while riding in jeeps.42 In both cases, US troops appear on the 
defensive while the Iraqis are portrayed as engaged in two types of violent activity, 
visibly demonstrating Fallujah's residents as 'problems' who are not easily 
distinguishable from 'insurgents'. Although these types of representations of Fallujans 
will be analysed in depth in a further section, for the purposes of analysing Fallujah's 
image as a city it is important to recognise this frequent tendency to associate it with 
anti-Americanism, Islamic extremism and support for Saddarn Hussein. These linkages 
are relevant both to the representation of the place and its people. 
A city backdrop for battle 
During both the April and November sieges of Fallujah, Gregory's comments on 
the reduction of the city to an object-space are obviously relevant. Much American 
newspaper coverage focused overwhelmingly on describing the experiences of 
American fighting troops; this coverage will be dealt with in a later section. Fallujah as 
a place tended to be reduced to a backdrop for the soldiers' activity, with its human 
elements downplayed. While NeuJ York Times coverage did frequently include 
residents' comments or, more commonly, statements of evacuees from Fallujah during 
the sieges, the articles' approach tended to focus on American tactics and the political 
ramifications of the violence. The November 2004 siege was viewed from a particularly 
Marine-centric viewpoint, with frequent comments on what had been learned from the 
earlier April attacks. 
An April14, 2004 New York Times article presents a common framework for 
reporting from Fallujah during the times of siege. The article is overwhelmingly a 
description of Marine-insurgent battles with comments from Marines on the ground. 
Fallujah is a depressing and dangerous backdrop for these encounters. Its streets are "a 
42 See Iraq/Uprising!Hostages/Fallujah{froops ... , CNN news, Aprill4, 2004 and Iraq/Fallujah/An Insider's 
View/Aerial Vehicles, CNN news, April19, 2004. 
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collage of ruin"; although the city is quiet, it is "ominously quiet" and "in an 
instant ... bursts into a fully engulfed combat zone."43 A subsequent article on April15 
makes similar statements. Fallujah is a "dusty city of monochromatic tan brick. .. a row 
of rooftops occupied by Marines look[s] down on garbage-strewn streets."44 Images 
accompanying the New York Times articles throughout April 2004 follow the patterns in 
written coverage. The majority of descriptions obtained through Lexis Nexis outline 
pictures of American troops involved in various activities. Fewer images of Fallujan 
citizens were published, although one of these would appear to be quite 'graphic', 
showing dead Iraqis and abandoned cars, said to have approached a Marine position 
near Fallujah.45 In most newspaper photos which could be viewed, however, the city of 
Fallujah is visible only as an often out-of-focus setting onto which the activities of the 
Marines are overlaid. (See Image 22) 
The November siege followed the same format as April with articles that were 
highly descriptive of the fighting from the American side and of destruction to Fallujah 
itself. The effects of such destruction on the city's inhabitants were only speculated at, 
however, possibly because most Western media in Fallujah at this time were embedded 
with American military units and had no safe access to residents trapped indoors by 
the violence. Many of the descriptions during the earlier half of November suggested 
that most of Fallujah's population had fled the city, leaving only buildings and 
infrastructure for destruction: 
Solely from a military standpoint, the operation redressed a disastrous 
assault on Fallujah last April that was called off when unconfirmed 
reports of large civilian casualties drove the political cost too high. This 
time, the Americans ... pummeled a dark and mostly abandoned city 
defended only by a wraithlike band of insurgents who fired 
43 Jeffrey Gettleman, "Marines in Falluja Still Face and Return Relentless Fire", The New York Times, April 
14,2004. 
44 Jeffrey Gettleman, "Marines Use Low-Tech Skill to Kill100 in Urban Battle", The New York Times, April 
15,2004. 
45 This image can be found with Gettleman, "Marines in Falluja Still Face and Return Relentless Fire". It 
was taken by Lynsey Addario of Corbis for The New York Times. 
Kalashnikovs, mortars and rockets at the Americans and then fled into 
alleys and apartment blocks, only to reappear elsewhere.46 
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The apparent disappearance of civilians from the urban environment often seemed to 
be used as justification for the use of increased force against Fallujah' s buildings and 
infrastructure, as it was assumed that only 'evil' insurgents would remain to face the 
American attack. Although the frequent discussion of the destruction wrought on 
Fallujah could be argued to be an attempt by reporters to make the violence and 
destruction they were seeing as 'real' as possible for readers, the fact that many of the 
operations took place at night and from the air meant that there was often very little 
available for observation or image generation. During both sieges, there was a 
reduction in the visibility of Fallujah; most 'views' of the city for both embedded 
reporters and military personnel came through the eye-pieces of weapons, via night-
vision equipment or through satellite and computer-generated imagery. (See Image 20) 
Visually, Fallujah was thus also viewed with metaphorical and physical distance and 
detachment, its destruction a necessity due to the presence of 'terrorist' elements in its 
midst. 
Discussions about the legitimacy of targeting a major hospital in Fallujah as part 
of American operations there were also tied to a broader framing of the city as a set of 
risks rather than as 'home'. Hospital reports had been a key way in which news of 
civilian casualties had emerged during the first siege of Fallujah in April. November 
reports in The New York Times, while not detailed, made it clear that US forces did not 
want this to happen again: "The offensive also shut down what officers said was a 
propaganda weapon for the militants: Falluja General Hospital, with its stream of 
reports of civilian casualties."47 An earlier New York Times article, written during the 
height of the November battle, comments on the hospital in a similar way: 
46 Dexter Filkins and James Glanz, "Rebels Routed in Falluja; Fighting Spreads Elsewhere", The New York 
Times, November 15, 2004. 
47 Eric Schmitt," A Goal Is Met. What's Next?", The New York Times, November 15,2004. 
After two hours of steady pounding by American guns, tanks, Bradley 
fighting vehicles and AC-130 gunships, at least one objective - a 
hospital about half a mile west of downtown Falluja- was secured by 
American Special Forces and the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion ... The 
hospital was selected as an early target because the American military 
believed that it was the source of rumors about heavy casualties. 'It's a 
center of propaganda,' a senior American officer said Sunday.48 
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The frame of reference for Fallujah's hospital in The New York Times coverage 
analysed is primarily a depiction of the hospital as a site of danger and 'propaganda'. 
Only one article comments that the seizure of the hospital has prevented the media 
from being able to show pictures of ''bleeding women and children being taken into 
emergency wards".49 There is no mention made of whether there were patients and 
staff at the hospital at the time of the attack, although American troops in front of the 
captured hospital are said to have taken heavy fire from insurgents. None of the 
articles analysed discuss the taking of the hospital as a contravention of the Geneva 
Conventions, a point of debate in other media during the conflict. The framework used 
by The New York Times serves to legitimize the targeting of the hospital. Other sources 
alleged that the action resulted in increased civilian deaths due to injured people not 
being able to reach or receive adequate treatment at the hospital. 5° As a military 
strategy, it appeared to succeed in minimizing the amount of information that could be 
released to the media regarding civilian casualties. During the April 2004 siege, Iraqi 
medical staff working for Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) were able to enter Fallujah. 
Dr. Abed Al-llah, a representative of the US-appointed Iraqi governing council, 
reported that many of those listed dead by Fallujah hospitals were women and 
children; a sizable proportion of these were said to have died from wounds which 
48 Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Robert F. Worth, "Gis Open Attack To Take Falluja From Iraq Rebels", The New 
York Times, November 8,2004. 
49 Neil MacFarquhar, "Arab Response to Attacks Reveals Mixed Allegiances", The New York Times, 
November 11, 2004. 
50 As but one example, see the Iraq Body Count website, which provides documentation collected by 
journalists in Iraq in an attempt to calculate numbers of civilians being killed in conflict there since the start 
of the 2003 war, http:Uwww.iraq,bodycount.or~/resources/falluja/ibc falluja apr 20.php (accessed July 10, 
2007). 
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would have been treatable with timely medical attention. 51 During the November 
siege, civilian casualty information remained highly uncertain; there was no attempt 
made by US forces to calculate numbers. 
During the November siege of Fallujah, the British newspapers analysed 
continued to produce more contextualizing articles than their American counterparts. 
There was a strong focus on the timing of the second 'battle for Fallujah', after George 
W. Bush had been successfully re-elected American president, and more reminders of 
why Fallujah had historically experienced a high level of tension with US forces, 
particularly the killing of civilian protestors. Greater amounts of interview material 
and quotes from Fallujan residents also helped to reduce the omnipotence of the 
reported statements by American military commanders. This alternative to strictly 
'authority' voices will be explored in more depth in a coming section. 
The depiction of Fallujah' s hospital was also noticeably different in the British 
newspapers analysed versus American ones, consistent with a greater focus on the 
condition of Fallujan civilians found in British papers. An April24, 2004 Guardian 
article reported that Marines had prevented access to Fallujah' s only hospital for more 
than two weeks and an Iraqi doctor gave a lengthy description of horrible conditions 
inside the closed hospital. An Iraqi emergency coordinator for Medecins sans 
Frontieres was quoted saying that MSF "wanted an independent inquiry to determine 
why the US military used the hospital as a military position- a violation of the Geneva 
conventions."52 In November 2004, the hospital's early seizure by American forces was 
also discussed in more depth in surveyed British coverage and again, unlike US 
coverage, the fact that this action could constitute a violation of the Geneva 
Conventions was mentioned: "Although Falluja general hospital, a small, poorly 
equipped facility on the western outskirts of the city, should have been protected under 
51 See quotes from Ekklesia and Cockburn in Stephen Graham, "Remember Fallujah: Demonizing Place, 
Constructing Atrocity", Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 23 (2005): 3. 
52 Rory McCarthy, "Uneasy Truce In the City Of Ghosts: Rory McCarthy Talks to Survivors of the US 
Forces Assault On Falluja, The Bloodiest Battle of the Uprising, Which Doctors Say Killed Up to 600 Iraqis", 
The Guardian, April 24, 2004. 
the Geneva conventions, it was deemed legitimate by US commanders because they 
said it had been taken over by insurgents."53 
318 
Interestingly, the seizure of the hospital was interpreted differently across a 
spectrum of British papers. The Sunday Times' reporting on the same event describes 
the takeover of the hospital as part of "softening up" procedures, since the hospital was 
suspected of being a "rebel command post". Mention is made of the fact that "50 fit 
young men suspected of pretending to be patients" were arrested. 54 On the same day, 
The Observer reported that: "One of the first actions of US troops ... was to seize its 
[Fallujah's] general hospital to prevent what one US officer described as 'insurgent 
propaganda' over casualty figures."55 While The Sunday Times includes information 
that appears to justify the American decision to seize the hospital, both The Guardian 
article in the previous paragraph and The Observer stress the problematic nature of the 
action under international law and, in the case of The Observer, use quotation marks to 
differentiate the views of American forces' commanders from the written 'voice' of the 
reporter. 
The limitations of CNN coverage during the November 2004 siege is 
particularly obvious, largely due to an absence of images available for presentation 
with reports and to the restrictions on the network's embedded reporters. One of the 
few instances of 'live' filming during the November siege involved images of prisoners 
of war, who were filmed being blindfolded by Iraqi troops allied with the US as they 
lay prone in the captured hospital in Fallujah. This footage is contentious in itself given 
the American condemnations of the airing on al-Jazeera television of images of 
American prisoners in Iraq. The Americans themselves seemed to have few qualms 
about allowing media to film their Iraqi captives. Initially, the CNN report simply 
states over this footage that Fallujah's hospital was one of the first buildings US troops 
wanted to secure with no rationale given. At the end of the report, a US expert witness 
53 Rory McCarthy, "Assault On Falluja: Go Kick Some Butt and Make History, Vietnam-Style, US Troops 
Urged", The Guardian, November 9, 2004. 
54 Hala Jaber, "Showdown In The City of Snipers", The Sunday Times, November 14,2004. 
55 Peter Beaumont, "Focus: Assault on Fallujah: The Final Battle?", The Observer, November 14,2004. 
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explains that the hospital was an early target for the Marines because the medical staff 
at the hospital are former Ba' athists responsible for lying about mass casualties in the 
last Fallujah siege. 56 The coverage ends shortly after this point is made with no 
comment about the potential suffering of civilians caused by the hospital closure and 
without making the point, as is done in some British newspaper coverage, that such an 
act could be interpreted as a violation of the Geneva Conventions. US military 
frameworks of understanding, which viewed the hospital as a legitimate target for 
seizure, were thus accepted without question by CNN at this point. (See Image 25) 
The examples above thus illustrate various ways in which Fallujah as a city 
became a backdrop, rather than a central point of discussion, during the American 
sieges. The city was rarely visually portrayed, likely due to media inability to gain safe 
access during the frequent nighttime attacks. The destruction happening within 
Fallujah was justified by reference to the need to completely wipe out insurgents, who 
were suggested to be the only people remaining in the city. As will be further 
elaborated in a later section, a choice was also made, mainly by American but also some 
British media, to devote story time and quotes to American troops and personnel, 
which had the effect of limiting discussion of Fallujah to militarized language of its 
risks as a battle site. In the specific case of Fallujah's hospital, the media surveyed, 
particularly American, often supported their military's explanation that the occupying 
of vital infrastructure was a battlefield necessity to stop 'propaganda'. Alternative 
understandings of this action appeared to be confined to British media such as The 
Guardian and The Observer. 
City of darkness: Fallujah as a 'terrorist nest' 
CNN coverage frequently used a combination of both sub-themes mentioned 
above, linking Fallujah to well-established 'enemies' of the US such as al-Qaeda 
militants and Saddam Hussein while also focusing predominantly on the experiences of 
US combat troops with minimal visual illustration of the devastation inflicted on 
56 Iraq/Fallujah Offensive/Anderson Interview, CNN news, November 8, 2004. 
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Fallujah by their actions. Coverage in late April 2004 continued to routinely sum up the 
situation in Fallujah as one which had to be resolved "decisively'', often explicitly 
interpreted to mean killing or capturing all'insurgents' in the city, so that it could not 
remain "a symbol for Islam" .57 Heavy and prolonged fighting in parts of Fallujah was 
attributed to the desperation of insurgents who were losing to US firepower. Iraqi 
outrage over the violence in Fallujah, however, led to an arranged pullout of US forces 
at the end of April and a turnover to Iraqi forces. After the withdrawal, coverage of 
Fallujah decreased but the city retained its reputation for danger and rebelliousness. It 
became known, as in earlier newspaper coverage, as an insurgent haven where 
militants had "unfettered control". A guest journalist on CNN described the state of 
affairs in Fallujah during a June 24, 2004 interview: "We're talking about Islamists now. 
Iraqi Islamists and a horde, an unknown number, of foreign Islamists. These men who 
aren't necessarily al-Qaeda, some of them may be certainly inspired by al-Qaeda, they 
act like them, they share the same ideology. This is who now controls Fallujah."58 
Aaron Brown, CNN' s news anchor for the program, concluded after this report 
that the Fallujah area had become a "Taliban-like state", where Islamic law was being 
practiced and brutal punishments meted out. A number of assumptions emerge from 
these types of indictments, namely that Fallujah is unable to function as a compliant 
city in Western terms. It is instead linked to violence against Western forces, either 
through the actions of Saddam-supporters or through radical Islamists. The 
associations made in the above statements with al-Qaeda and the Taliban can also help 
to link Fallujah in viewers' minds with other declared enemies of the US whose 
elimination had been frequently deemed necessary. Some more extreme American 
commentators, such as Ralph Peters in The New York Post, summed up this particular 
view openly, although it is implicit in other coverage as well: "Now we need to finish 
the job swiftly, no matter the cost in death and destruction, before the will of our 
civilian leaders weakens again. Stopping even one building short of the annihilation of 
57 This was a quote from Senator Jay Rockefeller in item- Iraq/Fallujah/Najaf, CNN news, April25, 2004. 
58 Iraq/Reporter's Notebook/Ware Interview, CNN news, June 24,2004. Michael Ware is a Time magazine 
reporter who was embedded with US troops in Fallujah. 
the terrorists and insurgents would be a defeat ... By quitting in April, we created the 
terrorist city-state of Fallujah. Now we need to shut it down for good."59 
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In November, CNN reported this instrumental and militaristic view as the 
explicit goal of the US military, now with the backing of the Iraqi governing council. 
Jamie Mcintyre commented that the US and Iraqi government had an agreement to 
finish the battle in Fallujah this time "no matter how messy it gets."6° Continued US 
bombing of Fallujah during the summer months between the two sieges was justified 
through ongoing portrayals of the city as harbouring 'evil' forces that required swift 
destruction. A July 8, 2004 CNN report used the often-recycled footage of head-scarf-
clad men firing guns in dilapidated streets immediately followed by a much-used face 
shot of the al-Qaeda figure Musab al-Zarqawi, described to be the world's most wanted 
terrorist, who was alleged to be using Fallujah as a base.61 
As has been touched on in the discussion above, the use of specific metaphors 
and meaning-loaded words in reports on Fallujah often could be seen as prompting 
viewers to specific understandings about the nature of events in the city. The use of 
militarized vocabulary, a feature of some newspaper articles, was also common in CNN 
television coverage during both sieges and led to a more subtle means of positioning 
Fallujah as a city destined to require violent subjugation. Complementing this 
vocabulary was a disappearance of the city as anything other than an obstacle to 
military takeover, presenting dangerous challenges to incoming troops. "Pacification" 
is described as the "unlikely" word for the combination of deadly force and good deeds 
that the Marines will allegedly perform in Fallujah in response to the attacks. Shots of 
the burning contractor SUVs are shown as this announcement is made to re-emphasize 
the reason for the attacks. These images then switch to ones showing US troops 
59 Ralph Peters, "Finishing Fallujah", The New York Post online edition, November 9, 2004, 
htq>:Uwww.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/33712.htm (accessed November 25, 2004). 
60 lraq/Fallujah offensive/Anderson interview, CNN news, November 8, 2004. 
61 Iraq/Attacks/Fallujah, CNN news, July 8, 2004. 
performing day and nighttime training exercises as US General Mark Kimmit states 
that Marines in Fallujah "will be methodical, precise and overwhelming".62 
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By the end of October 2004, the second battle for Fallujah, "the mother of all 
battles" as it was called, was being planned. CNN reports on these preparations 
reflected what was to be the overwhelming focus of the upcoming battle: American 
troops. Repetitive images of troops assembling weapons, riding in tanks and jeeps and 
discussing their feelings about the coming battle dominated the coverage. Fallujah was 
literally reduced to a 'sandbox' model, which Marines are pictured clustered around at 
their base, learning the city's terrain. The comment is made that US troops are 
developing strategies based on Russian experiences in attacking the Chechen city of 
Grozny, which was almost completely destroyed by Russian shelling and bombing 
amid widespread accusations of human rights abuses.63 A report a few days later, 
entitled "Falluja in the Crosshairs", showed only one shot of a mosque in Fallujah from 
rooftop level; all other imagery of the city was either through night vision devices, 
which provide only fuzzy green and black images, or from high-flying aircraft.64 The 
use of high aerial shots of Fallujah continued throughout the siege until troop actions in 
the city began to subside in mid to late November. 
The reduction of 'live' coverage throughout the November assault on Fallujah 
meant that CNN increasingly relied on earlier-recorded images of US troops and on 
'experts', particularly retired US generals, who were often brought in to give interviews 
on the unseen Marine progress. One former general who discussed the importance of 
clearing Fallujah and then holding ground in the city to keep terrorists "rooted out" on 
a house-by-house basis utilized three dimensional images of troops comparable to a 
video game. This particular series of images provides little to nothing in the way of 
additional explanation or clarification of his points but appears designed to fill visual 
time and space as the general speaks.65 CNN was often honest about the obstacles it 
62 Iraq/Attacks/Fallujah, CNN news, July 8, 2004. 
63 Iraq/Fallujah, CNN news, October 31, 2004. 
64 lraq/Fallujah offensive/ Allam Interview, CNN news, November 5, 2004. 
65 Iraq/Fallujah offensive/Murray Interview, CNN news, November 6, 2004. 
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faced in attempting to report on Fallujah; these obstacles involved a lack of access to 
images and potential stories throughout the siege periods. On November 8, 2004, 
CNN' s Aaron Brown opened his program by declaring that the night's news would 
involve some facts but not analysis, as there was simply no way to get information 
other than from embeds as the Marines entered Fallujah. Even the embedded reporter 
interviewed could barely be heard over the noise of weapon-fire; she informed viewers 
that military restrictions limited what she could report to the public. The only 'live' 
images available were those of tanks firing next to the reporter and smoke rising from 
buildings in the distance, presumably Fallujah. (See Image 23) General Myers, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld were 
interviewed and older, stock shots of US troops kicking in house doors and charging 
with guns were shown in an effort to represent a current situation that could not be 
easily witnessed or imaged by journalists.66 
This section suggests that representations of Fallujah as an "object-space" full of 
danger and risk, rather than as a populated city containing crucial infrastructure, were 
developed through a variety of strategies. In terms of discourses presented, Fallujah 
was linked to a tradition of resistance to governmental authority and frequently 
described as a Sunni bastion of support for Saddam Hussein. The Islamic piety of city 
residents was used as a means of tying them to other, problematic Muslim extremist 
groups who were openly enemies of the US state, such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 
Visual representation of the city, particularly when it came under American siege, was 
minimal; keeping these images to a minimum often appeared to be a US military goal. 
A variety of negative associations were thus used to create a largely unseen enemy for 
well-documented and imaged American troops, who, as will be seen in a further 
section, were often presented as the key protagonists in the Fallujah siege story. Absent 
from these coverage patterns is any sense of civilian life in Fallujah. Imagery of 
Fallujan civilians and quoting of their perspectives on the violence in their city are also 
66 Iraq/Fallujah offensive/Anderson interview, CNN news, November 8, 2004. 
324 
very rare in some coverage sources. The following section will explore this coverage 
omission in depth. 
New Orleans meets Fallujah: shared discourses of 'war zone' cities 
An example of the pervasiveness of American domestic discourses similar to 
those used in Fallujah and Somalia will be considered at this juncture, between 
discussions of the representation of Fallujah as a place and of Fallujans as people. This 
comparative moment resembles that of the Rodney King incident with representations 
of Somali men and boys in the previous chapter. The setting for these familiar 
discourses, similar to the King incident with events in Somalia, was America near the 
time of the Fallujah incidents. Media representation of Hurricane Katrina, which struck 
the Gulf coast of America on August 29, 2005, frequently called upon metaphors 
directly taken from US experiences in Iraq. Kathleen Tierney and her fellow authors 
outline how events were reported: 
(I)nitial media coverage of Katrina's devastating impacts was quickly 
replaced by reporting that characterized disaster victims as 
opportunistic looters and violent criminals and that presented 
individual and group behavior following the Katrina disaster through 
the lens of civil unrest. Later, narratives shifted again and began to 
metaphorically represent the disaster-stricken city of New Orleans as a 
war zone and to draw parallels between conditions in the city and 
urban insurgency in Iraq. These media frames helped guide and justify 
actions undertaken by military and law enforcement entities that were 
assigned responsibility for the postdisaster emergency response. The 
overall effect of media coverage was to further bolster arguments that 
only the military is capable of effective action during disasters.67 
As Tierney et. al. suggest, the linkage of New Orleans with Iraqi cities as places 
of danger, destruction and violence did not only have discursive effects on how New 
Orleans was conceptualised but also had material impacts. Stephen Graham points out 
67 Kathleen Tierney, Christine Bevc and Erica Kuligowski, "Metaphors Matter: Disaster Myths, Media 
Frames, and Their Consequences in Hurricane Katrina", The Annals of the American Academy 604 (March 
2006): 60-61. 
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some tangible impacts on a broader scale when he describes ways in which 'war on 
terror' discourses had already resulted in the privileging of certain governmental 
programs over others. In some cases, budget cuts in natural disaster preparedness 
programs in and around the Gulf coast of America can be directly linked to increases in 
spending on 'homeland security' programs, which prioritised the risk of 'terrorist' 
disasters over that of natural ones, and to the costs of the war in Iraq.68 
Like the situations in Fallujah and Somalia, discursive distinctions were drawn 
between 'innocent' victims of the disasters and those deemed to be opportunistically 
profiting from them. In the case of Katrina, these divisions routinely were made along 
racialized and gendered lines, with young, African American men most commonly 
identified as violent 'looters' in much the same way that Somali men were frequently 
represented as gun-toting thugs and Fallujan men were portrayed as potential Islamic 
extremists and insurgents. Such discourses, along with those which suggested that 
urban unrest was rife in parts of New Orleans, were unsubstantiated by evidence and 
tarred all members of the already disproportionately deprived African American 
community in the region with the same broad brush stroke. They also, according to 
Tierney et. al., resulted in post-disaster actions which placed more emphasis on 
policing and anti-looting efforts than on continued search and rescue missions, leading 
to a possible greater loss of lives.69 
As suggested above, discourses surrounding these policing efforts are 
particularly obvious in their ties to events in Iraq, with references to "urban combat", 
"insurgents" and "war zone" being common in media quotes from military personnel 
and politicians working in the American Gulf area.70 The insinuations made by many 
of these discourses are that the displaced, suffering citizens of New Orleans were 
people who required a strong, military hand to avert them from their socially-
destructive urges. Like Somalis and Iraqis, these 'other' people were portrayed as the 
68 Stephen Graham, "'Homeland' Insecurities?: Katrina and the Politics of 'Security' in Metropolitan 
America", Space and Culture 9, No.1 (February 2006): 2. 
69 Tierney, "Metaphors Matter", 68. 
70 Ibid, 71. 
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'less-than-civilised', who were incapable of helping themselves and required aggressive 
management, as opposed to a host of other possible approaches. Tierney et. al. note 
that it took some time before the American media began to critique their own coverage 
of Katrina, and before a few began to discuss the socio-economics of a situation where 
poor, African American communities could be so disproportionately effected by the 
disaster.71 With this brief comparison in mind, this chapter will now investigate the 
representation of Fallujan citizens. 
Fallujan Citizens: Seldom Seen, Rarely Heard 
The 2004 media coverage of Fallujans, and others associated with the city, 
varied considerably in terms of the emphasis placed on the experiences of citizens 
during different phases of the violence. As mentioned above, there are many possible 
reasons for these variations. After the contractor killings, Fallujah remained a 
dangerous area for Westerners to travel and Western media were often dependent on 
the work of Arab and Iraqi freelancers to obtain stories and images from the region. 
With few exceptions, journalists who went into Fallujah during the April and 
November sieges were embedded with American military units and thus were limited 
in where and how they could report. While there were attempts to explore the reasons 
for the violence in most media coverage, these efforts were often limited to American 
and British official opinions, with occasional quotes from Iraqi governors. Throughout 
the coverage analysed, there appears to be a relatively consistent difference in styles of 
coverage across the newspaper field, with The Guardian giving the most column space 
to presenting the views of Iraqi and Fallujan citizens while The New York Times tended 
to focus more on presenting a political and strategic view of the violence from a 
generally American standpoint. When space is given to individual comment, The New 
York Times often turns to the views of US troops on the ground in April and November 
or to officials' quotes. Other analysed newspapers alternate between these two 
generalized approaches. 
71 Tierney, "Metaphors Matter", 74. 
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The visual representations of people involved in the Fallujah events offer even 
less variety than the textual approaches. Both CNN coverage of the violence and 
analysed newspaper photographs show the conflict overwhelmingly from the 
perspective of the US military forces involved. Images of Iraqis, when shown with 
reference to Fallujah, are predominately recycled shots from the incident of the 
contractor killings and generic footage of 'insurgents' in headscarves firing weapons. 
Footage of civilian life is quite rare, as are images of dead bodies- either those of 
civilians or those of US troops. (See Image 24 as exception to this) 'Insurgent', enemy 
bodies were occasionally shown, most commonly during the two siege periods on 
Fallujah. As Gregory notes, this absence of bodies in much Western media coverage is 
one of the major differences from the coverage in Arab-language media: 
The Pentagon's war without bodies was in stark contrast to the war 
seen by the Arab world. Arabic newspapers and news channels 
showed the bloody victims of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the 
overwhelming grief of ordinary families who had been caught up in the 
violence of the war ... In the eyes of the Pentagon al-Jazeera was 
'cinematic agitprop against American Central Command's Hollywood 
news producers,' and on several occasions coalition forces took 
offensive action against its offices and staff, and against other so-called 
'unilateral' journalists who were supposedly reporting 'from the enemy 
side'.72 
This dichotomy in the representation of the Iraq war, and the violence in 
Fallujah in particular, has likely had significant repercussions on the already fragile 
relations between American and Islamic communities. While bombings and losses of 
life in Iraq were regularly summarized in newspaper and in TV coverage, American 
audiences were rarely confronted with graphic images of the human tragedies caused 
by the Iraq invasion. With some important exceptions, stories of civilian suffering were 
primarily confined to Arab language media and were not common in Western coverage 
during the Fallujah events. (See Image 26) Gregory uses the work of Jonathan Raban 
and Lawrence Rosen to suggest that images of the pain and suffering of fellow Muslims 
72 Gregory, I11e Colonial Present, 208. 
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likely had a particularly profound influence on viewers who shared this faith; 
111 Geographical distance from the site of the invasion hardly seems to dull the impact of this 
bodily assault. It's no wonder the call of the ummah effortlessly transcends the flimsy 
national boundaries of the Middle East' ... This way of seeing- and being in- the world 
involves a radically different conception of the self to the autonomous individual 
constructed under the sign of European modernity."73 
As was briefly discussed in this chapter's introduction, there seems to be little 
doubt that Western politicians and senior military personnel feared the potentially 
powerful and demoralizing effects that they believed seeing dead civilians or Western 
military personnel could have on Western publics, as well as Muslim viewers. As 
David Campbell suggests in an article discussing the use of images of death and 
suffering, the legacy of Vietnam War images is likely of key importance here. Infamous 
images of the summary execution of a VietCong suspect and of a young, naked 
Vietnamese girl fleeing a napalm attack are widely thought of as having influenced 
American public opinion of the fighting there. Since Vietnam, and most obviously 
since the 1991 Gulf War, American administrations have often attempted to control 
media access to sites of conflict.74 In the case of some Arab-language media, such as al-
Jazeera, there is some suggestion that these attempts went beyond limiting journalistic 
access to various areas and people and actually extended to military attacks on the 
station's offices in Baghdad and Kabul as punishment for al-Jazeera's focus on the 
human costs of US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.75 It is the contention of 
this section that official, and to an extent media, acceptance of the theory that dead 
civilians would equal decreasing American and Iraqi support for the invasion resulted 
in a disappearance of civilians from much discussion and imagery of the Fallujah 
conflict and their occasional replacement by diseussion of dangerous 'insurgents' in the 
73 Gregory, partially quoting Raban, in The Colonial Present, 209. Italics are Gregory's own. 
74 See David Campbell, "Horrific Blindness: Images of Death in Contemporary Media", Journal for Cultural 
Research 8, no. 1, Oanuary 2004): 59-60. 
75 Al-Jazeera's Baghdad offices were bombed in April2003, directly leading to the death of a journalist. The 
station's Kabul offices were hit by two 'smart' bombs in 2001, nearly destroying the nearby BBC offices as 
well. John Plunkett, "Bush Claim Revives al-Jazeera Bombing Fears", November 23,2005, 
htiJ?:Uwww.~mardian.co.ukflraq/Story/0,2763.1648988.00.html (accessed June 11, 2007). 
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city. American Marines and military personnel were largely used instead to provide 
the 'human' element to the siege periods, providing quotable material and functioning 
as the primary protagonists. Unsurprisingly, this focus on American personnel was 
more pronounced in US media coverage. British coverage, especially Guardian articles, 
gave more space to the views of Iraqi civilians and thus was often able to challenge 
some of the US government's favoured presentation of the US attack as a bloodless, 
humanitarian mission to 'save' Fallujah from insurgents. 
A limited portrait of Ba' athists and Islamic extremism· 
Media discussion of the deaths of the contractors in March 2004 provides an 
important starting point for exploring various sources' representation of Fallujans 
during this event. On the day of the attacks, most articles contained in-depth 
descriptions of the grisly nature of the violence. This Associated Press article is broadly 
representative of American newspaper reports on the killings and includes most of the 
descriptions also featured in other papers: 
In a scene reminiscent of Somalia, frenzied crowds dragged the burned, 
mutilated bodies of four American contractors through the streets of a 
town west of Baghdad on Wednesday and strung two of them up from 
a bridge after rebels ambushed their SUVs ... After the attack, a jubilant 
crowd of civilians, none of whom appeared to be armed, gathered to 
celebrate, dragging the bodies through the street and hanging two of 
them from the bridge. Many of those in the crowd were excited young 
boys who shouted slogans in front of television cameras. Associated 
Press Television News pictures showed one man beating a charred 
corpse with a metal pole ... The White House blamed terrorists and 
remnants of Saddam Hussein's former regime for the 'horrific attacks' 
on the American contractors.76 
This quote illustrates the graphic description applied to the situation, with words like 
"frenzied" and "jubilant" indicating the mood of the crowds, whom readers are told are 
civilians, rather than 'armed' insurgents. Description in text and voiceover, with 
76 Sameer N. Yacoub, "Bodies of Four American Contractors Dragged Through Streets of Fallujah; Bomb 
Kills Five US Troops", The Associated Press, March 31, 2004. 
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televised footage supporting it, portrays the main perpetrators of the attack as men and 
boys, who apparently seem proud of their actions, flaunting them before television 
cameras. Interestingly, the White House is said to blame "terrorists" and "remnants of 
Sad dam Hussein's former regime" for the attacks despite evidence that unarmed 
civilians were involved in much of the event. This begs the question of who the 
'enemy' actually is in this situation in much the same way as in the attacks on the Black 
Hawk helicopters in Mogadishu. Linkages between these two events, as hinted at in 
the above quote, will be explored in more depth in a further concluding chapter. 
American General Mark Kimmitt and Senior Advisor Dan Senor appeared at a 
press conference later on March 31, 2004 to attempt to clarify the issue of who the 
'enemy' was for the American contractors, and by extension for all Americans in Iraq. 
General Kimmitt distinguished 'good' from 'bad' civilians, yet declared the entire city 
to be a "Ba'athist stronghold", thus partly contradicting his attempt to absolve many 
'normal' citizens of responsibility for the violence: "Fallujah remains one of those cities 
in Iraq that just don't get it. It's a former Ba'athist stronghold. This was a city that 
profited immeasurably under the former regime .. .It is a small minority of the people in 
Fallujah. Most of the people in Fallujah want to move on with their lives ... want to be 
part of a new Iraq."77 
Dan Senor followed on from Kimmitt' s comments to stress the deviance of those 
involved in the attacks: 
(T)he people who pulled those bodies out and engaged in this attack 
against the contractors are not people we are here to help. They are 
people who have a much different vision for the future of Iraq than the 
overwhelming majority of Iraqis ... They are people who want Iraq to 
turn back to an era of mass graves, of rape rooms and torture chambers 
and chemical attacks. They want to turn back to the era of Saddam 
Hussein.78 
77 
"Deputy Director For Coalition Operations Hosts News Conference On Security Operations In Iraq", 
State News Service, US Department of Defense issued transcript, March 31, 2004. 
78 Ibid. 
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Those who participated in the contractor attacks are thus directly associated with 
support for the Hussein regime and are portrayed as engaging in desperate attacks to 
thwart the creation of a democratic Iraq. New York Times coverage of the killings on 
Aprill, 2004 utilizes many similar descriptors, highlighting the fact that "Falluja's 
streets were thick with men and boys and chaos" and describing in detail the 
destruction of the SUVs and the desecration of the bodies. A much-used photo of Iraqi 
men cheering in front of two burnt bodies suspended from a bridge was published 
beside this article on the front page. The article closes with Fallujans again being 
associated with strong anti-Americanism and support for Hussein.79 
The New York Times did, however, provide voice to some alternative framings of 
the Fallujah situation. It published an article the following day which described the 
disgust of many Fallujans at the desecration of the bodies despite their support for the 
attack. Many expressed fears that the publication of such images would portray the 
city in a wholly negative light. An interviewed Fallujan man differentiates the 
insurgents who shot at the SUV s and killed the contractors from those who later 
desecrated the bodies, insisting that the insurgents would not have approved of the un-
Islamic practice of desecrating the dead.80 These comments are important, as they 
illustrate some Fallujans' disapproval of the US presence in their city without 
necessarily equating this disapproval with irrationality, barbarity or support for the 
Hussein regime. This particular frame of understanding allows for recognition of the 
desire of many Iraqis to govern themselves and their refusal to accept the binary choice 
of either supporting the Americans or Saddam Hussein. While it is not explored in 
analysed coverage, further comments in this article comments also hint at the 
importance and influence of mosque and kin-based citizen support networks in Iraq, 
which had become particularly well-developed during the post-Gulf War I 
deterioration of Iraqi state services. Understanding these support networks outside the 
79 Jeffrey Gettleman, "4 From US Killed In Ambush In Iraq; Mob Drags Bodies", The New York Times, April 
1, 2004. 
80Jeffrey Gettleman, "Mix of Pride and Shame Follows Killings and Mutilation By Iraqis", The New York 
Times, April2, 2004. 
framework of potential creations and perpetuations of Islamic fundamentalism was 
especially difficult for American interveners in Iraq. 
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Another New York Times article on Aprilll, 2004, as the first siege of Fallujah 
began, discusses and quotes Iraqis on the surge of anti-Americanism that the attacks on 
Fallujah have caused in civilians across Iraq.81 This report helps to contextualize Iraqi 
sentiments by allowing them to describe the changed, and often tragic, events in their 
lives following the US occupation. Iraqi civilians thus appear less as irrational and 
violent crowds of killers and more as citizens with some grounds for dissatisfaction. 
The point is also made that civilians can and in some cases will turn to violence to 
protest US military and political actions, thereby bringing into question the clear 
insurgent/civilian dichotomy described earlier by General Kimrnitt and Dan Senor. 
CNN television footage only occasionally represented Fallujan citizens as 
people with potential grounds for complaint at their treatment by American forces. 
Particularly during the siege periods, reporters' embedded positions with the US 
military meant that their distance from Fallujan citizens was obvious both physically 
and in terms of their narrative approaches to the situation. Immediately after the 
deaths of the contractors, edited images were shown of the attack with the preface that 
these "pictures speak of chaos, cruelty and the past"82; viewers are later told that there 
are some images that won't be shown but that some are necessary "to illustrate the 
extent of the violence". As a map of Iraq is shown on screen, locating Baghdad and 
Fallujah, voiceover describes the attacks. Interestingly, the only visual image over this 
description for a few seconds is a blurred shot of two burning SUVs. As the voiceover 
declares "these Iraqis seemed to revel in mutilating and displaying the dead bodies", 
images of men yelling at a camera are shown. Viewers are told that the men are 
screaming "Fallujah is the graveyard of Americans". The anchor then announces, "The 
blood and sacrifice this day was from four civilian contractors, come to Iraq to try to 
81 Jeffrey Gettleman, "Anti-US Outrage Unites a Growing Iraqi Resistance", The New York Times, Aprilll, 
2004. 
82 The following quotations are all taken from Iraq/Attacks/Fallujah, Habbaniyah, CNN news, March 31, 
2004. 
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rebuild this country." Fallujah's civilians as a whole are thus symbolized by the crowd 
of angry men, doing unwatchable things to the bodies of those who are presented as 
only trying to help them. 
This particular framework offers no space for the possibility that the contractors 
might be viewed as invaders and perpetrators of violence to Iraqi civilians. Voiceover 
then explains that the corpses were dragged through the streets and hung over a 
bridge; at this point, viewers are given a single, distant shot of two blackened corpses 
hanging from a bridge. The substantial verbal aspect of this initial coverage is crucial to 
its understanding, partly because of a lack of continuity in the heavily-edited images of 
the attack. The imagery then switches suddenly to two Western experts, there to place 
the previous events in context. These US officials, General Kimmitt and Dan Senor, 
blame "insurgent" forces for the attack. As in the newspaper coverage, perpetrators of 
the attack are described as being motivated by support for Saddam Hussein; there is no 
acknowledgement of past problems with the American military in Fallujah such as the 
killing of demonstrators. 
The next day coverage of the "aftermath" of the attacks continued with edited 
shots of the attacks repeated. Although the attacks are said to be a "harsh reality for the 
good people of Fallujah", voiceover explains that other Iraqis have allegedly said that 
the US should not be surprised by the attacks since Fallujah harbours known 
supporters of Saddam Hussein. Paul Bremer, the US administrator in Iraq, and General 
Kimmitt are shown and quoted calling the attack "despicable" and "bestial" and 
promising punishment for the killings. Shots of the burning SUV s are shown yet again 
as voiceover explains that the US will no longer rely on "poorly-trained and ill-
equipped" Iraqi forces to secure Fallujah. Although there is a brief image of Iraqi 
children in schools with explanation of the importance for the US in winning the hearts 
and minds of Iraqi civilians, the item concludes that Marines in Fallujah must somehow 
mix violence with acts of kindness.83 US military action in Fallujah is thus presented as 
inevitable and the weight of emphasis in the item is placed on the parameters of a 
83 Iraq/Attacks/Fallujah, Baghdad, CNN news, Aprill, 2004. 
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military incursion. with only very brief mention of the importance of gaining local 
support. 
An April 2, 2004 CNN item the following day helps to consolidate viewer 
understanding of the Fallujan population as a dangerous 'Islamic' threat to US forces.84 
The item opens with shots of Iraqi men at prayer; a sheikh in the mosque is said to 
condemn the mutilation of the contractors' bodies but not their murder. Over rare 
shots of chador-dad women in a market, a voiceover states, "in the city, defiance, 
people promising the city will become a graveyard of Americans." This shot is then 
immediately followed by an image of Shi' a men marching in the streets of Baghdad 
carrying placards; clerics are shown denouncing the US as the 'Great Satan' to large 
audiences. Although the fact that the third set of images is filmed in Baghdad is 
mentioned, the opening of the item with discussion of Fallujah could lead many 
viewers to associate all of the above shots with generalized hatred of Fallujans for 
America. The imagery of prayer, sheikhs preaching and chador-dad women is 
combined with voiceover which associates statements of hatred and violence against 
the US with these visible signs of Islam. Iraqi civilians are 'othered' by their faith and, 
by reference to the term 'Great Satan', associated with the traditions of anti-
Americanism in their theocratic neighbor Iran. 
As the first US incursion into Fallujah began, CNN' s coverage overwhelmingly 
became the story of the experiences of US troops in the city. Insurgents were imaged 
occasionally as 'enemy' figures, while civilians largely disappeared altogether from 
coverage. On April6, 200485, as US troop incursions into Fallujah increased, images of 
'Arab' men waving guns and with headscarves obscuring their faces were briefly 
shown with voiceover comments stating that these men were likely Ba' athist 
sympathizers. As voiceover continued to describe reports that militants were roaming 
the streets of Fallujah, the same shot was repeated. After alternating a shot of US 
troops talking by a vehicle, Iraqi men are shown chanting and running in a street; 
84 Iraq/Attacks/Fallujah, CNN news, April2, 2004. 
85 Iraq/Attacks/Ramadi/Nordland Interview, CNN news, April6, 2004. 
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voiceover again explains that despite US claims of control, many cities are in fact run by 
"radical clerics". Shortly after this clip, Iraqis, including sobbing women, are shown in 
a funeral procession with voiceover claiming that they want to know why Iraqi 
civilians are being killed. The item then ends with no explanation for this loss of life. 
Although Marines are earlier said to be attacking Fallujah in response to the killing of 
the contractors, the only shots of Marines show them talking by a vehicle. A Marine is 
quoted saying "we did numerous community service projects in this neighborhood, 
now we're trying to find out why we're being shot at." While the Marines are 
portrayed as non-violent and merely trying to help Iraqis who are in turn attacking 
them, Iraqis in general, and by assumption Fallujan citizens, are visually depicted as 
predominately involved in violence or as hysterical and irrational. There is no visual 
linkage made between the US military activity in Fallujah and the deaths of civilians. 
The representation of Fallujans and Iraqis did not change dramatically as time 
went on. April14, 2004 CNN footage showed masked men shooting around corners 
against a background of destroyed concrete as well as middle-aged men aiming a 
machine gun down a street.86 (See Image 27 for example) A brief shot of Iraqis, 
including women, fleeing what appear to be attacks or bombings is shown interspersed 
with shots of Marines in action but no voiceover explanation of this shot is given. An 
interview at the end of the item addresses the radically different presentation of the 
Iraqi situation in the Arab media, where images of injured women and children are 
regularly shown. Rod Nordland, the CNN interviewee, acknowledges that such a 
distinction makes Iraqi lives appear unimportant in the US. He argues, however, that 
because the Western media are often denied access to certain areas due to the dangers 
of travel there is no way to challenge these Arab media accounts which are so fervently 
believed by many in the Islamic world. The way in which this issue is addressed works 
to shape its understanding. The assumption appears to be that, should Western media 
be able to gain access to conflict-ridden regions in Iraq, they would likely find that Arab 
media had overstated the case of civilian casualties. While the possibility of Iraqi 
86 Iraq/Uprising!Hostages/Fallujah/Troops, CNN news, April14, 2004. 
civilian casualties is not ignored, there is an assumption that the objectivity of the 
Western media is required to confirm this fact. 
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Throughout April, stock footage of men in headscarves firing guns or in 
chanting crowds appeared at regular intervals in analysed coverage, interspersed with 
much more frequent imagery of US troops firing on grey/brown collections of buildings 
which viewers were told was Fallujah. While there was an effort in an "Insider's View" 
item to present viewers with some of the initial issues which led to violence between 
Fallujans and US troops, visual representation of Fallujans remains confined primarily 
to men in 'aggressive' activities. Analysis of the situation is conducted from the 
position of American troops and their leaders, with Fallujan civilians considered only to 
the extent that their alienation from American troops could lead to increased support 
for the insurgents. Footage of Fallujan civilians with their own comments provided 
only began to appear months after the first assault on the city, in July 2004. A July 5 
item contains images of men digging through rubble and standing in a crater where a 
4500 lb American bomb is said to have been dropped as part of US attacks on the 
Fallujah safehouses of al-Qaeda leader Musab al-Zarqawi. In interviews, some Fallujan 
civilians claim that the dead were ordinary people, and images of ambulances and a 
blood-splattered wall are also shown.87 A September 17,2004 CNN item also provided 
rare interviews with Iraqis, who condemn the continued American attacks on Fallujah. 
Clerics are shown preaching against the attacks and some brief and unusual footage is 
shown of bombed areas of Fallujah, a covered dead body and two injured children in 
hospital.B8 (See Image 21 for less 'graphic' example) 
In the run-up to the American decision to attack Fallujah a second time, on this 
occasion with help from Iraqi governing council forces, CNN began to broadcast more 
sceptical coverage, which questioned some American military actions. An October 1189 
item presented images from the cockpit of an American aircraft as it bombed a running 
crowd in Fallujah. Debate was presented over whether the group was made up of 
87 lraq/Fallujah Air Strike/Hassoun Kidnap, CNN news, July 5, 2004. 
88 Iraq/Attacks/Baghdad/Fallujah, CNN news, September 17,2004. 
891raq/Fallujah/Air Strike/Cockpit Video, CNN news, October 11, 2004. 
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insurgents or civilians and, although the article's conclusion is that US forces followed 
the correct rules of engagement, the item did serve to question American conduct, a 
rare occurrence in analysed CNN coverage. As the November battle plans began, 
however, CNN returned to a style of coverage reminiscent of the April attack. An Iraqi 
representative for the governing council is quoted claiming that Fallujan civilians want 
insurgents to be driven out of Fallujah and scarved men with guns are again shown 
with a voiceover claim that thousands of insurgents are preparing defenses in Fallujah. 
Although the US troop shooting of demonstrators is again mentioned over a montage 
of shots provided to give background to the current situation in Fallujah, the 
accompanying visuals are yet again the burning SUVs of the contractors and men 
yelling with guns drawn. The choice to repeat this footage, rather than the US bombing 
of Fallujah or its aftermath, lends itself once more to the portrayal of Fallujah as a place 
predominately populated by anti-American extremists; it also triggers viewer memories 
of violence against US citizens.90 As has been suggested above, the media may well 
have been largely prevented from getting footage from inside Fallujah because of the 
dangers of travel and the embed system. While there are many reasons for the 
resulting limited coverage of Iraqi civilians, these gaps have likely had significant 
effects on how Western viewers understood the Fallujah conflict. Casualty statistics, 
when reported throughout the November attack, covered US troops dead and injured 
and estimates of dead insurgents; no mention of civilians is made.91 
As was the case with the newspaper coverage of the November 2004 attack, a 
CNN item also characterized Fallujah as a "ghost town", suggesting that most civilians 
and insurgents had fled. Nevertheless, shots of red and black scarved men with guns 
were again presented in a following shot, giving audiences a look at America's enemies. 
Later in the item, a brief shot appears of Iraqi men walking in a destroyed street waving 
a white flag. Seconds later, after this image changes to one of American troops shooting 
over a rooftop wall, embedded reporter Jane Arraf explains that her group of Marines 
90 Iraq/Fallujah Offensive/ Allam Interview, CNN news, November 5, 2004. 
91 Iraq/Fallujah Assault, CNN news, November 11, 2004. 
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has encountered no civilians. There is no explanation of the image of flag-waving 
men.92 An item on the same day by reporter Scott Peterson also states that he has seen 
more dead insurgents than live civilians. Images of civilians follow, however, as 
Peterson explains that most of the civilians which his Marine group has encountered 
are men who have been left to guard homes after they were forbidden to leave the city 
by US forces. The accompanying images show men sitting nervously on the floor with 
their hands up; Marines with guns drawn move around them.93 
The first shots of any sustained length of Fallujan civilians seen in analysed 
CNN coverage were on November 18, 2004 after much of the fighting in Fallujah had 
ceased and Marines had begun a clean up operation throughout the city. These shots 
came at the end of a news item which focused primarily on evidence US soldiers had 
found of Iraqi insurgent hideouts in Fallujah. The suggestion at the end of this first 
segment was that Fallujan civilians had been expelled from many areas of Fallujah 
weeks in advance of the American assault when insurgents took over. The implications 
of this assertion appeared to be that there were no civilians in the area to be injured 
during the violence. Shots of families, including young children, being evacuated from 
Fallujah at the time of the item's filming, however, are then shown, seemingly 
contradicting this suggestion. These images involved people being placed on the back 
of trucks and driven out of the city centre. Some images were also shown of men 
loading wrapped corpses into and out of trucks, with explanation that some civilians 
were being asked to assist with the collection and burial of bodies found in Fallujah.94 
A later item on November 26, 2004 showed the beginnings of further relief work in the 
city, with a Red Crescent truck pictured driving in damaged, deserted streets and men 
in red vests delivering aid supplies. Brief shots appeared of aid workers venturing into 
a house to talk to a Fallujan family who had survived the second assault and further 
images of armed Marines patrolling Fallujan streets showed civilians cautiously 
emerging from damaged houses. 
92 Iraq!Fallujah Assault/Anderson Interview, CNN news, November 10, 2004. 
93 Segment 7 (Staying Alive), CNN news, November 10, 2004. 
94 Iraq/Fallujah, CNN news, November 18, 2004. 
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Throughout CNN coverage, the use of voiceover remained a powerful 
technique for directing viewer interpretation of images, many of which were repeated; 
there was little or no dialogue with those being filmed. While shots of civilians were 
occasionally included in news items, they frequently lacked explanation or were 
peripheral to heavily-emphasized narratives of US troop experiences in Fallujah. As 
Gregory points out with reference to general Iraq media coverage: "For the most part, it 
was only when the bombing, fighting, and killing were supposed to be over that Iraq's 
ordinary inhabitants were recognized."95 Evident in the abovementioned CNN item, 
shots of civilians only began to emerge in this set of analysed coverage after the 
November American attack on Fallujah was over. Civilians are used at this point as 
symbols of the city corning back to life but, due to the use of voiceover, they are not 
given the opportunity to describe their experiences during the siege. This is precisely 
the period during which people such as themselves were generally alleged not to even 
have existed in Fallujah. CNN in this sense fails to challenge the American 
government's narrative of a siege with minimal risk to civilians. Visual evidence which 
appears to contradict government claims is shown but neither discussed nor elaborated; 
consequently, it may in many cases have been overlooked by viewers. 
'Disappeared': casualty counts and civilian opinions 
As was touched upon in the previous section, stories and imagery of American 
troops were routinely covered by much of the Western media while discussion and 
. pictures regarding Fallujans and the state of the city as a whole, especially during the 
siege periods, was minimal in many publications. US soldiers tended to be portrayed 
as bravely executing their urban combat training against dangerous and elusive 
enemies. The possibility that harsher tactics and the consequent likelihood of civilian 
deaths could become a rallying point against the American forces was recognised but 
this issue was only occasionally touched upon in American media coverage. A March 
27, 2004 New York Times article mentions that "renewed fighting seemed to generate 
95 Gregory, The Colonial Present, 213. 
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anti-American antipathy here [in Fallujah]" and describes the anger of Fallujans at the 
deaths of family and friends during American attacks on insurgents.96 Most analysed 
articles during the siege periods, however, focused exclusively on the battle through the 
viewpoint of the Marines, giving them names, quotes and character in ways which 
were almost never seen from the Iraqi perspective. An example follows here: 
On Sunday, a Marine tank fired 18 rounds into a house a suspected 
insurgent was firing from, said Jeremiah Day, a combat engineer from 
Minnetonka, Minn. 'And afterwards the guy was still standing,' 
Corporal Day said. 'It was like Scarface or something.' That same day, 
Brent Bourgeois, a 20-year-old lance corporal from Kenner, La., said he 
had seen an American helicopter fire a missile at a man with a 
slingshot. 'Crazy, huh?' the corporal said ... 'It's the fight that never 
came last year,' Major Petrucci said. 'I guess these guys didn't really 
want to die for Saddam. But all this anti-American feeling is now 
uniting them.'97 
During the November 2004 siege, when American military security around 
Fallujah was tightened further to prevent 'propaganda' leaks to the media about 
conditions inside the city, articles which focused on the perspective of US troops were 
very prominent. The absence of Fallujan civilians and insurgent bodies was declared 
"an enduring mystery" and the focus of major articles largely remained on descriptions 
of American actions in Fallujah and plans for its future. An important alternative 
perspective was provided by a November 11, 2004 New York Times article, in which an 
interview with an insurgent was conducted. This interview indicated that insurgent 
forces were prepared to fight an asymmetric battle with US forces and were aware of 
the power of civilian casualties in fostering anti-American sentiment amongst Iraqis.98 
This article was accompanied by a photo of a dead insurgent, contrasting with the 
majority of others during November which overwhelmingly illustrated American 
troops in various combat and combat-preparation settings. 
96 Dexter Filkins, "Up to 16 Die in Gun Battles in Sunni Areas of Iraq", I11e New York Times, March 27, 2004. 
97 Jeffrey Gettlernan, "Marines in Falluja Still Face and Return Relentless Fire", The New York Times, April 
14,2004. 
98 Edward Wong and Eric Schmitt, "Rebel Fighters Who Fled Attack May Now Be Active Elsewhere", The 
New York Times, November 10,2004. 
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Linked to the disappearance of Fallujan citizens in the coverage surrounding the 
sieges, Iraqi casualty numbers during the American invasion period as a whole and 
during the Fallujah operations specifically remained largely unknown and contested. 
The US military claimed not to keep records of the numbers of Iraqi civilians killed in 
their operations and this fact likely created a challenge for the media which, despite 
their penchant for quoting statistics, required 'reliable' and 'expert' sources to confirm 
and support estimates. During the April 2004 siege of Fallujah, estimates of dead and 
injured were gathered from spokespeople at Fallujah' s hospital and were reported 
every few days during the heaviest periods of fighting: "A hospital spokesman in 
Fallujah, quoted by The Associated Press, said the number of dead in the last week 
exceeded 600, including insurgents and civilians, and other accounts said more than 
1000 had been wounded."99 Two Arabic television stations, al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera, 
based correspondents in Fallujah during the American offensive to film events and 
interview civilians and doctors. Debate arose between these Arabic news sources, 
Fallujan citizens and US military command. While residents and Arabic-language 
media sources claimed that the Americans were using disproportionate force in 
Fallujah and killing and injuring innocents, General Kimmitt challenged these 
assertions with direct reference to the media coverage, calling American forces 
"tremendously precise" and urging viewers to "(c)hange the channel to a legitimate, 
authoritative, honest news station."1oo 
In the wake of the April2004 offensive, and following several months of routine 
American bombings in the Fallujah area, a much-discussed report was published in the 
prestigious medical journal, The Lancet. A study had been undertaken to compare 
mortality in Iraq before and after the American invasion and discovered a two and a 
half fold increase in the risk of death for Iraqi civilians since the invasion date. Two 
thirds of all the violent deaths reported to the survey were in one cluster in Fallujah, 
thus the Fallujah data was excluded to avoid skewing the survey. The results remained 
99 John F. Bums, "Troops Hold Fire For Negotiations at 3 Iraqi Cities", The New York Times, Aprill2, 2004. 
100 Ibid. 
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that an estimated ninety-eight thousand extra deaths had occurred due to invasion and 
post-invasion violence (a one and a half fold higher risk of death).101 The publication of 
this article coincided with the printing of at least two New York Times articles which 
described the destruction wrought in Fallujah by "nearly nightly airstrikes" and quoted 
Fallujan citizens explaining that the bombing was effectively driving them from their 
homes and damaging the possibilities for negotiation with local officials.102 As a second 
American assault on Fallujah began to appear inevitable, the American and Iraqi 
governing council forces faced what could have been a public relations disaster in parts 
of the West, the rest of Iraq and the broader Arab world should news of large numbers 
of casualties during their second attack be released. 
The result was a much more tightly-controlled operation, with Fallujah's major 
hospital an early target for capture. All but a few journalists covering the assault were 
embedded with American troops, thus coverage of the first crucial days in early to mid-
November was therefore almost exclusively reported from the standpoint of a reporter 
describing actions taken on Fallujah by US forces. The only casualty numbers given 
were those for American forces and Iraqi insurgents: "American commanders said 38 
American service members had been killed and 275 wounded in the Falluja assault, and 
the commanders estimated that 1,200 to 1,600 insurgents-about half the number 
thought to have been entrenched in Fallujah-had been killed."103 Despite these high 
estimated numbers, the same article later states that "the absence of insurgent bodies in 
Falluja has remained an enduring mystery." The means by which the earlier estimate 
was arrived at are not explained. An article published days earlier during one of the 
heaviest periods of fighting described the destructive force of American weaponry on 
10 1 Les Roberts et al, "Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey", The 
Lancet online, October 29, 2004, htt:p:Uimage.thelancet.com/extras/04art10342web.pdf (accessed November 
5, 2004). 
102 Dexter Filkins, "Iraqi Government's Peace Talks With Falluja Break Off; US Drive Against Rebels 
Expected", The New York Times, October 19,2004 and Dexter Filkins and Eric Schmitt, "US Intensifying" 
Bombing Attacks On Falluja Sites", The New York Times, October 16, 2004. 
103 Dexter Filkins and James Glanz, "Rebels Routed in Falluja; Fighting Spreads Elsewhere", The New York 
Times, November 15, 2004. 
Fallujah in depth but indicated that Fallujah "appeared eerily deserted".104 At this 
point, Fallujan civilians were for the most part visually and rhetorically invisible to 
Western audiences. 
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In terms of representing the position of Fallujan citizens, the UK newspapers 
surveyed appeared to offer more varied commentary from Iraqis themselves, including 
increased numbers of interviews and quotes from Iraqi civilians and insurgents. The 
views of these members of society appeared to be as frequent as those from Iraqi elites 
and officials. While there was still a strong focus on commentary from US troops 
involved in actions in Fallujah, UK newspapers appeared to offer more explanation of 
why violence and anti-US sentiment in Fallujah had developed. These explorations 
involved open recognition of the politicization of different positions. Styles of 
presentation varied considerably; an Observer article of more than four thousand words 
consisted entirely of interviews with various Iraqi citizens, documenting their opinions 
and experiences in post-invasion Iraq.105 A Sunday Telegraph article, written shortly 
after the contractor deaths, involved a journalist gaining trust and entry into the world 
of mujahideen fighters in Iraq to explore the reasons for their attacks on coalition and 
Iraqi governing council forces. 106 A later article for The Sunday Times by Hala Jaber 
investigated sources of anti-American resistance in Fallujah to expose its mixed support 
base. The resistance fighters were not only foreign jihadists but were also shown to 
include some local civilians who had become angry with the repeated American 
incursions into Fallujah.107 In all cases, the style of writing is substantially different 
from that commonly encountered in The New York Times, with the UK author/journalist 
inserted into the text presenting their own reactions and judgments of various 
situations rather than 'just the facts' reporting and quoting. 
104 Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Robert F. Worth, "GI's Open Attack To Take Falluja From Iraq Rebels", The 
New York Times, November 8, 2004. 
105 Interviews by Pete Beaumont, "Review: Special Report: Iraq: One Year On", The Observer, March 7, 2004. 
106 Lee Gordon, "The Iraqi Rebels Show Me Their Latest Victim: a German In a Pool of Blood", The Sunday 
Telegraph, Aprilll, 2004. 
107 Hala Jaber, "City of Death", The Sunday Times, May 2, 2004. 
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The greater extent to which Iraqi doctors, police and civilians are quoted in UK 
newspapers, especially in Guardian articles, provides a more substantial picture of life 
within Fallujah and of the divided loyalties and difficulties of existence faced by 
residents than is common in the surveyed American coverage. The comments of aid 
workers in Fallujah are more prominent in UK sources and The Guardian included a full 
article perspective piece based on the experiences of a UK aid worker in Fallujah; 
several of her statements confirm concerns expressed by Fallujans.108 Newly-organised 
Iraqi military forces, who are often portrayed as poorly-trained and ill-equipped, are 
given voice in a Sunday Telegraph article in which they describe past experiences taking 
'friendly fire' from American forces while on missions, helping to explain their fears at 
becoming involved in joint activities.109 A Times article following on Aprill7, 2004 
paints a similar picture of Iraqi troops willing to participate in peace-making ventures 
and the capture of bombers but ill-at-ease with targeting areas with high civilian 
populations.110 Another important factor explored almost exclusively in British 
newspaper coverage of the Fallujah sieges is the extent to which the attacks on the city 
ignited a united Iraqi response to assisting Fallujan civilians. A Daily Telegraph article 
explained the scale of activities: 
The injured of Fallujah have been moved to the capital in an 
extraordinary operation organized very largely by ordinary Iraqis. 
Fleets of ambulances and buses yesterday ferried scores of injured to 
medical treatment centres ... The plight of Fallujah has galvanized the 
nation, with the relief effort solely mounted by local neighborhoods and 
mosques. The effort has demonstrated an altruism at odds with the 
violence.111 
108 
"Getting Aid Past US Snipers Is Impossible", The Guardian, April17, 2004. 
109 Colin Freeman, "Iraqi Police 'Were Too Scared' to Help US Guards in Fallujah. Officers Who Remained 
Inside Their Barracks Say They Were Frightened of Being Hit By 'Friendly Fire"', The Sunday Telegraph, 
April4, 2004. 
110 James Hider, "Soldiers of Misfortune Want to Go Home", The Times, Aprill7, 2004. 
111 David Blair and Jack Fairweather, "Buses Ferry the Injured of Fallujah to Hospital", The Daily Telegraph, 
April 13, 2004. 
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The reporting of systematic locally-generated relief efforts is absent from other 
surveyed coverage. This approach to the situation in Fallujah presents a contrasting 
picture to common representations. The actions of Iraqi citizens are described and they 
are presented neither as passive objects to be helped or harmed nor are they portrayed 
as violent killers of coalition troops. Rather, they are people with skills and abilities 
acting for a group's well-being. 
Increased dialogue with Iraqi and Fallujan civilians in UK newspapers 
produced frequent and important challenges to the frames of understanding 
established by American officials in the country and outside. The representation of the 
Bush and Blair governments' statements as just one potential side to a story as opposed 
to the accepted framework for understanding Iraq scenarios is especially obvious in 
various Guardian articles during the April2004 attack: 
The Bush administration has tried to portray the insurgents inside the 
city as either foreign fighters or diehard supporters of Saddam 
Hussein ... Yesterday, however, those from Falluja could not understand 
Mr. Blair's claim. The insurgents were not terrorists but Iraqis, they did 
not support the old regime and were merely fighting a patriotic war 
against American occupation. 'The people doing the fighting are 
locals,' Mr. Mohammad, who fled with his wife and six children, said. 
'They are not people who support Saddam.'112 
Analysed American press and television did periodically recognise links between 
American actions and Iraqi civilian sentiment towards their interveners. The Guardian's 
basis for summing up the common sentiment in Fallujah as one of alienation due to an 
excessively-violent American approach was, however, routinely based on testimonies 
of Fallujan civilians, rather than on elite sources.113 Frequently, the sentiment expressed 
by civilians was one of confusion and fear at seemingly contradictory US policies: 
112 Luke Harding, "Iraq Conflict: 'It's Heli...Everything Will Be Destroyed': Refugees", The Guardian, April 
30,2004. 
113 Jonathan Steele, "'Shells and Rockets Were Falling Like Rain': Family Who Escaped Bombing in Falluja 
Tell How Feelings Towards Coalition Changed", The Guardian, Aprill2, 2004. 
An Iraqi doctor in Falluja, Ali Abbas, told al-Jazeera: 'We need help 
desperately. Bodies are scattered in the streets, families are in a 
miserable situation, doctors are besieged. Thousands of families are 
still in Falluja. We hear loudspeakers of the Americans asking us to 
leave our houses and put up white flags. But at the same time we are 
hearing explosions and gunfire. We don't know what to do. Should we 
leave?114 
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Given this more civilian-centred approach to the UK coverage, it is unsurprising 
that UK media commentary on the Iraqi, and specifically Fallujan, civilian death toll 
differed from American coverage. The issue of civilian casualties is dealt with more 
frequently and is mentioned more commonly in headlines, a very rare occurrence in 
New York Times coverage which tends to quote American and Iraqi troop numbers in 
Fallujah along with estimated numbers of insurgents and insurgent dead. These are 
counts which, unlike civilian deaths, were tallied by American forces. An April9, 2004 
Independent article places the estimated casualty toll in Fallujah due to American 
attacks, 280 dead and 400 injured, in its headline and also in its first sentence. The 
article then goes on to suggest that these numbers may be low given the fact that many 
casualties may be trapped under rubble or have received hasty burials by family 
outside a hospital setting.115 This emphasis on casualty figures was repeated in further 
Independent coverage of the Fallujah attack and reporting of casualty figures in general 
was more common in the British coverage surveyed. The difficulty, and indeed the 
impossibility, of reporting live from Fallujah on civilian death and injuries during the 
early days of the April attack was also highlighted more frequently in UK coverage. 
During the run-up to the second November attack, scepticism about the ability 
of the media to cover any of what might happen to civilians in Fallujah were clearly 
expressed in papers such as The Guardian: 
We don't know, and won't know, anything about what happens in the 
next few days except for what the US military authorities choose to let 
114 Rory McCarthy, "Curfews As Iraq Rebellion Spreads", The Guardian, November 13,2004. 
115 Patrick Cockburn, "Iraq: The Descent into Chaos: US Has Killed 280 In Fallujah This Week, Says 
Hospital Doctor", The Independent, April9, 2004. 
us know ... This is how the fantasy runs: a city the size of Brighton is 
now only ever referred to as a 'militant's stronghold' or 'insurgents' 
redoubt' ... The 'final assault' is imminent, in which the foreigners who 
have infiltrated the almost deserted Iraqi city with their extremist Islam 
will be 'cleared', 'rooted out' or 'crushed' ... These are the questionable 
assumptions and make-believe which are now all that the embedded 
journalists with the US troops know to report.116 
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During the second attack, as 'official' numbers became essentially unavailable to media 
sources with the seizure of Fallujah's main hospital, surveyed UK coverage continued 
to update readers on casualty figures with greater regularity than American papers 
such as The New York Times. A November 7, 2004 Guardian article sourced the Iraqi 
Body Count website, which uses media reports to tally approximate. casualty levels in 
Iraq, to claim that up to 600 civilians had been killed in Fallujah in April2004, with one 
half of them being woman and children. The point is immediately made following this 
estimate that "US forces say they do not keep count of civilian or enemy casualties."117 
This information could be seen as presenting a challenge to the US administration by 
highlighting their choice not to collect and publish these figures. An Independent article 
in April was stronger and more explicit, claiming that the Americans "refuse to keep 
count of Iraqi civilian casualties. Lt Gen Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of US forces 
in Iraq, deals with the question of civilian loss of life by assuming that all dead are 
rebels."118 
As the initial violence of the November attack began to subside, The Observer 
and Guardian moved quickly to attempt to calculate the number of civilians who might 
have remained in Fallujah and to report on the conditions of these civilians: "Although 
many of Falluja's 200,000 to 300,000 residents fled the city before the assault, between 
30,000 and 50,000 are believed to have remained during the fighting."119 In contrast, 
116 Madeleine Bunting, "Screams Will Not Be Heard", The Guardian, November 8, 2004. 
117 Lindsey Hilsum, "The World: Falluja Can Only Be Won When the Battle Ends and People Have Water", 
The Observer, November 7, 2004. 
118 Patrick Cockburn, "Iraq In Chaos: US Strikes Deal To Lift Fallujah Siege As Local Police Return", The 
Independent, April21, 2004. 
119 Rory McCarthy and Peter Beaumont, "Civilian Cost of Battle For Falluja Emerges", The Observer, 
November 14,2004. 
sampled New York Times coverage of the same period in November did not mention 
civilian numbers in Fallujah at all, although there are a few unspecific mentions that 
some residents may remain in the city. 
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Articles which focused on the relationship between attacking troops and 
Fallujan civilians were also an important aspect of surveyed UK newspaper coverage of 
the November 2004 assault on Fallujah, although there was only a small amount of such 
coverage. Insights into the difficult interactions of these two groups helped to illustrate 
the dramatically different background narratives and frameworks of understanding 
with which each group operated. Lindsey Hilsum's November 14 Observer article 
briefly explored the contradictions for US troops fighting an enemy they were 
supposed to be helping: "No soldier can fight unless he hates the enemy- which makes 
the message that this is all for the Iraqi people difficult to absorb. 'I guess there are 
some good people- it's jus' that we don' have nothin' to do with them,' mused a marine 
as he and his colleagues sorted their kit and cleaned their M16 assault rifles. 'I see the 
little kids in the cars and I feel sorry for them, but when they turn 16 they're evil' ."120 
This quote highlights the difficulties of fighting a non-traditional war amid a largely 
alienated population and once again exposes the challenges US military personnel face 
in defining their 'enemy' in Fallujah. Like US coverage, there are many articles during 
the two siege periods in UK coverage which devote a significant amount of print space 
to quotes and commentary from US troops. In general, however, the UK coverage of 
American troops is presented differently from the US coverage, in which the quotes 
from US troops tend to serve either to personalize them as individuals or are used to 
supply information about the fighting to readers. UK coverage of US troops more often 
explicitly portrays the frustration and confusion of fighting: 
'We walked into this thinking there'd be good guys and bad guys. 
Then you get here and have men in ambulances firing RPGs at 
you,' ... The Marines have little regard for their foes' mettle or fighting 
ability. 'When we capture them, they cry like babies. Then they p*** 
120 Lindsey Hilsum, "The World: A City In Ruins, Sky Thick With Smoke: 'Let's Kick Ass ... the American 
Way", The Observer, November 14,2004. 
themselves,' Lieutenant Michael Liguorni said. 'We find these little 
drug bottles around; we think half of these guys are drugged up,' he 
said as the eerie hiss and bang of rocket-propelled grenades broke the 
silence, followed by the rattle of rifle fire and the zing of richochets.121 
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A lengthy Financial Times article also exemplifies the differences in UK and US 
analysed coverage by describing in depth an interrogation process between US forces 
and an Iraqi woman and man. The author also describes a nighttime attack in which 
Iraqi insurgent forces shot down a US helicopter: 
For the paratroopers, the blood and death of that night, spent amid the 
charred remains of 16 comrades, hardened them to the plight of 
Falluja' s citizens, who complained of few services, no jobs, rising 
violence and indiscriminate killing by US troops. The senior officers of 
the units I rode with in January made an elaborate show of courtesy 
towards the locals but the rank and file did little to conceal their 
hostility towards the 'Hadjis', as they called Iraqis. 'You should have 
been there the night that Chinook went down, maybe you'd understand 
something,' said a team leader from the 10th Mountain Division, when I 
asked him about their aggressiveness towards the Iraqis. It was clear to 
him, even though it may not be clear to higher ranking briefers eager to 
spin the guerrilla war in Iraq, that 'we are fighting the local population' 
in Falluja.122 
The rarity of such coverage can be seen as an indicator of many factors including the 
physical danger and difficulties for journalists in accessing Fallujan civilians during the 
attack periods. The short time frame within which many newspaper articles need to be 
produced also appears to be a significant factor, as many of the articles which were able 
to provide a richer and more detailed picture of the situation in Fallujah were 
magazine-length features rather than daily items. Particularly in the case of American 
coverage, issues of patriotism and of according respect and prominence to the US 
citizen angle of the story could also be factors which resulted in the prioritizing of 
121 James Hider, "Rules Get Ragged As Death Comes From All Quarters", The Times, AprillS, 2004. 
122 Charles Clover, "The Fighters of Falluja US Forces Have Met a Different and Virulent Form of Resistance 
In This City Near Baghdad", Financial Times Weekend Magazine, April24, 2004. 
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American troops' actions and opinions over reports on the condition of the Fallujan 
population. 
With the primary exception of the Guardian coverage, the disappearance of 
civilians from much print discussion of the events meant that Western readers, 
particularly Americans, received little information regarding the conditions of those 
most directly affected by their activities in Fallujah. Military and political leaders' 
expressions of hope and confidence that civilian casualties were being avoided to the 
greatest extent possible were often presented on US media. Repeated quoting of these 
goals, however, was not necessarily reflective of what was actually occurring on the 
battlefield. The media's acceptance of the discourse of 'precision' weapons and 
minimal (but uncountable) casualties was an important 'branding' success for the 
American administration in several instances.123 
US soldiers: highly visible individuals 
One of the major continuing themes in representations of American troops on 
CNN was the personalizing of individual casualties. Anchor Aaron Brown often 
opened his nightly news program with detailed information on US troops killed in Iraq; 
these facts were placed on a background of the American flag with patriotic music 
played as the information was shown.124 At the close of his April30 program, Brown 
discussed this practice as becoming controversial when one of CNN' s competitors, ABC 
Nightline, decided to run a show naming and putting faces to US dead in Iraq. A 
sizable American broadcaster, the Sinclair Broadcast Group, refused to air the program, 
calling it unpatriotic, in a controversy reminiscent of Life magazine's decision to run a 
cover spread entirely composed of face shots of US troops killed during the Vietnam 
War. Many other broadcasters and Senator John McCain, however, were said to 
123 For further development of this idea, see Carl Conetta, "Disappearing the Dead: Iraq, Afghanistan and 
the Idea of a 'New Warfare', Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #9, February 18,2004, 
htq>:Uwww.comw.org/pda/0402rm9.html (accessed July 11, 2007). 
124 The first instance of this practice in analysed coverage was on Iraq/Attacks/Fallujah/82nd Airborne, CNN 
news, April2, 2004. 
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support this way of publicizing the costs of war.125 This debate highlights the political 
power of dead Americans, likely greater than that of dead Iraqis in the US. Although 
the circumstances are very different to those of 'Black Hawk down', discussions about 
whether recognising the cost of the war in Iraq through the visualization of individual 
bodies would provoke anti-war sentiments in the US population were similar to 
debates about the power of the images of dead US forces in Mogadishu.126 
The shadow of Vietnam hangs over much media coverage of the Iraq fighting, 
as fears developed that it was becoming a 'quagmire', but this terminology is used 
specifically with reference to American lives being lost. Throughout analysed CNN 
footage discussions never involve the issue of excessive Iraqi casualties as a factor for 
ending American involvement in Iraq. Rather, civilian casualties are framed as reasons 
why the Iraqi population will turn against American forces, putting their lives in 
greater danger and jeopardizing American-led political efforts in Iraq. There is no 
comment on the irony of this limited range of ethical concern for 'others' in a war that is 
allegedly being fought for the Iraqi people. 
Throughout both attack periods on Fallujah, the vast majority of CNN's reports 
comprise imagery of American troops 'in action'- climbing over city wreckage with 
guns, taking cover and shooting at alleged insurgent snipers, or performing routine 
tasks such as cleaning weapons or servicing vehicles. Technology is a key aspect of 
these images, although shots of American helicopters and planes bombing Fallujan 
targets are fairly rare. Many of these shots, including one of soldiers firing over a 
rooftop wall and taking heavy fire, were used repetitively because of what appeared to 
be a lack of other quality images. The scene is also reminiscent of historic images of 
'trench' warfare, as the soldiers stand to shoot over a wall and then duck behind it in a 
row. The limited dialogue heard between them emphasizes their cooperation, 
teamwork and training. At several points, Marines are interviewed, which along with 
the regular coverage helps to personalize them; they are portrayed as likable and 
125 Iraq/Fallujah/Najaf/'Nightline' Story, CNN news, April30, 2004. 
126 For more information on this debate, see "'Nightline' Airs War Dead Amid Controversy", CNN.corn, 
posted May 1, 2004, htt:p://www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZUV/05/01/abc.ni~htline/ (accessed June 8, 2007). 
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dutiful characters with little understanding of the Iraqi violence against them.127 CNN 
coverage was particularly notable for its frequent story focus on individual Marines. 
Interviews are conducted in which troops discuss their lives, missed loved ones and the 
difficulties of gaining the trust of Iraqis.12s 
Interviews with Marines and US military experts also serve to maintain the 
American dominance of the logic and parameters of the assault. As April fighting 
intensified, CNN reported that US leaders suspected that the worst of the insurgents, 
including former Saddam-era intelligence officers and Republican Guard, were in 
Fallujah and that "wiping them out now might provide the best opportunity to break 
the back of the resistance" .129 Marines in a report following this one reinforce this view 
by declaring their frustration with the rules of engagement which prevent them from 
launching a full-scale assault and with the political calculations which later resulted in 
their pullout from Fallujah.l3° Although there is acknowledgement in the April 23rd 
report that differences in media coverage mean that Iraqis have a very divergent 
perspective on the violence in Fallujah and are upset by the civilian casualties, the 
predominance of US military perspectives in CNN coverage on a regular basis tends to 
downplay these concerns. The use of retired US military personnel as interpreters of 
much of the limited battle footage from Fallujah again results in a militarized dialogue 
and appears to encourage a focus solely on the activities of US troops. Throughout the 
summer of 2004, despite civilian casualties caused by repeated American bombing of 
Fallujah, the city was regularly portrayed as falling into extremism because of the 
halting of the Marine assault in Aprit which had prevented it from being cleared of 
insurgents.131 
As American preparations for the November assault on Fallujah increased, 
CNN reflected these preparations with increased imagery of soldiers training and 
preparing their weapons. The troops are again individualized through interviews and 
127 Iraq/Attacks/Ramadi/Nordland Interview, CNN news, April6, 2004. 
128 Iraq/Elections/Mosul/Fallujah, CNN news, November 26, 2004. 
129 Iraq!Fallujah, CNN news, April23, 2004. 
130 Iraq/Fallujah/Najaf, CNN news, April25, 2004. 
m Iraq/Attacks/Fallujah, CNN news, July 8, 2004. 
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several shots of the insides of their tanks, which contain lucky charms and pictures of 
loved ones.132 Claims are made that Fallujan citizens want the insurgents driven from 
their city; the Marines are thus presented as doing a job which is both strategically 
necessary and supported by Iraqi citizens. The involvement of Iraqi government troops 
and the support of the governing council for the attack are said to be ways in which the 
US hopes to prevent civilian backlash against the second assault.133 During various 
phases of the attack, several CNN stories worked to promote this perspective, showing 
what often appeared to be orchestrated images of US and Iraqi soldiers side by side. 
These reports thus functioned to support the American military's goal of making the 
attack appear as multilateral and locally-supported as possible. 
The repetition of troop 'action' images continued from November 8-11, as the 
main fighting took place. At times this meant that the same footage was repeated twice 
in a two or three minute item, making the lack of available alternative coverage 
obvious. Reassuring updates were made over this imagery about the success of US and 
Iraqi forces at taking this "ghost town", where only a few desperate and disorganized 
insurgents remained. As new imagery of Marines blowing up cars and buildings in 
various parts of Fallujah was shown on November 11, these actions were explained as 
being necessary because of the large scale insurgent booby-trapping of the city.134 This 
issue of booby-trapping grew in significance when footage of an American soldier 
shooting an apparently injured and disarmed insurgent was shown. A Human Rights 
Watch spokesperson was briefly interviewed, arguing that if the soldiers were not 
under clear threat from the insurgent than this killing would constitute a war crime. A 
military spokesman responds that such caution was necessary as explosives have been 
hidden in dead Iraqis and insurgents have blown themselves up when Marines have 
approached them. Aaron Brown concludes this segment by stating that most Marines 
are dealing with conditions in Fallujah very calmly, thereby painting this incident as a 
one-off aberration. 
132 Iraq!Fallujah, CNN news, October 31, 2004. 
133 Iraq/Fallujah Offensive/ Allam Interview, CNN news, November 5, 2004. 
134 Iraq/Fallujah Assault, CNN news, November 11, 2004. 
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Descriptions of conditions in Fallujah as Marines fought their way into greater 
portions of it continued to reinforce descriptions of the city as inherently dangerous 
while overlooking the possibility of severe risk for remaining civilians, who received 
little consideration or coverage during the fighting. Aaron Brown opened his CNN 
news program on November 16, 2004 by describing the horrors of "sniper-infested" 
streets in Fallujah and the fact that Marines often had to step over dead bodies to get 
into houses.135 No mention is made of the horrible conditions likely to be affecting any 
Fallujan civilians left in the city. 
A report immediately following by embedded reporter Lindsey Hilsum works 
to confirm this portrayal of the Marines as reasonable young men dealing with fanatics. 
A long section of filming shows Marines attempting to deal with a sniper-filled 
building. An interviewed marine explains that he has urged surrender through an 
interpreter but the insurgents have rejected this option. It is thus deemed necessary to 
destroy the building using an air-strike.136 Voiceover explains that Marines are aware 
that each house they enter may be booby-trapped and that much of the city must be 
destroyed for security reasons.137 Such statements, although they remain undeveloped, 
answer the obvious question of 'safer for whom?' Strategic and media concern is based 
completely around the need to protect the entering Marines, without any comment on 
Fallujah's civilians. Further items also serve to reinforce the legitimacy of the Marines' 
invasion of Fallujah; a report details the Marines' discovery of insurgent weapons 
caches, propaganda, medical supplies and letters which allegedly confirm the presence 
of the al-Qaeda operative Zarqawi in Fallujah at some point. Jane Arraf opens a report 
on Marines' discoveries of insurgent tunnels, weapons and correspondence allegedly to 
and from the infamous Zarqawi. As Marines explain the uses for all the insurgent 
equipment they are said to have found, the headline "Finding The Hornet's Nest" 
appears onscreen.138 Embedded reporter Karl Penhaul echoes earlier statements of 
135 Iraq/Hassan Execution/Fallujah/Shooting, CNN news, November 16, 2004. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Iraq/Fallujah Assault, CNN news, November 11, 2004. 
138 Iraq/Fallujah, CNN news, November 18, 2004. 
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Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld when he points out that most insurgents have likely 
escaped to other Iraqi cities and will simply return to Fallujah should US troops not 
stay in the city to protect it.l39 Rather than indicating that this likelihood may indeed 
have made the siege and attack on Fallujah by the Americans an action of questionable 
utility, the assumption appears to be that the US and allied Iraqi troops will require a 
long stay in Fallujah, precisely the conditions which caused friction with residents in 
the early stages of the Iraq invasion. 
The Implications of Absence 
Gregory quotes Roxanne Euben in The Colonial Present to point out that part of 
the importance of the frequently asked post-9/11 question "why do they hate us?" is its 
revelation of the power and luxury of the inquirer, who has previously never asked this 
question. 
As Roxanne Euben remarked ... 'a privilege of power too often unseen: 
the luxury of not having had to know, a parochialism and insularity that 
those on the margins can neither enjoy nor afford.' It is this 
asymmetry- accepting the privilege of contemplating 'the other' 
without acknowledging the gaze in return, what novelist John 
Wideman calls 'dismissing the possibility that the native can look back 
at you as you are looking at him'- that marks this as a colonial gesture 
of extraordinary contemporary resonance.140 
As Gregory goes on to point out, the answer as to why enmity exists seems to most 
frequently to trace back to 'them' not to 'us'. The search for answers after the 9/11 
attacks was one which looked outwards, with American innocence and beneficence 
pre-assumed, and to a large extent unquestionable. This work suggests that the media 
often functions to preserve 'unquestionable' areas, rather than challenge them with new 
perspectives. 
139 Iraq/Fallujah, CNN news, November 18, 2004. 
140 Gregory, The Colonial Present, 21. The italicization is Euben's. 
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In the case of representing Fallujah, many Western media narratives did not 
allow the 'them' in question- the Fallujan people- a voice of their own. Those deemed 
responsible for anti-American violence were often slotted into recognizable categories 
of 'villain', associated either with the regime of Saddam Hussein or with the brand of 
fundamentalist Islam seen as responsible for the 9/11 attacks. In media coverage where 
this overt 'othering' did not take place, Fallujans were often rendered invisible by 
coverage when journalists were unable to access them. Dangers and difficulties in 
accessing the city of Fallujah, likely due to American military actions, the embed system 
and the actions of some violent Iraqi groups, led to the city's representation primarily 
in terms decided by the American military and policymakers. When Fallujah was 
presented as a "hotbed" of extremism and a "hornet's nest", with its daily functions as 
a home and network of necessary infrastructure largely unseen, framings of the city as 
'target' to be 'taken out' where likely more palatable to Western viewers. 
The extent to which binary enemy/friend categories could not hold in Iraq, and 
the extent to which these unstable constructions were 'fed-back' and reconstructed by 
Iraqi interpretations of the behaviour and involvement of the Americans in their 
country, were only regularly explored in select, and in the case of the coverage 
analysed primarily non-American, media coverage. The proximity of 'friend' and 
'enemy' was a situation that new American military training was supposed to come 
closer to dealing with, better recognition of these categories was to be achieved so that 
one side could be preserved and the other destroyed. The blurring of the enemy/friend 
categories, however, during the realities of fighting illustrates the extent to which new 
American military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) could only limit the confusion 
and 'engagement' of battlefield encounters between Americans and Iraqi 'insurgents' to 
a certain extent. Fighting 'insurgents' in one block while aiding civilians in the next 
was part of the rhetoric and strategy associated with (MOUT), yet undertaking these 
sorts of judgments and actions in battle often proved to be an impossible venture for US 
troops. While new technology may increasingly allow war to be fought at a distance, 
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when close encounters between parties cannot be prevented many old problems with 
war resurface. 
Debbie Lisle and Andrew Pepper suggest that the film Black Hawk Down 
"reveals slippages between the falsely opposed categories of' America' and 'the world', 
even as American power is affirmed and rearticulated in these slippages."141 In the case 
of Fallujah, verbal, textual and visual strategies which distanced Western audiences 
from the human elements of Fallujah as a city and from the lives of its inhabitants often 
may have contributed to viewing publics seeing American forces as 'just' and 'moral' 
combatants when defined against the violent and chaotic space of Fallujah (and more 
generally Iraq). Media coverage which dealt with the 'messy' realities of interaction 
between Americans and Iraqis is rare, but it provides important counter-evidence of the 
ways in which clear distinctions between 'friend' and enemy 'other' are challenged in 
Iraq on both individual and nation-state levels. As is also suggested by Lisle and 
Pepper, the unrepresented links between 'America' and 'Iraq' and 'America' and 
'Somalia' are often those developed through increasingly interlinked and 
interdependent globalizing economies. These similarities between the case studies, 
along with several others, will be explored in a concluding chapter to follow, which will 
deal specifically with important, comparative elements. 
141 Lisle & Pepper, "The New Face of Global Hollywood", 169. 
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Figure 7: Khalid Mohammed's image used in a different context in 
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Figure 10: Less 'graphic' imagery, more common in US media coverage. 
362 
363 
Image 20: Remote imagery of Fallujah- from Global Security.org. 
Image 21: After a bombing - an Agence France Press image. 
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Image 22: American forces in Fallujah - from US military website. 
Image 23: Bombarding Fallujah, November 2004 -from US military website. 
Image 24: A dead US soldier - shown the German Stern magazine. 
Image 25: Doctors and US troops at Fallujah hospital - this image from a 
online source is said to have appeared in The New York Times. 
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Image 26: A young casualty in Fallujah- shown on al-Jazeera. 
Image 27: Fallujan insurgents pictured with weapons - from the Middle East 
Online website 
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Conclusion- The Shadow of 'Black Hawk Down' 
At a press conference held immediately after the March 31, 2004 contractor 
deaths in Iraq, Sarah Rosenberg of ABC news asked the question that echoed 
throughout several other media reports presented on or shortly after the day of the 
attacks: Was this localized incident in Fallujah comparable to events that had taken 
place in Somalia eleven years earlier, at least in a visual sense? General Kimmitt 
responded briefly and swiftly: "My comment is, sometimes false comparisons are not 
helpful."1 One would be justified in wondering when 'false comparisons' are ever 
helpful. 
Regardless of the general's refusal to address the incident comparatively, 
several news items highlighted similarities between the events in Fallujah and those of 
'Black Hawk down'. In a Washington Times article, author Paul Crespo says Americans 
were "reeling" from the "barbarous and gruesome ambush" of four contractors 
"protecting food convoys" in Fallujah; "Those victims' charred bodies were mutilated 
and dragged through the streets in a despicable manner eerily reminiscent of the Black 
Hawk debacle in Mogadishu, Somalia. After TV screens worldwide filled with photos 
and videos of that 1993 incident, Bill Clinton promptly withdrew our troops."2 
Unsurprisingly, it was the visual elements of similarity between these events which 
were most frequently noted. Although it constituted only a brief mention in most 
items, this aspect will be discussed in depth in a further section of this chapter, as it 
reveals much that has not changed regarding the manner in which 'others' are 
represented by an 'us'. Initially, however, the larger geopolitical discourses called upon 
to link these two events will be investigated. 
In the Crespo article, along with several others which were surveyed, 
Mogadishu is presented as a failure because American troops 'cut and ran' in the 
aftermath of a few lost soldiers. In a chain of cause and effect, this action is said to have 
1 Deputy Director For Coalition Forces Hosts News Conference On Security Operations In Iraq, States 
News Service, Washington, March 31,2004. 
2 Paul Crespo, "Somalia Redux?; Time For Forceful Action In Iraq", The Washington Times, April7, 2004. 
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emboldened 'terrorists', including al-Qaeda, who then have assumed that causing 
American casualties will lead the US to withdraw from various conflict situations. In 
order to rectify this ongoing issue, a strong military response, which was not 
undertaken in Mogadishu, is deemed necessary for Fallujah. The 1990s humanitarian 
mission gone wrong is thus linked to a current situation of invasion and insurgency 
under the new geopolitical discourse of 'the war on terror'. Significantly, the 'enemy' 
themselves are shown to have adopted a near-identical discourse. Versions of Ridley 
Scott's Black Hawk Down are said to be circulating in Iraq as motivational materials for 
those willing to attack American 'invaders' and an Osama bin Laden speech in which 
he refers to the failures of America in Somalia is noted.3 Such anecdotes suggest an 
ambiguity and 'openness' of the Black Hawk Down film to a variety of 'readings', which 
likely were not planned by its producers. These comments also call to mind Lisle and 
Pepper's mention of a Somali showing of Black Hawk Down in Mogadishu, where 
crowds cheered every moment of US defeat in the film, thus neatly reversing the 
opposed categories of 'hero' and 'enemy'.4 
While there was undoubtedly a tendency in media coverage to link Mogadishu 
1993 and Fallujah 2004 through a narrative based upon the 'war on terror', there was an 
equally strong and opposing inclination, far more detailed than the response of General 
Kimmitt, to stress that these two events were not the same. This insistence came in 
spite of the fact that many commentators recommended a similar, militarized response 
to each situation. An Associated Press article by Tom Raum, published on the day of 
the contractor killings, is an example of coverage which differentiates the events.5 His 
argument hinges on the fact that the US "has far more at stake in Iraq" in terms of 
presidential"credibility'{, "strategic importance" and "level of investment''. These 
terms are quoted from a Brookings Institution expert and are not further explained, 
3 See Crespo, "Somalia Redux?"; Rod Nordland, Melinda Liu & Scott Johnson, "The Dark Road Ahead", 
Newsweek, April 12, 2004 and William Kristol, "Honour The Slain By Crushing Mob", The Australian, April 
6,2004. 
4 Debbie Lisle & Andrew Pepper, "The New Face of Global Hollywood: Black Hawk Down and the Politics 
of Meta-Sovereignty", Cultural Politics 1, Is. 2 (2005): 176. 
5 Tom Raum, "Stakes For US Much Higher In Iraq Than They Were In Somalia", The Associated Press, March 
31,2004. 
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although it is demonstrably the case that the current American administration has 
invested far greater numbers of troops, amounts of equipment, and funding in the 
invasion and reconstruction of Iraq than was ever allocated to Somalia.6 Vague 
comments about a US withdrawal from Iraq being "more complicated, perhaps leading 
to civil war and creating new havens for terror organizations" are slightly hollow 
points of differentiation from Somalia, however, given that the country fell back into 
civil strife after the departure of the US and UN troops. Several years prior to the Iraq 
invasion, Somalia was already labelled a safe haven for al-Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups; post-9/11, these comments on Somalia's links to 'the war on terror' have only 
increased. These points of difference between the two cases do not hold. 
How, then, is Fallujah, and more broadly Iraq, not like Somalia? In terms of 
public preparedness for the incidents, government self-positioning and rationale for 
their actions were much more coordinated with regards to Iraq than in the case of 
Somalia. The 'war on terror' links to the case of Somalia have only been made on a 
widespread basis retrospectively, whereas the buildup to the Iraq war, after the 9/11 
events, was steeped in 'war on terror' discourses. George W. Bush's representation of 
'the war on terror' as a long war, often described in dramatic, global terms of 'good 
versus evil', was largely quoted verbatim in many media sources. The US public had 
therefore been at least rhetorically prepared for a 'war' in Iraq and the inevitability of 
some casualties. Despite later criticism and scepticism regarding these statements, the 
media often repeated the Bush administration's linking of Iraq to 'the war on terror', 
through unproved allegations of Sad dam Hussein's support for al-Qaeda and his 
alleged proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Invading Iraq was thus 
represented as an absolute priority for American and world security, while Somalia is 
often described as merely a humanitarian mission gone wrong. The fact that Somalia's 
humanitarian situation had also once been deemed a 'threat' to global security by 
6 The cost of the Iraq war is estimated to be about $400 billion thus far, mostly financed through borrowing, 
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle-east/jan-june07/warcost 05-23.html. Troop deaths are estimated at 
3658 and injured at 25,950, www.globalsecurity.org/militazy/ops/iraq casualties.htm (accessed July 16, 
2007). 
would-be 'global north' interveners was long forgotten, belonging to a pre-9/11 time 
when 'threats' were conceived differently. 
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As has been observed by many commentators, 'the war on terror' discourse is 
highly dependent on problematic binary representations of 'us/them' and 
'terrorists/civilization' which are similar to those which haunt media and government 
representations of the Somalia intervention. Indeed, many of the roots of 'terror' 
discourses may be seen in the predictions of violent culture-based clashes described by 
Samuel Huntington in the early 1990s. In addition to supporting binary divides based 
on cultural criteria, Susan Moeller suggests that the "war on terror" discourse has also 
restricted other areas of discussion, such as American citizens' and journalists' 
willingness to criticize their government for failings and hypocrisies regarding human 
rights issues. Interestingly, she sees 'human rights' discourses as being at their greatest 
strength, at least rhetorically, during the post-Cold War 1990s, at the time of the 
Somalia intervention.7 Research in this work would suggest that even during its 
'heyday' period in the 1990s, discourses founded on concern for others across national 
boundaries were heavily circumscribed by fatalistic conceptualizations of geopolitics 
and discourses based on the primacy of the nation-state. 
There are important explanatory absences in these discourses for anyone willing 
to push the Brookings expert's term "strategic" beyond its use in 'war on terror' 
representations. In particular, economic reasons for American involvement in Iraq, 
including its businesses' and its public's high demand for oil, were not mentioned in 
analysed coverage of the events in Fallujah, and seem to be very rarely discussed in 
more general Iraq coverage. Such economic considerations do not fit within the 
cultural and security rhetoric of the 'war on terror' discourse. As Lisle and Pepper 
suggest in their work on Black Hawk Dawn, such "deterritorialized, mobile and 
circulating relationships" require not only analyses of modes of representation, through 
study of the content of media discourses, but also modes of production, that is, the 
7 Susan Moeller," A Moral Imagination: The Media's Response to the War on Terrorism", in Reporting War: 
Journalism in Wartime, eds. Stuart Allen & Barbie Zelizer, 73 (London: Routledge, 2004). 
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operation of conceptual and material constraints on what and how images and 
narratives are circulated, as well as to who and when. While the next section will 
briefly consider the content of both sets of images, those of Mogadishu and those of 
Fallujah, rationales for the production of the particular narratives used will be linked in 
following sections to flows of power and influence in a global media sphere. 
Imaging 'Others' in Mogadishu & Fallujah 
Much academic research, including that of Derek Gregory, James Ryan, Robert 
Young and others discussed throughout this work, has explored the ways in which 
'other' cultures have been represented by 'the West', dating back to early colonial 
encounters. Most have described the dangers and inevitable omissions when conflicts 
are overwhelmingly presented as struggles between 'barbaric' or 'primitive' cultures 
and 'civilized' ones. Gregory details three strategic methods of 'othering': "opposing", 
"locating" and "casting out"; these three categories are in evidence in both the Somalia 
and Fallujah cases.8 The "opposing" relationship has been well-detailed above, 
referring to the limited, culture-based, binary categories into which 'clashes' between 
various groups have been placed. 'The war on terror' discourse represents one 
important strategy which results in the 'othering' 'of those deemed to be 'terrorists' and 
'barbarians'. 
Initially, however, according to Gregory, 'others' are reduced to objects, usually 
in a primarily visual and technical sphere. In Fallujah, this is occurrence is particularly 
obvious. Military technology, along with visual strategies used by both the military 
and the media, represented the space of Fallujah as one largely devoid of community, 
networks of services and people. It was instead viewed, usually at a distance but 
sometimes close-up, as an abandoned space, a 'backdrop' against which the battles 
between American troops and 'insurgents' took place. The effects of these battles on 
Fallujan residents, or even the suggestion that Fallujan citizens existed in the city to be 
injured/killed during the times of siege, were often downplayed or went unrecognized. 
8 See Gregory, The Colonial Present, 248-249. 
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In the case of Somalia, consistent representation of the country as a space of war, 
famine and violence rendered it an unimaginable 'hell' to Westerners, illustrated 
primarily through close-ups of emaciated women and children contrasted with images 
of armed men. The ruined city of Mogadishu only began to be pictured on a regular 
basis after the US/UN hunt for General Aidid began. Because nightly 'surgical' air 
strikes to 'take out' Aidid, along with their aftermath, often could not be represented by 
the media because of security issues, the extent of the destruction of these attacks was 
largely unseen by Westerners. The devaluation of the city, through long-standing 
background descriptions of it as an already-destroyed place of' others' who appeared 
destined to self-destruct in warfare, was thus a difficult discourse for the media to 
challenge, even when efforts were made to do so. Portraits of successful rebuilding and 
peace in rural Somali areas were also only rarely seen. 
Gregory's final category of "casting out" deals with strategies by which 
particular peoples' lives are deemed not to matter. In many ways, as Gregory suggests, 
this is achieved through the labelling of 'our' armed opponents as 'insurgents', 
'terrorists', 'warlords' or 'gangs'. They are people whose cause is not 'just', individuals 
who in political and legal terms are often not recognized and therefore in any way 
protected by the codes of conduct which apply to 'us', such as the Geneva Conventions. 
In the case of Fallujah, the category of 'civilian', while supposedly protected within the 
American 'surgical~ attack military discourses, was often said to be empty. No 
'civilians', or minimal civilians, were recognized as residing in Fallujah during the 
times of siege. Thus there was no one to protect; all those remaining, who were classed 
as 'insurgents', were fair game for destruction. In Somalia, the 'innocent' and the 'evil-
doers' were also highly polarized discursive groups whose boundaries often could not 
be maintained on the ground, especially during 'precision' air-strikes. The failure of 
these binary categories to represent the complex, messy realities of specific situations is 
occasionally recognized in media coverage, sometimes by members of American forces 
who fought in Mogadishu and Fallujah. These accounts, however, remain the 
exception, rather than standard, in analysed media coverage of both these conflicts. 
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Television coverage offers many opportunities to highlight the use of Gregory's 
categories immediately following the 2004 contractor attack, particularly in the visual 
realm. Fallujah, like Mogadishu, is portrayed as a dangerous, violent place. As 
mentioned above, images of men and boys cheering and participating in the 
desecration of the dead contractors in Fallujah are highly reminiscent of Somali citizens 
dragging dead American troops after the 'Black Hawk down' events. The only 
significant factors of difference are the burned state of the corpses in Fallujah, which 
rendered the bodies unrecognizable as specific individuals, and the presence of women 
in the Somali case; none are visible in the Fallujah footage. Several analysed media 
items featured a selective reading of the activities of contractors in Iraq, in much the 
same way that the role of American troops in Somalia was obfuscated following 'Black 
Hawk down'. The violence and dangers for civilians that were created by military 
invasion in the case of Iraq and, in Somalia's case, by the activities of elite US troops, 
did not tend to be a central theme of stories in Western media coverage. The activities 
of foreign troops were therefore not regularly seen as motivation for the violence 
against these groups carried out by civilians and insurgents. Rather, American 
contractors and troops were portrayed as benevolent forces helping to rebuild the 
'damaged' spaces of Somalia and Iraq. This presentation of events was used by 
President Clinton after the 'Black Hawk down' incidents and was echoed by General 
Kirnmitt and Dan Senor after the contractor killings. In both cases, some Western 
media supported this discourse with quotes from 'confused' troops who were unable to 
understand the violence being inflicted on them. 
Because American involvement in both Somalia and Iraq was justified either 
fully or at least partially as humanitarian, US government representatives in both cases 
attempted to differentiate between hostile elements of the population, 'insurgent' forces 
and 'gangs', and the majority of peaceful citizens, who were often assumed to support 
the methods and actions of US forces. In both instances, these distinctions failed to 
hold, with the majority of the populations in Mogadishu and Fallujah expressing anger 
and frustration over American actions and suffering the effects of their military 
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presence. American troops, however, often functioned as if such differentiation could 
be clearly maintained, or at least that their desire to distinguish was effort enough. The 
media correspondingly detailed their strategies rather than routinely challenging 
overall approaches, for example the morality or efficacy of attacking Mogadishu and 
Fallujah.9 
The choice of insurgents to conduct attacks against American forces in urban, 
heavily-populated areas in both Iraq and Somalia did pose the problem of people who 
were not armed and fighting being caught in the crossfire between those who were. It 
is worth noting, however, that this was not solely a choice on the part of the insurgent 
forces, as was often suggested in media quotes from US troops and commanders. 
American forces chose to respond to insurgent attacks and to actively conduct offensive 
maneuvers in ways which also put civilian populations at risk. This 'choice' is rarely 
presented as such for American forces, which instead are portrayed as having few 
options in their possible responses to the 'extremist' groups. It is often implicit in many 
media narratives that morality and 'honour' in battle reside solely with the American 
troops. In both case studies, Somali and Iraqi challengers to the American presence in 
their countries are portrayed as having no concern for civilian life; instead, they are 
presented as corning from fiercely vengeful cultures, based in age-old local custom and 
the Islamic faith. 
As has been suggested throughout this chapter, what these binary discourses 
omit is extremely important. Among what is often not acknowledged are the flows and 
interconnections which have existed and continue to exist between 'our' world and 
9 Both an approach to combat and a condition of the fighting in Mogadishu were repeated in Fallujah- the 
use of 'wanted' posters with monetary rewards to encourage civilians to tum in top insurgents to 
American forces and publicized fears that insurgents would use civilians as 'human shields' when doing 
battle with US troops. The fact that the 'wanted' posters had prompted public ridicule and anger in 
Mogadishu, and had only added questionable amounts to US intelligence in the city, did not appear to 
have discouraged their use later in Fallujah. In the case of Fallujah, media mention of this particular 
strategy was very brief. More emphasis was placed on the 'playing card' approach of placing the images 
and names of Iraq's most wanted figures on decks of playing card-size paper. There is some indication, 
however, that 'wild-West' attempts at arresting various 'wanted' people in Fallujah met with similar public 
distaste in this city as in Mogadishu, despite media description of this tactic as a "hearts and minds" 
strategy to distinguish Fallujan offenders from "law-abiding" residents. See Eric Schmitt, "Marines Battle 
Guerrillas in Streets of Falluja", The New York Times, April9, 2004. 
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'their' 'danger zones'. As Gregory and Lisle and Pepper suggest10, these flows, often of 
global capitalism, are in some senses de-territorializing; they function to break down 
the barriers between 'us' and 'them' which other colonising discourses seek to install. 
The rich mix of political, economic, military and social interactions between America 
and Somalia and America and Iraq thus cannot, and should not, be ignored or erased. 
Some Somali gunmen likely attacked American 'invaders' using US weaponry, 
dictators in both countries were tolerated for oil and security privileges, Fallujan 
insurgents used new communications technology to organize and promote themselves, 
Aidid's son undertook his military training in the US and later led his father's 
supporters in attacking UN troops. All these points and many more indicate the 
possibility of blurring the boundaries between 'us' and 'them', of learning and 
exchange. The media, governments, publics and various international organisations all 
exist within this world of barriers and flows. 
Circulating Power: Changing Communication Networks Between 1993 & 2004 & 
Enduring Media Content Themes 
Several aspects of Western media representation of the 'Black Hawk down' 
events and the 2004 Fallujah contractor killings have been shown to be similar. Was 
there reason to expect or hope for changes in the presentation of 'others' in the 
intervening time between Western, particularly American, involvement in Somalia in 
1992-1993 and in Iraq ten years later? Findings from this project suggest that while the 
communications and entertainment economies in which the media, governments, 
international organisations and audiences operate have changed significantly, much of 
the style of mainstream media content has remained the same. In terms of structural 
barriers to journalists covering a broad range of issues in each situation, the embed 
system created for the Iraq war limited options from the beginning. Those who did not 
participate in this system received unequal access to Western personnel and plans and 
had to work in an environment made extremely dangerous by both Iraqi insurgent 
10 See Gregory's The Colonial Present and Lisle & Pepper's "The New Face of Global Hollywood". 
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forces and American military actions. Those who took part in the embed system, while 
given much access to US troops, often found it impossible to leave their military units, 
thus reducing their range of coverage, or found that their reporting came under 
significant restrictions, especially during action phases for their units. 
Journalistic and academic debate about the embedding system has been a 
significant feature of the 2003 invasion. Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer argue that 
coverage of the Iraq war, like many wars before it, forced journalists to confront a 
difficult balancing act between patriotism and militarism. Allan and Zelizer' s research 
suggests that television news remained the most trusted source for the American public 
during the Iraq war, with twenty-four hour news networks seeing marked increases in 
their ratings. The unabashed patriotic reporting of Fox News was very popular, 
suggesting, according to Jim Rutenberg of The New York Times, that "there were 
significant ratings to be gained in 'opinionated news with an America-first flair."' 11 
Although the main terrestrial networks, ABC, NBC and CBS, maintained higher 
audience numbers overall, the rapid growth of channels such as Fox has worried 
journalists who still see merit in traditional journalistic values of scepticism towards 
government, objectivity in reporting and representation of dissenting views. Allan and 
Zelizer quote CNN's Christiane Amanpour reflecting on these concerns: '"I think the 
press was muzzled and I think the press self-muzzled. I'm sorry to say but certainly 
television and, perhaps, to a certain extent, my station [CNN] was intimidated by the 
administration and its foot soldiers at Fox News."' When asked whether there were 
any stories she felt she could not cover, Amanpour answered, '"it's not a question of 
couldn't do it, it's a question of tone."'12 The polarized, and censoring, atmosphere in 
which Amanpour made these comments becomes clear when Allan and Zelizer report 
that a Fox News representative later likened Amanpour to a "spokeswoman for al-
Qaeda". 
11 The above information, including the Ruten~erg quote, can be found in Stuart Allan & Barbie Zelizer, 
"Rules of Engagement: Journalism and War", in Reporting War: Joumalism in Wartime, eds. Stuart Allan & 
Barbie Zelizer, 7 (London: Routledge, 2004). 
12 Amanpour quoted in Allan & Zelizer, "Rules of Engagement", 8-9. 
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Across the Atlantic, British concern over the direction American journalism is 
taking has also been apparent. The BBC' s Director General Greg Dyke voiced his 
concerns regarding the unquestioned support of some American networks for the 
policies of the Bush administration. Interestingly, Dyke suggested that the reason for 
this increased 'rallying around the flag' was the decline of the larger, dominant 
networks of ABC, CBS and NBC; "As a result many of the large television news 
organisations in the States are no longer profitable or confident of their future. The 
effect of this fragmentation is to make government, the White House, and the Pentagon, 
all-powerful with no news organisation strong enough or brave enough to stand up 
against it."13 Dyke's concern appears directly opposed to that of many commentators, 
such as those who follow Chomsky and Herman in viewing increasing consolidation of 
media-entertainment companies during the post-Somalia 1990s as leading to a 
decreasing variety of news sources.14 Many who are worried about consolidation look 
to the rapidly-expanding Internet to provide new, varied and non-commercial sources 
of information. Both predictions are worth investigating in greater depth, in terms of 
better understanding the mechanisms which shape mass media markets and through 
analysis of the outputs of old and new media types to determine whether 
diversification or constriction of coverage areas and topics is taking place. 
In contrast to the flurry of discussion surrounding Iraq, the media economy in 
which the Somalia intervention coverage occurred has triggered very little debate. 
Although the growth of CNN, evident during the 1991 Gulf War, had been significant, 
it is worth noting that events in Somalia occurred during a period when television 
networks were facing less competition and before widespread use of the Internet. 
Although journalists covering the Somalia intervention faced considerable dangers, the 
structural conditions of Somalia and Iraq were different; this is unsurprising given their 
historical separation and the very different conceptual positioning of each event. In 
13 Greg Dyke's speech to the University of London Goldsmiths Journalism Symposium, April24, 2003, 
http:Uwww.bbc.co.uk/print/pressoffice/speeches/stories/dyke journalism.shtml (accessed July 17, 2007). 
14 See, for example, the work of Daya Kishan Thussu, International Communication: Continuity & Change 
(London: Arnold Publishers, 2000) and Susan Carruthers, The Media At War: Communication & Conflict in the 
201h Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 
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Somalia, journalists' movements were also curtailed by violence which carne from both 
the Somali and the American sides. According to journalists who covered the conflict, 
however, such as Paul Lowe, the media were able to be highly mobile during the early 
and middle stages of the Somalia intervention. Many had arrived in Somalia prior to 
the American intervention and therefore, as Lowe explains, the US military did not 
have the same ability as in Iraq to set the conditions for journalism on the ground.15 
Danger primarily arose after the American hunt for Aidid began, when civilian deaths 
due to American bombing in Mogadishu turned many Somali civilians against their 
Western interveners. Jennifer Woofter's work on the subject suggests that, had it not 
been for this increasing danger, reporting of the intervention would have been viewed 
by media personnel as relatively straightforward, with good ease of access to most 
involved parties.t6 
Although different structural factors affected media coverage of both events, 
this work argues that the content of coverage of the Somalia intervention and Fallujah 
shares many limitations in the broad discursive strategies used to narrate and image 
each event. In both cases, there was a strong focus on 'official' Western views of the 
conflicts, presented through regular media briefings with policymakers and their public 
relations personnel. Even in more traditionally liberal media, scepticism about 
statements emanating from government bodies often did not extend to challenging the 
ways in which issues and events pertaining to each situation were prioritized. Susan 
Moeller phrases this problem well in relation to the Iraq war: 
In effect the media continued to confirm the Bush administration's 
political and diplomatic agenda-setting. Through overly stenographic 
reporting on the president, the media amplified the administration's 
voice- so when Bush said to the country that Americans were 
vulnerable to WMD in the hands of terrorists, the media effectively 
15 Author's interview with Paul Lowe, November 2005. 
16 Jennifer Kay Woofter, "OPSEC v. RTK: Media Restrictions in United Nations Peacekeeping", 
scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-11272000-114350/, 81-85 (accessed July 17, 2007). 
magnified those fears, even while they challenged the prior assumption 
that Iraq had been an 'imminent threat'P 
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Returning to the theoretical work of Chapter One, combined with the empirical 
findings of Chapters Four, Five and Six, it is possible to link understandings of Somalia 
and Fallujah, and of Somalis and Fallujans, to older, powerful discourses of colonialism, 
and beyond this point to ethical considerations of the politics of identity creation. Both 
Somalia and Iraq, and their peoples, have consistently been classed as 'different' from 
the 'Western world', which has positioned itself as an entity with the right, or even the 
duty, to define and intervene in 'them', both discursively and materially. Resistance to 
such classifications and actions is sometimes recognized, and often crushed, but rarely, 
as Baudrillard suggests, is an 'exchange' between an 'us' and 'them' allowed or 
acknowledged to occur. In Spivak's language, indebted to that of Levinas and Derrida, 
the 'other' or 'subaltern' is often not allowed to speak. Western mainstream media 
coverage tends to be about 'us': 'our' troops, 'our' leaders, 'our' civilians, 'our' story; the 
often-enforced silence of 'others', however, can and should be made visible and 
relevant. This silencing also has important ethical ramifications for 'our' frequent 
failure to acknowledge injury to 'others' or even to recognize the existence and rights of 
'others'. It results in a 'West' which looks at the world through a one-way mirror18, and 
is constantly surprised when the 'other' speaks or acts 'back' in unpredicted ways, 
proving that it too can be a 'self', capable of watching 'theWest'. 
A diverse range of commentators, from Gregory to Baudrillard to anti-colonial 
writers such as Frantz Fanon, point out that the damage of this hegemon/subordinate 
relationship does not merely run in one direction. In a world where the chasms and 
divisions between 'friends' and 'enemies' can produce significant discursive and 
material effects, and where such divisions can change, shift and have similar affects at 
more local levels; we are all always at risk of becoming 'others'.19 Gregory quotes 
17 Moeller, "A Moral Imagination: The Media's Response To The War On Terrorism", 71. 
18 Metaphor taken from Gregory, The Colonial Present, 21. 
19 As an example, David Campbell's work, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992) details the discursive and material histories and 
Samuel Huntington at the beginning of The Clash of Civilizations in order to highlight 
Huntington's basis of identity politics: "There can be no true friends without true 
enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are."20 This 
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statement bases relationships with 'others' in a fundamentally negative way and, as 
Gregory points out, is presented as a 'truth', rather than as a constructed state of affairs. 
It denies the hope of 'our' being able to hear, see and exchange with 'others' in 'their' 
terms, or in shared terms, a possibility which is at the heart of Derrida and Levinas' 
deconstructive ethics and which, as a strategy of approach, could allow particular 
power/knowledge accumulations, in Foucault's theoretical terms, to be challenged from 
within. 
With specific reference to media coverage, there is little question that stories 
which encourage the possibility of exchange would necessarily also involve a 
rethinking of the imagery and narrative styles used in much current Western 
mainstream coverage. As but one brief example, this might involve a decreased use of 
'voiceover', the presentation of images by a usually 'outside' narrator, and an increased 
effort to listen to, and to actually include, the voices of 'others' in media reports. In a 
world where segments of the mass media accept uncritically the statements of 
government leaders and policymakers, it will be necessary to seek out a variety of 
critical news sources. Although some commentators have expressed hope and faith 
that many of these new sources will be Internet-based, other scholars and media 
personnel, such as Piers Robinson and Greg Dyke, have argued that a proliferation of 
new Internet media will not necessarily equal a greater diversity of viewpoints or more 
critical ones.21 
effects of inside/outside binaries, illustrating how international exclusionary actions built around 'America' 
vs. 'other' concepts often also create domestic' others' in 'America' who must be contained and policed. 
Gregory makes this point in The Colonial Present with reference to the US Patriot Act and other domestic 
security measures on American soil, which have placed certain groups, affiliated with external 'others', 
under increased scrutiny. Examples would include segments of the American Muslim population. 
20 This is Gregory quoting Samuel Huntington in The Clash ofCivilizatiorts, where Huntington is quoting 
from novelist Michael Dibdin's work, Dead Lagoon. Gregory, The Colonial Present, 260. 
21 See Piers Robinson, "Researching US Media-State Relations and Twenty-First Century Wars", in 
Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime, eds. Stuart Allan & Barbie Zelizer, 100-102 (London: Routledge, 2004). 
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To return to the question asked at the beginning of this section, the shift in 
circulations of power and media economies from Somalia to Fallujah is perhaps 
describable as an intensification in many directions, rather than a 'change'. New 
communications technologies are being embraced by the media, governments, 
international organisations and public audiences. In the sphere of media-military 
interactions, military groups have embraced various communications strategies in an 
attempt to better assert their own agendas in a world of expanding media reach and 
diversifying media formats. In tum, various media organisations, and private 
individuals, have responded by using new technological forums for spreading their 
own ideas, for example, in the case of the current Iraq conflict, Internet blogging. 
Further study to better understand the dynamics of these interactions will be important. 
I feel, particularly, that academic study of and engagement with audiences will be 
crucial for interpreting how different groups are selecting media sources, interpreting 
media narratives and images, and, in some cases, creating their own media sites of 
news and information. 
Contributions to Knowledge & Recommendations for Further Research 
This project has been based upon the assumption that mass media images and 
narratives have an important role to play in the workings of international and domestic 
politics. It suggests that technological developments, particularly in the late nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, have enabled a rapidly-growing 'economy' of images and 
means of communicating information; these new commodities are circulated in an 
international sphere defined by shifting and unequal power relations. Images should 
thus be understood through their various functions as creations, exchange objects and 
interpretative objects within human social systems, rather than as artifacts somehow 
Greg Dyke makes this point in his speech to Goldsmiths Journalism Symposium, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/print/pressoffice/speeches/stories/dyke_joumalism.shtml 
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separate from these systemsP This particular worldview owes much to the theoretical 
work of Foucault, whose contributions to understanding the history of knowledge 
creation and use by social institutions has been critical for re-thinking colonial and 
postcolonial practices of identity creation in particular. The role of images in this 
history has been well-documented23, but this project brings these analytical efforts into 
modern, and very recent, times, when image-creation has been rendered faster, easier 
and more accessible to many groups. 
The study of modern media and visual economies at their intersections with 
geopolitics requires, as political geographer David Campbell suggests, a significant 
amount of further development.24 The importance of theorizing "what images do in 
circulation rather than just an interpretation of their iconography"25 is acknowledged by 
this project, both in what is drawn out of its theoretical influences but also in its 
empirical analysis of the Somalia and Fallujah case studies. The influence and 'power' 
of images and narratives, at various points and for various actors in each event, has 
been regularly assumed. In making these assumptions throughout this work, I have 
become strongly aware of the need for further theoretical and empirical study to 
explore how news images and narratives in particular might produce or encourage 
certain actions, emotions and ways of understanding. I feel that this effort will 
continue to require a strong focus on the study of discourses and texts that accompany 
images, supporting the ideas of those such as Susan Sontag and Gillian Rose that visual 
media is always mixed media. Social and historical'settings', along with actual 
surrounding information, are therefore crucial parts of image analysis. Understanding 
the active, performative aspects of visual media will need to involve engagement with 
audiences, media personnel, policymakers and representatives of the NGO and 
international organization sectors, as was suggested at the end of the previous section. 
22 For more on the idea of 'visual economy', see Deborah Poole, Vision, Race and Modernity: A Visual 
Economy of the Andean Image World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
23 See, for example, the work of James Ryan, Victor Burgin, and John Tagg. 
24 I am drawing heavily here on material from David Campbell's work, "Geopolitics and Visuality: Sighting 
the Darfur Conflict", Political Geography 26, no. 4 (2007): 360-361. 
25 Campbell, "Geopolitics and Visuality", 361. 
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While these groups should not be interpreted too rigidly, as single individuals might fit 
into more than one, nonetheless such work will likely yield important new insights. 
Much of media and communications research to date has focused specifically on levels 
of influence and interaction between media personnel and governmental policymakers 
and this focus should be extended to explore the creative, circulatory and interpretive 
work of other groups. 
The contributions of this project become clearer when focus is put on its 
empirical contributions. The case study of the Somalia intervention provides a more in-
depth analysis of this event's Western media coverage than has been undertaken in 
previous academic research, such as that done by Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, 
Jonathan Mermin and Piers Robinson. Specifically, it asks questions about the content 
of media coverage and what affects this content may have, rather than focusing 
primarily on coverage volume as predictive of specific actions. Although academic 
research on the content and style of Fallujah, and generally Iraq's, media coverage has 
been conducted by other authors, such as Stephen Graham and Derek Gregory, this 
project's focus particularly on newspaper and selected television coverage had not yet 
been undertaken. With the example of Daniel Hallin's analysis of Vietnam War 
coverage in mind, this work's aim was to study media coverage of a particular event in 
depth and over a significant duration of time. Because of the expense of acquiring a 
large volume of television coverage, sustained studies of visual media are often difficult 
to undertake. The work of Hallin in America and that of the Glasgow Media Group in 
Britain26 stand out as examples of efforts to analyse television coverage with greater 
rigour than this work was able to achieve, largely for financial reasons. Nonetheless, it 
has been able to contribute a level of depth, particularly in analysis of Somalia 
intervention newspaper coverage, which is valuable for recognizing both the strength 
and fragility of various styles of imagery and narratives over time. 
26 See, as examples, John Eldridge ed., Getting the Message: News, Truth & Power (London: Routledge, 1993) 
and John Eldridge ed., Glasgow Media Group Reader Volume 1 (London: Routledge, 1995). 
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Theoretically and methodologically, I am uncomfortable with research which 
attempts to make broad claims or generalisations across social phenomena and 
throughout history. Following in a strong, multidisciplinary tradition of detailed case 
study work, but particularly influenced by the work of Foucault in that regard, the aim 
of this work has been to undertake a close analysis of a particular event, the Somalia 
intervention. A less detailed case study, Fallujah, has been used for comparison and to 
provide current relevance to this event of over fourteen years ago. It is my hope that 
sustained case study research of other portions of the 2003 Iraq war's media coverage, 
among many other important world events, will be undertaken in the future. Study of 
past events with apparent lasting relevance to political discourses surrounding 
international intervention, such as the Rwandan genocide, the Bosnian conflict and the 
Kosovo crisis would also be a useful extension of the research that has been undertaken 
here. Although the technological capabilities available to various groups and political 
context are different in each case, the content of coverage for each may well illustrate 
similarities across time and space. 
The primary aim of this project was to highlight and problematize the powerful 
dichotomizations made between a primarily Western 'us' and 'others', which are 
evident across a wide range of media coverage, in order to hint at the failings and 
consequences of such attempts at division. This aspect of the research undertaken by 
this project owes much to the theoretical approach of Derrida and Levinas, touching 
upon ethical issues for visual studies of the geopolitical, the importance of which 
Campbell, for one, stresses. To paraphrase Campbell, the ways in which images 
establish either distancing or proximate relations with 'others', and how they help to 
create and define 'others', will likely continue to be a major issue for studies of media 
and geopolitics.27 My future research efforts will involve a continuing investigation of 
the ways in which visual and discursive economies encourage and enable particular 
flows of knowledge and understanding while obfuscating and denying others. Tracing 
the appearances, disappearances and fetishizing of particular images and discourses 
27 Campbell, "Geopolitics and Visuality", 361. 
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could provide ways of tracking and exposing the workings of power/knowledge in 
global societies. It could also assist in the development of ethical strategies and projects 
which aim to challenge and contest violence and oppression in their many forms. 
Susan Carruthers states these aims particularly clearly with relation to areas of' Africa': 
"more must be done to place 'the West' and' Africa' in the same analytic 
frame ... Exploring this obfuscated mutuality may help us better understand both the 
character of the West- particularly its self-proclaimed 'humanitarian interventions'- and 
the global underpinnings of ruptured social relations in Africa."28 
28 Susan Carruthers, "Tribalism and Tribulation: Media Constructions of' African Savagery' and 'Western 
Humanitarianism' in the 1990s", in Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime, eds. Stuart Allan and Barbie 
Zelizer, 157 (London: Routledge, 2004). 
Appendix One - List of Media Items Surveyed 
Somalia Coverage 
Newspapers 
The New York Times 
1992 - 275 articles 
1993 - 354 articles 
The Times 
1992- 201 articles 
1993-214 articles 
Television 
ABC coverage (nightly primetime news items unless noted as Nightline) 
November 30, 1992 Nightline (carries over to December 1) 
December 4, 1992 (Bush's speech on sending troops with Special Report by Peter 
Jennings) 
December 7, 1992 
December 8, 1992 Nightline in Somalia 
December 11, 1992 Nightline Road to Baidoa 
January 27, 1993 Nightline Homecoming- An End in Sight? 
June 12, 1993 
June 14, 1993 
June 17, 1993 
June 21, 1993 
October 4, 1993 
October 5, 1993 Nightline 
October 7, 1993 
October 8, 1993 
October 10, 1993 
October 14, 1993 
October 25, 1993 
BBC coverage (nightly 9 o'clock news) 
December 4, 1992 
December 6, 1992 
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December 7, 1992 
December 8, 1992 
December 9, 1992 
December 11, 1992 
June 6, 1993 
June 7,1993 
June 8,1993 
June 11, 1993 
June 12, 1993 
June 13, 1993 
August 30, 1993 
September 6, 1993 
October 5, 1993 
October 6, 1993 
October 7, 1993 
October 10, 1993 
October 14, 1993 




March 2004-17 articles 
April2004- 37 articles 
May 2004 - 13 articles 
October 15 - November 15, 2004 - 20 articles 
UK newspapers 
March 2004 - 4 articles 
April2004- 92 articles 
May 2004 - 32 articles 
October 15 -November, 2004 - 27 articles 
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Television 
CNN coverage (from nightly newscasts unless indicated as special programming) 





April 6, 2004 
April14, 2004 
April19, 2004 




April 28, 2004 
April 30, 2004 
June 26, 2004 
June 30, 2004 
July 5, 2004 
July 8, 2004 
September17,2004 
October 1, 2004 
October 11, 2004 
October 31, 2004 
November 5, 2004 
November 6, 2004 
November 8, 2004 




November 18, 2004 
November 26, 2004 
Iraq! Attacks/Fallujah, Habbaniyah 
Iraq! Attacks/Fallujah, Baghdad 
Images of War/History /Turnley & Burns interview- CNN 
Newsnight 
Iraq! Attacks/Fallujah 
Iraq! Attacks/Fallujah/82nd Airborne 
Iraq/ Attacks/Ramadi/Nordland Interview 
Iraq/Uprising/Hostages/Fallujah/Troops ... 
Iraq/Fallujah/An Insider's View/Aerial Vehicles 
Iraq!Insurgency/Fallujah/Cost of War 
Iraq/Fallujah 
Iraq/Fallujah/Najaf 
Iraq/Drafting History 1J ournalists/ A Discussion 
Iraq!Fallujah/Najaf/Shadid Interview 
Iraq/Fallujah/Najaf/'Nightline' Story 
Iraq/Reporter's Notebook/Ware Interview 
Iraq/Fallujah/Rosen Interview 




Iraq/Fallujah/Air Strike/Cockpit Video 
Iraq/Fallujah 
Iraq!Fallujah Offensive/ Allam Interview 
Iraq!Fallujah Offensive/Murray Interview 
Iraq!Fallujah Offensive/ Anderson Interview 
Iraq!Fallujah Assault/ Anderson Interview 






Appendix Two- References for Somalia & Fallujah 
Images from Internet Sources 
Somalia 
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Image 9- 'Famine' mother and child in Somalia, photographer - Scott Peterson, source 
- Edina Education Image Gallery, http://edina.ac.uk/eig/ 
Image 10- Body and clothing in Somalia, photographer- Scott Peterson, source -
Edina Education Image Gallery, http:ljedina.ac.uk/eig/ 
Image 15(i) - Demonstrators in Mogadishu, photographer - Scott Peterson, source -
Edina Education Image Gallery, http:ljedina.ac.uk/eig/ 
Fallujah 
Figure 6- The New York Times, April1, 2004 
Figure 7- The New York Post, April1, 2004 
Figure 8 - The Guardian, April1, 2004 
Figure 9- The New York Sun, April1, 2004 
Figure 10- The Los Angeles Times, April1, 2004 
All of the above newspaper front pages were sourced from the Newseum website 
archive, 
http://www.newseum.org/todaysfrontpages/default archive.asp?fpArchive=040104 
(accessed July 9, 2007). 
Image 20- Fallujah bombed from the air, Global Security.org, Public Eye, Source-
Digital Globe, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/fallujah-imagery.htm 
(accessed July 9, 2007). 
Image 21- Boy crying near rubble, an AFP image, used on The Age website, 
www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/09/09/1094530764694.html (accessed July 9, 2007). 
Image 22- US Soldiers from the 1st Cavalry Division prepare to enter and clear a 
building during fighting in Fallujah, Iraq. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class 
Johancharles Van Boers, dated November 12, 2004, 
http://www4.army.mil/armyimages/armyirnage.php?photo=3952 (accessed July 8, 
2007). 
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Image 23- An M-109A6 howitzer from Alpha Battery, 3rd Battalion, 83rd Field 
Artillery, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, sends a round down range 
during combat operations in Fallujah, Iraq. US Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class 
Johancharles Van Boers, dated November 6, 2004, 
http:Uwww4.army.mil/armyimages/armyimage.php?photo=3922 (accessed July 8, 
2007). 
Image 24- A dead US soldier in Fallujah. Pictured in the German magazine, Stern 49, 
November 25, 2004, www.karlofgermany.com/sample2.htm (accessed July 9, 2007). 
Image 25- Doctors in Fallujah General Hospital are tied up by US troops, November 8, 
2004. This photo was said to have appeared in The New York Times, 
http://www.internationalist.org/fallujarape0412.html (accessed July 9, 2007). 
Image 26- Dead child in Fallujah, shown on al-Jazeera, November 15,2004, 
www.bu.edu/globalbeat/indexl11504.html (accessed July 8, 2007). 
Image 27- Image captioned "Fallujah fighters awaiting looming U5-Iraqi offensive" 
dated July 10, 2004, http:ijwww.middle-east-online.com/englishl?id=11503 (accessed 
October 4, 2007). 
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